BOGGS, Chief Justice.

Petitioner Deandre Arnold filed a petition in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus against Ché Alexander, the Clerk of the Fulton County Superior Court, alleging that the Clerk has subjected Petitioner, as an indigent pro se litigant, to a Catch-22 situation that unlawfully prevents him from filing any civil complaint. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that, except in very limited circumstances not present here, we lack original jurisdiction to grant the sort of relief Petitioner seeks and that the case does not fall within our appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, we transfer the original petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution.

In his verified original petition, Petitioner alleges that he attempted to file a civil complaint, accompanied by an affidavit of indigence, through the Fulton County Superior Court’s e-filing system, which is mandatory even for pro se filers unless they are incarcerated. However, the complaint was rejected because it was not accompanied by an order authorizing him to file “using a waiver payment account.” Petitioner called the Clerk’s office and was told that any person seeking to file a complaint accompanied by an affidavit of indigence must first obtain an order authorizing indigent status. He was also advised that to obtain such an order, he had to present the complaint in person and be sworn before a superior court judge, who would either grant or deny the request for indigent status. Finally, he was told that the Clerk would not accept the filing by mail. Petitioner represents that he is unable to drive or to walk the 25 miles from his home to the Clerk’s office and that there is no private party available to transport him. He asserts that the Clerk’s policy of not accepting complaints accompanied by an affidavit of indigence is contrary to OCGA § 9-15-2, which sets forth procedures for a party to present an affidavit as to the party’s indigence in lieu of payment of costs.^[1] He also asserts that the Clerk’s policy violates the Clerk’s ministerial duty to file papers and that the policy violates his federal constitutional rights to equal protection, due process, and access to the courts. He also contends he has no adequate remedy other than filing an original petition in this Court because if he attempted to file a mandamus petition in superior court, he would run into the exact same difficulty because he cannot appear in person to present a writ of mandamus and affidavit of indigence and the Clerk would not accept such a filing by mail. He seeks an order from this Court directing the Clerk and her staff to accept all filings accompanied by an affidavit of indigence and to present such filings to a judge.

1. It is well established that this Court has a “duty to inquire into [its] jurisdiction in any case in which there may be a doubt about the existence of such jurisdiction.” State of Ga. v. Fed. Defender Program, Inc., 315 Ga. 319, 324 (882 SE2d 257) (2022) (cleaned up).2 Here, it appears that Petitioner is asserting that this Court has jurisdiction to consider his original petition under Article VI, Section I, Paragraph IV of the 1983 Constitution (“Paragraph IV”). “When we inquire into the meaning of a constitutional provision, we look to its text, and our object is to ascertain the meaning of the text at the time it was adopted.” Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 428 (801 SE2d 867) (2017) (cleaned up). We “view the text in the context in which it appears, and read the text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” Id. at 429 (cleaned up). “In so doing, we typically refer to the rules of English grammar, inasmuch as those rules are the guideposts by which ordinary speakers of the English language commonly structure their words.” Walton Electric Membership Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., ___ Ga. ___ ( ___ SE2d ___ ) (Jan. 28, 2025) (S24G0314, S24G0318) (cleaned up). Additionally, “for relevant context, we may look to, among other things, the other law—constitutional, statutory, and common law alike—that formed the legal background of the constitutional provision in question at the time of its adoption.” Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 429 (cleaned up).

Although Petitioner references the “original jurisdiction” of this Court,3 the term “original jurisdiction” does not appear in our current Constitution. However, shortly after the ratification of the 1983 Constitution, we used the phrase “original jurisdiction” in Brown v. Johnson, 251 Ga. 436, 436 (306 SE2d 655) (1983), and suggested that Paragraph IV authorized this Court to grant a writ of mandamus to a superior court judge as an exercise of “original jurisdiction.” Since Brown, we have on occasion in published opinions dismissing similar original petitions referred to our “original jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Gay v. Owens 292 Ga. 480, 483 (738 SE2d 614) (2013); Graham v. Cavender, 252 Ga. 123, 123 (311 SE2d 832) (1984). But we have not addressed the scope of the “powers” granted in Paragraph IV. And while we and the Court of Appeals have both used the phrase “original jurisdiction” in published opinions since 1983, we have not expressly held that the Constitution of 1983 grants such jurisdiction.

