Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 440.15 (2025)

Compensation for disability.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session
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440.15 Compensation for disability.Compensation for disability shall be paid to the employee, subject to the limits provided in s. 440.12(2), as follows:
(1) PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY.
(a) In case of total disability adjudged to be permanent, 662/3 or 66.67 percent of the average weekly wages shall be paid to the employee during the continuance of such total disability. No compensation shall be payable under this section if the employee is engaged in, or is physically capable of engaging in, at least sedentary employment.
(b) In the following cases, an injured employee is presumed to be permanently and totally disabled unless the employer or carrier establishes that the employee is physically capable of engaging in at least sedentary employment within a 50-mile radius of the employee’s residence:
1. Spinal cord injury involving severe paralysis of an arm, a leg, or the trunk;
2. Amputation of an arm, a hand, a foot, or a leg involving the effective loss of use of that appendage;
3. Severe brain or closed-head injury as evidenced by:
a. Severe sensory or motor disturbances;
b. Severe communication disturbances;
c. Severe complex integrated disturbances of cerebral function;
d. Severe episodic neurological disorders; or
e. Other severe brain and closed-head injury conditions at least as severe in nature as any condition provided in sub-subparagraphs a.-d.;
4. Second-degree or third-degree burns of 25 percent or more of the total body surface or third-degree burns of 5 percent or more to the face and hands; or
5. Total or industrial blindness.

In all other cases, in order to obtain permanent total disability benefits, the employee must establish that he or she is not able to engage in at least sedentary employment, within a 50-mile radius of the employee’s residence, due to his or her physical limitation. Entitlement to such benefits shall cease when the employee reaches age 75, unless the employee is not eligible for social security benefits under 42 U.S.C. s. 402 or s. 423 because the employee’s compensable injury has prevented the employee from working sufficient quarters to be eligible for such benefits, notwithstanding any age limits. If the accident occurred on or after the employee reaches age 70, benefits shall be payable during the continuance of permanent total disability, not to exceed 5 years following the determination of permanent total disability. Only claimants with catastrophic injuries or claimants who are incapable of engaging in employment, as described in this paragraph, are eligible for permanent total benefits. In no other case may permanent total disability be awarded.

(c) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from injuries that occurred prior to July 1, 1955, such payments shall not be made in excess of 700 weeks.
(d) If an employee who is being paid compensation for permanent total disability becomes rehabilitated to the extent that she or he establishes an earning capacity, the employee shall be paid, instead of the compensation provided in paragraph (a), benefits pursuant to subsection (3). The department shall adopt rules to enable a permanently and totally disabled employee who may have reestablished an earning capacity to undertake a trial period of reemployment without prejudicing her or his return to permanent total status in the case that such employee is unable to sustain an earning capacity.
(e)1. The employer’s or carrier’s right to conduct vocational evaluations or testing by the employer’s or carrier’s chosen rehabilitation advisor or provider continues even after the employee has been accepted or adjudicated as entitled to compensation under this chapter and costs for such evaluations and testing shall be borne by the employer or carrier, respectively. This right includes, but is not limited to, instances in which such evaluations or tests are recommended by a treating physician or independent medical-examination physician, instances warranted by a change in the employee’s medical condition, or instances in which the employee appears to be making appropriate progress in recuperation. This right may not be exercised more than once every calendar year.
2. The carrier must confirm the scheduling of the vocational evaluation or testing in writing, and must notify the employee and the employee’s counsel, if any, at least 7 days before the date on which vocational evaluation or testing is scheduled to occur.
3. The employer or carrier may withhold payment of benefits for permanent total disability or supplements for any period during which the employee willfully fails or refuses to appear without good cause for the scheduled vocational evaluation or testing.
(f)1. If permanent total disability results from injuries that occurred subsequent to June 30, 1955, and for which the liability of the employer for compensation has not been discharged under s. 440.20(11), the injured employee shall receive additional weekly compensation benefits equal to 3 percent of her or his weekly compensation rate, as established pursuant to the law in effect on the date of her or his injury, multiplied by the number of calendar years since the date of injury. The weekly compensation payable and the additional benefits payable under this paragraph, when combined, may not exceed the maximum weekly compensation rate in effect at the time of payment as determined pursuant to s. 440.12(2). These supplemental payments shall not be paid or payable after the employee attains age 62, regardless of whether the employee has applied for or is eligible to apply for social security benefits under 42 U.S.C. s. 402 or s. 423, unless the employee is not eligible for social security benefits under 42 U.S.C. s. 402 or s. 423 because the employee’s compensable injury has prevented the employee from working sufficient quarters to be eligible for such benefits. These supplemental benefits shall be paid by the department out of the Workers’ Compensation Administration Trust Fund when the injury occurred subsequent to June 30, 1955, and before July 1, 1984. These supplemental benefits shall be paid by the employer when the injury occurred on or after July 1, 1984. Supplemental benefits are not payable for any period prior to October 1, 1974.
2.a. The department shall provide by rule for the periodic reporting to the department of all earnings of any nature and social security income by the injured employee entitled to or claiming additional compensation under subparagraph 1. Neither the department nor the employer or carrier shall make any payment of those additional benefits provided by subparagraph 1. for any period during which the employee willfully fails or refuses to report upon request by the department in the manner prescribed by such rules.
b. The department shall provide by rule for the periodic reporting to the employer or carrier of all earnings of any nature and social security income by the injured employee entitled to or claiming benefits for permanent total disability. The employer or carrier is not required to make any payment of benefits for permanent total disability for any period during which the employee willfully fails or refuses to report upon request by the employer or carrier in the manner prescribed by such rules or if any employee who is receiving permanent total disability benefits refuses to apply for or cooperate with the employer or carrier in applying for social security benefits.
3. When an injured employee receives a full or partial lump-sum advance of the employee’s permanent total disability compensation benefits, the employee’s benefits under this paragraph shall be computed on the employee’s weekly compensation rate as reduced by the lump-sum advance.
(2) TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY.
(a) Subject to subsection (7), in case of disability total in character but temporary in quality, 662/3 or 66.67 percent of the average weekly wages shall be paid to the employee during the continuance thereof, not to exceed 104 weeks except as provided in this subsection, s. 440.12(1), and s. 440.14(3). Once the employee reaches the maximum number of weeks allowed, or the employee reaches the date of maximum medical improvement, whichever occurs earlier, temporary disability benefits shall cease and the injured worker’s permanent impairment shall be determined.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), an employee who has sustained the loss of an arm, leg, hand, or foot, has been rendered a paraplegic, paraparetic, quadriplegic, or quadriparetic, or has lost the sight of both eyes shall be paid temporary total disability of 80 percent of her or his average weekly wage. The increased temporary total disability compensation provided for in this paragraph must not extend beyond 6 months from the date of the accident; however, such benefits shall not be due or payable if the employee is eligible for, entitled to, or collecting permanent total disability benefits. The compensation provided by this paragraph is not subject to the limits provided in s. 440.12(2). If, at the conclusion of this period of increased temporary total disability compensation, the employee is still temporarily totally disabled, the employee shall continue to receive temporary total disability compensation as set forth in paragraphs (a) and (c). The period of time the employee has received this increased compensation will be counted as part of, and not in addition to, the maximum periods of time for which the employee is entitled to compensation under paragraph (a) but not paragraph (c).
