Daniel v. Am. Optical Corp., 304 S.E.2d 383 (Ga. 1983). · Go Syfert
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Daniel v. Am. Optical Corp., 304 S.E.2d 383 (Ga. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
99 citation events (48 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: MCKESSON CORPORATION v. ANGEL BOLTON (gactapp, 2026-02-12) · Strongest negative: Lewis v. Atlanta Casualty Co. (gactapp, 1986-04-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 24 distinct citers.
discussed Cited "but see" Lewis v. Atlanta Casualty Co. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166 ( 304 SE2d 383 ) (1983); Smith, Miller & Patch v. Lorentzson, 254 Ga. 111 ( 327 SE2d 221 ) (1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) MCKESSON CORPORATION v. ANGEL BOLTON (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
OCGA § 9-3-33 provides that “actions for injuries to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues[.]” This provision is a “traditional general statute of limitations[,]” and “the scope of the application of this statute of limitation is determined by the nature of the injury sustained, rather than the legal theory underlying the claim for relief.” Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 168 (1) ( 304 SE2d 383 ) (1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) LEE v. APOGEE MEDICAL MANAGEMENT INC
M.D. Ga. · 2022 · confidence medium
Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 167 (1983).
examined Cited as authority (rule) GARDEI v. CONWAY (4×)
Ga. · 2022 · confidence medium
Similarly, and more recently, in Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 167 (304 SE2d 383) (1983), a federal appellate court certified the question of what statute of limitation applied to a strict liability cause of action when the strict liability statute did not 12 include a specific statute of limitation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pti Royston, LLC v. Shirley Eubank
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
See OCGA § 9-3-33 (setting two-year limitation period for injuries to person); Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 167 (1) ( 304 SE2d 383 ) (1983) (limitation period for injuries to 9 Other states have also carved out exceptions to prevent the statute of repose from barring asbestos claims.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. Ethicon, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
S.D. Ga. · 2021 · confidence medium
Optical Corp., 304 S.E.2d 383, 385 (Ga. 1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ELLIS v. WARREN
M.D. Ga. · 2020 · confidence medium
Optical Corp., 304 S.E.2d 383, 385 (Ga. 1983) (finding that courts should determine whether O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 applies “by the nature of the injury sustained rather than the legal theory underlying the claim for relief”); Smith, Miller & Patch v. Lorentzson, 327 S.E.2d 221, 222 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (finding O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 applies to product liability actions for injuries to the person).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DeMOTT v. OLD TOWN TROLLEY TOURS OF SAVANNAH, INC. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Quoting Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 168 (1) ( 304 SE2d 383 ) (1983), the trial court held that “the scope of application of this statute of limitations is determined by the nature of the injury sustained rather than the legal theory underlying the claim for relief.” The court concluded that DeMott’s injury did not arise out of any breach of Old Town’s contractual duty to safely transport her but was a premises liability claim for personal injury based on the condition of the parking lot.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davenport v. Cummins Alabama, Inc.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
“OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) ... is in derogation of common law and[, therefore,] must be strictly construed or limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed and not extended beyond plain and explicit terms.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 167 (1) ( 304 SE2d 383 ) (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Boyce v. Gregory Poole Equipment Co.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Robert F. Bullock, Inc. v. Thorpe, 256 Ga. 744, 745 ( 353 SE2d 340 ) (1987); Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 167 (1) ( 304 SE2d 383 ) (1983); Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 658 ( 238 SE2d 361 ) (1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Colormatch Exteriors, Inc. v. Hickey
Ga. · 2002 · confidence medium
Compare OCGA § 9-3-30 (b) (providing a special rule for synthetic stucco causes of action which do not expire before March 28, 2000); Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 167 (1) ( 304 SE2d 383 ) (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Denton v. Browns Mill Development Co. (2×)
Ga. · 2002 · confidence medium
However, this is an incorrect statement of the principle that a civil statute "which is in derogation of common law... `must be strictly construed or limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed and not extended beyond plain and explicit terms.' [Cits.]" Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 167 (1), 304 S.E.2d 383 (1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc.