As we noted in Brown, every constitution since the creation of this Court, except the 1983 Constitution, expressly provided that this Court “shall have no original jurisdiction.”4 From at least the 1800s, the term “original jurisdiction” has been understood as the authority of a court to hear and decide a case from the beginning as opposed to the appellate jurisdiction of a higher court to review a judgment from a lower court. See Black’s Law Dictionary (1st ed. 1891) (defining original jurisdiction as “[j]urisdiction in the first instance; jurisdiction to take cognizance of a cause at its inception, try it, and pass judgment upon the law and facts. Distinguished from appellate jurisdiction.” (emphasis in original)). An appellate court’s issuance of a writ of mandamus that is not connected to a pending or impending appeal is also considered an exercise of “original jurisdiction.” See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175- 176 (2 LEd 60) (1803) (explaining that the issuance of a writ of mandamus by that Court to the Secretary of State, which writ was not necessary to enable the Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, would be an exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction). However, an appellate court’s issuance of a writ of mandamus in aid of its jurisdiction is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. See id. at 175.

So, with this background, the question is what are we to make of the suggestion in Brown that Paragraph IV was a source of “original jurisdiction.” Paragraph IV, which is captioned “Exercise of Judicial Power,” provides:

Each court may exercise such powers as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its judgments; but only the superior and appellate courts and state-wide business court shall have the power to issue process in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, specific performance, quo warranto, and injunction. Each superior court, state court, and other courts of record and the state-wide business court may grant new trials on legal grounds.^[5]

The plain language of Paragraph IV does not mention “original jurisdiction,” and the framers could have, but did not, include an original jurisdiction provision in Paragraph IV or in any other provision of the 1983 Constitution. Compare U. S. Const. Art. III, Sec. II, Cl. II (granting United States Supreme Court “original jurisdiction” over certain cases). But, as noted above, Paragraph IV, which first appeared in the 1983 Constitution, authorizes every court to exercise “such powers as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its judgments,” but authorizes only certain courts, including this Court, “to issue process in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, specific performance, quo warranto, and injunction.” In construing this provision, we observe that the use of the semicolon relates the first clause to the second. See Springtime, Inc. v. Douglas County, 228 Ga. 753, 755 (187 SE2d 874) (1972) (“The semicolon is normally employed in marking off a series of sentences or clauses of coordinate value, that is, to separate consecutive phrases or clauses which are independent of each other grammatically, but dependent alike on some word preceding or following.”). Here, the first clause references “powers” that each court may exercise and the second clause refers to “the power to issue process” and describes the nature of that power as “mandamus, prohibition, specific performance, quo warranto, and injunction.” Therefore, the exercise of Paragraph IV’s grant of authority to issue writs of mandamus is connected only to “such powers as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” It does not grant jurisdiction to this Court to issue process as an original matter wholly unconnected to its appellate jurisdiction.

Moreover, the authority granted in Paragraph IV mirrors the power this Court has had by statute since its creation to issue writs of mandamus to lower courts in limited circumstances. See, e.g., OCGA § 15-2-8 (3) (stating that the Supreme Court has authority “[t]o grant any writ necessary to carry out any purpose of its organization or to compel any inferior tribunal or officers thereof to obey its order”); Ga. Code Ann. 1933, § 24-3901 (3) (stating that Supreme Court has authority to issue writs necessary to purposes of organization); Ga. Code Ann. 1860, Part I, Title V, Chapter II, § 211 (3) (authorizing this Court to “grant any writ necessary to carry out any purpose of its organization, or to compel any inferior tribunal, or officer thereof, to obey its order”); Ga. Laws 1845, p. 21-22 (allowing this Court to issue a writ of mandamus to a superior court judge who refuses to certify a bill of exceptions, to a clerk of court who fails to transmit the record in a case, or to a sheriff who fails to perform any duty imposed under the Act). This Court has exercised the power granted in these statutory provisions in the context of an ongoing or impending appeal. See, e.g., McLendon v. Anderson, 207 Ga. 243, 243 (60 SE2d 762) (1950) (granting application for writ of mandamus to compel trial judge to enter an order of supersedeas as to the sentence of execution upon the filing of the bill of exceptions where execution date would render appeal moot); Sears v. Candler, 112 Ga. 381, 382 (37 SE 442) (1900) (granting application for writ of mandamus to compel trial judge to certify a bill of exceptions); Taylor v. Reese, 108 Ga. 379, 383 (33 SE 917) (1899) (same). However, we have not found any case in which we have held that the power to grant a writ of mandamus to a lower court authorized this Court to exercise original jurisdiction as that term is generally understood. See generally Vanderford v. Brand, 126 Ga. 67, 68 (54 SE 822) (1906) (quoting the express constitutional prohibition on the exercise of original jurisdiction by this Court and explaining that this Court’s power to issue writs of mandamus to lower courts in connection with pending or impending appeals is “ancillary” to this Court’s appellate jurisdiction and not an exercise of original jurisdiction).