(c) Temporary total disability benefits paid pursuant to this subsection shall include such period as may be reasonably necessary for training in the use of artificial members and appliances, and shall include such period as the employee may be receiving training and education under a program pursuant to s. 440.491.
(d) The department shall, by rule, provide for the periodic reporting to the department, employer, or carrier of all earned income, including income from social security, by the injured employee who is entitled to or claiming benefits for temporary total disability. The employer or carrier is not required to make any payment of benefits for temporary total disability for any period during which the employee willfully fails or refuses to report upon request by the employer or carrier in the manner prescribed by the rules. The rule must require the claimant to personally sign the claim form and attest that she or he has reviewed, understands, and acknowledges the foregoing.
(3) PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT BENEFITS.
(a) Once the employee has reached the date of maximum medical improvement, impairment benefits are due and payable within 14 days after the carrier has knowledge of the impairment.
(b) The three-member panel, in cooperation with the department, shall establish and use a uniform permanent impairment rating schedule. This schedule must be based on medically or scientifically demonstrable findings as well as the systems and criteria set forth in the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment; the Snellen Charts, published by the American Medical Association Committee for Eye Injuries; and the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry Disability Schedules. The schedule must be based upon objective findings. The schedule shall be more comprehensive than the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment and shall expand the areas already addressed and address additional areas not currently contained in the guides. On August 1, 1979, and pending the adoption, by rule, of a permanent schedule, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, copyright 1977, 1971, 1988, by the American Medical Association, shall be the temporary schedule and shall be used for the purposes hereof. For injuries after July 1, 1990, pending the adoption by rule of a uniform disability rating agency schedule, the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry Disability Schedule shall be used unless that schedule does not address an injury. In such case, the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment by the American Medical Association shall be used. Determination of permanent impairment under this schedule must be made by a physician licensed under chapter 458, a doctor of osteopathic medicine licensed under chapters 458 and 459, a chiropractic physician licensed under chapter 460, a podiatric physician licensed under chapter 461, an optometrist licensed under chapter 463, or a dentist licensed under chapter 466, as appropriate considering the nature of the injury. No other persons are authorized to render opinions regarding the existence of or the extent of permanent impairment.
(c) All impairment income benefits shall be based on an impairment rating using the impairment schedule referred to in paragraph (b). Impairment income benefits are paid biweekly at the rate of 75 percent of the employee’s average weekly temporary total disability benefit not to exceed the maximum weekly benefit under s. 440.12; provided, however, that such benefits shall be reduced by 50 percent for each week in which the employee has earned income equal to or in excess of the employee’s average weekly wage. An employee’s entitlement to impairment income benefits begins the day after the employee reaches maximum medical improvement or the expiration of temporary benefits, whichever occurs earlier, and continues until the earlier of:
1. The expiration of a period computed at the rate of 3 weeks for each percentage point of impairment; or
2. The death of the employee.

Impairment income benefits as defined by this subsection are payable only for impairment ratings for physical impairments. If objective medical findings can substantiate a permanent psychiatric impairment resulting from the accident, permanent impairment benefits are limited for the permanent psychiatric impairment to 1-percent permanent impairment.

(d) After the employee has been certified by a doctor as having reached maximum medical improvement or 6 weeks before the expiration of temporary benefits, whichever occurs earlier, the certifying doctor shall evaluate the condition of the employee and assign an impairment rating, using the impairment schedule referred to in paragraph (b). If the certification and evaluation are performed by a doctor other than the employee’s treating doctor, the certification and evaluation must be submitted to the treating doctor, the employee, and the carrier within 10 days after the evaluation. The treating doctor must indicate to the carrier agreement or disagreement with the other doctor’s certification and evaluation.
1. The certifying doctor shall issue a written report to the employee and the carrier certifying that maximum medical improvement has been reached, stating the impairment rating to the body as a whole, and providing any other information required by the department by rule. The carrier shall establish an overall maximum medical improvement date and permanent impairment rating, based upon all such reports.
2. Within 14 days after the carrier’s knowledge of each maximum medical improvement date and impairment rating to the body as a whole upon which the carrier is paying benefits, the carrier shall report such maximum medical improvement date and, when determined, the overall maximum medical improvement date and associated impairment rating to the department in a format as set forth in department rule. If the employee has not been certified as having reached maximum medical improvement before the expiration of 98 weeks after the date temporary disability benefits begin to accrue, the carrier shall notify the treating doctor of the requirements of this section.
(e) The carrier shall pay the employee impairment income benefits for a period based on the impairment rating.
(f) The department may by rule specify forms and procedures governing the method of payment of benefits under this section.
(g) Notwithstanding paragraph (c), for accidents occurring on or after October 1, 2003, an employee’s entitlement to impairment income benefits begins the day after the employee reaches maximum medical improvement or the expiration of temporary benefits, whichever occurs earlier, and continues for the following periods:
1. Two weeks of benefits are to be paid to the employee for each percentage point of impairment from 1 percent up to and including 10 percent.
2. For each percentage point of impairment from 11 percent up to and including 15 percent, 3 weeks of benefits are to be paid.
3. For each percentage point of impairment from 16 percent up to and including 20 percent, 4 weeks of benefits are to be paid.
4. For each percentage point of impairment from 21 percent and higher, 6 weeks of benefits are to be paid.
(4) TEMPORARY PARTIAL DISABILITY.
(a) Subject to subsection (7), in case of temporary partial disability, compensation shall be equal to 80 percent of the difference between 80 percent of the employee’s average weekly wage and the salary, wages, and other remuneration the employee is able to earn postinjury, as compared weekly; however, weekly temporary partial disability benefits may not exceed an amount equal to 662/3 or 66.67 percent of the employee’s average weekly wage at the time of accident. In order to simplify the comparison of the preinjury average weekly wage with the salary, wages, and other remuneration the employee is able to earn postinjury, the department may by rule provide for payment of the initial installment of temporary partial disability benefits to be paid as a partial week so that payment for remaining weeks of temporary partial disability can coincide as closely as possible with the postinjury employer’s work week. The amount determined to be the salary, wages, and other remuneration the employee is able to earn shall in no case be less than the sum actually being earned by the employee, including earnings from sheltered employment. Benefits shall be payable under this subsection only if overall maximum medical improvement has not been reached and the medical conditions resulting from the accident create restrictions on the injured employee’s ability to return to work.
