The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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In addition to any sanction imposed for a violation of s. 784.011, s. 784.021, s. 784.03, s. 784.041, s. 784.045, s. 784.048, s. 784.07, s. 784.08, s. 784.081, s. 784.082, s. 784.083, s. 784.085, s. 794.011, or for any offense of domestic violence described in s. 741.28, the court shall impose a surcharge of $201.However we might decide the issue ourselves—and we can see good arguments going both ways—we are bound by circuit precedent to conclude at Chevron step one that 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) is ambiguous, so we must proceed to step two and defer to the BIA's interpretation so long as it's reasonable. In Pierre , we considered whether a conviction for child battery under Fla. Stat. § 784.085 was a "crime of child abuse" under the same provision of the INA at issue here, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). See 879 F.3d at 1249. We first explained that "[i]f an INA term or provision is undefined or ambiguous, and the BIA has interpreted that term or provision in a published, precedential decision, we defer to the BIA's interpretation under Chevron , as long as it reflects a permissible construction of the INA statute." Id. Then, observing that "[t]he INA does not define ‘child abuse,’ " we immediately—and without further explanation—concluded that the "statute is silent on the issue" and, accordingly, that we should "defer to the BIA's interpretation of the INA, so long as that interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the statute." Id. "[A]pplying Chevron deference to the… See, e.g. , § 104.16, Fla. Stat. (stating that someone who "votes or attempts to vote a fraudulent ballot" commits a felony); § 560.111(2), Fla. Stat. (stating that a person "may not knowingly execute, or attempt to execute," a scheme or artifice to defraud a money services business"); § 775.087(1), (2)(d), (3)(d), Fla. Stat. (providing for felony reclassification and enhanced sentencing for someone who "carries, displays, uses, threatens to use, or attempts to use any weapon or firearm" during the commission of a felony); § 775.33(2)(c), (3), Fla. Stat. (stating that someone who "attempts" to "provide material support or resources" in connection with terrorist activity commits a first-degree felony); § 784.0495(1), Fla. Stat. (making it unlawful to "attempt to compel or induce [ ] another person to do or refrain from doing any act or to assume, abandon, or maintain a particular viewpoint against his or her will"); § 784.085( 1), Fla. Stat. (making it unlawful "to knowingly cause or attempt to cause a child to come into contact with" various offensive materials); § 787.025, Fla. Stat. (providing that an adult who "intentionally lures or entices, or attempts to lure or… The State charged Appellant with seven counts of sexual crimes against his stepdaughter. A jury found him guilty as charged on all counts. Counts one, two, and three were for sexual battery by a familial or custodial authority, contrary to section 794.011(8)(b), Florida Statutes. Counts four and five were for lewd or lascivious molestation, contrary to section 800.04(5)(c) 2., Florida Statutes. Counts six and seven were for battery of a child by expelling seminal fluid onto the victim, contrary to section 784.085, Florida Statutes. At sentencing, the State and defense stipulated that double jeopardy applied to prohibit sentencing for counts two, five, and seven. These three counts are worded identically on the charging document, with identical dates, to counts one, four, and six, respectively. The State disagreed with the defense, however, on whether count four, the remaining lewd or lascivious molestation charge, was necessarily subsumed by count three, the remaining sexual battery charge. Applying Lee v. State , 258 So. 3d 1297 (Fla. 2018), the trial court determined that it could only examine the language of the charging document for double jeopardy purposes and… But Appellant argues that the fact that S.P. was under the age of twelve satisfies the requirements of Khianthalat , because a minor cannot give consent to an unlawful sexual touching; thus, as a matter of law, Appellant's acts were without S.P.'s consent. This assertion is untenable, however, given our Court's recent affirmation that parents and those in loco parentis are privileged to touch their children, non-abusively, against their will. Morris v. State , 228 So.3d 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). As a matter of law, Appellant could not commit a battery against his stepchild, unless Appellant touched her in a lewd manner, which is unlawful, and therefore the fondling would be a lewd and lascivious molestation. Thus, either the act of fondling the nine-year old's breasts was a lewd molestation or it was no crime at all, because a non-lewd touching of a child by a parent cannot constitute a battery , absent evidence of physical injury or other factors not alleged or proven here. See § 784.085, Fla. Stat.; § 827.03(1)(a)&(b), Fla. Stat.Florida Statute § 784.085 is entitled "Battery of child by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling certain fluids or materials." Fla. Stat. § 784.085. Under the statute, battery of a child occurs when a person "knowingly cause[s] or attempt[s] to cause a child to come into contact with blood, seminal fluid, or urine or feces by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling such fluid or material." Id. § 784.085(1).