Florida Statutes
Fla. Stat. § 316.193 (2025)
Driving under the influence; penalties.
✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session
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316.193 Driving under the influence; penalties.—
(1) A person is guilty of the offense of driving under the influence and is subject to punishment as provided in subsection (2) if the person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state and:
(a) The person is under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893, when affected to the extent that the person’s normal faculties are impaired;
(b) The person has a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood; or
(c) The person has a breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(2)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), subsection (3), or subsection (4), any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (1) shall be punished:
1. By a fine of:
a. Not less than $500 or more than $1,000 for a first conviction.
b. Not less than $1,000 or more than $2,000 for a second conviction; and
2. By imprisonment for:
a. Not more than 6 months for a first conviction.
b. Not more than 9 months for a second conviction.
3. For a second conviction, by mandatory placement for a period of at least 1 year, at the convicted person’s sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license.
The portion of a fine imposed in excess of $500 pursuant to sub-subparagraph 1.a. and the portion of a fine imposed in excess of $1,000 pursuant to sub-subparagraph 1.b., shall be remitted by the clerk to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the General Revenue Fund.
(b)1. Any person who is convicted of a third violation of this section for an offense that occurs within 10 years after a prior conviction for a violation of this section commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. In addition, the court shall order the mandatory placement for a period of not less than 2 years, at the convicted person’s sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license.
2. Any person who is convicted of a third violation of this section for an offense that occurs more than 10 years after the date of a prior conviction for a violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than $2,000 or more than $5,000 and by imprisonment for not more than 12 months. The portion of a fine imposed in excess of $2,500 pursuant to this subparagraph shall be remitted by the clerk to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the General Revenue Fund. In addition, the court shall order the mandatory placement for a period of at least 2 years, at the convicted person’s sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license.
3. Any person who is convicted of a fourth or subsequent violation of this section, regardless of when any prior conviction for a violation of this section occurred, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. However, the fine imposed for such fourth or subsequent violation may be not less than $2,000. The portion of a fine imposed in excess of $1,000 pursuant to this subparagraph shall be remitted by the clerk to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the General Revenue Fund.
(c) In addition to the penalties in paragraph (a), the court may order placement, at the convicted person’s sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 for at least 6 continuous months upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person if, at the time of the offense, the person had a blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of .08 or higher.
(3) Any person:
(a) Who is in violation of subsection (1);
(b) Who operates a vehicle; and
(c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes or contributes to causing:
1. Damage to the property or person of another commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
2. Serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
3. The death of any human being or unborn child commits DUI manslaughter, and commits:
For purposes of this subsection, the term “unborn child” has the same meaning as provided in s. 775.021(5). A person who is convicted of DUI manslaughter shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 4 years.
(4) Any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (1) and who has a blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.15 or higher, or any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (1) and who at the time of the offense was accompanied in the vehicle by a person under the age of 18 years, shall be punished:
(a) By a fine of:
1. Not less than $1,000 or more than $2,000 for a first conviction.
2. Not less than $2,000 or more than $4,000 for a second conviction.
3. Not less than $4,000 for a third or subsequent conviction.
(b) By imprisonment for:
1. Not more than 9 months for a first conviction.
2. Not more than 12 months for a second conviction.
For the purposes of this subsection, only the instant offense is required to be a violation of subsection (1) by a person who has a blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.15 or higher. The portion of a fine imposed in excess of $1,000 pursuant to subparagraph (a)1. and the portion of a fine imposed in excess of $2,000 pursuant to subparagraph (a)2. or subparagraph (a)3., shall be remitted by the clerk to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the General Revenue Fund.
(c) In addition to the penalties in paragraphs (a) and (b), the court shall order the mandatory placement, at the convicted person’s sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person for not less than 6 continuous months for the first offense and for not less than 2 continuous years for a second offense, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license.
(5) The court shall place all offenders convicted of violating this section on monthly reporting probation and shall require completion of a substance abuse course conducted by a DUI program licensed by the department under s. 322.292, which must include a psychosocial evaluation of the offender. If the DUI program refers the offender to an authorized substance abuse treatment provider for substance abuse treatment, in addition to any sentence or fine imposed under this section, completion of all such education, evaluation, and treatment is a condition of reporting probation. The offender shall assume reasonable costs for such education, evaluation, and treatment. The referral to treatment resulting from a psychosocial evaluation shall not be waived without a supporting independent psychosocial evaluation conducted by an authorized substance abuse treatment provider appointed by the court, which shall have access to the DUI program’s psychosocial evaluation before the independent psychosocial evaluation is conducted. The court shall review the results and recommendations of both evaluations before determining the request for waiver. The offender shall bear the full cost of this procedure. The term “substance abuse” means the abuse of alcohol or any substance named or described in Schedules I through V of s. 893.03. If an offender referred to treatment under this subsection fails to report for or complete such treatment or fails to complete the DUI program substance abuse education course and evaluation, the DUI program shall notify the court and the department of the failure. Upon receipt of the notice, the department shall cancel the offender’s driving privilege, notwithstanding the terms of the court order or any suspension or revocation of the driving privilege. The department may temporarily reinstate the driving privilege on a restricted basis upon verification from the DUI program that the offender is currently participating in treatment and the DUI education course and evaluation requirement has been completed. If the DUI program notifies the department of the second failure to complete treatment, the department shall reinstate the driving privilege only after notice of completion of treatment from the DUI program. The organization that conducts the substance abuse education and evaluation may not provide required substance abuse treatment unless a waiver has been granted to that organization by the department. A waiver may be granted only if the department determines, in accordance with its rules, that the service provider that conducts the substance abuse education and evaluation is the most appropriate service provider and is licensed under chapter 397 or is exempt from such licensure. A statistical referral report shall be submitted quarterly to the department by each organization authorized to provide services under this section.
