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2018 Georgia Code 48-5-7 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 48 REVENUE AND TAXATION

Section 5. Ad Valorem Taxation of Property, 48-5-1 through 48-5-607.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

48-5-7. (For effective date, see note.) Assessment of tangible property.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this Code section, taxable tangible property shall be assessed at 40 percent of its fair market value and shall be taxed on a levy made by each respective tax jurisdiction according to 40 percent of the property's fair market value.
  2. Tangible real property which is devoted to bona fide agricultural purposes as defined in this chapter and which otherwise conforms to the conditions and limitations imposed in this chapter shall be assessed for ad valorem property tax purposes at 75 percent of the value which other tangible real property is assessed and shall be taxed on a levy made by each respective tax jurisdiction according to said assessment.
  3. Tangible real property which qualifies as rehabilitated historic property pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 48-5-7.2 shall be assessed at 40 percent of its fair market value and shall be taxed on a levy made by each respective tax jurisdiction according to 40 percent of the property's fair market value. For the purposes of this subsection, the term "fair market value" shall mean the fair market value of rehabilitated historic property pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (3) of Code Section 48-5-2.
  4. The requirement contained in this Code section that all tax jurisdictions assess taxable tangible property at 40 percent of fair market value shall not apply to any tax jurisdiction whose ratio of assessed value to fair market value exceeded 40 percent for the tax year 1971. No tax jurisdiction so exempted shall assess at a ratio of less than 40 percent except as necessary to effect the preferential assessment provided in subsection (b) of this Code section.
  5. Each notice of ad valorem taxes due sent to taxpayers of counties and municipalities shall include both the fair market value of the property of the taxpayer which is subject to taxation and the assessed value of the property after being reduced as provided by this Code section.

(c.1)Tangible real property which qualifies as landmark historic property pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 48-5-7.3 shall be assessed at 40 percent of its fair market value and shall be taxed on a levy made by each respective tax jurisdiction according to 40 percent of the property's fair market value.For the purposes of this subsection, the term "fair market value" shall mean the fair market value of landmark historic property pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph (D) of paragraph (3) of Code Section 48-5-2.

(c.2)Tangible real property which is devoted to bona fide conservation uses as defined in this chapter and which otherwise conforms to the conditions and limitations imposed in this chapter shall be assessed for property tax purposes at 40 percent of its current use value and shall be taxed on a levy made by each respective tax jurisdiction according to 40 percent of the property's current use value.

(c.3)Tangible real property located in a transitional developing area which is devoted to bona fide residential uses and which otherwise conforms to the conditions and limitations imposed in this chapter for bona fide residential transitional property shall be assessed for property tax purposes at 40 percent of its current use value and shall be taxed on a levy made by each respective tax jurisdiction according to 40 percent of the property's current use value.

(c.4)Tangible real property which qualifies as brownfield property pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 48-5-7.6 shall be assessed at 40 percent of its fair market value and shall be taxed on a levy made by each respective tax jurisdiction according to 40 percent of the property's fair market value. For the purposes of this subsection, the term "fair market value" shall mean the fair market value of brownfield property pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph (F) of paragraph (3) of Code Section 48-5-2.

(Ga. L. 1851-52, p. 288, § 14; Code 1863, § 734; Code 1868, § 801; Code 1873, § 804; Code 1882, § 804; Civil Code 1895, § 770; Ga. L. 1909, p. 36, § 1; Civil Code 1910, § 1010; Code 1933, § 92-5703; Ga. L. 1968, p. 358, § 2; Ga. L. 1972, p. 1102, § 1; Ga. L. 1975, p. 1083, § 1; Ga. L. 1976, p. 518, § 1; Code 1933, § 91A-1019, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 309, § 2; Ga. L. 1979, p. 5, § 26; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1850, § 2; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1585, § 2; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1122, § 2; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1903, § 4; Ga. L. 1992, p. 6, § 48; Ga. L. 2003, p. 170, § 2; Ga. L. 2018, p. 119, § 3/HB 85.)

Delayed effective date.

- Ga. L. 2018, p. 119, § 7/HB 85, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "(a) This Act shall become effective on January 1, 2019, only if an amendment to the Constitution of Georgia is ratified at the November, 2018, general election modifying constitutional prescriptions for forest land conservation use property and related assistance grants, permitting the withholding of a portion of assistance grants to provide for certain state administrative costs, and establishing qualified timberland property as a subclassification of tangible property for purposes of ad valorem taxation.