W.D. La. · 2001 · confidence medium
Id. at 385.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Busbee v. Chrysler Corp.
Ga. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 167 (1) ( 304 SE2d 383 ) (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gantes v. Kason Corp. (2×)
N.J. · 1996 · confidence medium
Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166 , 304 S.E.2d 383, 384 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nelson v. C. M. City, Inc.
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
The fair result advocated by Chief Judge Pope is reached in this case, however, by focusing more precisely on the exact language of OCGA § 51-1-11.1, so that it is “ ‘strictly construed or limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed and not extended beyond plain and explicit terms.’ ” Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 168 (1) ( 304 SE2d 383 ), quoted in AUtrade.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Reaugh v. Inner Harbour Hospital, Ltd.
Ga. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 168 (1) ( 304 SE2d 383 ) (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alltrade, Inc. v. McDonald (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
As this Court noted in Tyler v. Pepsico, 198 Ga. App. 223, 225 (1) ( 400 SE2d 673 ) (1990), quoting Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 167 (1) ( 304 SE2d 383 ) (1983), OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) "is in derogation of the common law and `"must be strictly construed or limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed and not extended beyond plain and explicit terms." (Cits.)' [Cit.]" An entity which merely affixes its label to a product and sells it under its name is a product seller rather than a manufacturer under OCGA § 51-1-11 and is not liable in a product liability action base…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. J. I. Case Co.
Ga. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
“OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) . . . is our statute governing strict liability in tort which is in derogation of common law and ‘must be strictly construed or limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed and not extended beyond plain and explicit terms.’ [Cits.]” Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 167 (1) ( 304 SE2d 383 ) (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tyler v. PepsiCo, Inc.
Ga. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
In the instant case, we likewise recognize the bottling agreement’s function of protecting the Pepsi trade name and find that despite the relationship created by the agreement, appellee is not a manufacturer as contemplated by OCGA § 51-1-11 (b), which is in derogation of the *226 common law and “ ‘must be strictly construed or limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed and not extended beyond plain and explicit terms.’ [Cits.]” Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 167 (1) ( 304 SE2d 383 ) (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thorpe v. Robert F. Bullock, Inc. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
In fact, the approach of strict construction was given recently in Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 167 (1) ( 304 SE2d 383 ) (1983): "OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (Code Ann. § 105-106) is our statute governing strict liability in tort which is in derogation of common law and `must be strictly construed or limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed and not extended beyond plain and explicit terms.' [Cits.]" We must assume that the legislature deliberately chose the word "sold." Where the language of an act is plain and unequivocal, judicial construction is not only unnecessa…
examined Cited "see" Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co. (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166 ( 304 SE2d 383 ) (1983); Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 243 Ga. 91 ( 252 SE2d 623 ) (1979).
examined Cited "see, e.g." HARVEY v. MERCHAN (4×)
Ga. · 2021 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 168 (1)-(2) (304 SE2d 383) (1983) (action based on injury to the person accrued when plaintiff suffered physical injury); Doe v. Saint Joseph’s Catholic Church, 357 Ga. App. 710, 713 (1) (b) (850 SE2d 267) (2020) (cause of action accrued when plaintiff was allegedly molested by priest).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Carr v. Core Industries (2×)
S.D. · 1986 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166 , 304 S.E.2d 383 (1983); Smith v. Elliard, 110 Mich.App. 25 , 312 N.W.2d 161 (1981); Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395 , 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 , 335 N.E.2d 275 (1975); Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 598 S.W.2d 24 (Tex.Civ.App.1980); Kinney v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 134 Vt. 571 , 367 A.2d 677 (1976); Note, Strict Liability Actions — Which Statute of Limitations?, 31 Mercer L.Rev. 773 (1980); Annot. 91 A.L.
Daniel
v.
American Optical Corporation
39457.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jun 28, 1983.
304 S.E.2d 383
White & Nackley, Robert J. White, for appellant., Hart & Sullivan, Michael G. Frick, for appellee.
Gregory.
Cited by 43 opinions  |  Published
Gregory, Justice