(6) With respect to any person convicted of a violation of subsection (1), regardless of any penalty imposed pursuant to subsection (2), subsection (3), or subsection (4):
(a) For the first conviction, the court shall place the defendant on probation for a period not to exceed 1 year and, as a condition of such probation, shall order the defendant to participate in public service or a community work project for a minimum of 50 hours. The court may order a defendant to pay a fine of $10 for each hour of public service or community work otherwise required only if the court finds that the residence or location of the defendant at the time public service or community work is required or the defendant’s employment obligations would create an undue hardship for the defendant. However, the total period of probation and incarceration may not exceed 1 year. The court must also, as a condition of probation, order the impoundment or immobilization of the vehicle that was operated by or in the actual control of the defendant or any one vehicle registered in the defendant’s name at the time of impoundment or immobilization, for a period of 10 days or for the unexpired term of any lease or rental agreement that expires within 10 days. The impoundment or immobilization must not occur concurrently with the incarceration of the defendant. The impoundment or immobilization order may be dismissed in accordance with paragraph (e), paragraph (f), paragraph (g), or paragraph (h).
(b) For the second conviction for an offense that occurs within a period of 5 years after the date of a prior conviction for violation of this section, the court shall order imprisonment for not less than 10 days. The court must also, as a condition of probation, order the impoundment or immobilization of all vehicles owned by the defendant at the time of impoundment or immobilization, for a period of 30 days or for the unexpired term of any lease or rental agreement that expires within 30 days. The impoundment or immobilization must not occur concurrently with the incarceration of the defendant and must occur concurrently with the driver license revocation imposed under s. 322.28(2)(a)2. The impoundment or immobilization order may be dismissed in accordance with paragraph (e), paragraph (f), paragraph (g), or paragraph (h). At least 48 hours of confinement must be consecutive.
(c) For the third or subsequent conviction for an offense that occurs within a period of 10 years after the date of a prior conviction for violation of this section, the court shall order imprisonment for not less than 30 days. The court must also, as a condition of probation, order the impoundment or immobilization of all vehicles owned by the defendant at the time of impoundment or immobilization, for a period of 90 days or for the unexpired term of any lease or rental agreement that expires within 90 days. The impoundment or immobilization must not occur concurrently with the incarceration of the defendant and must occur concurrently with the driver license revocation imposed under s. 322.28(2)(a)3. The impoundment or immobilization order may be dismissed in accordance with paragraph (e), paragraph (f), paragraph (g), or paragraph (h). At least 48 hours of confinement must be consecutive.
(d) The court must at the time of sentencing the defendant issue an order for the impoundment or immobilization of a vehicle. The order of impoundment or immobilization must include the name and telephone numbers of all immobilization agencies meeting all of the conditions of subsection (13). Within 7 business days after the date that the court issues the order of impoundment or immobilization, the clerk of the court must send notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the registered owner of each vehicle, if the registered owner is a person other than the defendant, and to each person of record claiming a lien against the vehicle.
(e) A person who owns but was not operating the vehicle when the offense occurred may submit to the court a police report indicating that the vehicle was stolen at the time of the offense or documentation of having purchased the vehicle after the offense was committed from an entity other than the defendant or the defendant’s agent. If the court finds that the vehicle was stolen or that the sale was not made to circumvent the order and allow the defendant continued access to the vehicle, the order must be dismissed and the owner of the vehicle will incur no costs. If the court denies the request to dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization, the petitioner may request an evidentiary hearing.
(f) A person who owns but was not operating the vehicle when the offense occurred, and whose vehicle was stolen or who purchased the vehicle after the offense was committed directly from the defendant or the defendant’s agent, may request an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the impoundment or immobilization should occur. If the court finds that either the vehicle was stolen or the purchase was made without knowledge of the offense, that the purchaser had no relationship to the defendant other than through the transaction, and that such purchase would not circumvent the order and allow the defendant continued access to the vehicle, the order must be dismissed and the owner of the vehicle will incur no costs.
(g) The court shall also dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization of the vehicle if the court finds that the family of the owner of the vehicle has no other private or public means of transportation.
(h) The court may also dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization of any vehicles that are owned by the defendant but that are operated solely by the employees of the defendant or any business owned by the defendant.
(i) The court may also dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization if the defendant provides proof to the satisfaction of the court that a functioning, certified ignition interlock device has been installed upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person.