"(b) If such an amendment to the Constitution is not so ratified, then this Act shall not become effective and shall stand repealed by operation of law on January 1, 2019." If the amendment is ratified, subsections (c.5) and (c.6) will read as follows: "(c.5) Tangible real property which qualifies as forest land conservation use property pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 48-5-7.7 shall be assessed at 40 percent of its forest land conservation use value and shall be taxed on a levy made by each respective tax jurisdiction according to 40 percent of the property's forest land conservation use value.

"(c.6) Tangible real property which qualifies as qualified timberland property in accordance with the provisions of Article 13 of this chapter shall be assessed at 40 percent of its fair market value of qualified timberland property and shall be taxed on a levy made by each respective tax jurisdiction according to 40 percent of its fair market value of qualified timberland property as such value is determined by the commissioner in accordance with Article 13 of this chapter." Until the ratification and January 1, 2019, there are no subsections (c.5) and (c.6).

The 2018 amendment added subsections (c.5) and (c.6). For effective date of this amendment, see the delayed effective date note.

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 1983, p. 1850, § 1, effective April 8, 1983, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that: "It is the intent of this Act to implement certain changes imposed by Article VII, Section I, Paragraph III, subparagraph (c) of the Constitution of the State of Georgia."

Ga. L. 1983, p. 1850, § 4, effective April 8, 1983, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that that Act ( § 2 of which amended this Code section) "shall apply to all tax years beginning on or after January 1, 1984."

Ga. L. 1991, p. 1903, § 15, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section shall be applicable beginning January 1, 1992, with respect to ad valorem taxation of timber and shall be applicable beginning January 1, 1992, for all other purposes. Taxation for prior periods shall continue to be governed by prior law.

The state-wide referendum (Ga. L. 2002, p. 1017, § 2), which would have added a new subsection (c.4), relating to exemption from ad valorem taxation for commercial dockside facilities, was defeated at the November 2002, general election.

Law reviews.

- For note on the 1989 amendment to this Code section, see 6 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 173 (1989).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Statute is not unconstitutional for vagueness of the term "fair market value." Chilivis v. Backus, 236 Ga. 88, 222 S.E.2d 371 (1976).

Constitutionality.

- Setting the assessed value of tangible property at 40 percent of fair market value is not in conflict with the Georgia Constitution. Salem v. Tattnall County, 250 Ga. 881, 302 S.E.2d 99 (1983).

Department of Natural Resources certification not required within two-year time frame.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.2, an owner needed only to complete the rehabilitation of property within 24 months in order to be allowed to apply for and obtain certification of the property as rehabilitated historic property for purposes of preferential assessment under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7(c) and there was no statutory basis that the owner obtain final certification from the Department of Natural Resources within that two year time frame. Chatham County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Emmoth, 278 Ga. 144, 598 S.E.2d 495 (2004).

Assessment procedures upheld.

- Assessment of property at 40% of value did not violate the constitutional requirement of uniformity, even though statistical evidence showed the average level of assessment of other property to be 38.84% of fair market value or lower. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Henry County Bd. of Assessors, 217 Ga. App. 699, 458 S.E.2d 705 (1995).

Construction with other provisions.

- Words "assessed value" in Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VIII, Sec. XII, Para. I (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Para. I) mean the correctly assessed value, that is, the assessed value approved by the commissioner, not an incorrectly assessed value. Board of Comm'rs v. Allgood, 234 Ga. 9, 214 S.E.2d 522 (1975).

Because a beneficial property owner only benefitted from a lower ad valorem tax in proportion to the interest owned in the property, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to a corporation, as approval of preferential ad valorem tax treatment for property co-owned by the shareholders of the corporation by a tenancy in common did not violate O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4(b)(3), as an individual's benefit was to be determined on a pro-rata basis; thus, if the interests of shareholders who were tenants in common of the property were so calculated, no single shareholder would have benefitted from current use assessment as to more than 2,000 acres. Effingham County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Samwilka, Inc., 278 Ga. App. 521, 629 S.E.2d 501 (2006).

