Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...guardian). Petitioner failed to appear at arraignment and pickup orders issued. Petitioner then turned nineteen years old which deprived the court of jurisdiction to proceed in delinquency. See generally State v. Griffith, 675 So.2d 911 (Fla.1996); § 985.0301(5)(a), Fla....

...In this appeal, the State challenges an order dismissing its petition for delinquency, filed in October of 2010 and charging W.D. with resisting an officer. By March of 2012, W.D. still had not been arraigned on the charge and the State still had not served W.D. and his parents/guardian with a summons. Relying upon section 985.0301(6), Florida Statutes (2012), which states “[t]he court may at any time enter an order ending its jurisdiction over any child,” the trial court dismissed the ease. The State insists the dismissal was in error. While the State raises a number of arguments, we find merit in only one: its claim that interpreting section 985.0301(6) to permit a trial court to dismiss a juvenile proceeding for no reasons other than those presented in this case would be contrary to the statute’s intent, infringe upon the State’s prosecutorial authority, and render the statute unconstitutional as violating separation of powers principles....

...cord: You could try to serve him in Indiana, but the reason he was initially stopped was because he ran away from Indiana. Now he’s back in Indiana. And what he did is the-police officer told him to stop and ... he hid in a closet. So, pursuant to 985.0301, subsection (6), which states that the Court may at any time enter an order ending its jurisdiction over any child, I’m going to dismiss this based on that and end the jurisdiction of the Court over this child. The prosecutor objected, insisting the statute gave the court the authority to terminate jurisdiction only “once the case has been resolved.” The trial court noted the objection and entered an order dismissing the petition for delinquency. Section 985.0301, Florida Statutes (2012), provides, in relevant part, that (1) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law....

...h this chapter. [[Image here]] (6) The court may at any time enter an order ending its jurisdiction over any child. Here, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over W.D., pursuant to subsection (2) of the statute, when he was taken into custody. See § 985.0301(2), Fla....

...Fundamental principles of statutory construction, however, require that the statutory language be interpreted in the context of the statute as a whole. See, e.g., Koile v. State, 934 So.2d 1226, 1233 (Fla.2006). And, with respect to termination of jurisdiction, the remainder of section 985.0301 is directed to the length of time that the court is permitted to retain jurisdiction following an adjudicatory hearing, i.e., subsection (5)(a) provides that, in the event the court adjudicates the child delinquent, it may retain jur...

...nd alternatives available to the court subsequent to an adjudicatory hearing. In 2006, the legislature rewrote portions of chapter 985. The rewrite resulted in the language that once appeared in section 985.231(l)(f) being moved to the newly-created section 985.0301....

...the terms of the "release order" did not rise to the level of "detention," there is still no authority to impose them. The State relies on two statutes as authority for the court's power to impose this "release order" on Petitioner. [4] The first is section 985.0301, which merely establishes that the circuit court has jurisdiction over juvenile delinquency cases; yet even that statute specifies that the court's control over the child has to accord with the provisions of Chapter 985. § 985.0301(2), Fla....

...Further, both orders extended the trial court’s jurisdiction over E.D.B. until the assessed costs were paid in full. E.D.B. appeals, arguing that the trial court lacked the authority to retain jurisdiction over him past his nineteenth birthday. 1 Section 985.0301, Florida Statutes (2007), addresses the circuit court’s jurisdiction in juvenile cases, providing in pertinent part: (1) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law....

...The State contends that the statute’s authority to extend jurisdiction for repayment of restitution encompasses outstanding cost assessments. In construing a statute, “statutory language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.” Williams v. Ergle, 698 So.2d 1294, 1296 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Section 985.0301(5)0) unambiguously provides that a “court may retain jurisdiction over a child and the child’s parent or legal guardian whom the court has ordered to pay restitution until the restitution order is satisfied” by entering “a restitution order, which is separate from any disposition or order of commitment, on or prior to the date that the court’s jurisdiction would cease under section [985.0301].” Further, “[t]he terms of the restitution order are subject to [section] 775.089(5),” Florida Statutes. § 985.0301(5)(i)....

...ith s. 55.03, and, when properly recorded, becomes a lien on real estate owned by the defendant. If civil enforcement is necessary, the defendant shall be liable for costs and attorney’s fees incurred by the victim in enforcing the order. Finally, section 985.0301(5)(i) states what must be included in a restitution order. This includes “a notation that costs, interest, penalties, and attorney’s fees may also be due and owing.” Reading sections 985.0301(5)(i) and 775.089(5) together, we conclude that costs, interests, penalties, and attorney’s fees under section 985.0301(5)® refers to the interest, costs and attorney’s fees associated with the enforcement of a restitution order under section 775.089(5). Because section 985.0301(5) 2 only allows jurisdiction to be retained to enforce orders of restitution and does not address the issue of retaining jurisdiction to enforce an order of assessed costs, it necessarily excludes it from its purview....