Finally, an additional important context to consider is that Paragraph IV appears in the constitutional provision addressing “Judicial Power” generally. It does not appear in Article VI, Section VI, Paragraphs II and III of the 1983 Georgia Constitution, which are the constitutional provisions that specifically grant this Court “appellate jurisdiction.” Those provisions provide that this Court “shall be a court of review” that exercises “exclusive appellate jurisdiction” in specified cases and non-exclusive “appellate jurisdiction” in other categories of cases. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II and III.

Accordingly, we conclude that the best reading of the plain language of Paragraph IV, viewed in context, authorizes this Court and the Court of Appeals to grant a writ of mandamus only in matters related to an appeal or impending appeal, when necessary in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate appellate court judgments.^[6] A different reading of Paragraph IV as authorizing this Court to have “original jurisdiction” to issue writs of mandamus unrelated to an appellate matter would be contrary to the plain language of that provision. See Camden County v. Sweatt, 315 Ga. 498, 509 (883 SE2d 827) (2023) (in construing a constitutional provision, we give the “text its plain and ordinary meaning, view the text in the context in which it appears, and read the text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would” (cleaned up)). See also TDGA, LLC v. CBIRA, LLC, 298 Ga. 510, 511-512 (783 SE2d 107) (2016) (in construing constitutional provisions, “courts are not authorized either to read into or read out that which would add to or change its meaning” (cleaned up)). To the extent that Brown, 251 Ga. at 436, and its progeny can be read as holding that Paragraph IV grants this Court or the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction to grant a writ of mandamus or prohibition unconnected to the appellate jurisdiction of the respective courts, those cases are hereby disapproved. ^[7]

2. Because we lack jurisdiction to grant the original relief Petitioner seeks, the next question to consider is whether this Court is even the proper appellate court to consider the exercise of authority under Paragraph IV over Petitioner’s claim for relief.^[8] The authority that Paragraph IV gives us to grant a writ of mandamus when necessary in aid of our appellate jurisdiction or to effectuate our judgments must necessarily relate to one of the categories of cases over which we have appellate jurisdiction. We have “exclusive appellate jurisdiction” over election contests, cases involving the construction of a treaty or the United States or Georgia Constitution, and cases in which certain constitutional questions are presented. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II. We also have appellate jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, cases certified by the Court of Appeals, all cases “in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed,” and all equity cases and cases involving extraordinary remedies related to cases in which a sentence of death was or could be imposed. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III; OCGA § 15-3-3.1 (a) (2), (4).9 Petitioner has not included with his petition a copy of the civil complaint he sought to file below and has not described the nature of the action he sought to file. Given that this Court has appellate jurisdiction over only a small subset of all civil cases, we cannot presume that the case he seeks to file would invoke this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI. Par. II and III; OCGA § 15-3-3.1. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that any final judgment in that case would invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.^[10] Where we lack jurisdiction over a civil case, we are bound to transfer the case to the appropriate court that has jurisdiction. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. VIII (“Any court shall transfer to the appropriate court in the state any civil case in which it determines that jurisdiction or venue lies elsewhere.”). And the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over cases not reserved to this Court, see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. IV and V, as well as the authority under Paragraph IV to grant writs of mandamus in aid of its jurisdiction.

Accordingly, we transfer this original petition to the Court of Appeals. We leave to that court the question of whether it is appropriate to issue a writ of mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction to require the Clerk to accept by mail Petitioner’s affidavit of indigence and civil complaint and present the same to a superior court judge. See OCGA § 9-15-2 (b), (d).

Transferred to the Court of Appeals. All the Justices concur.

BOGGS, Chief Justice.