Under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4, the owners of "bona fide conservation use property," including property used for certain agricultural purposes and meeting other statutory criteria and conditions, may apply to the county board of tax assessors for "current use assessment" of their property for purposes of calculating ad valorem taxes. If the application is granted, the property is assessed for tax purposes at 40 percent of the property's "current use value" instead of 40 percent of the property's "fair market value," under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7(a) and (c.2), thus resulting in tax savings. Morrison v. Claborn, 294 Ga. App. 508, 669 S.E.2d 492 (2008).

Court erred by failing to make necessary findings as to business operated on property.

- Trial court erred by holding that operating a commercial grain business on property designated conservation use property under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4 did not constitute a breach of the conservation use covenant because the court failed to make any findings as to whether the grain business was incidental and not detrimental to the qualifying use of the property. Terrell County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Goolsby, 324 Ga. App. 535, 751 S.E.2d 158 (2013).

All property to be returned at fair market value.

- Basic requirement, whether the property is returnable to the comptroller general (now commissioner) or to the tax receivers of the several counties, is that all property shall be returned and assessed at the property's fair market value. Ogletree v. Woodward, 150 Ga. 691, 105 S.E. 243 (1920).

Property is not ordinarily deemed as taxed until tax has been levied since the word "taxation" ordinarily includes a determination of the rate of levy and imposition of the levy, as an essential part of the sovereign power and process, it follows that property will not ordinarily be deemed as taxed until the tax has been levied. Rayle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Cook, 195 Ga. 734, 25 S.E.2d 574 (1943).

Valuation of debts.

- It is not necessary that the owner of a debt should return it at more than its fair market value, and the fact that the debt is valued, with other debts, at a gross amount, and the whole thus returned, can make no difference, provided the value placed upon them is what the taxpayer believes to be their fair market value. Lewis v. Horne, 44 Ga. 627 (1872).

Right to appeal penalty assessment.

- An assessment of a penalty for a breach of a conservation use covenant is an assessment for which a property owner has the right to appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311. Oconee County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Thomas, 282 Ga. 422, 651 S.E.2d 45 (2007).

Mandamus relief properly denied since certification of appeals obtained.

- Trial court did not err by denying a group of property owners their request for mandamus relief in the nature of finding that the county board of tax assessors certified their property tax appeals because it was undisputed that the tax appeals were physically delivered to the trial court and that it had ruled that such appeals were certified to it, thus, the property owners received the relief sought regarding certification. Newton Timber Co., L.L.L.P. v. Monroe County Bd. of Tax Assessors, Ga. , 755 S.E.2d 770 (2014).

Cited in Fulton County v. Strickland, 251 Ga. 473, 306 S.E.2d 299 (1983); Ga. Power Co. v. Monroe County, 284 Ga. App. 707, 644 S.E.2d 882 (2007).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 72 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, §§ 689, 731.

C.J.S.

- 84 C.J.S., Taxation, § 449 et seq.

ALR.

- Construction and application of statute prohibiting or restricting reassessment after assessment and payment of taxes, 85 A.L.R. 107.

Original cost of construction or reproduction cost as proper factors in assessing real property for taxation, 104 A.L.R. 790.

Different parts or parcels of land in same ownership as single unit or separate units for tax assessment purposes, 133 A.L.R. 524.

Real-estate tax equalization, reassessment, or revaluation program commenced but not completed within the year, as violative of constitutional provisions requiring equal and uniform taxation, 76 A.L.R.2d 1077.

Tax assessor's civil liability to taxpayer for excessive or improper assessment of real property, 82 A.L.R.2d 1148.

Income or rental value as a factor in evaluation of real property for purposes of taxation, 96 A.L.R.2d 666.

Judicial notice as to assessed valuations, 42 A.L.R.3d 1439.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7

Total Results: 8  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Roberts v. Deal, 723 S.E.2d 901 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 19, 2012 | 290 Ga. 705, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 952

...legislation. See, e.g., OCGA §§ 15-44-22(4) (defining "court reporting" and the government entities for which it is done); 28-1-8(b)(1) (addressing expenses of members of the General Assembly and service pertaining to various government entities); 48-5-7.6(e)(1)(B) (regarding taxation of certain property and transfer to government entities)....
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Chatham Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Emmoth, 598 S.E.2d 495 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 28, 2004 | 278 Ga. 144, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 2126

