Not a court of first instance.

- Supreme Court is in no respect a court of first instance. Vanderford v. Brand, 126 Ga. 67, 54 S.E. 822, 9 Ann. Cas. 617 (1906).

No review of questions not ruled on by trial judge.

- Supreme Court is a court for the correction of errors, and has no original jurisdiction; the Supreme Court will not pass upon questions on which no ruling has ever been made by a trial judge. South View Cem. Ass'n v. Hailey, 199 Ga. 478, 34 S.E.2d 863 (1945).

If defendant in custody proceeding raises for first time on appeal, factual issues and an attack on the validity of the divorce, the questions cannot be considered by the Supreme Court. Beggs v. Beggs, 208 Ga. 415, 67 S.E.2d 135 (1951).

Constitutionality of statutes.

- If constitutional questions are raised for the first time in a petition for certiorari to the superior court from a judgment rendered in a recorder's court of Atlanta, the superior court could not consider, and the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to review, the assignment of error that the ordinance under which the plaintiff in error was convicted in the recorder's court is unconstitutional. Worth v. Borough of Atlanta, 175 Ga. 377, 165 S.E. 245 (1932).

If statutes are not attacked as being unconstitutional in the trial court, such an attack, enumerated as error and argument in the brief of counsel before the Supreme Court, will not be passed upon. Turk v. State Hwy. Dep't, 226 Ga. 245, 174 S.E.2d 791 (1970).

Certification of question authorized.

- Court of Appeals was authorized to certify a question to the Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of retroactive application of the cap on damages recoverable against the state provided in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26. Department of Human Resources v. Phillips, 223 Ga. App. 520, 478 S.E.2d 598 (1996).

Case sent by mistake to Court of Appeals retained on docket of Supreme Court.

- If a case is sent to the Court of Appeals by mistake, and the case is transmitted therefrom and decided to be within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, such case will be retained and entered on the docket of that court for hearing and determination. Dawson v. State, 130 Ga. 127, 60 S.E. 315 (1908); Mitchell v. Masury, 132 Ga. 360, 64 S.E. 275 (1909).

Cited in Kelley v. State, 49 Ga. 12 (1873); Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Kent, 91 Ga. 687, 18 S.E. 850 (1893); Comer v. Dufour, 95 Ga. 376, 22 S.E. 543, 51 Am. St. R. 89, 30 A.L.R. 300 (1895); Lester v. Wright, 145 Ga. 15, 88 S.E. 403 (1916); Smyly v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 28 Ga. App. 776, 113 S.E. 220 (1922); Tice Co. v. Evans, 32 Ga. App. 385, 123 S.E. 742 (1924); Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga. 106, 135 S.E. 481 (1926); Allen v. State, 164 Ga. 669, 139 S.E. 415 (1927); Wilkes County v. Mayor of Washington, 167 Ga. 181, 145 S.E. 47 (1928); Hornady v. Goodman, 167 Ga. 555, 146 S.E. 173 (1928); Burkhalter v. De Loach, 171 Ga. 384, 155 S.E. 513 (1930); AT & T Co. v. Sewell, 172 Ga. 787, 158 S.E. 800 (1931); Griffin v. Booth, 176 Ga. 1, 167 S.E. 294 (1932); Brooks v. Sturdivant, 177 Ga. 514, 170 S.E. 369 (1933); Jones v. Ellis, 182 Ga. 380, 185 S.E. 510 (1936); McRae v. Sears, 183 Ga. 133, 187 S.E. 664 (1936); Hadden v. Fuqua, 194 Ga. 621, 22 S.E.2d 377 (1942); Singleton v. State, 196 Ga. 136, 26 S.E.2d 736 (1943); Weatherford v. Weatherford, 204 Ga. 553, 50 S.E.2d 323 (1948); Parks v. State, 206 Ga. 675, 58 S.E.2d 142 (1950); Campbell v. Powell, 206 Ga. 768, 58 S.E.2d 829 (1950); Woods v. State, 117 Ga. App. 546, 160 S.E.2d 922 (1968); Lamb v. Nabers, 224 Ga. 396, 162 S.E.2d 336 (1968); Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d 718 (1969); Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Moran, 248 Ga. 461, 284 S.E.2d 256 (1981); Waldrip v. Head, 272 Ga. 572, 532 S.E.2d 380 (2000).

Duty of Supreme Court.