Petitioner Deandre Arnold filed a petition in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus against Ché Alexander, the Clerk of the Fulton County Superior Court, alleging that the Clerk has subjected Petitioner, as an indigent pro se litigant, to a Catch-22 situation that unlawfully prevents him from filing any civil complaint. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that, except in very limited circumstances not present here, we lack original jurisdiction to grant the sort of relief Petitioner seeks and that the case does not fall within our appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, we transfer the original petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution.

In his verified original petition, Petitioner alleges that he attempted to file a civil complaint, accompanied by an affidavit of indigence, through the Fulton County Superior Court’s e-filing system, which is mandatory even for pro se filers unless they are incarcerated. However, the complaint was rejected because it was not accompanied by an order authorizing him to file “using a waiver payment account.” Petitioner called the Clerk’s office and was told that any person seeking to file a complaint accompanied by an affidavit of indigence must first obtain an order authorizing indigent status. He was also advised that to obtain such an order, he had to present the complaint in person and be sworn before a superior court judge, who would either grant or deny the request for indigent status. Finally, he was told that the Clerk would not accept the filing by mail. Petitioner represents that he is unable to drive or to walk the 25 miles from his home to the Clerk’s office and that there is no private party available to transport him. He asserts that the Clerk’s policy of not accepting complaints accompanied by an affidavit of indigence is contrary to OCGA § 9-15-2, which sets forth procedures for a party to present an affidavit as to the party’s indigence in lieu of payment of costs.^[1] He also asserts that the Clerk’s policy violates the Clerk’s ministerial duty to file papers and that the policy violates his federal constitutional rights to equal protection, due process, and access to the courts. He also contends he has no adequate remedy other than filing an original petition in this Court because if he attempted to file a mandamus petition in superior court, he would run into the exact same difficulty because he cannot appear in person to present a writ of mandamus and affidavit of indigence and the Clerk would not accept such a filing by mail. He seeks an order from this Court directing the Clerk and her staff to accept all filings accompanied by an affidavit of indigence and to present such filings to a judge.

1. It is well established that this Court has a “duty to inquire into [its] jurisdiction in any case in which there may be a doubt about the existence of such jurisdiction.” State of Ga. v. Fed. Defender Program, Inc., 315 Ga. 319, 324 (882 SE2d 257) (2022) (cleaned up).2 Here, it appears that Petitioner is asserting that this Court has jurisdiction to consider his original petition under Article VI, Section I, Paragraph IV of the 1983 Constitution (“Paragraph IV”). “When we inquire into the meaning of a constitutional provision, we look to its text, and our object is to ascertain the meaning of the text at the time it was adopted.” Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 428 (801 SE2d 867) (2017) (cleaned up). We “view the text in the context in which it appears, and read the text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” Id. at 429 (cleaned up). “In so doing, we typically refer to the rules of English grammar, inasmuch as those rules are the guideposts by which ordinary speakers of the English language commonly structure their words.” Walton Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ga. Power Co., 320 Ga. 740, 747 (911 SE2d 559) (2025) (cleaned up). Additionally, “for relevant context, we may look to, among other things, the other law—constitutional, statutory, and common law alike—that formed the legal background of the constitutional provision in question at the time of its adoption.” Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 429 (cleaned up).

Although Petitioner references the “original jurisdiction” of this Court,3 the term “original jurisdiction” does not appear in our current Constitution. However, shortly after the ratification of the 1983 Constitution, we used the phrase “original jurisdiction” in Brown v. Johnson, 251 Ga. 436, 436 (306 SE2d 655) (1983), and suggested that Paragraph IV authorized this Court to grant a writ of mandamus to a superior court judge as an exercise of “original jurisdiction.” Since Brown, we have on occasion in published opinions dismissing similar original petitions referred to our “original jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Gay v. Owens, 292 Ga. 480, 483 (738 SE2d 614) (2013); Graham v. Cavender, 252 Ga. 123, 123 (311 SE2d 832) (1984). But we have not addressed the scope of the “powers” granted in Paragraph IV. And while we and the Court of Appeals have both used the phrase “original jurisdiction” in published opinions since 1983, we have not expressly held that the Constitution of 1983 grants such jurisdiction.