...Supreme Court of Georgia. June 28, 2004. *496 Lowther & Walmsley, Timothy R. Walmsley, Savannah, for appellants. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, Harold B. Yellin, Adam G. Kirk, Savannah, for appellee. HUNSTEIN, Justice. This appeal involves the interpretation of OCGA § 48-5-7.2, which provides for the certification of property as rehabilitated historic property for purposes of preferential assessment under OCGA § 48-5-7(c) and the "freezing" of this assessed value for ad valorem taxation during the rehabilitation period and thereafter for up to ten years. Anna K. Emmoth sought to utilize the provisions of OCGA § 48-5-7.2 to qualify for the preferential assessment after she decided to improve her property in Savannah....
...in appraised and assessed property values). Emmoth petitioned the Superior Court of Chatham County for mandamus relief, asserting that she was entitled as a matter of law to approval of her application for preferential assessment because under OCGA § 48-5-7.2 she needed only to complete the rehabilitation of the property within 24 months and that there was no statutory basis *497 for the Board's requirement that she obtain the DNR's final certification within that time frame....
...The superior court found the Board's other issues raised in its motion to dismiss were not ripe for disposition and denied the motion. The Board appeals the trial court's ruling. [3] Because the trial court properly interpreted the plain and unambiguous language of OCGA § 48-5-7.2 and provided Emmoth with the appropriate remedy, we affirm. 1. The Board argues that Emmoth's claim should have been dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies available to her in an appeal to the Board of Equalization pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-311. OCGA § 48-5-7.2(e) expressly required the Board, upon denying Emmoth's application for preferential assessment, to notify the applicant in the same manner that notices of assessment are given pursuant to Code Section 48-5-306....
...We reject the Board's argument that mandamus was not appropriate. OCGA § 48-5-380 does not provide a legally adequate remedy to a taxpayer who has been denied the long-term preferential assessment that may be accorded rehabilitated historic property under OCGA § 48-5-7.2. 2. The Board contends that the trial court's interpretation of OCGA § 48-5-7.2 is contrary to the language and intent of the statute and argues that the proper interpretation is the one applied by the Board, namely, that OCGA § 48-5-7.2 requires a taxpayer both to complete the rehabilitation of the historic property and to obtain final certification from DNR within the two-year period in subsection (c). We disagree. OCGA § 48-5-7.2(c) gives a property owner 24 months from the date the county board of tax assessors receives the submitted preliminary certification "in which to complete the rehabilitation of such property in conformity with the application approved" by the DNR....
...subsection (e) makes clear that it is only "[u]pon receipt of final certification from the [DNR]" that a property owner may make application to the county board of tax assessors for preferential assessment. The plain and unambiguous language of OCGA § 48-5-7.2 does not support the Board's claim that both the rehabilitation process and the DNR final certification process must be completed within the two-year period before the owner may apply and obtain preferential assessment *498 for the properly certified, rehabilitated historic property....
...Indeed, the Board's interpretation conflicts with subsection (c), in that by requiring the property owner to obtain DNR final certification within the two-year time frame the Board would lessen the 24 months the subsection expressly gives property owners in which to rehabilitate their property. Furthermore, OCGA § 48-5-7.2 places no time limitations on DNR in the processing of the owner's request for final certification and the statute contains no guidelines whereby an owner could calculate the time required to obtain that final certification....
...the statute. The trial court properly declined to apply to the statute a construction that is not only contrary to the plain statutory language but also leads to absurd and unreasonable results. The Board attempts to avoid the plain language of OCGA § 48-5-7.2 by arguing that its interpretation is "implicit" in the interplay between subsections (c) and (e), in that a contrary interpretation would result in the Board having no value upon which to base the preferential assessment whenever the own...
...bilitation period. This argument has no merit, however, because in order to determine that value the Board need only look to OCGA § 48-5-2(3)(C), which defines "fair market value" of property classified as rehabilitated historic property under OCGA § 48-5-7.2, and OCGA § 48-5-7.2(g)(3), which sets forth the same test to be used when the county tax receiver or tax commissioner enters the basis or value of a parcel of rehabilitated historic property....
...We find similarly meritless the Board's argument that the trial court's interpretation would allow any property owner who completed the rehabilitation within two years to postpone indefinitely the submission of the final certification to the Board. The provisions in OCGA § 48-5-7.2 eliminate any incentive for a property owner to delay submission of the final certification....
...fication. Contrary to the Board's assertion that the property owner can submit the final certification years after the rehabilitation period has expired and obtain at that later time the full benefit of the statute's ten-year assessment freeze, OCGA § 48-5-7.2(g)(1) clearly provides that the "first year of eligibility" for the preferential assessment is "the tax year following the year in which the preliminary certification was filed" and subsection (g)(3) provides that the rehabilitated histor...
...ion is received pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section in which to complete the rehabilitation of such property in conformity with the application approved by the [DNR]." [2] The trial court recognized that the Board was entitled under OCGA § 48-5-7.2(c) to remove the preferential assessment status it had granted Emmoth upon the expiration of the 24-month period after the date she submitted the preliminary certification to it....
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Dawson v. Dawson, 597 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 24, 2004 | 277 Ga. 850, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 1710