- It is the duty of the Supreme Court not only to grant judgments of affirmance or reversal, but any other order, direction, or decree required, and if necessary to make a final disposition of the cause. Harris v. Hull, 70 Ga. 831 (1883).

General authority of Supreme Court.

- Supreme Court is authorized to make final disposition of a case and to give the case such direction as is consistent with the law and justice applicable to the case, and as will prevent the unnecessary protraction of litigation. Robinson v. Wilkins, 74 Ga. 47 (1884); Ross v. Rambo, 195 Ga. 100, 23 S.E.2d 687 (1942).

One great purpose in establishing the Supreme Court (or the Court of Appeals) was to terminate suits, and with this view, it is made the court's duty not only to grant judgments of affirmance or reversal, but any other order, direction, or decree required, and if necessary to make a final disposition of the cause, and the court is empowered to give to the cause in the court below such direction as may be consistent with the law and justice of the case. Gray v. Watson, 54 Ga. App. 885, 189 S.E. 616 (1936).

General authority of Court of Appeals.

- Under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VIII (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Para. III), the Court of Appeals has, as to cases within the court's peculiar jurisdiction, the same powers as the Supreme Court has within that court's jurisdiction. Finley v. Southern Ry., 5 Ga. App. 722, 64 S.E. 312 (1909).

Court of Appeals may make final disposition of the case and give such directions as are consistent with the law and justice applicable to the cause and as will prevent unnecessary protraction of litigation. Parks v. Parks, 89 Ga. App. 725, 80 S.E.2d 837 (1954).

Amendment of judgment by Court of Appeals.

- Court of Appeals has power to direct that verdict and judgment be so amended as to meet the ends of justice and comply with the law. Parks v. Parks, 89 Ga. App. 725, 80 S.E.2d 837 (1954).

Reviewing court to apply law existing at time of judgment.

- Reviewing court should apply law as the law exists at the time of the court's judgment rather than the law prevailing at rendition of judgment under review, and may therefore reverse a judgment that was correct at the time the judgment was rendered and affirm a judgment that was erroneous at the time, if the law has been changed in the meantime and if such application of the new law will impair no vested right under the prior law. Osteen v. Osteen, 244 Ga. 445, 260 S.E.2d 321 (1979).

Judgment affirmed when in accordance with direction of Supreme Court.

- If judgment of a lower court is in accordance with the direction of the Supreme Court, the judgment will be affirmed. Loyd v. Hicks, 32 Ga. 499 (1861).

Distinction between reversals for different reasons.

- Dismissal of a writ of error (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-49 and5-6-50) because a judgment of reversal would be in effect a nullity is a different thing from the reversal of a judgment upon proof of facts which have transpired since the judgment was rendered. In the one instance, review is refused because review would be useless, while in the other instance, to reverse the judgment of the lower court would be to hold that the judge erred because of the proof of the existence of facts which have occurred since the judge's judgment was rendered, and hence were not before the judge when the judge made the decision. Marietta Chair Co. v. Henderson, 119 Ga. 65, 45 S.E. 725 (1903).

Harmless error if execution of amended judgment conforms to original judgment.

- If court erred in amending judgment but execution conformed to the original judgment, the error was harmless and correctible. Kicklighter v. Burkhalter, 177 Ga. 187, 170 S.E. 75 (1933) (decided prior to Civil Practice Act of 1966).

If sentence is partly illegal, Supreme Court will direct that illegal part be stricken out. Newman v. State, 101 Ga. 534, 28 S.E. 1005 (1897).

If fine imposed is excessive, the sentence may be corrected by reducing the fine. Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 87 Ga. 62, 13 S.E. 201 (1891).

Fine for contempt that exceeds the legal amount may be corrected by reducing the fine. Warner v. Martin, 124 Ga. 387, 52 S.E. 446 (1905).

Reversal of judgment in cases of multiple defendants.

- Appellate court can reverse the judgment as to only one of three defendants if a joint motion for new trial is filed, and, a fortiori, it can reverse the judgment as to one defendant only if the appellants themselves separate the appellants' cause by filing separate motions for new trial and coming to the court on separate bills of exceptions (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-49 and5-6-50). Gray v. Watson, 54 Ga. App. 885, 189 S.E. 616 (1936).

Power to compel signing of bill of exceptions.