(j)1. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, s. 316.1937, and s. 322.2715 relating to ignition interlock devices required for second or subsequent offenders, in order to strengthen the pretrial and posttrial options available to prosecutors and judges, the court may order, if deemed appropriate, that a person participate in a qualified sobriety and drug monitoring program, as defined in subparagraph 2., in addition to the ignition interlock device requirement. Participation shall be at the person’s sole expense.
2. As used in this paragraph, the term “qualified sobriety and drug monitoring program” means an evidence-based program, approved by the department, in which participants are regularly tested for alcohol and drug use. As the court deems appropriate, the program may monitor alcohol or drugs through one or more of the following modalities: breath testing twice a day; continuous transdermal alcohol monitoring in cases of hardship; or random blood, breath, urine, or oral fluid testing. Testing modalities that provide the best ability to sanction a violation as close in time as reasonably feasible to the occurrence of the violation should be given preference. This paragraph does not preclude a court from ordering an ignition interlock device as a testing modality.
3. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “evidence-based program” means a program that satisfies the requirements of at least two of the following:
a. The program is included in the federal registry of evidence-based programs and practices.
b. The program has been reported in a peer-reviewed journal as having positive effects on the primary targeted outcome.
c. The program has been documented as effective by informed experts and other sources.
(k) All costs and fees for the impoundment or immobilization, including the cost of notification, must be paid by the owner of the vehicle or, if the vehicle is leased or rented, by the person leasing or renting the vehicle, unless the impoundment or immobilization order is dismissed. All provisions of s. 713.78 shall apply. The costs and fees for the impoundment or immobilization must be paid directly to the person impounding or immobilizing the vehicle.
(l) The person who owns a vehicle that is impounded or immobilized under this paragraph, or a person who has a lien of record against such a vehicle and who has not requested a review of the impoundment pursuant to paragraph (e), paragraph (f), or paragraph (g), may, within 10 days after the date that person has knowledge of the location of the vehicle, file a complaint in the county in which the owner resides to determine whether the vehicle was wrongfully taken or withheld from the owner or lienholder. Upon the filing of a complaint, the owner or lienholder may have the vehicle released by posting with the court a bond or other adequate security equal to the amount of the costs and fees for impoundment or immobilization, including towing or storage, to ensure the payment of such costs and fees if the owner or lienholder does not prevail. When the bond is posted and the fee is paid as set forth in s. 28.24, the clerk of the court shall issue a certificate releasing the vehicle. At the time of release, after reasonable inspection, the owner or lienholder must give a receipt to the towing or storage company indicating any loss or damage to the vehicle or to the contents of the vehicle.
(m) A defendant, in the court’s discretion, may be required to serve all or any portion of a term of imprisonment to which the defendant has been sentenced pursuant to this section in a residential alcoholism treatment program or a residential drug abuse treatment program. Any time spent in such a program must be credited by the court toward the term of imprisonment.
For the purposes of this section, any conviction for a violation of s. 327.35; a previous conviction for the violation of former s. 316.1931, former s. 860.01, or former s. 316.028; or a previous conviction outside this state for driving under the influence, driving while intoxicated, driving with an unlawful blood-alcohol level, driving with an unlawful breath-alcohol level, or any other similar alcohol-related or drug-related traffic offense, is also considered a previous conviction for violation of this section. However, in satisfaction of the fine imposed pursuant to this section, the court may, upon a finding that the defendant is financially unable to pay either all or part of the fine, order that the defendant participate for a specified additional period of time in public service or a community work project in lieu of payment of that portion of the fine which the court determines the defendant is unable to pay. In determining such additional sentence, the court shall consider the amount of the unpaid portion of the fine and the reasonable value of the services to be ordered; however, the court may not compute the reasonable value of services at a rate less than the federal minimum wage at the time of sentencing.
(7) A conviction under this section does not bar any civil suit for damages against the person so convicted.
(8) At the arraignment, or in conjunction with any notice of arraignment provided by the clerk of the court, the clerk shall provide any person charged with a violation of this section with notice that upon conviction the court shall suspend or revoke the offender’s driver license and that the offender should make arrangements for transportation at any proceeding in which the court may take such action. Failure to provide such notice does not affect the court’s suspension or revocation of the offender’s driver license.
(9) A person who is arrested for a violation of this section may not be released from custody:
(a) Until the person is no longer under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893 and affected to the extent that his or her normal faculties are impaired;
(b) Until the person’s blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level is less than 0.05; or
(c) Until 8 hours have elapsed from the time the person was arrested.
(10) The rulings of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles under s. 322.2615 shall not be considered in any trial for a violation of this section. Testimony or evidence from the administrative proceedings or any written statement submitted by a person in his or her request for administrative review is inadmissible into evidence or for any other purpose in any criminal proceeding, unless timely disclosed in criminal discovery pursuant to Rule 3.220, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(11) The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles is directed to adopt rules providing for the implementation of the use of ignition interlock devices.