(b) Within 5 business days after the carrier’s knowledge of the employee’s release to restricted work, the carrier shall mail to the employee and employer an informational letter, adopted by department rule, explaining the employee’s possible eligibility and responsibilities for temporary partial disability benefits.
(c) When an employee returns to work with the restrictions resulting from the accident and is earning wages less than 80 percent of the preinjury average weekly wage, the first installment of temporary partial disability benefits is due 7 days after the last date of the postinjury employer’s first biweekly work week. Thereafter, payment for temporary partial benefits shall be paid biweekly no later than the 7th day following the last day of each biweekly work week.
(d) If the employee is unable to return to work with the restrictions resulting from the accident and is not earning wages, salary, or other remuneration, temporary partial disability benefits shall be paid no later than the last day of each biweekly period. The employee shall notify the carrier within 5 business days after returning to work. Failure to notify the carrier of the establishment of an earning capacity in the required time shall result in a suspension or nonpayment of temporary partial disability benefits until the proper notification is provided.
(e) Such benefits shall be paid during the continuance of such disability, not to exceed a period of 104 weeks, as provided by this subsection and subsection (2). Once the injured employee reaches the maximum number of weeks, temporary disability benefits cease and the injured worker’s permanent impairment must be determined. If the employee is terminated from postinjury employment based on the employee’s misconduct, temporary partial disability benefits are not payable as provided for in this section. The department shall by rule specify forms and procedures governing the method and time for payment of temporary disability benefits for dates of accidents before January 1, 1994, and for dates of accidents on or after January 1, 1994.
(5) SUBSEQUENT INJURY.
(a) The fact that an employee has suffered previous disability, impairment, anomaly, or disease, or received compensation therefor, shall not preclude her or him from benefits, as specified in paragraph (b), for a subsequent aggravation or acceleration of the preexisting condition or preclude benefits for death resulting therefrom, except that no benefits shall be payable if the employee, at the time of entering into the employment of the employer by whom the benefits would otherwise be payable, falsely represents herself or himself in writing as not having previously been disabled or compensated because of such previous disability, impairment, anomaly, or disease and the employer detrimentally relies on the misrepresentation.
(b) If a compensable injury, disability, or need for medical care, or any portion thereof, is a result of aggravation or acceleration of a preexisting condition, or is the result of merger with a preexisting condition, only the disabilities and medical treatment associated with such compensable injury shall be payable under this chapter, excluding the degree of disability or medical conditions existing at the time of the impairment rating or at the time of the accident, regardless of whether the preexisting condition was disabling at the time of the accident or at the time of the impairment rating and without considering whether the preexisting condition would be disabling without the compensable accident. The degree of permanent impairment or disability attributable to the accident or injury shall be compensated in accordance with this section, apportioning out the preexisting condition based on the anatomical impairment rating attributable to the preexisting condition. Medical benefits shall be paid apportioning out the percentage of the need for such care attributable to the preexisting condition. As used in this paragraph, “merger” means the combining of a preexisting permanent impairment or disability with a subsequent compensable permanent impairment or disability which, when the effects of both are considered together, result in a permanent impairment or disability rating which is greater than the sum of the two permanent impairment or disability ratings when each impairment or disability is considered individually.
(6) EMPLOYEE REFUSES EMPLOYMENT.If an injured employee refuses employment suitable to the capacity thereof, offered to or procured therefor, such employee shall not be entitled to any compensation at any time during the continuance of such refusal unless at any time in the opinion of the judge of compensation claims such refusal is justifiable. Time periods for the payment of benefits in accordance with this section shall be counted in determining the limitation of benefits as provided for in paragraphs (2)(a), (3)(c), and 1(4)(b).
(7) EMPLOYEE LEAVES EMPLOYMENT.If an injured employee, when receiving compensation for temporary partial disability, leaves the employment of the employer by whom she or he was employed at the time of the accident for which such compensation is being paid, the employee shall, upon securing employment elsewhere, give to such former employer an affidavit in writing containing the name of her or his new employer, the place of employment, and the amount of wages being received at such new employment; and, until she or he gives such affidavit, the compensation for temporary partial disability will cease. The employer by whom such employee was employed at the time of the accident for which such compensation is being paid may also at any time demand of such employee an additional affidavit in writing containing the name of her or his employer, the place of her or his employment, and the amount of wages she or he is receiving; and if the employee, upon such demand, fails or refuses to make and furnish such affidavit, her or his right to compensation for temporary partial disability shall cease until such affidavit is made and furnished. If the employee leaves her or his employment while receiving temporary partial benefits without just cause as determined by the judge of compensation claims, temporary partial benefits shall be payable based on the deemed earnings of the employee as if she or he had remained employed.
(8) EMPLOYEE BECOMES INMATE OF INSTITUTION.In case an employee becomes an inmate of a public institution, then no compensation shall be payable unless she or he has dependent upon her or him for support a person or persons defined as dependents elsewhere in this chapter, whose dependency shall be determined as if the employee were deceased and to whom compensation would be paid in case of death; and such compensation as is due such employee shall be paid such dependents during the time she or he remains such inmate.
(9) EMPLOYEE ELIGIBLE FOR BENEFITS UNDER THIS CHAPTER AND FEDERAL OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS, AND DISABILITY INSURANCE ACT.
(a) Weekly compensation benefits payable under this chapter for disability resulting from injuries to an employee who becomes eligible for benefits under 42 U.S.C. s. 423 shall be reduced to an amount whereby the sum of such compensation benefits payable under this chapter and such total benefits otherwise payable for such period to the employee and her or his dependents, had such employee not been entitled to benefits under this chapter, under 42 U.S.C. ss. 402 and 423, does not exceed 80 percent of the employee’s average weekly wage. However, this provision shall not operate to reduce an injured worker’s benefits under this chapter to a greater extent than such benefits would have otherwise been reduced under 42 U.S.C. s. 424(a). This reduction of compensation benefits is not applicable to any compensation benefits payable for any week subsequent to the week in which the injured worker reaches the age of 62 years.
(b) If the provisions of 42 U.S.C. s. 424(a) are amended to provide for a reduction or increase of the percentage of average current earnings that the sum of compensation benefits payable under this chapter and the benefits payable under 42 U.S.C. ss. 402 and 423 can equal, the amount of the reduction of benefits provided in this subsection shall be reduced or increased accordingly. The department may by rule specify forms and procedures governing the method for calculating and administering the offset of benefits payable under this chapter and benefits payable under 42 U.S.C. ss. 402 and 423. The department shall have first priority in taking any available social security offsets on dates of accidents occurring before July 1, 1984.
