No certification for moot questions.

- While federal district courts could certify open questions of law under the Georgia state constitution and relevant state statutes to the Supreme Court of Georgia under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. IV, O.C.G.A. § 15-2-9, and Ga. S. Ct. R. 46 - 48, because the direct actions by plaintiff insureds against defendant insurer were barred by O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 for failure to have first obtained a judgment against their uninsured motorists, the insureds' request for certification of a question of law to the Supreme Court of Georgia, to determine whether Georgia precedent prohibited the insurer from asserting set-offs in the payment of uninsured motorist personal injury claims, was not warranted. Harden v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., F.3d (11th Cir. July 22, 2009)(Unpublished).

Question certified as to state insurance law.

- Question was certified to the state supreme court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-2-9 as to whether a notice of cancellation, properly given by an insurer after the premium was past due, was ineffective under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44 because the notice provided the insured an opportunity to keep the policy in force by paying the past due premium within the 10-day statutory period. Infinity Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 570 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2009).

Question certified.

- Because the question of whether bank directors and officers might be subject to claims for ordinary negligence was debatable under Georgia law, the issue was certified to the state supreme court. FDIC v. Skow, 741 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2013).

Because the appeal seemed to present questions of state law that had not yet been decided by the Georgia appellate courts, three questions were certified to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Piedmont Office Realty Trust v. Xl Speciality Ins. Co., 769 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2014).

Question not certified.

- Court's reasoning was not transformed from a principled decision to a conjectural conclusion simply because the court chose not to rely on legal theories that had either not been recognized in this state or that did not apply to the facts presented. As such, certification to the Georgia Supreme Court was inappropriate. Gold Cross EMS, Inc. v. Children's Hosp. of Ala., F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. June 1, 2015), aff'd, No. 15-14369, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 7622 (11th Cir. Ga. 2016).

Cited in Szczepanski v. GMAC, 558 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1977); Miree v. United States, 565 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1978); Insurance Co. v. Meyer, 565 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1978); Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 570 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1978); Szczepanski v. GMAC, 571 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1978); Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 580 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1978); Miree v. United States, 588 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1979); Balboa Ins. Co. v. A.J. Kellos Constr. Co., 247 Ga. 393, 276 S.E.2d 599 (1981); United States v. Aretz, 248 Ga. 19, 280 S.E.2d 345 (1981); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 634 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1981); Aretz v. United States, 635 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1981); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Young, 638 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1981); Aretz v. United States, 660 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1981); Continental Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 251 Ga. 412, 306 S.E.2d 285 (1983); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983); Harlan v. Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 699 F.2d 521 (11th Cir. 1983); General Tel. Co. v. Trimm, 706 F.2d 1117 (11th Cir. 1983); Lamb v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 712 F.2d 466 (11th Cir. 1983); Robinson v. Parrish, 720 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1983); Griffin v. Continental Am. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 671 (11th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 732 F.2d 129 (11th Cir. 1984); Abney v. Cox Enters., 777 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1985); Jordan v. TG & Y Stores Co., 256 Ga. 16, 342 S.E.2d 665 (1986); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Folsom, 256 Ga. 400, 349 S.E.2d 368 (1986); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Folsom, 806 F.2d 225 (11th Cir. 1986); Southern Guar. Corp. v. Doyle, 256 Ga. 790, 353 S.E.2d 510 (1987); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Celotex Corp., 854 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1988); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 913 F.2d 907 (11th Cir. 1990); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Mouyal, 959 F.2d 219 (11th Cir. 1992); Granite State Ins. Co. v. Nord Bitumi U.S., Inc., 959 F.2d 911 (11th Cir. 1992); Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 965 F.2d 991 (11th Cir. 1992); Kitchen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 19 F.3d 601 (11th Cir. 1994); United States Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Park 'N Go of Ga., Inc., 66 F.3d 273 (11th. Cir. 1995); Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengel-Ellschaft, 81 F.3d 139 (11th Cir. 1996); Colonial Oil Indus., Inc. v. Underwriters, 106 F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 1997); Boardman Petro., Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 119 F.3d 883 (11th Cir. 1997); Waldrip v. Head, 272 Ga. 572, 532 S.E.2d 380 (2000); Hallum v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2002); Baillie Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 391 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2004); Hardin v. NBC Universal, Inc., 283 Ga. 477, 660 S.E.2d 374 (2008); Trinity Outdoor, LLC v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ga. 583, 679 S.E.2d 10 (2009); Mooney v. Webster, 300 Ga. 283, 794 S.E.2d 31 (2016).

ALR.

- Right of federal courts in passing upon the validity or construction of state statute or constitutional provision, or rights and obligations accruing thereunder, to exercise their own judgment independent of latest state court decisions thereon rendered subsequent to the accrual of the right in question, 97 A.L.R. 515.