(12) If the records of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles show that the defendant has been previously convicted of the offense of driving under the influence, that evidence is sufficient by itself to establish that prior conviction for driving under the influence. However, such evidence may be contradicted or rebutted by other evidence. This presumption may be considered along with any other evidence presented in deciding whether the defendant has been previously convicted of the offense of driving under the influence.
(13) If personnel of the circuit court or the sheriff do not immobilize vehicles, only immobilization agencies that meet the conditions of this subsection shall immobilize vehicles in that judicial circuit.
(a) The immobilization agency responsible for immobilizing vehicles in that judicial circuit shall be subject to strict compliance with all of the following conditions and restrictions:
1. Any immobilization agency engaged in the business of immobilizing vehicles shall provide to the clerk of the court a signed affidavit attesting that the agency:
a. Has verifiable experience in immobilizing vehicles;
b. Maintains accurate and complete records of all payments for the immobilization, copies of all documents pertaining to the court’s order of impoundment or immobilization, and any other documents relevant to each immobilization. Such records must be maintained by the immobilization agency for at least 3 years; and
c. Employs and assigns persons to immobilize vehicles that meet the requirements established in subparagraph 2.
2. The person who immobilizes a vehicle must:
a. Not have been adjudicated incapacitated under s. 744.331, or a similar statute in another state, unless his or her capacity has been judicially restored; involuntarily placed in a treatment facility for the mentally ill under chapter 394, or a similar law in any other state, unless his or her competency has been judicially restored; or diagnosed as having an incapacitating mental illness unless a psychologist or psychiatrist licensed in this state certifies that he or she does not currently suffer from the mental illness.
b. Not be a chronic and habitual user of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his or her normal faculties are impaired; not have been committed under chapter 397, former chapter 396, or a similar law in any other state; not have been found to be a habitual offender under s. 856.011(3), or a similar law in any other state; or not have had any convictions under this section, or a similar law in any other state, within 2 years before the affidavit is submitted.
c. Not have been committed for controlled substance abuse or have been found guilty of a crime under chapter 893, or a similar law in any other state, relating to controlled substances in any other state.
d. Not have been found guilty of or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to, regardless of adjudication, or been convicted of a felony, unless his or her civil rights have been restored.
e. Be a citizen or legal resident alien of the United States or have been granted authorization to seek employment in this country by the United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services.
(b) The immobilization agency shall conduct a state criminal history check through the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to ensure that the person hired to immobilize a vehicle meets the requirements in sub-subparagraph (a)2.d.
(14) As used in this chapter, the term:
(a) “Immobilization,” “immobilizing,” or “immobilize” means the act of installing a vehicle antitheft device on the steering wheel of a vehicle, the act of placing a tire lock or wheel clamp on a vehicle, or a governmental agency’s act of taking physical possession of the license tag and vehicle registration rendering a vehicle legally inoperable to prevent any person from operating the vehicle pursuant to an order of impoundment or immobilization under subsection (6).
(b) “Immobilization agency” or “immobilization agencies” means any person, firm, company, agency, organization, partnership, corporation, association, trust, or other business entity of any kind whatsoever that meets all of the conditions of subsection (13).
(c) “Impoundment,” “impounding,” or “impound” means the act of storing a vehicle at a storage facility pursuant to an order of impoundment or immobilization under subsection (6) where the person impounding the vehicle exercises control, supervision, and responsibility over the vehicle.
(d) “Person” means any individual, firm, company, agency, organization, partnership, corporation, association, trust, or other business entity of any kind whatsoever.
History.—s. 1, ch. 71-135; s. 19, ch. 73-331; s. 1, ch. 74-384; s. 1, ch. 76-31; s. 1, ch. 79-408; s. 1, ch. 80-343; s. 2, ch. 82-155; s. 1, ch. 82-403; s. 2, ch. 83-187; s. 1, ch. 83-228; s. 1, ch. 84-359; s. 24, ch. 85-167; s. 2, ch. 85-337; s. 1, ch. 86-296; s. 2, ch. 88-5; s. 5, ch. 88-82; s. 8, ch. 88-196; s. 8, ch. 88-324; s. 60, ch. 88-381; s. 7, ch. 89-3; ss. 1, 18, ch. 91-255; s. 32, ch. 92-78; ss. 1, 11, ch. 93-124; s. 3, ch. 93-246; s. 1, ch. 94-324; s. 895, ch. 95-148; s. 1, ch. 95-186; s. 4, ch. 95-333; s. 12, ch. 95-408; s. 3, ch. 96-330; s. 2, ch. 96-413; s. 48, ch. 97-100; s. 97, ch. 97-264; s. 25, ch. 97-271; ss. 6, 13, ch. 98-324; s. 5, ch. 99-234; s. 139, ch. 99-248; s. 4, ch. 2000-313; s. 10, ch. 2000-320; s. 2, ch. 2002-78; s. 1, ch. 2002-263; s. 1, ch. 2004-379; s. 1, ch. 2005-119; s. 3, ch. 2007-211; s. 29, ch. 2008-111; s. 5, ch. 2008-176; s. 5, ch. 2009-138; s. 10, ch. 2009-206; s. 5, ch. 2010-223; s. 3, ch. 2014-194; s. 8, ch. 2014-216; s. 3, ch. 2015-34; s. 12, ch. 2016-105; s. 15, ch. 2019-58; s. 58, ch. 2020-2; s. 2, ch. 2025-121.