(c) Disability compensation benefits payable for any week, including those benefits provided by paragraph (1)(f), may not be reduced pursuant to this subsection until the Social Security Administration determines the amount otherwise payable to the employee under 42 U.S.C. ss. 402 and 423 and the employee has begun receiving such social security benefit payments. The employee shall, upon demand by the department, the employer, or the carrier, authorize the Social Security Administration to release disability information relating to her or him and authorize the Department of Commerce to release reemployment assistance information relating to her or him, in accordance with rules to be adopted by the department prescribing the procedure and manner for requesting the authorization and for compliance by the employee. The department or the employer or carrier may not make any payment of benefits for total disability or those additional benefits provided by paragraph (1)(f) for any period during which the employee willfully fails or refuses to authorize the release of information in the manner and within the time prescribed by such rules. The authority for release of disability information granted by an employee under this paragraph is effective for a period not to exceed 12 months and such authority may be renewed, as the department prescribes by rule.
(d) If compensation benefits are reduced pursuant to this subsection, the minimum compensation provisions of s. 440.12(2) do not apply.
(10) EMPLOYEE ELIGIBLE FOR BENEFITS UNDER THIS CHAPTER WHO HAS RECEIVED OR IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE.
(a) No compensation benefits shall be payable for temporary total disability or permanent total disability under this chapter for any week in which the injured employee has received, or is receiving, reemployment assistance or unemployment compensation benefits.
(b) If an employee is entitled to temporary partial benefits pursuant to subsection (4) and reemployment assistance or unemployment compensation benefits, such reemployment assistance or unemployment compensation benefits shall be primary and the temporary partial benefits shall be supplemental only, the sum of the two benefits not to exceed the amount of temporary partial benefits which would otherwise be payable.
(11) FULL-PAY STATUS FOR CERTAIN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS.Any law enforcement officer as defined in s. 943.10(1), (2), or (3) who, while acting within the course of employment as provided by s. 440.091, is maliciously or intentionally injured and who thereby sustains a job-connected disability compensable under this chapter shall be carried in full-pay status rather than being required to use sick, annual, or other leave. Full-pay status shall be granted only after submission to the employing agency’s head of a medical report which gives a current diagnosis of the employee’s recovery and ability to return to work. In no case shall the employee’s salary and workers’ compensation benefits exceed the amount of the employee’s regular salary requirements.
(12) REPAYMENT.If an employee has received a sum as an indemnity benefit under any classification or category of benefit under this chapter to which she or he is not entitled, the employee is liable to repay that sum to the employer or the carrier or to have that sum deducted from future benefits, regardless of the classification of benefits, payable to the employee under this chapter; however, a partial payment of the total repayment may not exceed 20 percent of the amount of the biweekly payment.
History.s. 15, ch. 17481, 1935; CGL 1936 Supp. 5966(15); s. 4, ch. 20672, 1941; s. 2, ch. 22814, 1945; s. 1, ch. 23921, 1947; s. 11, ch. 25035, 1949; s. 1, ch. 26877, 1951; s. 10, ch. 26484, 1951; s. 1, ch. 29803, 1955; s. 3, ch. 29778, 1955; s. 1, ch. 59-103; s. 1, ch. 59-102; s. 2, ch. 61-119; s. 1, ch. 61-188; s. 1, ch. 63-235; s. 1, ch. 65-168; ss. 17, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 1, ch. 70-71; s. 1, ch. 70-312; s. 5, ch. 73-127; s. 9, ch. 74-197; s. 6, ch. 75-209; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 4, ch. 77-290; ss. 5, 23, ch. 78-300; ss. 10, 124, ch. 79-40; ss. 8, 21, ch. 79-312; s. 5, ch. 80-236; s. 5, ch. 81-119; s. 275, ch. 81-259; ss. 1, 3, ch. 82-237; s. 8, ch. 83-174; s. 5, ch. 83-305; s. 2, ch. 84-267; s. 3, ch. 86-171; s. 3. ch. 87-330; s. 4, ch. 88-203; ss. 12, 43, ch. 89-289; ss. 20, 56, ch. 90-201; ss. 18, 52, ch. 91-1; s. 20, ch. 93-415; s. 73, ch. 96-418; s. 1052, ch. 97-103; s. 47, ch. 97-264; s. 2, ch. 98-125; ss. 190, 261, ch. 98-166; s. 92, ch. 2000-153; s. 65, ch. 2001-62; s. 28, ch. 2002-194; s. 52, ch. 2003-1; s. 11, ch. 2003-36; s. 18, ch. 2003-412; s. 62, ch. 2004-5; s. 347, ch. 2011-142; s. 67, ch. 2012-30; s. 7, ch. 2013-141; s. 2, ch. 2014-109; s. 170, ch. 2024-6.
1Note.Paragraph (4)(b) does not reference time periods for payment of benefits. The appropriate reference may be to paragraph (4)(e).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 921 cases (8 in the last 5 years), 1943–2025 · leading case: & SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. & City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016).
& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. & City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). · cites it 109× “Section 440.15, Florida Statutes Section 440.”
Matrix Emp. Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). · cites it 84× “[2] *624 Section 440.15, Florida Statutes, governs the payment of disability benefits to injured employees.”
Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). · cites it 51× “” See “House of Representatives, As Further Revised By the Committee on Commerce, Final Bill Analysis & Economic Impact Statement,” § 20, pg.”
Wyeth/Pharma Field Sales v. Toscano, 40 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). · cites it 24× “See section 440.15(1) Florida Statutes (2007) (stating, to prove entitlement to permanent total disability benefits, employee “must establish that he or she is not able to engage in at least sedentary employment, within a 50 mile radius” of his residence); see also section 440.”
Sharer v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 144 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1962). · cites it 28× “15(5) (d) (2) to determine the benefits due the petitioner herein because, although in point of time or order of arrangement said section is prior to the section which creates the conflict heretofore found to exist, a thorough study and comprehensive analysis of Section 440.15…”
Escambia Cty. Council v. Goldsmith, 500 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). · cites it 25× “" The term "permanent impairment" is used in several portions of section 440.15, entitled "Compensation for disability.”
Staffmark v. Merrell, 43 So. 3d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). · cites it 25× “See §§ 440.15(2)(a), (4)(a), Fla. Stat (2008).”
City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). · cites it 22× “Additionally, the Legislature left intact the provisions of § 440.15(1), F.S. (1994), providing essentially for a dollar for dollar reduction and offset of a claimant's workers' compensation indemnity benefits when the claimant becomes eligible for receipt of Social Security…”
Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. 1995). · cites it 6× “§ 8-42-107(8)(c); Fla.Stat.Ann. § 440.15(3); Ga.Code Ann. § 34-9-1(5); Idaho Code § 72-430 (2); Kan.”
Chaffee v. Miami Transfer Co., Inc., 288 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1974). · cites it 25× “1954), that "disability", for purposes of Fla. Stat. § 440.15 (3)(u), refers to a diminution of earning capacity resulting from an injury, rather than to the physical impairment itself, commenting that the two were not necessarily proportional.”
