Florida Statute 713.71 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research

The 2024 Florida Statutes

Title XL
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY

Chapter 713
LIENS, GENERALLY

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F.S. 713.71

713.71 Liens for loans and advances.—Any person who shall procure a loan or advance of money or goods and chattels, wares or merchandise or other things of value, to aid him or her in the business of planting, farming, timber-getting or any other kind of businesses in this state, from any factor, merchant, firm or person in this state, or in the United States or in any foreign country, shall, by this part, be held to have given to the lender, lenders, or person making such advance, a statutory lien of prior dignity to all other encumbrances, saving and excepting liens for labor and liens in favor of landlords, upon all the timber-getting, all the crops, and products grown or anything else made or grown by said person, through the assistance of said loan or advances; provided, that the lien above-given shall not be created unless the person obtaining or procuring such loan or advance shall give to the person making such loan or advance an instrument of writing consenting to said lien; and the same shall be recorded in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county wherein such business of planting, farming, or timber-getting is conducted.

History.—s. 1, ch. 4163, 1893; GS 2208; RGS 3515; CGL 5378; s. 36, ch. 67-254; s. 827, ch. 97-102.

Note.—Former s. 85.22.

F.S. 713.71 on Google Scholar

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Amendments to 713.71

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 713.71

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 713.71.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases Citing Statute 713.71

Total Results: 1

Russell v. Wainwright

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida | Date Filed: 1972-08-31

Citation: 266 So. 2d 375, 1972 Fla. App. LEXIS 6311

Snippet: OWEN, Judge. Boyce Lee Russell was convicted of first degree murder with recommendation of mercy, and sentenced to life imprisonment. No direct appeal was taken, but by means of writ of habeas corpus we have afforded to him delayed appellate review of his conviction. Before this court Russell contends that (1) the identification of the deceased victim was not proved with the requisite sufficiency and (2) he was deprived of a fair and impartial trial because the prosecution used a member of the victim’s