...Further, both orders extended the trial court's jurisdiction over E.D.B. until the assessed costs were paid in full. E.D.B. appeals, arguing that the trial court lacked the authority to retain jurisdiction over him past his nineteenth birthday. [1] Section 985.0301, Florida Statutes (2007), addresses the circuit court's jurisdiction in juvenile cases, providing in pertinent part: (1) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law....

...The State contends that the statute's authority to extend jurisdiction for repayment of restitution encompasses outstanding cost assessments. In construing a statute, "statutory language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning." Williams v. Ergle, 698 So.2d 1294, 1296 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Section 985.0301(5)(i) unambiguously provides that a "court may retain jurisdiction over a child and the child's parent or legal guardian whom the court has ordered to pay restitution until the restitution order is satisfied" by entering "a restitution order, which is separate from any disposition or order of commitment, on or prior to the date that the court's jurisdiction would cease under section [985.0301]." Further, "[t]he terms of the restitution order are subject to [section] 775.089(5)," Florida Statutes. § 985.0301(5)(i)....

...with s. 55.03, and, when properly recorded, becomes a lien on real estate owned by the defendant. If civil enforcement is necessary, the defendant shall be liable for costs and attorney's fees incurred by the victim in enforcing the order. Finally, section 985.0301(5)(i) states what must be included in a restitution order. This includes "a notation that costs, interest, penalties, and attorney's fees may also be due and owing." Reading sections 985.0301(5)(i) and 775.089(5) together, we conclude that costs, interests, penalties, and attorney's fees under section 985.0301(5)(i) refers to the interest, costs and attorney's fees associated with the enforcement of a restitution order under section 775.089(5). Because section 985.0301(5)(i) only allows jurisdiction to be retained to enforce orders of restitution and does not address the issue of retaining jurisdiction to enforce an order of assessed costs, it necessarily excludes it from its purview....

...burglary. Each of these offenses falls within the purview of subsection 14. Therefore the trial court did not err in making this designation. The court further did not err in failing to limit its jurisdiction over this juvenile to the age of 19. See § 985.0301(5)(d), Fla....

...Appellant argues that prosecution in adult court and the resulting 40-year adult sentence violated his 6th Amendment right to a jury determination of the facts supporting his exposure to a sentence which will far exceed his 21st birthday, the date any juvenile sanctions would expire. § 985.0301(5)(c), Fla....

PER CURIAM. At issue here is whether the trial court erred by placing a juvenile sex offender on probation beyond her nineteenth birthday. Section 985.0301(5)(h), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that “[t]he court may retain jurisdiction of a juvenile sexual offender who has been placed in a program or facility for juvenile sexual offenders until the juvenile sexual offender reaches...

...y-one because she was not committed to a residential treatment facility. We disagree and affirm. In construing a statute, “statutory language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.” E.D.B. v. State, 5 So.3d 787, 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). Section 985.0301(5)(h) extends jurisdiction over juvenile sex offenders placed in either a “program or facility.” (Emphasis added)....

...He contends that because the juvenile court failed to reserve jurisdiction on the issue of restitution by separate order prior to his nineteenth birthday, it lost jurisdiction over him pursuant to the plain language of the juvenile jurisdiction statute. 1 We agree. Section 985.0301(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), provides in relevant part: [Wjhen the jurisdiction of any child who is alleged to havé committed a delinquent act or violation of law is obtained, the court shall retain jurisdiction, unless relinquis...

...child turns nineteen, whichever is first. However, the filing of a *614 notice of appeal also divests the trial court of jurisdiction during the pendency of the appeal. See K.D. v. State, 779 So.2d 468, 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Regarding restitution, section 985.0301(5)(i) 2 specifically instructs: The court may retain jurisdiction over a child and the child’s ■ parent or legal guardian whom the court has ordered to pay restitution until the restitution order is satisfied....

...Even though at the adjudicatory hearing the judge orally stated that he would be ordering restitution, and both the disposition order and the order of probation reflect this, there was no restitution order entered “separate from any disposition or order of commitment, on or prior to the date” V.A.C. turned nineteen. § 985.0301(5)©; see Cesaire v....