...As the majority erroneously holds otherwise, I dissent to the judgment affirming the trial court's order. I am authorized to state that Justice THOMPSON joins in this dissent. NOTES [1] The appellants now assert that this understanding was incorrect, contending OCGA § 48-5-7.4(n)(3) allows early termination without penalty in this situation....
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Oconee Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Thomas, 282 Ga. 422 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 24, 2007 | 651 S.E.2d 45, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 2919

...As a definitional matter, therefore, assessment is much more than valuation. Its primary sense, imposition of a tax or fine, accurately describes the action of the BOA which Thomas seeks to appeal and which OCGA § 48-5-311 permits to be appealed to the BOE. The BOA cites to OCGA §§ 48-5-7, 48-5-306, and 48-5-341 as support for its effort to limit the meaning of “assessment” to “valuation,” but those Code sections are not effective support in that none of them define the word, and not all of them use it in the exclusive manner BOA urges....
...Moving beyond definitions, the BOA also contends its assessment of a penalty is not appealable to the BOE because the BOE is given jurisdiction to appeal only one aspect of conservation use covenants, the denial of an application for such use. See OCGA § 48-5-7.4 (j) (1)....
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Fulton Cnty. v. Strickland, 251 Ga. 473 (Ga. 1983).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 9, 1983 | 306 S.E.2d 299

...In June 1982, the State Revenue Commissioner (Commissioner) entered a “factor order” requiring an 8% increase in the assessments of taxable tangible property on the 1982 Fulton County tax digest so as to achieve a digest of 40% of the fair market value of taxable property. OCGA § 48-5-7(a) (Code Ann....
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Newton Timber Co., L.L.L.P. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 295 Ga. 29 (Ga. 2014).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 10, 2014 | 755 S.E.2d 770, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 442

...See OCGA § 48-5- 7.4 The number “2008" was handwritten on the top of each printed given to the city and county governing authorities, either of which may prohibit the appeal by majority vote within the allowed period of time. 4 OCGA § 48-5-7 provides: (a) Except as otherwise provided in this Code section, taxable tangible property shall be assessed at 40 percent of its fair market value and shall be taxed on a levy made by each respective tax jurisdict...
...s assessed and shall be taxed on a levy made by each respective tax jurisdiction according to said assessment. (c) Tangible real property which qualifies as rehabilitated historic property pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 48-5-7.2 shall be assessed at 40 percent of its fair market value and shall be taxed on a levy made by each respective tax jurisdiction according to 40 percent of the property's fair market value....
...d historic property pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (3) of Code Section 48-5-2. (c.1) Tangible real property which qualifies as landmark historic property pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 48-5-7.3 shall be assessed at 40 percent of its fair market value and shall be taxed on a levy made by each respective tax jurisdiction 4 application.5 All of these applications were appr...
...on a levy made by each respective tax jurisdiction according to 40 percent of the property's current use value. (c.4) Tangible real property which qualifies as brownfield property pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 48-5-7.6 shall be assessed at 40 percent of its fair market value and shall be taxed on a levy made by each respective tax jurisdiction according to 40 percent of the property's fair market value....
...County Clerk of the Superior Court. Count II stated: Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 et seq., Plaintiffs seek a writ of mandamus from the court compelling the [Board] to perform its official public duties, thereby requiring [the Board] to comply with O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4 (j) (1) and approve or deny the CUVA applications. At a hearing before the superior court on December 12, 2012, Newton Entities argued, inter alia, that the Board had a duty to certify its appeals to the clerk of the superior court pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-311 (g) (2)....
...Newton Entities now state that the Board did implicitly deny them CUVA treatment for 2008, and instead, argues that the superior court erred in denying their mandamus request by finding that the Board had provided them the opportunity to appeal the denial of their 2008 CUVA applications.13 Citing OCGA § 48-5-7.4 (j) (1),14 12 Upon return of the remittitur in this case, the status of the filed tax appeals should be assessed in light of any non-payment of ordered fees. 13 Newton Entities state that they “do not dispute the validity of this denial.” 14 OCGA § 48-5-7.4 (j) (1) provides: All applications for current use assessment under this Code section, including the covenant agreement required under this Code section, shall be filed on or before the last day for filing ad...
...now requested; therefore, it can hardly be found error for the superior court to fail to grant it. Second, it is plain that Newton Entities filed only one set of CUVA applications, and that they were filed in 2011; the very statutory provision upon which they now rely, OCGA § 48-5-7.4 (j) (1), would render any attempt to make those applications effective for 2008 untimely as a matter of law....
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Salem v. Tattnall Cnty., 302 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 1983).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 3, 1983 | 250 Ga. 881