- Supreme Court has power to compel a judge to sign a bill of exceptions (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-49 and5-6-50), if the judge unlawfully refuses to do so. Taylor v. Reese, 108 Ga. 379, 33 S.E. 917 (1899).

Appellate courts have authority to require judge of trial court to sign bill of exceptions (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-49 and5-6-50) by means of mandamus. Garland v. Tanksley, 99 Ga. App. 201, 107 S.E.2d 866 (1959).

Limits on authority to grant mandamus.

- Appellate courts do not have the authority to grant mandamus to compel a superior court judge to approve brief of evidence presented to the judge in connection with a motion for new trial pending in that court. Central R.R. v. Miller, 91 Ga. 83, 16 S.E. 256 (1892).

Limits on authority to compel grant of supersedeas.

- Appellate courts do not have the authority to compel grant of supersedeas to stay execution of judgment in criminal case while pending on bill of exceptions (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-49 and5-6-50). Spann v. Clark, 47 Ga. 369 (1872); Vanderford v. Brand, 126 Ga. 67, 54 S.E. 822, 9 Ann. Cas. 617 (1906).

Power of Supreme Court greater than superior court.

- Powers of the Supreme Court are much more ample in the matter of awarding direction than are those of the superior court to shape what may be termed special proceedings or results without direction from the Supreme Court. Powell v. Augusta & S.R.R., 77 Ga. 192, 3 S.E. 757 (1886).

Appellate court may not aid litigant absent writ of error.

- Appellate court cannot aid a petitioner in taking any step in the superior court in a case pending in that court if no writ of error (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-49 and5-6-50) has been sued out or applied for, except for the purpose of preventing the case from becoming moot and thus divesting the court of jurisdiction. Garland v. Gray, 108 Ga. App. 303, 132 S.E.2d 834 (1963).

Creation of unified state bar is judicial function.

- In proposing that the Supreme Court create a unified bar, the General Assembly did not have the authority to circumscribe the court by denying the court the right to adopt rules and regulations on the court's own initiative. Since the court had the power to create the State Bar, the court must necessarily also have the power to make rules for the government of this administrative arm of the court. Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 914, 90 S. Ct. 916, 25 L. Ed. 2d 94 (1970).

State Bar Act authorizes adoption of disciplinary rules and regulations.

- Purpose of Ga. L. 1963, p. 70, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 19, T. 15) was to initiate the creation of the State Bar of Georgia. That law eliminated any conflicting claims of coordinate branches of government to such power. Furthermore, that law's adoption encouraged the court to exercise the court's inherent power in this regard. In response thereto, but in the exercise of an inherent judicial function, the Supreme Court acted and the State Bar of Georgia was created. Although the article was not essential for such action, it is a valid legislative enactment and not subject to constitutional attack. The rules and regulations are therefore not a nullity. Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 914, 90 S. Ct. 916, 25 L. Ed. 2d 94 (1970).

Promulgation of rule absent statutory provision.

- In absence of statutory provision, when no rule has been prescribed, the Supreme Court will promulgate a rule. McCowan v. Brooks, 113 Ga. 384, 39 S.E. 112 (1901).

Disqualification of an attorney to represent codefendants must be raised prior to trial; otherwise, any disqualification could result in manufactured error. Brown v. State, 247 Ga. 298, 275 S.E.2d 52 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 290 S.E.2d 442 (1982).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 75 et seq.

ALR.

- Change of former decisions by court of last resort as ground of relief from decrees or orders rendered or entered in the interval in other cases, 95 A.L.R. 708.

Injunction by appellate court to protect subject matter of appeal or preserve status quo as between the parties, 133 A.L.R. 1105.

Right of accused to attack indictment or information after reversal or setting aside of conviction, 145 A.L.R. 493.

Propriety of disposition of pending action involving controversy within religious society or other nonprofit association, by ordering election, 158 A.L.R. 182.

Extraterritorial effect of valid award of custody of child of divorced parents, in absence of substantial change in circumstances, 35 A.L.R.3d 520.

Attorney's failure to attend court, or tardiness, as contempt, 13 A.L.R.4th 122.

Small claims: jurisdiction limits as binding on appellate court, 67 A.L.R.4th 1117.

Civil actions removable from state court to federal court under 28 USCA § 1443, 159 A.L.R. Fed. 377.

Who is "person acting under" officer of United States or any agency thereof for purposes of availability of right to remove state action to federal court under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442(a)(1), 166 A.L.R. Fed. 297.