PER CURIAM. The appellant is a juvenile offender who contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to commit him to a non-secure residential program after he reached his 19th birthday. Appellant claims that section 985.0301(5), Florida Statutes (2009), gives the trial court jurisdiction over delinquent children up to age 19, and that he was not placed in a program (or facility) as would permit an extension of the court’s jurisdiction under (5)(h). Section 985.0301(5)(h), states: (h) The court may retain jurisdiction over a juvenile sexual offender who has been placed in a program or facility for juvenile sexual offenders until the juvenile sexual offender reaches the age of 21, specifically for the purpose of completing the program....

...has now turned nineteen and may no longer be under the jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the trial court for the purposes of remand because the jurisdiction of the juvenile court terminates when the child reaches her nineteenth birthday. See § 985.0301(5)(a), Fla....

...has now turned nineteen and may no longer be under the jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the trial court for the purposes of remand because the jurisdiction of the juvenile court terminates when the child reaches her nineteenth birthday. See § 985.0301(5)(a), Fla....

...Carney, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ellen Griffin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The circuit court improperly dismissed this case prior to an adjudicatory hearing. See § 985.0301(6), Fla....

...Carney, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Alan T. Lipson, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The circuit court improperly dismissed this case prior to an adjudicatory hearing. See § 985.0301(6), Fla....

...The court orally sentenced J.S. to a probationary period of either three years or until J.S.’s nineteenth birthday, whichever comes first. However, the written order of probation does not make clear that the probationary period must end *803 when J.S. turns nineteen. See § 985.0301(5)(b)(l) (2015) (providing that the juvenile court shall retain jurisdiction over a child on probation until the court relinquishes jurisdiction or the child reaches nineteen years of age)....

...2d DCA 2010))). The court orally sentenced J.S. to a probationary period of either three years or until J.S.'s nineteenth birthday, whichever comes first. However, the written order of probation does not make clear that the probationary period must end when J.S. turns nineteen. See § 985.0301(5)(b)(1) (2015) (providing that the juvenile court shall retain jurisdiction over a child on probation until the court relinquishes jurisdiction or the child reaches nineteen years of age)....

...3d 229 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), where we explained: On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition based on our holding in [State v. W.D., 112 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)]. In that case, we held that section 985.0301(6) “is fairly viewed as authorizing the court to elect to end its jurisdiction over a child at any time following the initial adjudicatory hearing—not as permitting the trial court to use its discretion to termi...

PER CURIAM. The State of Florida appeals the trial court’s order dismissing a petition for delinquency against E.I. under section 985.0301(6), Florida Statutes (2012), which allows a juvenile court to end jurisdiction over any child at any time....

...reached his 19th birthday on May 11, 2012. Unless a child is already under commitment, in a transition program, or subject to a restitution order, the jurisdiction of a juvenile court ends at age 19. V.I. v. State, 667 So.2d 439, 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also § 985.0301(5), Fla....

...the “release order” did not rise to the level of “detention,” there is still no authority to impose them. The State relies on two statutes as authority for the court’s power to impose this “release order” on Petitioner. 4 The first is section 985.0301, which merely establishes that the circuit court has jurisdiction over juvenile delinquency cases; yet even that statute specifies that the court’s control over the child has to accord with the provisions of Chapter 985. § 985.0301(2), Fla....

...We need not address the precise point raised by X.R. because the record supports the sanction of contempt in this case, specifically due to X.R.’s disobedience of the show cause order. The juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction over X.R. who was charged with a delinquent act. See § 985.0301(1), Fla....

...We recognize that section 985.455(3),' Florida Statutes’(2009), requires that commitment to the Department be “for an indeterminate period of time.” However, the same statute prohibits commitment for longer than "the maximum term of imprisonment that an adult may serve for the same offense,” id., and section 985.0301(5)(c) prohibits the Department or the court from exercising jurisdiction *237 after the child turns twenty-one years of age....

...Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee. DAMOORGIAN, C.J. In this appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s order dismissing its petition for delinquency. We reverse and hold that the trial court impermissibly relied on section 985.0301(6), Florida Statutes (2011), to dismiss the petition before the adjudicatory hearing....

...in August of 2011, based on allegations that he punched another student in the school cafeteria. At the hearing on the petition more than a year later, the State informed the court that J.C. was living at a family shelter in New York. Defense counsel moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to section 985.0301(6), which permits the court “at any time [to] enter an order ending its jurisdiction over any child.” See § 985.0301(6), Fla....

...The trial court granted the motion over the State’s objection and dismissed the delinquency petition.  On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition pursuant to our holding in W.D., 112 So. 3d 702. There, we held that section 985.0301(6) allows the trial court to end its jurisdiction over a child only after the initial adjudicatory hearing. Id. at 704. The public defender concedes error based on W.D. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court impermissibly relied on section 985.0301(6) to terminate its jurisdiction over J.C....