(1) If a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, any offense against a minor in violation of s. 784.085, chapter 787, chapter 794 , s. 796.03, s. 800.04 , chapter 827, s. 847.0145, or s. 985.701, the court shall impose a court cost of $101 against the offender in addition to any other cost or penalty required by law.938.085 Additional cost to fund rape crisis centers.—In addition to any sanction imposed when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, a violation of s. 784.011, s. 784.021, s. 784.03, s. 784.041, s. 784.045, s. 784.048, s. 784.07, s. 784.08, s. 784.081, s. 784.082, s. 784.083, s. 784.085, ors. 794.011, the court shall impose a surcharge of $151. Payment of the surcharge shall be a condition of probation, community control, or any other court-ordered supervision.Pursuant to section 784.076, “A juvenile who has been committed to or detained by the Department of Juvenile Justice pursuant to a court order, who commits battery upon a person who provides health services commits a felony of the third degree....” § 784.076, Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added). Exactly one year after the enactment of section 784.076—which was expressly restricted to juveniles—the Legislature, in enacting section 784.082, decided against being so restrictive by using the word “person.” See ch. 95–267, § 57, Laws of Fla. In addition, the Legislature excepted children from being prosecuted under section 784.085, which states that “any person, except a child ... [who] knowingly cause[s] or attempt[s] to cause a child to come into contact with” certain fluids or materials thereby commits a battery of a child, a third-degree felony. § 784.085(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added).. . . See § 784.085, Fla. Stat.; § 827.03(1)(a)&(b), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . Stat. § 784.085. . . . Id. § 784.085(1). . . . Stat. § 784.085(1).. . . . Stat. § 784.085(1); see Thomas, 531 So.2d at 709-10. . . . Stat. § 784.085. That charge was withdrawn. . . . .
. . . 784.03, s. 784.041, s. 784.045, s. 784.048, s. 784.07, s. 784.08, s. 784.081, s. 784.082, s. 784.083, s. 784.085 . . . , or is found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, any offense against a minor in violation of s. 784.085 . . .
. . . 784.03, s. 784.041, s. 784.045, s. 784.048, s. 784.07, s. 784.08, s. 784.081, s. 784.082, s. 784.083, s. 784.085 . . . 784.03, s. 784.041, s. 784.045, s. 784.048, s. 784.07, s. 784.08, s. 784.081, s. 784.082, s. 784.083, s. 784.085 . . . , or is found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, any offense against a minor in violation of s. 784.085 . . .
. . . See §§ 784.076, 784.085, 784.078, Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . In addition, the Legislature excepted children from being prosecuted under section 784.085, which states . . . contact with” certain fluids or materials thereby commits a battery of a child, a third-degree felony. § 784.085 . . .
. . . . § 784.085(1), and soon afterward, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings . . .
. . . . § 784.085 for “Battery of a Child by Throwing, Tossing, Projecting, or Expelling Certain Fluids or . . .
. . . . § 784.085, “Battery of child by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling certain fluids or materials . . . Stat. § 784.085(1) makes it “unlawful for any [adult] to knowingly cause or attempt to cause a child . . . In Young, we reasoned that: [The actions outlawed by § 784.085(1)] require a physical act and are directed . . .
. . . batteries on designated classes: “784.074, 784.075, 784.076, 784.078, 784.081, 784.082, 784.083, and 784.085 . . .
. . . . § 784.085, is a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(l). . . .
. . . Young pled guilty to violating Florida Statute § 784.085, “Battery of a Child by Throwing, Tossing, Projecting . . . Stat. § 784.085; Fla. Stat. § 775.082(3)(d). . . . Stat. § 784.085. . . . that the district court did not err in determining that a conviction for violating Florida Statute § 784.085 . . . Stat. § 784.085. These actions require a physical act and are directed against a person. . . .
. . . section 800.04(5)(b), and one count of battery of a child by bodily fluids in violation of section 784.085 . . . correct that the count regarding battery of a child by bodily fluids constitutes a third-degree felony. § 784.085 . . .
. . . Stat. (2005) (stalking), or the concept of rape, see § 784.085, Fla. . . .
. . . 784.03, s. 784.041, s. 784.045, s. 784.048, s. 784.07, s. 784.08, s. 784.081, s. 784.082, s. 784.083, s. 784.085 . . . 784.03, s. 784.041, s. 784.045, s. 784.048, s. 784.07, s. 784.08, s. 784.081, s. 784.082, s. 784.083, s. 784.085 . . .