The 2023 Florida Statutes
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Feldman does not dispute that he used the title "architect" in various websites and that he does not have a state license to practice architecture in Florida. He claims, however, that he is entitled to provide architectural services—and thereby truthfully advertise that he is an "architect"— under section 481.229(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which states that:The court also determined that the services were provided for residential application, and therefore, no license was necessary. See § 481.229(6)(a) (exempting from licensure "[a] person who performs interior design services or interior decorator services for any residential application").The statutory exemption in section 481.229(3) recognizes such contracts, but requires that the “design” side of design-build services be provided by a licensed architect. The statute does not explicitly require the contractor to identify an individually-named architect before offering the design-build services. The exemption requires that both the “rendering” and “offering” of architectural services associated with a design-build project be provided by a licensed architect. § 481.229(3). The Board's construction of the exemption language purports to mandate that, in order to meet the exemption's requirement that a licensed architect “offer” the architectural services of a design-build project, the identity of the architect must actually be specified in the design-build contract; otherwise the contractor faces civil and criminal liability under section 481.223, Florida Statutes (2010).The statutory exemption in section 481.229(3) recognizes such contracts, but requires that the "design" side of design-build services be provided by a licensed architect. The statute does not explicitly require the contractor to identify an individually-named architect before offering the design-build services. The exemption requires that both the "rendering" and "offering" of architectural services associated with a design-build project be provided by a licensed architect. § 481.229(3). The Board's construction of the exemption language purports to mandate that, in order to meet the exemption's requirement that a licensed architect "offer" the architectural services of a design-build project, the identity of the architect must actually be specified in the design-build contract; otherwise the contractor faces civil and criminal liability under section 481.223, Florida Statutes (2010).The Court agrees that it is inappropriate at this stage to strike Plaintiffs' second affirmative defense. Paradise is correct that the exemption in section 481.229(b) does not absolve Plaintiffs from liability under FDUTPA for misrepresenting their qualifications. In other words, whether or not Plaintiffs were required to be licensed bears no relevance to alleged fraudulent behavior that would be actionable under FDUTPA. However, part of Paradise's FDUTPA claim appears to rely, at least in part, on Plaintiffs' alleged violation of Florida's Architecture statute. See (Dkt. 29 at ¶ 39). To that extent, Plaintiffs' Second Affirmative Defense is relevant because they allege that they were not required to qualify as an architect to engage in the designing of single family homes.Florida's interior design license requirement includes several exceptions. For instance, interior designers practicing in residential settings in Florida may do so without a license. See Fla. Stat. §§ 481.223(1)(b) and 481.229(6)(a). Under certain conditions, Florida also exempts from the license requirement manufacturers of "commercial food service equipment" and employees of retail establishments performing interior decorator services in connection with a retail sale. See Fla. Stat. §§ 481.229(6)(b), (8). Florida also allows unlicensed employees of an architect to practice "under the instruction, control, or supervision" of a licensed architect. Fla. Stat. § 481.229(2). Similarly, "any person" can "act[] as a contractor in the execution of work designed by an architect." Id.2. It is declared that § 481.223(1)(c) and the proviso in § 481.229(6)(a) prohibiting advertising or representing oneself as an interior designer are unconstitutional.Section 481.229, Florida Statutes (1999), which pertains to exceptions or exemptions from licensure for architecture and interior design provides that:We affirm the final judgment under review as the record does not reflect that the specific claim of error made on appeal was argued and presented to the lower court. See Tillman v. State, 471 So.2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985) ("In order to be preserved for further review by a higher court, an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved."). In any event, it appears the services provided by the appellee were exempt from the applicable licensing requirements when they were rendered. § 481.203 (8), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994); § 481.229 (1)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994).With respect to the judgment's denial of the lien claim, subpart (2) of section 713.03 specifically limits the right to claim a lien on property which is not actually improved to "architects." Section 713.01(1), Florida Statutes, defines "architect" as a person or firm authorized to practice architecture pursuant to chapter 481 or a general contractor who provides architectural services under a design-build contract authorized by s. 481.229(3). We note that this definition specifically includes unlicensed persons acting pursuant to one statutory exemption from licensure, i.e., section 481.229(3). Our record does not reflect that Appellant made any claim under this provision. However, the definition makes no mention of unlicensed persons acting pursuant to any other of the statutory exemptions listed in section 481.229, including persons designing single family homes. We need not consider whether Appellant would have been entitled to a mechanic's lien had the property been improved. See, generally, O'Kon Co., Inc. v. Riedel, 540 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).. . . their design-build proposal and services were authorized by a specific statutory exemption in section 481.229 . . . Is it your understanding that Chapter 481.229, there is an exception for a general contractor to enter . . . Analysis The requirements of the design-build exemption in section 481.229(3) were satisfied in this . . . The statutory exemption in section 481.229(3) recognizes such contracts, but requires that the “design . . . the exemption expressly authorizes a licensed contractor to “negotiate” a design-build contract. § 481.229 . . .
. . . . §§ 481.223(l)(b) and 481.229(6)(a). . . . Stat. §§ 481.229(6)(b), (8). . . . Stat. § 481.229(2). . . . Stat. § 481.229(2). . . . Stat. § 481.229(6)(a). . . .
. . . .” § 481.229(6)(a). . . . (to be codified at § 481.229(8), Fla. Stat. (2009)). . . . The state’s only argument in support of § 481.229(6)(a) is that it is misleading for a residential interior . . . It is declared that § 481.223(l)(e) and the proviso in § 481.229(6)(a) prohibiting advertising or representing . . . The defendants must not enforce or attempt to enforce § 481.223(l)(c) or the proviso in § 481.229(6)( . . .
. . . appel-lee’s motion to dismiss the charges against him on the grounds that sections 481.223(l)(c) and 481.229 . . . Appellee moved to dismiss the charge arguing that sections 481.223(c) and 481.229(6) were unconstitutionally . . . Section 481.229, Florida Statutes (1999), which pertains to exceptions or exemptions from licensure for . . . Appellee claimed that section 481.223(l)(c), and the exception set forth in 481.229(6) which allows a . . . Section 481.229(6)(a) provides an exemption to licensure for a person “who performs interior design services . . .
. . . (Supp.1994); § 481.229(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). Affirmed. . . .
. . . Appellant relies on the following statutory exception to the licensure requirement: 481.229 Exceptions . . . includes unlicensed persons acting pursuant to one statutory exemption from licen-sure, i.e., section 481.229 . . .