As we noted in Brown, every constitution since the creation of this Court, except the 1983 Constitution, expressly provided that this Court “shall have no original jurisdiction.”4 From at least the 1800s, the term “original jurisdiction” has been understood as the authority of a court to hear and decide a case from the beginning as opposed to the appellate jurisdiction of a higher court to review a judgment from a lower court. See Black’s Law Dictionary (1st ed. 1891) (defining original jurisdiction as “[j]urisdiction in the first instance; jurisdiction to take cognizance of a cause at its inception, try it, and pass judgment upon the law and facts. Distinguished from appellate jurisdiction.” (emphasis in original)). An appellate court’s issuance of a writ of mandamus that is not connected to a pending or impending appeal is also considered an exercise of “original jurisdiction.” See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175- 176 (2 LE 60) (1803) (explaining that the issuance of a writ of mandamus by that Court to the Secretary of State, which writ was not necessary to enable the Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, would be an exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction). However, an appellate court’s issuance of a writ of mandamus in aid of its jurisdiction is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. See id. at 175.

So, with this background, the question is what are we to make of the suggestion in Brown that Paragraph IV was a source of “original jurisdiction.” Paragraph IV, which is captioned “Exercise of Judicial Power,” provides:

Each court may exercise such powers as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its judgments; but only the superior and appellate courts and state-wide business court shall have the power to issue process in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, specific performance, quo warranto, and injunction. Each superior court, state court, and other courts of record and the state-wide business court may grant new trials on legal grounds.^[5]

The plain language of Paragraph IV does not mention “original jurisdiction,” and the framers could have, but did not, include an original jurisdiction provision in Paragraph IV or in any other provision of the 1983 Constitution. Compare U. S. Const. Art. III, Sec. II, Cl. II (granting United States Supreme Court “original [j]urisdiction” over certain cases). But, as noted above, Paragraph IV, which first appeared in the 1983 Constitution, authorizes every court to exercise “such powers as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its judgments,” but authorizes only certain courts, including this Court, “to issue process in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, specific performance, quo warranto, and injunction.” In construing this provision, we observe that the use of the semicolon relates the first clause to the second. See Springtime, Inc. v. Douglas County, 228 Ga. 753, 755 (187 SE2d 874) (1972) (“The semicolon is normally employed in marking off a series of sentences or clauses of coordinate value, that is, to separate consecutive phrases or clauses which are independent of each other grammatically, but dependent alike on some word preceding or following.”). Here, the first clause references “powers” that each court may exercise and the second clause refers to “the power to issue process” and describes the nature of that power as “mandamus, prohibition, specific performance, quo warranto, and injunction.” Therefore, the exercise of Paragraph IV’s grant of authority to issue writs of mandamus is connected only to “such powers as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” It does not grant jurisdiction to this Court to issue process as an original matter wholly unconnected to its appellate jurisdiction.

Moreover, the authority granted in Paragraph IV mirrors the power this Court has had by statute since its creation to issue writs of mandamus to lower courts in limited circumstances. See, e.g., OCGA § 15-2-8 (3) (stating that the Supreme Court has authority “[t]o grant any writ necessary to carry out any purpose of its organization or to compel any inferior tribunal or officers thereof to obey its order”); Ga. Code Ann. 1933, § 24-3901 (3) (stating that Supreme Court has authority to issue writs necessary to purposes of organization); Ga. Code Ann. 1860, Part I, Title V, Chapter II, § 211 (3) (authorizing this Court to “grant any writ necessary to carry out any purpose of its organization, or to compel any inferior tribunal, or officer thereof, to obey its order”); Ga. L. 1845, pp. 21-22 (allowing this Court to issue a writ of mandamus to a superior court judge who refuses to certify a bill of exceptions, to a clerk of court who fails to transmit the record in a case, or to a sheriff who fails to perform any duty imposed under the Act). This Court has exercised the power granted in these statutory provisions in the context of an ongoing or impending appeal. See, e.g., McLendon v. Anderson, 207 Ga. 243, 243 (60 SE2d 762) (1950) (granting application for writ of mandamus to compel trial judge to enter an order of supersedeas as to the sentence of execution upon the filing of the bill of exceptions where execution date would render appeal moot); Sears v. Candler, 112 Ga. 381, 382 (37 SE 442) (1900) (granting application for writ of mandamus to compel trial judge to certify a bill of exceptions); Taylor v. Reese, 108 Ga. 379, 383 (33 SE 917) (1899) (same). However, we have not found any case in which we have held that the power to grant a writ of mandamus to a lower court authorized this Court to exercise original jurisdiction as that term is generally understood. See generally Vanderford v. Brand, 126 Ga. 67, 68 (54 SE 822) (1906) (quoting the express constitutional prohibition on the exercise of original jurisdiction by this Court and explaining that this Court’s power to issue writs of mandamus to lower courts in connection with pending or impending appeals is “ancillary” to this Court’s appellate jurisdiction and not an exercise of original jurisdiction).