Sasso v. Ram Prop. Mgmt., 431 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). · cites it 14× “1980); § 440.15(10), Fla. Stat. (1979). Also distinguishable is the case of the worker who tries to collect workers' compensation and unemployment compensation benefits, which is not permissible, Section 440.”
Ace Disposal v. Holley, 668 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). · cites it 28× “The employer or carrier is not required to make any payment of benefits for permanent total disability for any period during which the employee *647 willfully fails or refuses to report upon request by the employer or carrier in the manner prescribed by such rules or if any…”
— 440.15(1) — 50 cases
& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. & City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). “Section 440.15, Florida Statutes Section 440.”
Dep't of Child. & Fam. v. Monroe, 744 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
Wyeth/Pharma Field Sales v. Toscano, 40 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “See section 440.15(1) Florida Statutes (2007) (stating, to prove entitlement to permanent total disability benefits, employee “must establish that he or she is not able to engage in at least sedentary employment, within a 50 mile radius” of his residence); see also section 440.”
Henderson v. Sol Walker & Co., 138 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1962).
Escambia Cty. Council v. Goldsmith, 500 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “" The term "permanent impairment" is used in several portions of section 440.15, entitled "Compensation for disability.”
— 440.15(1)(a) — 7 cases
City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “Additionally, the Legislature left intact the provisions of § 440.15(1), F.S. (1994), providing essentially for a dollar for dollar reduction and offset of a claimant's workers' compensation indemnity benefits when the claimant becomes eligible for receipt of Social Security…”
E. Indus., Inc. v. Burnham, 750 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Liggon, 668 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
Florida Power Corp. v. Van Loan, 764 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
Pinellas Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Higgins, 597 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
— 440.15(1)(b) — 53 cases
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Liggon, 668 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. & City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). “Section 440.15, Florida Statutes Section 440.”
Ferrell Gas v. Childers, 982 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “Additionally, the Legislature left intact the provisions of § 440.15(1), F.S. (1994), providing essentially for a dollar for dollar reduction and offset of a claimant's workers' compensation indemnity benefits when the claimant becomes eligible for receipt of Social Security…”
Home Depot v. Turner, 820 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
— 440.15(1)(d) — 8 cases
Hg Boddiford Painting Cons., Inc. v. Boddiford, 426 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Lister v. Walker, 409 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Matrix Emp. Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “[2] *624 Section 440.15, Florida Statutes, governs the payment of disability benefits to injured employees.”
City of Miami v. Jones, 593 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Brannon v. Tampa Tribune, 711 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
— 440.15(1)(e) — 32 cases
Harrell v. Fla. Const. specialists/aarla/agent for Fwciga, 834 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
Shipp v. State Workers'comp. Trust Fund, 481 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Styles v. Broward Cnty. Sch. Bd., 831 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
Dep't of Child. & Fam. v. Monroe, 744 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
City of Clearwater v. Acker, 755 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1999).
— 440.15(1)(e)(1) — 3 cases
City of Clearwater v. Acker, 755 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1999).
Acker v. City of Clearwater, 755 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Renfroe, 568 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
— 440.15(1)(f) — 13 cases
Ace Disposal v. Holley, 668 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “The employer or carrier is not required to make any payment of benefits for permanent total disability for any period during which the employee *647 willfully fails or refuses to report upon request by the employer or carrier in the manner prescribed by such rules or if any…”
Harrell v. Fla. Const. specialists/aarla/agent for Fwciga, 834 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “Additionally, the Legislature left intact the provisions of § 440.15(1), F.S. (1994), providing essentially for a dollar for dollar reduction and offset of a claimant's workers' compensation indemnity benefits when the claimant becomes eligible for receipt of Social Security…”
Orange Cnty. Fire Rescue v. Antonelli, 794 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
Florida Distillers v. Rudd, 751 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
— 440.15(10) — 41 cases
Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Little, 393 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1980).
Harrell v. Fla. Const. specialists/aarla/agent for Fwciga, 834 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
Monroe v. PUBLIX 148, 790 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
Ace Disposal v. Holley, 668 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “The employer or carrier is not required to make any payment of benefits for permanent total disability for any period during which the employee *647 willfully fails or refuses to report upon request by the employer or carrier in the manner prescribed by such rules or if any…”
Sasso v. Ram Prop. Mgmt., 431 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “1980); § 440.15(10), Fla. Stat. (1979). Also distinguishable is the case of the worker who tries to collect workers' compensation and unemployment compensation benefits, which is not permissible, Section 440.”
— 440.15(10)(a) — 29 cases
Modern Plating Co. v. Whitton, 394 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Little, 393 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1980).
Morrow v. Amcon Concrete, Inc., 433 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Dixon v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 767 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 2000).
City of Vero Beach v. Thomas, 388 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
— 440.15(10)(b) — 4 cases
Hill v. Baptist Hosp., 464 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Ocean Manor Resort Hotel v. Garbalosa, 512 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
Stoker/Ashland v. Douglas, 455 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Nat'l Advert./3M v. Wise, 590 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
— 440.15(10)(c) — 13 cases
Dept. of Transp., Div. of Risk v. Lindsey, 383 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
Ace Disposal v. Holley, 668 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “The employer or carrier is not required to make any payment of benefits for permanent total disability for any period during which the employee *647 willfully fails or refuses to report upon request by the employer or carrier in the manner prescribed by such rules or if any…”
Monroe v. PUBLIX 148, 790 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
Orange Cnty. Fire Rescue v. Antonelli, 794 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
South Florida Water Dist. v. Ciacci, 647 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
— 440.15(11) — 6 cases
Williams v. City of Fort Walton, 691 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Sasso v. Ram Prop. Mgmt., 431 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “1980); § 440.15(10), Fla. Stat. (1979). Also distinguishable is the case of the worker who tries to collect workers' compensation and unemployment compensation benefits, which is not permissible, Section 440.”
Regency Inn v. Johnson, 422 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Borden, Inc. v. Butler, 377 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
Dep't of Juv. Just. v. Rivera, 693 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
— 440.15(11)(b) — 1 case
Regency Inn v. Johnson, 422 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
— 440.15(12) — 8 cases
Jackson v. Comput. Sci. Raytheon, 36 So. 3d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
Williams v. City of Fort Walton, 691 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Pepsi Bottling Grp., Inc. v. Underwood, 8 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
City of North Bay Vill. v. Cook, 617 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
O'Connor v. Hillsborough Cnty. SEC. Svcs., 954 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
— 440.15(13) — 8 cases
Brown v. Lp Sanitation, 689 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Monroe v. PUBLIX 148, 790 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
Orange Cnty. Fire Rescue v. Antonelli, 794 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
City of Hollywood v. Lombardi, 738 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
HRS DIST. II v. Pickard, 778 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
— 440.15(2) — 40 cases
& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. & City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). “Section 440.15, Florida Statutes Section 440.”
Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). “” See “House of Representatives, As Further Revised By the Committee on Commerce, Final Bill Analysis & Economic Impact Statement,” § 20, pg.”