1Note.—Substituted by the editors for a reference to s. 327.35(3)(c)3., as added by s. 2, ch. 2025-121, to conform to the redesignation of existing subunits in s. 327.35 by s. 6, ch. 2025-197.
Note.—Former s. 316.028.
Arrestable Offenses under F.S. 316.193
M = misdemeanor · F = felony · degree: F=1st S=2nd T=3rd§316.193(1)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHRENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8513
§316.193(1)TRAFFIC OFFENSEREVISED. SEE REC #6276
§316.193(1)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHRENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8825
§316.193(1)TRAFFIC OFFENSEREVISED. SEE REC # 6276
§316.193(1a)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHDUI INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR DRUGS
§316.193(1b)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHDUI BLOOD ALCOHOL 0.08 OR MORE PER 100 ML
§316.193(1c)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHDUI BREATH ALCOHOL 0.08 OR MORE PER 210 L
§316.193(2a)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHRENUMBERED. SEE REC # 6276
§316.193(2a)TRAFFIC OFFENSEREVISED. SEE REC #6278
§316.193(2a)TRAFFIC OFFENSEREMOVE BY CH 2002-263
§316.193(2a)TRAFFIC OFFENSEREVISED. SEE REC # 6278
§316.193(2b)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHRENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8506
§316.193(2b1)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHDUI ALCOHOL OR DRUGS 3RD VIOL W/I 10YR
§316.193(2b2)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHREMOVED
§316.193(2b2)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHDUI ALCOHOL OR DRUG 3RD VIOL/CONV OUTSIDE 10YR
§316.193(2b3)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHDUI ALCOHOL OR DRUGS 4TH OR SUBSQ OFF
§316.193(3c1)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHDUI DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OR PERSON OF ANOTHER
§316.193(3c2)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHDUI AND SERIOUS BODILY INJURY TO ANOTHER
§316.193(3c3a)HOMICIDE-NEGLIG MANSL-VEHDUI CAUSE DEATH TO HUMAN OR UNBORN CHILD
§316.193(3c3b)HOMICIDE-NEGLIG MANSL-VEHDUI CAUSE DEATH FAIL TO GIVE INFO RENDER AID
§316.193(3c3c)HOMICIDE-NEGLIG MANSL-VEHDUI CAUSE DEATH FAIL GIVE INFO/AID PREV CONV
§316.193(4)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCH0.15 OR HIGHER OR W PERSON UNDER 18 IN VEHICLE
§316.193(4)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHREMOVED
§316.193(4)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHREMOVED
§316.193(4)DUI-UNLAW BLD ALCHRENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8507
§316.193(13a)PUBLIC ORDER CRIMESVEHICLE IMMOBILIZATION AGENCY VIOLATE REGS
§316.193(13a)PUBLIC ORDER CRIMESRENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8508
§316.193(13c)PUBLIC ORDER CRIMESRENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8873
Civil Citations under F.S. 316.193
Driver's license points · R = revocation · S = suspension§316.193(1)DUI - DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
§316.193(1)DUI - DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE (BICYCLE)
§316.193(2)(b)1DUI - 3rd violation within 10 years
§316.193(2)(b)1DUI - 3rd violation within 10 years (BICYCLE)
§316.193(2)(b)2DUI - 3rd Violation more than 10 years
§316.193(2)(b)2DUI - 3rd Violation more than 10 years (BICYCLE
§316.193(2)(b)3DUI - 4th of Subsequent offense
§316.193(2)(b)3DUI - 4th of Subsequent offense (BICYCLE)
§316.193(3)(c)1DUI - Property Damage/Personal Injury
§316.193(3)(c)1DUI - Property Damage/Personal Injury (BICYCLE)
§316.193(3)(c)2DUI - Serious Bodily Injury
§316.193(3)(c)2DUI - Serious Bodily Injury (BICYCLE)
§316.193(3)(c)3DUI - Manslaughter
§316.193(3)(c)3DUI - Manslaughter (BICYCLE)
§316.193(3)(c)3aDUI - Cause death to human or unborn child
§316.193(3)(c)3aDUI - Cause death to human or unborn child (BYCYCLE)
§316.193(3)(c)3bDUI - Cause death fail to give info/render aid
§316.193(3)(c)3bDUI - Cause death fail to give info/render aid (BICYCLE)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 807
cases (63 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case: State v. King, 346 Conn. 238 (Conn. 2023).
State v. King, 346 Conn. 238 (Conn. 2023). “Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court prop- erly had enhanced the defendant’s sentence as a third time offender under § 14-227a (g), this court having concluded that the element of ‘‘actual physical control’’ in Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.193 (1) is…”
Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). “§ 316.193, Fla. Stat. (1997). Moreover, the existence of any conflicting studies or scientific articles can always be introduced by the defense to challenge the weight of the DRE testimony.”
State v. Brigham, 694 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). “08 percent or above, both in violation of Section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1993).”
