689.09
Deeds under statute of uses.
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689.09 Deeds under statute of uses.—By deed of bargain and sale, or by deed of lease and release, or of covenant to stand seized to the use of any other person, or by deed operating by way of covenant to stand seized to the use of another person, of or in any lands or tenements in this state, the possession of the bargainor, releasor or covenantor shall be deemed and adjudged to be transferred to the bargainee, releasee or person entitled to the use as perfectly as if such bargainee, releasee or person entitled to the use had been enfeoffed by livery of seizin of the land conveyed by such deed of bargain and sale, release or covenant to stand seized; provided, that livery of seizin can be lawfully made of the lands or tenements at the time of the execution of the said deeds or any of them.
History.—s. 12, Nov. 15, 1828; RS 1954; GS 2455; RGS 3795; CGL 5668.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 5
cases, 1962–1995 · leading case: Chase Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Schreiber
Chase Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Schreiber (1985)
“Section 689.09, Florida Statutes (1983), provides as follows: By deed of bargain and sale, or by deed of lease and release, or of covenant to stand seized [sic] to the use of any other person, or by deed operating by way of covenant to stand seized to the use of another person,…”
Brevard County v. Ramsey (1995)
“§ 689.09, Fla. Stat. (1993). This is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Trusts: [A] declaration of trust of a freehold interest in land .”
Kingsland v. Godbold (1984)
“[5] Consideration is required to raise a use by bargain and sale, which is then executed by virtue of section 689.09, Florida Statutes (1983). A deed may be set aside for want of consideration.”
Clement v. Charlotte Hospital Association, Inc. (1962)
“The theory of the plaintiff's suit is that the trust provision in the deed to the defendants created only a dry and passive trust which was executed by the Florida Statute of Uses, Fla. Stat. § 689.09 F.S.A. [1] when the corporation was formed and the hospital constructed.”
Sessa v. Simbari (1982)
“The deed did not require the trustee to discharge any affirmative duties and, pursuant to the Statute of Uses, F.S.689.09, both legal and equitable title vested in Jennifer Simbari.”
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