673.1091
Payable to bearer or to order.
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673.1091 Payable to bearer or to order.—
(1) A promise or order is “payable to bearer” if it:
(a) States that it is payable to bearer or to the order of bearer or otherwise indicates that the person in possession of the promise or order is entitled to payment;
(b) Does not state a payee; or
(c) States that it is payable to or to the order of cash or otherwise indicates that it is not payable to an identified person.
(2) A promise or order that is not payable to bearer is “payable to order” if it is payable to the order of an identified person or to an identified person or order. A promise or order that is payable to order is payable to the identified person.
History.—s. 2, ch. 92-82.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7
cases, 2011–2017 · leading case: Mark Pennington v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
Mark Pennington v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (2014)
“§ 673.1091, Fla. Stat. (“A promise or order that is payable to order is payable to the identified person”).”
Federal National Mortgage Association v. McFadyen (2016)
“”); § 673.1091(3), Fla. Stat. (2015) ("An instrument payable to an identified person may become payable to bearer if it is indorsed in blank pursuant to s.”
Anastacia S. Lacombe and Max P. Lacombe v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, etc. (2014)
“The note was “payable to order” under section 673.1091, Florida Statutes because it specifically named Tower Mortgage as the payee.”
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Bohatka (2013)
“at 496; see § 673.1091(2), Fla. Stat. (“If an instrument is payable to bearer, it may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone.”
Isaac v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011)
“” § 673.1091(1), Fla. Stat. “If an instrument is payable to bearer, it may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone.”
Lindsey v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2013)
“Moreover, unlike the note in the Riggs case relied on by Wells Fargo, the original note in this case was not endorsed in blank or otherwise assigned to Wells Fargo. See Gee, 72 So.”
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOC., ETC v. JEAN KACHIK (2017)
“” § 673.1091(1), Fla. Stat. “If an instrument is payable to bearer, it may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone.”
— 673.1091(1) — 2 cases
Isaac v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011)
“” § 673.1091(1), Fla. Stat. “If an instrument is payable to bearer, it may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone.”
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOC., ETC v. JEAN KACHIK (2017)
“” § 673.1091(1), Fla. Stat. “If an instrument is payable to bearer, it may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone.”
— 673.1091(2) — 1 case
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Bohatka (2013)
“at 496; see § 673.1091(2), Fla. Stat. (“If an instrument is payable to bearer, it may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone.”
— 673.1091(3) — 1 case
Federal National Mortgage Association v. McFadyen (2016)
“”); § 673.1091(3), Fla. Stat. (2015) ("An instrument payable to an identified person may become payable to bearer if it is indorsed in blank pursuant to s.”
— 673.1091(l)(b) — 1 case
Federal National Mortgage Association v. McFadyen (2016)
“”); § 673.1091(3), Fla. Stat. (2015) ("An instrument payable to an identified person may become payable to bearer if it is indorsed in blank pursuant to s.”
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