State v. Kliphouse, 771 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). “A person is deemed to be under the influence of alcoholic beverages when (1) affected to the extent that the person's normal faculties are impaired or (2) when the person has a blood-alcohol level of 0.”
State v. Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991). “One of the charges was for DUI in violation of section 316.193(1), (2)(b) of the Florida Statutes (Supp.”
In Re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases—Report No. 2008-08, 6 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 2009). “I-u-~appropnate ■ cases, — an instruction may-be given on one or more-ofthe-pre-sumptions-of impairment established by § 316.193b(&)(a)-(e),~ Fla. Stai=F as follows^When appropriate, give one or more of the following instructions on the “presumptions of impairment” established…”
State v. Kelly, 999 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 2008). “2d at 33 (defendant's prior misdemeanor DUI convictions are an element of felony DUI); § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (2003). [22] Miranda v.”
McGhee v. State, 847 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). “See § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (1985); § 316.1931, Fla.”
Freddie Beckham, III v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 799 S.E.2d 689 (Va. Ct. App. 2017). “During the bench trial on the refusal charge, the Commonwealth introduced two prior DUI convictions under Fla. Stat. § 316.193 : one from March 9, 2006 and the other from October 13, 2013.”
State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1999). “The court began its analysis by noting that the statute at issue, section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1995), was amended in 1986 and construed by this Court three years later in Magaw v.”
Unruh v. State, 669 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1996). “Thereafter, Unruh was tried and convicted of DUI under section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1991).”
State v. Woodruff, 676 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1996). “The relevant portions of section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1991), provide: (1) A person is guilty of the offense of driving under the influence and is subject to punishment as provided in subsection (2) if such person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle within…”
— 316.193(1) — 135 cases
State v. Kliphouse, 771 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). “A person is deemed to be under the influence of alcoholic beverages when (1) affected to the extent that the person's normal faculties are impaired or (2) when the person has a blood-alcohol level of 0.”
State v. Bodden, 877 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 2004).
Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1984).
State v. Meador, 674 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
State v. Rolle, 560 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 1990).
— 316.193(1)(2) — 1 case
State v. Perez, 531 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1988).
— 316.193(1)(a) — 46 cases
Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). “§ 316.193, Fla. Stat. (1997). Moreover, the existence of any conflicting studies or scientific articles can always be introduced by the defense to challenge the weight of the DRE testimony.”
Caverly v. State, 436 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
Griffin v. State, 457 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
Allred v. State, 622 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1993).
State, Dept. of High. Saf. & Motor Vehs. v. Possati, 866 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).
— 316.193(1)(b) — 18 cases
State v. Brigham, 694 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). “08 percent or above, both in violation of Section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1993).”
Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). “§ 316.193, Fla. Stat. (1997). Moreover, the existence of any conflicting studies or scientific articles can always be introduced by the defense to challenge the weight of the DRE testimony.”
State v. Bastos, 985 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).
Cardenas v. State, 867 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 2004).
Layman v. State, 455 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
— 316.193(1)(c) — 7 cases
State v. Kelly, 999 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 2008). “2d at 33 (defendant's prior misdemeanor DUI convictions are an element of felony DUI); § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (2003). [22] Miranda v.”
Farneth v. State, 945 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
Dep't of High. Saf. & Motor Vehs. v. Mowry, 794 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
Lanoue v. Florida Dept. of Law Enf't, 751 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
State v. Bastos, 985 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).
— 316.193(1)(e) — 1 case
Dep't of High. Saf. & Motor etc. v. Eric Hirtzel, 163 So. 3d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
— 316.193(12) — 4 cases
Johnson v. State, 994 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 2008).
Ibarrondo v. State, 1 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).
Fender v. State, 980 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
Gregory John Landrum v. State, 149 So. 3d 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).
— 316.193(2) — 11 cases
State v. Muoio, 438 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
McGhee v. State, 847 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). “See § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (1985); § 316.1931, Fla.”
Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). “§ 316.193, Fla. Stat. (1997). Moreover, the existence of any conflicting studies or scientific articles can always be introduced by the defense to challenge the weight of the DRE testimony.”
State v. Perez, 531 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1988).
— 316.193(2)(a) — 30 cases
Baker v. State, 377 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1979).
State v. VanBebber, 848 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2003).
State v. Bodden, 877 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 2004).
Hlad v. State, 565 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
State v. VanBebber, 805 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
— 316.193(2)(a)(2)(a) — 1 case
State v. Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991). “One of the charges was for DUI in violation of section 316.193(1), (2)(b) of the Florida Statutes (Supp.”
— 316.193(2)(a)(2)(b) — 1 case
State v. Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991). “One of the charges was for DUI in violation of section 316.193(1), (2)(b) of the Florida Statutes (Supp.”
— 316.193(2)(a)(2)(c) — 1 case
State v. Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991). “One of the charges was for DUI in violation of section 316.193(1), (2)(b) of the Florida Statutes (Supp.”