Holiday Care Ctr. v. Scriven, 418 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Williams v. City of Fort Walton, 691 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Wyeth/Pharma Field Sales v. Toscano, 40 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “See section 440.15(1) Florida Statutes (2007) (stating, to prove entitlement to permanent total disability benefits, employee “must establish that he or she is not able to engage in at least sedentary employment, within a 50 mile radius” of his residence); see also section 440.”
— 440.15(2)(a) — 39 cases
& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. & City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). “Section 440.15, Florida Statutes Section 440.”
Matrix Emp. Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “[2] *624 Section 440.15, Florida Statutes, governs the payment of disability benefits to injured employees.”
Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). “” See “House of Representatives, As Further Revised By the Committee on Commerce, Final Bill Analysis & Economic Impact Statement,” § 20, pg.”
Marvin Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016).
City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “Additionally, the Legislature left intact the provisions of § 440.15(1), F.S. (1994), providing essentially for a dollar for dollar reduction and offset of a claimant's workers' compensation indemnity benefits when the claimant becomes eligible for receipt of Social Security…”
— 440.15(2)(b) — 30 cases
EB Malone Corp. v. Johnson, 425 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Dolphin Tire Co. v. Ellison, 402 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Neavins v. City of St. Petersburg, 823 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
Spitzer v. Bartlett Bros. Roofing, 437 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Marriott In-flite Servs. v. Garcia, 450 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
— 440.15(2)(c) — 6 cases
Santiago v. Orr Indus., Inc., 407 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Van Eyk v. RN Hicks Const. Co., 377 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
EB Malone Corp. v. Johnson, 425 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Roberson v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 669 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
Gardner v. D. F. S. Constr. Co., 358 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1978).
— 440.15(2)(d) — 1 case
Ace Disposal v. Holley, 668 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “The employer or carrier is not required to make any payment of benefits for permanent total disability for any period during which the employee *647 willfully fails or refuses to report upon request by the employer or carrier in the manner prescribed by such rules or if any…”
— 440.15(2)(e) — 1 case
Roberson v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 669 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
— 440.15(3) — 82 cases
City of Port Orange v. Sedacca, 953 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. 1995). “§ 8-42-107(8)(c); Fla.Stat.Ann. § 440.15(3); Ga.Code Ann. § 34-9-1(5); Idaho Code § 72-430 (2); Kan.”
& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. & City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). “Section 440.15, Florida Statutes Section 440.”
Brannon v. Tampa Tribune, 711 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
Ball v. Mann, 75 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1954).
— 440.15(3)(a) — 84 cases
Escambia Cty. Council v. Goldsmith, 500 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “" The term "permanent impairment" is used in several portions of section 440.15, entitled "Compensation for disability.”
City of St. Petersburg v. Nasworthy, 751 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. 1995). “§ 8-42-107(8)(c); Fla.Stat.Ann. § 440.15(3); Ga.Code Ann. § 34-9-1(5); Idaho Code § 72-430 (2); Kan.”
Rhaney v. Dobbs House, Inc., 415 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “Additionally, the Legislature left intact the provisions of § 440.15(1), F.S. (1994), providing essentially for a dollar for dollar reduction and offset of a claimant's workers' compensation indemnity benefits when the claimant becomes eligible for receipt of Social Security…”
— 440.15(3)(a)(1) — 2 cases
Carr v. Cent. Florida Aluminum Prods., Inc., 402 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Morris v. CA Meyer Paving & Const., 516 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
— 440.15(3)(a)(3) — 9 cases
Racz v. Chennault, Inc., 418 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Jamar Sportswear, Inc. v. Miller, 413 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Dayron Corp. v. Morehead, 509 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 1987).
Tallahassee Mem'l Reg. Med. Ctr. v. Snead, 400 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Regal Marine Indus. v. Cappucci, 523 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
— 440.15(3)(a)(4) — 1 case
Chavarria v. Selugal Clothing, Inc., 840 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
— 440.15(3)(b) — 228 cases
Sasso v. Ram Prop. Mgmt., 452 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1984).
City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Sasso v. Ram Prop. Mgmt., 431 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “1980); § 440.15(10), Fla. Stat. (1979). Also distinguishable is the case of the worker who tries to collect workers' compensation and unemployment compensation benefits, which is not permissible, Section 440.”
Litvin v. St. Lucie Cty. Sheriff's Dept., 599 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Regency Inn v. Johnson, 422 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
— 440.15(3)(b)(1) — 4 cases
Vida Appliances, Inc. v. Gates, 416 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Racz v. Chennault, Inc., 418 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Waldorf v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Bd., 622 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
Anna Maria Fire Control Dist. v. Angell, 528 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
— 440.15(3)(b)(2) — 19 cases
Vida Appliances, Inc. v. Gates, 416 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Mac Papers, Inc. v. Cruz, 658 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
Nickolls v. Univ. of Florida, 606 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Iverson v. Holy Cross Hosp., 498 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Leffler v. Grand Union Co., 409 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
— 440.15(3)(b)(3) — 2 cases
Moya v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Bd., 627 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
Fruggiero v. Best W. Resort Inn, 461 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
— 440.15(3)(b)(3)(a) — 1 case
Dufrene v. Video Co-op, La. Workers'comp., 843 So. 2d 1066 (La. 2003).
— 440.15(3)(b)(3)(d) — 1 case
Acosta v. Kraco, Inc., 426 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
— 440.15(3)(b)(4) — 2 cases
Cmeyla v. Baynard-Thompson Funeral Home, 439 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Murphy v. Ne. Drywall, 692 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
— 440.15(3)(b)(4)(a) — 1 case
Dufrene v. Video Co-op, La. Workers'comp., 843 So. 2d 1066 (La. 2003).
— 440.15(3)(b)(4)(d) — 1 case
Murphy v. Ne. Drywall, 692 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
— 440.15(3)(b)(6) — 1 case
Deep South Prods. v. Beach, 616 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
— 440.15(3)(b)(l) — 6 cases
Aguiar v. Doral Hotel & Country Club, 599 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Entenmann's Bakery v. Smith, 620 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
Flanigan's Enter., Inc. v. Pont, 395 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Builders Specialties Supply v. Cole, 409 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
McDonald v. Florida Erection Servs., 437 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
— 440.15(3)(c) — 10 cases
Stahl v. Hialeah Hosp., 160 So. 3d 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
Poole & Kent Co. v. Asbell, 394 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
S & S Stove Repair, Inc. v. Dumas, 465 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Box v. Tallahassee Fire Dep't/City of Tallahassee, 160 So. 3d 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
Holl v. United Parcel Serv., 140 So. 3d 1062 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
— 440.15(3)(d) — 5 cases
Matrix Emp. Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “[2] *624 Section 440.15, Florida Statutes, governs the payment of disability benefits to injured employees.”
Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). “” See “House of Representatives, As Further Revised By the Committee on Commerce, Final Bill Analysis & Economic Impact Statement,” § 20, pg.”
Gauthier v. Florida Int'l Univ., 38 So. 3d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
Farrens Tree Surgeons v. Winkles, 334 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1976).
Williamson v. Bush & LaFoe, 294 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1974).
— 440.15(3)(d)(2) — 1 case
Gauthier v. Florida Int'l Univ., 38 So. 3d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
— 440.15(3)(e) — 2 cases
Mahoney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 419 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
— 440.15(3)(f) — 1 case
Ken Lones Landscaping, Inc. v. Tucker, 382 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
— 440.15(3)(g) — 5 cases
& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. & City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). “Section 440.15, Florida Statutes Section 440.”
Matrix Emp. Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “[2] *624 Section 440.15, Florida Statutes, governs the payment of disability benefits to injured employees.”
Stahl v. Tenet Health Sys., Inc., 54 So. 3d 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).
Gray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 999 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
— 440.15(3)(i) — 1 case
Chaffee v. Miami Transfer Co., Inc., 288 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1974). “1954), that "disability", for purposes of Fla. Stat. § 440.15 (3)(u), refers to a diminution of earning capacity resulting from an injury, rather than to the physical impairment itself, commenting that the two were not necessarily proportional.”
— 440.15(3)(m) — 2 cases
Plantation Const. Co. v. Ayers, 385 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
Noel v. M. Ecker & Co., 422 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
— 440.15(3)(n) — 1 case
King v. Lord Colony Enter., 400 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
— 440.15(3)(p) — 1 case
— 440.15(3)(s) — 3 cases
City of Port Orange v. Sedacca, 953 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
Kennedy v. Tyson, 382 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. Beach, 409 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
— 440.15(3)(t) — 1 case
Jordan v. Smith, 389 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
— 440.15(3)(u) — 27 cases
Chaffee v. Miami Transfer Co., Inc., 288 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1974). “1954), that "disability", for purposes of Fla. Stat. § 440.15 (3)(u), refers to a diminution of earning capacity resulting from an injury, rather than to the physical impairment itself, commenting that the two were not necessarily proportional.”
Kerce v. Coca-Cola Co.-Foods Div., 389 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1980).
Farrens Tree Surgeons v. Winkles, 334 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1976).
Flesche v. Interstate Warehouse, 411 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
S & S Stove Repair, Inc. v. Dumas, 465 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
— 440.15(3)(u)(2) — 1 case
Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Aydelotte, 395 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
— 440.15(3)(u)(3) — 1 case
North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Gavagan, 398 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
— 440.15(4) — 40 cases
Vencor Hosp. v. Ahles, 727 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
Wyeth/Pharma Field Sales v. Toscano, 40 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “See section 440.15(1) Florida Statutes (2007) (stating, to prove entitlement to permanent total disability benefits, employee “must establish that he or she is not able to engage in at least sedentary employment, within a 50 mile radius” of his residence); see also section 440.”
Nealy v. City of West Palm Beach, 442 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Vincent Jones v. Food Lion, Inc. & Risk Mgmt. Servs., 202 So. 3d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
Cramer v. State of Florida, 885 F. Supp. 1545 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
— 440.15(4)(a) — 27 cases
Wyeth/Pharma Field Sales v. Toscano, 40 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “See section 440.15(1) Florida Statutes (2007) (stating, to prove entitlement to permanent total disability benefits, employee “must establish that he or she is not able to engage in at least sedentary employment, within a 50 mile radius” of his residence); see also section 440.”
Alie v. Crum Staffing, Inc., 41 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
A. Duda & Sons, Inc. v. Kelley, 900 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
Vencor Hosp. v. Ahles, 727 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
Holiday Care Ctr. v. Scriven, 418 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
— 440.15(4)(b) — 46 cases
Edwards v. Caulfield, 560 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
Hurley v. Stuart Fine Foods, 687 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Kirkland v. Harold Pratt Paving, Inc, 518 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
Baggett v. Mulberry Const. Co., 549 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “Additionally, the Legislature left intact the provisions of § 440.15(1), F.S. (1994), providing essentially for a dollar for dollar reduction and offset of a claimant's workers' compensation indemnity benefits when the claimant becomes eligible for receipt of Social Security…”
— 440.15(4)(b)(1985) — 1 case
Gusmano v. J & A Assocs., 692 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
— 440.15(4)(c) — 4 cases
Vincent Jones v. Food Lion, Inc. & Risk Mgmt. Servs., 202 So. 3d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
Square G. Const. Co. v. Grace, 412 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Univ. of Cent. Fla. v. Gleaves, 586 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
— 440.15(4)(e) — 14 cases
Thorkelson v. NY Pizza & Pasta Inc., 956 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
Wyeth/Pharma Field Sales v. Toscano, 40 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “See section 440.15(1) Florida Statutes (2007) (stating, to prove entitlement to permanent total disability benefits, employee “must establish that he or she is not able to engage in at least sedentary employment, within a 50 mile radius” of his residence); see also section 440.”
Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). “” See “House of Representatives, As Further Revised By the Committee on Commerce, Final Bill Analysis & Economic Impact Statement,” § 20, pg.”
Arnold v. Florida's Blood Centers, Inc., 949 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
Fardella v. Genesis Health, Inc., 917 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
— 440.15(5) — 44 cases
Sharer v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 144 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1962). “15(5) (d) (2) to determine the benefits due the petitioner herein because, although in point of time or order of arrangement said section is prior to the section which creates the conflict heretofore found to exist, a thorough study and comprehensive analysis of Section 440.15…”
& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. & City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). “Section 440.15, Florida Statutes Section 440.”
Structural Sys., Inc. v. Worthen, 463 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Russell House Movers, Inc. v. Nolin, 210 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1968).
Staffmark v. Merrell, 43 So. 3d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “See §§ 440.15(2)(a), (4)(a), Fla. Stat (2008).”
— 440.15(5)(a) — 28 cases
Fawaz v. Florida Polymers, 622 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
Cruise Quality Painting v. Paige, 564 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
Escambia Cty. Council v. Goldsmith, 500 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “" The term "permanent impairment" is used in several portions of section 440.15, entitled "Compensation for disability.”
Staffmark v. Merrell, 43 So. 3d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “See §§ 440.15(2)(a), (4)(a), Fla. Stat (2008).”
Pearson v. Paradise Ford, 951 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
— 440.15(5)(b) — 17 cases
Staffmark v. Merrell, 43 So. 3d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “See §§ 440.15(2)(a), (4)(a), Fla. Stat (2008).”
Matrix Emp. Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “[2] *624 Section 440.15, Florida Statutes, governs the payment of disability benefits to injured employees.”
Giaimo v. Florida Autosport, Inc., 154 So. 3d 385 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
Escambia Cty. Council v. Goldsmith, 500 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “" The term "permanent impairment" is used in several portions of section 440.15, entitled "Compensation for disability.”