...There is no constitutional requirement that local option sales tax revenues be used for educational purposes. Enumeration of error two therefore presents no ground for reversal. 3. The taxpayers' third enumeration of error questions the constitutionality of OCGA § 48-5-7 (a) (Code Ann....

Chestnut Ridge, LLC v. Hall Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 9, 2025 | 250 Ga. 881

...On appeal, Chestnut Ridge argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Hall County Board of Tax Assessors (the “Board”) because (1) the Board was required to conduct a physical inspection of the property prior to declaring a breach and assessing a penalty; (2) OCGA § 48-5-7.4(l) violates the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution on the ground of vagueness; and (3) the covenant was 1 Although originally captioned as an LLC, the parties agree Chestnut Ridge is actually an LLLP. a renewal, such that the less severe penalty provision in OCGA § 48- 5-7.4(x), rather than OCGA § 48-5-7.4(l), applies....
...proceedings consistent with this opinion. The record shows that in March 2005, Bartow Morgan, Jr., purchased a 59.3-acre tract of land on Lake Lanier. Three months earlier, the prior owner had applied for and received a CUVA covenant for 58.3 acres pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-7.4. Under that statute, qualified property owners can enter into a covenant with their local taxing authority to maintain the property for conservation use for a mandatory period of ten years. See OCGA § 48-5-7.4(d). In exchange, the property owner gains the benefit of a preferential ad valorem tax assessment by allowing for the property to be assessed at 40 percent of its current use value rather than 40 percent of its fair market value. See OCGA § 48-5-7(c.2). 2 In July 2022, Chestnut Ridge sold 43.05 acres of the property to Athletic Club Drive, LLC....
...ub Drive did not apply by the deadline, and the Board sent notices to both owners on May 2, 2023, entitled “Notice of Intent to Assess Penalty for Breach of a Conservation Use Covenant.” This notice stated it was sent in accordance with OCGA § 48-5-7.4(k.1)4 to notify the owners of the 2 The sole member of this LLC appears to be a citizen of the United Kingdom. 3 The letter notes that “proof of US Citizenship is required when the application is filed.” The Board also...
...breached the covenant and that the imposition of a penalty was proper. Chestnut Ridge filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Board’s attempt to impose the penalty was improper because the Board failed to complete the statutorily required steps, that OCGA § 48-5-7.1(l) is unconstitutionally vague, and that the Board relied on the wrong statutory subsection to improperly double the amount of the penalty....
...The trial court granted summary judgment to the Board on all issues raised, and this appeal 5 followed.7 1. It initially appeared that this Court had jurisdiction over this appeal because it involved a novel constitutional question, i.e., whether OCGA § 48-5-7.4(l) violates the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution on the ground of vagueness....
...thereof. Ignorance of the law excuses no one.” OCGA § 1-3-6. At oral argument, Chestnut Ridge conceded that it had not served the Attorney General with a copy of the proceeding before the trial court ruled on its constitutional challenge to OCGA § 48-5-7.4(l). Accordingly, the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the constitutional issue....