Finally, an additional important context to consider is that Paragraph IV appears in the constitutional provision addressing “Judicial Power” generally. It does not appear in Article VI, Section VI, Paragraphs II and III of the 1983 Georgia Constitution, which are the constitutional provisions that specifically grant this Court “appellate jurisdiction.” Those provisions provide that this Court “shall be a court of review” that exercises “exclusive appellate jurisdiction” in specified cases and non-exclusive “appellate jurisdiction” in other categories of cases. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Pars. II and III.

Accordingly, we conclude that the best reading of the plain language of Paragraph IV, viewed in context, authorizes this Court and the Court of Appeals to grant a writ of mandamus only in matters related to an appeal or impending appeal, when necessary in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate appellate court judgments.^[6] A different reading of Paragraph IV as authorizing this Court to have “original jurisdiction” to issue writs of mandamus unrelated to an appellate matter would be contrary to the plain language of that provision. See Camden County v. Sweatt, 315 Ga. 498, 509 (883 SE2d 827) (2023) (in construing a constitutional provision, we give the “text its plain and ordinary meaning, view the text in the context in which it appears, and read the text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would” (cleaned up)). See also TDGA, LLC v. CBIRA, LLC, 298 Ga. 510, 511-512 (783 SE2d 107) (2016) (in construing constitutional provisions, “courts are not authorized either to read into or read out that which would add to or change its meaning” (cleaned up)). To the extent that Brown, 251 Ga. at 436, and its progeny can be read as holding that Paragraph IV grants this Court or the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction to grant a writ of mandamus or prohibition unconnected to the appellate jurisdiction of the respective courts, those cases are hereby disapproved. ^[7]

2. Because we lack jurisdiction to grant the original relief Petitioner seeks, the next question to consider is whether this Court is even the proper appellate court to consider the exercise of authority under Paragraph IV over Petitioner’s claim for relief.^[8] The authority that Paragraph IV gives us to grant a writ of mandamus when necessary in aid of our appellate jurisdiction or to effectuate our judgments must necessarily relate to one of the categories of cases over which we have appellate jurisdiction. We have “exclusive appellate jurisdiction” over election contests, cases involving the construction of a treaty or the United States or Georgia Constitution, and cases in which certain constitutional questions are presented. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II. We also have appellate jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, cases certified by the Court of Appeals, all cases “in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed,” and all equity cases and cases involving extraordinary remedies related to cases in which a sentence of death was or could be imposed. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III; OCGA § 15-3-3.1 (a) (2), (4).9 Petitioner has not included with his petition a copy of the civil complaint he sought to file below and has not described the nature of the action he sought to file. Given that this Court has appellate jurisdiction over only a small subset of all civil cases, we cannot presume that the case he seeks to file would invoke this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Pars. II and III; OCGA § 15-3-3.1. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that any final judgment in that case would invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.^[10]

Where we lack jurisdiction over a civil case, we are bound to transfer the case to the appropriate court that has jurisdiction. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. VIII (“Any court shall transfer to the appropriate court in the state any civil case in which it determines that jurisdiction or venue lies elsewhere.”). And the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over cases not reserved to this Court, see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Pars. IV and V, as well as the authority under Paragraph IV to grant writs of mandamus in aid of its jurisdiction.

Accordingly, we transfer this original petition to the Court of Appeals. We leave to that court the question of whether it is appropriate to issue a writ of mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction to require the Clerk to accept by mail Petitioner’s affidavit of indigence and civil complaint and present the same to a superior court judge. See OCGA § 9-15-2 (b), (d).

Transferred to the Court of Appeals. All the Justices concur.

Decided March 18, 2025 — Reconsideration denied March 31, 2025.

Jurisdiction. Fulton Superior Court.

Deandre Arnold, pro se.

Kaye W. Burwell, Sandy Milford, Mathew E. Plott, Y. Soo Jo, for appellee.

Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Zachary A. Mullinax, Assistant Attorney General; Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor-General, Ross W. Bergethon, Deputy Solicitor-General, amici curiae.