— 316.193(2)(a)(3) — 2 cases
Dickenson v. Aultman, 905 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
Doyon v. Dep't of High. Saf., 902 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
— 316.193(2)(b) — 81 cases
State v. Woodruff, 676 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1996). “The relevant portions of section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1991), provide: (1) A person is guilty of the offense of driving under the influence and is subject to punishment as provided in subsection (2) if such person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle within…”
State v. Harbaugh, 754 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2000).
State v. Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991). “One of the charges was for DUI in violation of section 316.193(1), (2)(b) of the Florida Statutes (Supp.”
Harbaugh v. State, 711 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
Stand. Jury Instructions-Crim. Cases, 603 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1992).
— 316.193(2)(b)(1) — 2 cases
Karz v. Dickenson, 932 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
State of Florida v. Allen Robert Boston, 267 So. 3d 463 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
— 316.193(2)(b)(2) — 1 case
Gonse v. State, 952 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
— 316.193(2)(b)(3) — 6 cases
Johnson v. State, 994 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 2008).
State v. Kelly, 999 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 2008). “2d at 33 (defendant's prior misdemeanor DUI convictions are an element of felony DUI); § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (2003). [22] Miranda v.”
Hyden v. State, 117 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
Gonse v. State, 952 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
State v. Salter, 143 So. 3d 1049 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
— 316.193(2)(b)(l) — 5 cases
Murphy v. State, 976 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
State v. Fitzgerald, 63 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
Brooks v. State, 122 So. 3d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).
Woodbury v. State, 110 So. 3d 17 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).
In Re Forfeiture of 2006 Chrysler 4-Door, 9 So. 3d 709 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).
— 316.193(2)(c) — 1 case
Morgan v. State, 47 Fla. Supp. 2d 34 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991).
— 316.193(3) — 54 cases
State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1999). “The court began its analysis by noting that the statute at issue, section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1995), was amended in 1986 and construed by this Court three years later in Magaw v.”
Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1984).
Michael D. Miller v. State of Florida, 250 So. 3d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).
McGhee v. State, 847 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). “See § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (1985); § 316.1931, Fla.”
Burks v. State, 613 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1993).
— 316.193(3)(B) — 1 case
Salazar v. State, 665 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
— 316.193(3)(a) — 18 cases
Collins v. State, 605 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
In Re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases—Report No. 2016-08, 211 So. 3d 995 (Fla. 2017).
Collins v. State, 578 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
Naumowicz v. State, 562 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2018-09., 262 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2019).
— 316.193(3)(a)(1) — 1 case
Carbone v. State, 564 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
— 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c) — 10 cases
In Re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases—Report No. 2008-08, 6 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 2009). “I-u-~appropnate ■ cases, — an instruction may-be given on one or more-ofthe-pre-sumptions-of impairment established by § 316.193b(&)(a)-(e),~ Fla. Stai=F as follows^When appropriate, give one or more of the following instructions on the “presumptions of impairment” established…”
In Re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-report No. 2015-07, 192 So. 3d 1190 (Fla. 2016).
In re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report No. 2012-04, 131 So. 3d 720 (Fla. 2013).
In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2018-09., 262 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2019).
Servis v. State, 802 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
— 316.193(3)(a)(b)(e) — 2 cases
In Re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases—Report No. 2008-08, 6 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 2009). “I-u-~appropnate ■ cases, — an instruction may-be given on one or more-ofthe-pre-sumptions-of impairment established by § 316.193b(&)(a)-(e),~ Fla. Stai=F as follows^When appropriate, give one or more of the following instructions on the “presumptions of impairment” established…”
Link v. Tucker, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (N.D. Fla. 2012).
— 316.193(3)(c) — 87 cases
Stand. Jury Instructions-Crim. Cases, 603 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1992).
Florida Rules of Crim. Procedure Re: Sentencing Guidelines, 522 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1988).
John Goodman v. State of Florida, 229 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).
State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1999). “The court began its analysis by noting that the statute at issue, section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1995), was amended in 1986 and construed by this Court three years later in Magaw v.”
Satterfield v. State, 553 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
— 316.193(3)(c)(1) — 5 cases
Thomas v. State, 820 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
Mizell v. State, 716 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
Onesky v. State, 544 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
Thompson v. State, 617 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
Rekey Davies Bell v. State of Florida (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).
— 316.193(3)(c)(2) — 16 cases
State v. Walton, 42 So. 3d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
Kelly v. State, 987 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
Kezal v. State, 42 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
Pulaski v. State, 540 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
Thomas v. State, 820 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
— 316.193(3)(c)(3) — 17 cases
Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 2003).
State v. Rubio, 967 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2007).
Servis v. State, 855 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).
Lawrence v. State, 801 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
State v. Cooper, 634 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1994).
— 316.193(3)(c)(3)(A) — 1 case
Murphy v. State, 977 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
— 316.193(3)(c)(3)(a) — 6 cases
Cooper v. State, 960 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
Ferrington v. State, 804 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
State v. Torres, 60 So. 3d 560 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
Rekey Davies Bell v. State of Florida (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).
Rodriguez v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr. (M.D. Fla. 2023).
— 316.193(3)(c)(3)(b) — 2 cases
Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 2003).