...1977)). In the criminal context, this means circuit courts may hear all cases except adult misdemeanor offenses. See § 34.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012) (providing county courts with original jurisdiction “[i]n all misdemeanor cases not cognizable by the circuit courts”). Section 985.0301(1), Florida Statutes (2012), states that “[t]he circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law.” Jurisdiction of juvenile procee...

...municipal or county ordinance. § 775.08(3), Fla. Stat. (2013). Under the delinquency statutes, the state attorney files a petition for delinquency in the circuit court to obtain “a finding that a child has committed a delinquent act or violation of law.” §§ 985.0301(1), 985.318(1), Fla. Stat. (2013); Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.030(a). The petition shall be filed “where the delinquent act or violation of law occurred.” § 985.0301(4)(a), Fla....

...burglary. Each of these offenses falls within the purview of subsection 14. Therefore the trial court did not err in making this designation. The court further did not err in failing to limit its jurisdiction over this juvenile to the age of 19. See § 985.0301(5)(d), Fla....

...D.A., a juvenile, appeals from an October 4, 2013, order withholding adjudication and issuing a judicial admonition. D.A. challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction to enter this disposition order because on the date the order was entered, he was 19-years old. See § 985.0301(5)(a), Fla....

...Therefore, it does not control this case. Even if the issue were preserved, we would hold that any error in omitting comments from DJJ would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as appellant was an adult when he was sentenced and had thus aged out of the juvenile justice system. See § 985.0301(5)(a), Fla....

...ears old on May 13, 2019. Petitioner was sentenced without the comprehensive evaluation required by section 985.185(1), Florida Statutes (2018). Once his sentence was reversed, he was no longer “committed to the department” within the meaning of section 985.0301(5). Therefore, the circuit court was bound by section 985.0301(5)(a), which states that the court retains jurisdiction “until the child reaches 19 years of age.” To rule otherwise, would be to add words to the plain language of the statute. LEVINE, C.J., WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur....

...It is incumbent upon us to discern the legislative intent. The majority correctly set forth the statutory provisions involved. Section 316.635(1), Florida Statutes, vests jurisdiction in the county court over misdemeanor traffic offenses, despite the general provisions of section 985.0301(1), which would otherwise have provided for jurisdiction in the juvenile division of the circuit court....

...NOTES [1] § 316.027(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). [2] § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (2008). [3] § 790.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). [4] Fla. R.App. P. 9.145(c)(1)(A). [5] In N.J.G., we recognized that section 316.635(1) appeared to be in conflict with section 985.201 (since renumbered as section 985.0301(1)), which provided that a circuit court shall have "exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law." [6] Section 26.012(2)(c) provides: (2) [Circuit...

...§ 316.027(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). . § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (2008). . § 790.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). . Fla. R.App. P. 9.145(c)(1)(A). . In N.J.G., we recognized that section 316.635(1) appeared to be in conflict with section 985.201 (since renumbered as section 985.0301(1)), which provided that a circuit court shall have "exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law.” ....

...The trial court then sua sponte dismissed the pending petition for delinquency based on State v. A.A., 110 So. 3d 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). The state objected and this appeal ensues.  We review the dismissal of a petition for delinquency de novo. State v. S.P., 24 So. 3d 756, 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Section 985.0301, Florida Statutes (2014), provides, in relevant part, that: (1) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act or violation of...

...3d 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), is most instructive. In J.C., the state filed a delinquency petition. At a hearing more than one year later, the state informed the trial court that J.C. was living in New York. Defense counsel moved to dismiss pursuant to section 985.0301(6), claiming that this section permitted the trial court to “enter an order ending its jurisdiction over any child.” Id. at 757. This court in J.C. held that the “trial court impermissibly relied on section 985.0301(6) to terminate its jurisdiction over J.C....

...and ‘put an end to the prosecution before the case ever reache[d] adjudication on the merits.’” Id. (quoting State v. W.D., 112 So. 3d 702, 704 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)). In reaching this decision, J.C. relied on W.D., where this court determined that the trial court incorrectly relied on section 985.0301(6) to dismiss a delinquency petition. In W.D., this court determined the scope of section 985.0301(6) “as authorizing the court to elect to end its jurisdiction over a child at any time following the initial adjudicatory hearing—not as permitting the trial court to use its discretion to terminate jurisdiction to put an end to...