— 440.15(5)(b)(1) — 1 case
Iley v. Linzey, 531 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
— 440.15(5)(c) — 20 cases
Meek v. Layne-W. Co., 624 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
Jackson v. Nat Harrison Assocs., 283 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1973).
Escambia Cty. Council v. Goldsmith, 500 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “" The term "permanent impairment" is used in several portions of section 440.15, entitled "Compensation for disability.”
Cooper's Inc. v. Taylor, 556 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
Rollins Bldg. Servs., Inc. v. Thomas, 393 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
— 440.15(5)(d) — 6 cases
Williams Roofing, Inc. v. Moore, 447 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Meek v. Layne-W. Co., 624 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
Special Disability Trust Fund v. Martin Marietta Corp., 512 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
— 440.15(6) — 37 cases
Moore v. Servicemaster Com. Servs., 19 So. 3d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
Carraway v. Armour & Co., 156 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1963).
Arnold v. Florida's Blood Centers, Inc., 949 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
Chase v. Walgreen Co., 750 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).
Wyeth/Pharma Field Sales v. Toscano, 40 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “See section 440.15(1) Florida Statutes (2007) (stating, to prove entitlement to permanent total disability benefits, employee “must establish that he or she is not able to engage in at least sedentary employment, within a 50 mile radius” of his residence); see also section 440.”
— 440.15(6)(b) — 1 case
Metro. Dade Cnty., Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners v. Wyche, 383 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
— 440.15(6)(f) — 3 cases
Plant City Steel v. Grace, 381 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
Botanical Gardens v. Smith, 340 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1976).
Lavalle, Wochna, Rutherford, Maker & Truesdell v. Stevens, 394 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
— 440.15(7) — 13 cases
Arnold v. Florida's Blood Centers, Inc., 949 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
A. Duda & Sons, Inc. v. Kelley, 900 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
Wyeth/Pharma Field Sales v. Toscano, 40 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “See section 440.15(1) Florida Statutes (2007) (stating, to prove entitlement to permanent total disability benefits, employee “must establish that he or she is not able to engage in at least sedentary employment, within a 50 mile radius” of his residence); see also section 440.”
Alie v. Crum Staffing, Inc., 41 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
Chase v. Walgreen Co., 750 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).
— 440.15(8) — 4 cases
Hanna v. Indus. Labor Serv. Inc., 636 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Holiday Foliage v. Anderson, 642 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
RE Dailey Co. v. Dorman, 509 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
Jack Feagin Elec., Inc. v. Hallmark, 894 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
— 440.15(8)(a) — 1 case
White v. State, 134 So. 3d 1134 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
— 440.15(8)(b) — 3 cases
Cuccarollo v. Gulf Coast Bldg. Contractors, 500 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Van Doran v. Pope Co., 657 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
Gates Energy Prods. v. Wheeler, 637 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
— 440.15(9) — 21 cases
Walker v. City of Tampa, 520 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
Dep't of Pub. Health v. Wilcox, 543 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1989).
Escambia Cnty. Sheriff's Dept. v. Grice, 692 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1997).
City of Clearwater v. Acker, 755 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1999).
RE Dailey Co. v. Dorman, 509 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
— 440.15(9)(a) — 23 cases
Barruzza v. Suddath Van Lines, Inc., 474 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Hunt v. Stratton, 677 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
Jackson v. Hochadel Roofing Co., 794 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
Burks v. Day's Harvesting, Inc., 597 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Dep't of Pub. Health v. Wilcox, 543 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1989).
— 440.15(9)(c) — 5 cases
Barruzza v. Suddath Van Lines, Inc., 474 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
South Florida Water Dist. v. Ciacci, 647 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Canovas v. Sugar Supply, Inc., 921 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
Dep't of Pub. Health v. Wilcox, 543 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1989).
Upson v. Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd., 811 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
— 440.15(9)(d) — 1 case
Klase v. Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, 466 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
— 440.15(S)(b) — 1 case
— 440.15(d) — 1 case
Sharer v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 144 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1962). “15(5) (d) (2) to determine the benefits due the petitioner herein because, although in point of time or order of arrangement said section is prior to the section which creates the conflict heretofore found to exist, a thorough study and comprehensive analysis of Section 440.15…”
— 440.15(l) — 1 case
Bonifay Mfg. Co. v. Harris, 691 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
— 440.15(l)(a) — 1 case
Escambia Cnty. Sch. Dist./Bd. v. Vickery-Orso, 109 So. 3d 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
— 440.15(l)(b) — 36 cases
& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. & City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). “Section 440.15, Florida Statutes Section 440.”
Blake v. Merck & Co., 43 So. 3d 882 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). “” See “House of Representatives, As Further Revised By the Committee on Commerce, Final Bill Analysis & Economic Impact Statement,” § 20, pg.”
Matrix Emp. Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “[2] *624 Section 440.15, Florida Statutes, governs the payment of disability benefits to injured employees.”
Sarasota Cnty. Sch. Bd./Optacomp v. Roberson, 135 So. 3d 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
— 440.15(l)(d) — 3 cases
Matrix Emp. Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “[2] *624 Section 440.15, Florida Statutes, governs the payment of disability benefits to injured employees.”
Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). “” See “House of Representatives, As Further Revised By the Committee on Commerce, Final Bill Analysis & Economic Impact Statement,” § 20, pg.”
Fairchild Aircraft v. Raybon, 634 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
— 440.15(l)(e) — 18 cases
Eckert v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
Douglas v. Florida Power & Light, Inc., 921 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
Barnett Bank of Volusia Cnty. v. Pelle, 684 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). “” See “House of Representatives, As Further Revised By the Committee on Commerce, Final Bill Analysis & Economic Impact Statement,” § 20, pg.”
Delgado v. A. Garcia Harvesting, Inc., 913 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
— 440.15(l)(e)(3) — 1 case
Interior Custom Concepts v. Slovak, 969 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
— 440.15(l)(e)(l) — 4 cases
Interior Custom Concepts v. Slovak, 969 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
State, Dep't of Labor & Emp. Sec. v. McGrath, 774 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
Boynton Landscape Co. v. Dickinson, 487 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Brooks v. E. Airlines, Inc., 634 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
— 440.15(l)(f) — 3 cases
Rodriguez v. Sears Holdings Corporations, 162 So. 3d 129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
Raymond James & Assocs. v. Smith, 860 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
Bonifay Mfg. Co. v. Harris, 691 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.

This Florida statute resource is curated by an Orange Park personal injury and workers' comp lawyer, a Jacksonville, Florida personal injury and workers' compensation attorney (Florida Bar No. 39104). Attorney Syfert regularly handles Chapter 440 matters in the context of workers' compensation claims and represents clients throughout Northeast Florida. For legal consultation, call 904-383-7448.