Gill v. State, 886 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
— 316.193(3)(c)(l) — 2 cases
Wills v. Wilson, 586 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
Boutwell v. State, 625 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
— 316.193(3)(e)(l) — 1 case
Voorhees v. State, 630 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
— 316.193(4) — 13 cases
In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2018-09., 262 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2019).
State v. McInnis, 581 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
In Re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-report No. 2015-07, 192 So. 3d 1190 (Fla. 2016).
In Re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases—Report No. 2016-08, 211 So. 3d 995 (Fla. 2017).
Van Buren v. State, 500 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
— 316.193(4)(a) — 5 cases
Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
McGhee v. State, 847 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). “See § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (1985); § 316.1931, Fla.”
State v. Muoio, 438 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
State v. McInnis, 581 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
Kahasim Rashid Brown v. State of Florida (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).
— 316.193(4)(b) — 1 case
Self v. State, 504 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
— 316.193(4)(c) — 2 cases
DMV v. Gonzalez-Zaila, 920 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).
State, Dep't of High. Saf. & Motor Vehs. v. Butler, 959 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).
— 316.193(5) — 15 cases
Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
State v. Torres, 890 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
State v. Scibana, 726 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
Nicholas G. Coullias v. State of Florida (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).
McGhee v. State, 847 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). “See § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (1985); § 316.1931, Fla.”
— 316.193(6) — 7 cases
McGhee v. State, 847 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). “See § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (1985); § 316.1931, Fla.”
McAdam v. State, 648 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
Drigotas v. State, 531 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
DiPietro v. State, 992 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
John Powers v. State of Florida (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).
— 316.193(6)(a) — 6 cases
Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
State v. Burdette, 826 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 11-551 re: Nelson, 95 So. 3d 122 (Fla. 2012).
NADZO v. State, 24 So. 3d 690 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).
Trujillo v. State, 575 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
— 316.193(6)(b) — 1 case
Voorhees v. State, 630 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
— 316.193(6)(c) — 3 cases
Drigotas v. State, 531 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
State v. Lopez-Ona, 32 Fla. Supp. 2d 157 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1989).
DiPietro v. State, 992 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
— 316.193(6)(d) — 9 cases
Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2000).
State v. Muller, 693 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 1997).
State v. Summers, 651 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
State v. Ginn, 660 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
State v. Wichmann, 726 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
— 316.193(6)(k) — 3 cases
In Re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases—Report No. 2008-08, 6 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 2009). “I-u-~appropnate ■ cases, — an instruction may-be given on one or more-ofthe-pre-sumptions-of impairment established by § 316.193b(&)(a)-(e),~ Fla. Stai=F as follows^When appropriate, give one or more of the following instructions on the “presumptions of impairment” established…”
In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2018-09., 262 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2019).
Farr v. State, 995 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
— 316.193(6)(m) — 1 case
Kahasim Rashid Brown v. State of Florida (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).
— 316.193(9) — 8 cases
Unruh v. State, 669 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1996). “Thereafter, Unruh was tried and convicted of DUI under section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1991).”
In Re Maloney, 916 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 2005).
State v. Unruh, 658 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
Milanese v. City of Boca Raton, 84 So. 3d 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
Chambers v. State, 708 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
— 316.193(9)(b) — 2 cases
The City of Boca Raton, Fl v. Claire L. Basso, 242 So. 3d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
State v. Talty, 692 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
— 316.193(B) — 1 case
State v. Witcher, 737 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
— 316.193(a) — 1 case
Dumile Carolina Wagner v. State of Florida (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).
— 316.193(a)(a) — 1 case
State v. Rife, 26 Fla. Supp. 2d 64 (Fla. Miami-Dade Cty. Ct. 1987).
— 316.193(b) — 1 case
White v. State, 702 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
— 316.193(c)(1) — 1 case
State v. VanBebber, 805 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
— 316.193(i)(b) — 1 case
State v. Tassell, 15 Fla. Supp. 2d 88 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1985).
— 316.193(l)(a) — 29 cases
Williams v. Radivoj, 111 B.R. 361 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
State v. Geiss, 70 So. 3d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
Zink v. State, 448 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Harbaugh v. Cochran, 688 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
Leveritt v. State, 924 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
— 316.193(l)(a)(b) — 1 case
Leveritt v. State, 924 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
— 316.193(l)(b) — 14 cases
Ryan v. Nat'l Marine Mfrs. Ass'n, 103 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).
State v. Naumowicz, 535 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
Leveritt v. State, 924 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
State v. Rife, 26 Fla. Supp. 2d 64 (Fla. Miami-Dade Cty. Ct. 1987).
State v. Oakley, 29 Fla. Supp. 2d 97 (Fla. Broward Cty. Ct. 1988).
— 316.193(l)(b)(1985) — 1 case
Gray v. Lewis (In Re Lewis), 69 B.R. 600 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 1987).
— 316.193(l)(c) — 3 cases
Leveritt v. State, 924 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
State v. Fitzgerald, 63 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
Laws v. State, 145 So. 3d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
— 316.193(l)(e) — 1 case
State v. Baltrus, 33 Fla. Supp. 2d 164 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1989).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.