This case comes before us upon questions certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit pursuant to Rule 36 of the Supreme Court of Georgia. See OCGA § 15-2-9; Code Ann. § 24-4536. The following statement of the case was submitted to us by the circuit court.

Statement of the case

“On January 4,1978, while operating a lathe, plaintiff suffered an eye injury when a piece (or pieces) of hot metal flew over his safety glasses into his left eye. The defendant is the manufacturer of the safety glasses that the plaintiff was wearing at the time of the accident. On May 22, 1981, more than two years after the accident, plaintiff filed this diversity suit, and seeks damages for strict liability in tort under Ga. Code § 105-106 [OCGA § 51-1-11 (b)] and for negligence.

“Ga. Code § 3-1004 [OCGA § 9-3-33] provides in relevant part that ‘[a]ctions for injuries to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues.’ The defendant brought a Motion to Dismiss contending that the action is barred by § 3-1004 [OCGA § 9-3-33]. If this statute of limitations applies, then plaintiff’s[*167] action was untimely filed. Plaintiff argues that § 3-1004 [OCGA § 9-3-33] does not apply to the strict liability claim under § 105-106 [OCGA § 51-1-11 (b)].

“Plaintiff notes that the Georgia legislature added a statute of limitations to § 105-106 [OCGA § 51-1-11 (b)]. [This limitation applies only to that portion of § 105-106 dealing with products liability — now subsection (b) of OCGA § 51-1-11] in April 1978, after the accident in this case occurred. The amendment provides, in relevant part: No action shall be commenced pursuant to this subsection with respect to an injury after 10 years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury. Prior to April 1978, § 105-106 did not provide any such statute of limitations; plaintiff argues, therefore, no statute of limitations applied to strict products liability claims arising under § 105-106 [OCGA § 51-l-ll(b)].

“The defendant contends that, because an action under § 105-106 [OCGA § 51-1-11 (b)] sounds in tort, § 3-1004 [OCGA § 9-3-33] applies. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff appealed.”

Certified Questions

“(1) What period of limitations applies to the instant fact situation, the two-year period under § 3-1004 [OCGA § 9-3-33] or the ten-year period under § 105-106 [OCGA § 51-1-11 (b)]? (2) Is some other period of limitations applicable? (3) Was the complaint by the plaintiff timely filed?”

1. OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (Code Ann. § 105-106) is our statute governing strict liability in tort which is in derogation of common law and “must be strictly construed or limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed and not extended beyond plain and explicit terms.” Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 658 (238 SE2d 361) (1977); Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 243 Ga. 91 (252 SE2d 623) (1979). In the 1978 amendment to this subsection, the legislature expressly placed time restrictions on the bringing of a cause of action under the subsection, but it was not a traditional statute of limitations which typically declares “that no suit shall be maintained on such causes of action unless brought within a specified period after the right accrued. ” (Emphasis supplied.) Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1077 (4th Ed. 1968). OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (Code Ann. § 105-106) does not contain such a traditional statute of limitations. Since OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (Code Ann. § 105-106) must be strictly construed, we do not believe this 1978 amendment was intended to preclude the application of a general statute of limitations which would otherwise apply or to suggest that no general statute of limitations applied to[*168] strict liability actions under OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (Code Ann. § 105-106) prior to the 1978 amendment. See Eldridge, Products Liability in Georgia § 5-6.6 (1982 Supp.).

Decided June 28, 1983. White & Nackley, Robert J. White, for appellant.

OCGA § 9-3-33 (Code Ann. § 3-1004) provides in relevant part, “Actions for injuries to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues ...” This is a traditional general statute of limitations. By its very language, the scope of application of this statute of limitations is determined by the nature of the injury sustained rather than the legal theory underlying the claim for relief. The nature of injuries covered are “injuries to the person.” Physical injuries such as these are clearly covered by this language. Dalrymple v. Brunswick Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 51 Ga. App. 754 (181 SE 597) (1935). Because the nature of the injury sustained in this case is an injury to the person, OCGA § 9-3-33 (Code Ann. § 3-1004) applies. See Taylor v. Murray, 231 Ga. 852 (204 SE2d 747) (1974). [1] We find no reason to differentiate between actions for personal injuries brought under a theory of strict liability as opposed to negligence for purposes of applying OCGA § 9-3-33 (Code Ann. § 3-1004).

2. Based on the facts provided this action is barred by the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries expressed in OCGA § 9-3-33 (Code Ann. § 3-1004). The personal injury occurred on January 4, 1978, yet the complaint was not filed until May 21, 1981, more than two years after the cause of action accrued. See Gibson v. Kelley, 88 Ga. App. 817 (78 SE2d 76) (1953). Consequently, this complaint for damages for personal injury, brought under a theory of strict liability, was not timely filed.

3. Certified questions answered as follows:

(1) The two-year statute of limitations under OCGA § 9-3-33 (Code Ann. § 3-1004) applies to the instant fact situation.

(2) No.

(3) No.

All the Justices concur. [*169] Hart & Sullivan, Michael G. Frick, for appellee.
1

We note that the following seventeen jurisdictions have also held that their general statutes of limitations governing actions in personal injury or tort also apply to strict liability actions: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See 91 ALR 3rd 455 for cases cited therein.