...However, “the child had been detained and taken into custody.” Id. Thus, this court determined that the trial court had jurisdiction over the juvenile. Nowhere in A.A. did this court discuss the circumstances where a trial court could dismiss a petition for delinquency under section 985.0301(6); rather, we briefly opined that the trial court had jurisdiction because the juvenile had been detained and taken into custody, citing to section 985.0301(1) and (2). Further, in the instant case, when the trial court sua sponte dismissed the petition, it erred because “the trial court improperly ruled on an issue that was not before it and interfered with the State’s discretion to bring charges against” the juvenile....

...Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. At issue here is whether the trial court erred by placing a juvenile sex offender on probation beyond her nineteenth birthday. Section 985.0301(5)(h), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that "[t]he court may retain jurisdiction of a juvenile sexual offender who has been placed in a program or facility for juvenile sexual offenders until the juvenile sexual offender reaches the age of 21 ....

...wenty-one because she was not committed to a residential treatment facility. We disagree and affirm. In construing a statute, "statutory language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning." E.D.B. v. State, 5 So.3d 787, 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). Section 985.0301(5)(h) extends jurisdiction over juvenile sex offenders placed in either a "program or facility." (Emphasis added)....

...was placed on probation for a lewd offense and was required to complete sex- offender counseling. However, three years later, he failed to complete the program. In response, K.D. asked the court to dismiss the 2016 and 2018 cases (the non-sexual offenses), arguing that, under section 985.0301(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2019), the court’s jurisdiction in those cases terminated when K.D....

...case (the lewd conduct case) because he was a sexual offender who needed to complete a program. The State argued section 985.475, Florida Statues (2019), defined a juvenile sex offender as a juvenile found guilty of violating chapter 800, like K.D. here. Further, the State argued, section 985.0301(5)(c) gave the court jurisdiction over K.D., as a juvenile sex offender, not just the juvenile sex offender case....

...at mandated by statute.” Cesaire v. State, 811 So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citation omitted). A circuit court has “exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings” where the child allegedly commits a delinquent act or violates the law. § 985.0301(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2019). The jurisdiction attaches “to the child and the case,” and after service, “the court may control the child and the case in accordance with” chapter 985. § 985.0301(2), Fla. Stat. With limited exceptions, the court retains jurisdiction to dispose of a case until the child turns 19 years old. § 985.0301(5)(a), Fla. Stat.; State v. E.I., 114 So. 3d 309, 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). Section 985.0301(5) sets out some of the circumstances under which the court’s jurisdiction is extended and provides, in part: (5)(a) Notwithstanding s....

...who has been placed in a program or facility for juvenile sexual offenders, pursuant to s. 985.48, until the juvenile sexual offender reaches 21 years of age, specifically for the purpose of allowing the juvenile to complete the program. § 985.0301(5)(a)–(c), Fla....

...until he was 21 years old because he was a juvenile sex offender. Both K.D. and the State purport to rely on the plain meaning of the statute in support of their argument. The statute states that jurisdiction attaches to a child and case until the child reaches the age of 19. § 985.0301(2), (5)(a), Fla. Stat. But it also allows a court to retain jurisdiction over a juvenile sex offender until the juvenile sexual offender reaches the age of 21. § 985.0301(5)(c), Fla. Stat. We conclude that although section 985.0301(2) confers the court with jurisdiction over the child and case, that jurisdiction is limited by other provisions within chapter 985. § 985.0301(2), Fla. Stat. The default rule under section 985.0301(5)(a) is that the court—which already obtained jurisdiction over the child—retains jurisdiction to dispose of the case until the child turns 19. § 985.0301(5)(a), Fla. Stat. And if additional sexual offenses are filed in a case that already allows the court to retain jurisdiction over the juvenile sex offender under section 985.0301(5)(c), then the court may retain jurisdiction over the juvenile until the age of 21 “specifically for the purpose of allowing the juvenile to complete the program.” § 985.0301(5)(c), Fla....

...Pappacoda, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. DAMOORGIAN, J. In this appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s final order sua sponte dismissing its petition for delinquency. We reverse and hold that the trial court impermissibly relied on section 985.0301(6), Florida Statutes (2014), to sua sponte dismiss the petition before the initial adjudicatory hearing....

...After noting it appeared that the State had declined to extradite D.A. after he was arrested in Colorado, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the petition for delinquency. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition based on our holding in W.D.1 In that case, we held that section 985.0301(6) “is fairly viewed as authorizing the court to elect to end its jurisdiction over a child at any time following the initial adjudicatory hearing—not as permitting the trial court to use its discretion to terminate jurisdiction...

...The state contends that the trial court could not dismiss this juvenile case, because the court had not acquired jurisdiction as the child had not been served. However, the child had been detained and taken into custody. Therefore, jurisdiction attached. See § 985.0301, Fla....