Principle of estoppel runs throughout law.

- As between individuals, where no question of the general welfare of society or public policy is involved, the principle of estoppel runs throughout the law. Although an Act is unconstitutional and void, it will operate as an estoppel upon the party applying for it, and procuring its passage and accepting its benefits. Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818 (1944).

Cited in Stephenson v. Kellett, 46 Ga. App. 27, 166 S.E. 457 (1932); Gettis v. Gormley, 49 Ga. App. 339, 175 S.E. 393 (1934); Myers v. Atlantic Greyhound Lines, 52 Ga. App. 698, 184 S.E. 414 (1936); Freeney v. Pape, 185 Ga. 1, 194 S.E. 515 (1937); Roberts v. State, 189 Ga. 36, 5 S.E.2d 340 (1939); Dunn v. Meyer, 193 Ga. 91, 17 S.E.2d 275 (1941); Buttersworth v. State, 200 Ga. 13, 36 S.E.2d 301 (1945); Jordan v. State, 75 Ga. App. 815, 44 S.E.2d 821 (1947); Tatum v. Tatum, 203 Ga. 406, 46 S.E.2d 915 (1948); Campbell v. Allen, 208 Ga. 274, 66 S.E.2d 226 (1951); Webb v. Henlery, 209 Ga. 447, 74 S.E.2d 7 (1953); Johnson v. Plunkett, 215 Ga. 353, 110 S.E.2d 745 (1959); Bankers Fid. Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 104 Ga. App. 894, 123 S.E.2d 433 (1961); Northeast Factor & Disct. Co. v. Mortgage Invs., Inc., 107 Ga. App. 705, 131 S.E.2d 221 (1963); Swint v. Smith, 219 Ga. 532, 134 S.E.2d 595 (1964); Timmons v. State, 223 Ga. 450, 156 S.E.2d 68 (1967); Arkwright v. State, 223 Ga. 768, 158 S.E.2d 370 (1967); Grizzard v. Grizzard, 224 Ga. 42, 159 S.E.2d 400 (1968); Brannan v. Kilpatrick, 225 Ga. 3, 165 S.E.2d 721 (1969); Steffner v. Steffner, 228 Ga. 189, 184 S.E.2d 575 (1971); Livsey v. Livsey, 229 Ga. 368, 191 S.E.2d 859 (1972); Grimes v. Community Loan & Inv. Corp., 130 Ga. App. 8, 202 S.E.2d 265 (1973); Garcia v. Garcia, 232 Ga. 869, 209 S.E.2d 201 (1974); Boyd v. State, 133 Ga. App. 431, 211 S.E.2d 387 (1974); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Day, 136 Ga. App. 359, 221 S.E.2d 467 (1975); Phillips v. Meadow Garden Hosp., 139 Ga. App. 541, 228 S.E.2d 714 (1976); Daniel v. Daniel, 250 Ga. 849, 301 S.E.2d 643 (1983); Tedesco v. CDC Fed. Credit Union, 167 Ga. App. 337, 306 S.E.2d 397 (1983); Lovelace v. Figure Salon, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 51, 345 S.E.2d 139 (1986); Panfel v. Boyd, 187 Ga. App. 639, 371 S.E.2d 222 (1988); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ainsworth, 198 Ga. App. 740, 402 S.E.2d 759 (1991); Morris v. Cowart, 201 Ga. App. 288, 411 S.E.2d 81 (1991).

Courts' power to declare contract void exercised only in cases free from doubt.

- The power of the courts to declare a contract void for being in contravention of a sound public policy is a very delicate and undefined power, and, like the power to declare a statute unconstitutional, should be exercised only in cases free from doubt. Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 156 Ga. App. 602, 275 S.E.2d 163 (1980).

Contract not contrary to public policy unless declared so, or contrary to morals and law.

- A contract cannot be said to be contrary to public policy unless the General Assembly has declared it to be so, or unless the consideration of the contract is contrary to good morals and contrary to law, or unless the contract is entered into for the purpose of effecting an illegal or immoral agreement or doing something which is in violation of law. Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 156 Ga. App. 602, 275 S.E.2d 163 (1980), aff'd, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981).

Provisions of former Code 1933, § 20-504 (see now O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2) should not be enlarged without convincing and conclusive reasons. Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 156 Ga. App. 602, 275 S.E.2d 163 (1980), aff'd, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981).

Only authentic and admissible evidence of state's public policy is constitution, laws, and judicial decisions. Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 156 Ga. App. 602, 275 S.E.2d 163 (1980), aff'd, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981).

Contract by which debtor attempts to waive garnishment exemption void.

- A contract, either specific or general, by which a debtor attempts to waive the debtor's exemption and to make the debtor's wages earned as a laborer subject to garnishment is void and not enforceable. Traders Inv. Co. v. Macon Ry. & Light Co., 3 Ga. App. 125, 59 S.E. 454 (1907). See also Green v. Watson, 75 Ga. 471, 58 Am. R. 479 (1185).

Venue cannot be waived in divorce suit.

- In a suit for divorce, jurisdiction of the court cannot be waived so as to permit a suit for divorce to be brought in a county other than that of the residence of the defendant. Watts v. Watts, 130 Ga. 683, 61 S.E. 593 (1908); Odum v. Odum, 132 Ga. 437, 64 S.E. 470 (1909); Haygood v. Haygood, 190 Ga. 445, 9 S.E.2d 834 (1940).

Neither can notice required as condition precedent to recovery of attorney's fees.

- Where a promissory note contains an obligation to pay attorney's fees, the statutory notice which the plaintiff is required to give to the defendant as a condition precedent to the defendant's right to recover these fees cannot be waived in the note, and the attempt to waive it therein is unenforceable and of no effect. Miller v. Roberts, 9 Ga. App. 511, 71 S.E. 927 (1911).

One responsible for acts of criminal negligence, or, where gratuitous bailment created, gross negligence.

- One may not be released by agreement or waiver from responsibility for acts of criminal negligence, nor, where the status of the parties creates a bailment as to the injured property, from acts or omissions caused by gross negligence, under the measure of liability controlling a gratuitous bailee. King v. Smith, 47 Ga. App. 360, 170 S.E. 546 (1933).

Public officer cannot take less than full statutory salary.

- Since an agreement by a public officer to accept less than the fees or salary allowed the officer by law is contrary to public policy and void, a public officer cannot bind oneself to take less than the statute provides for the officer's salary, by silently accepting less than the full amount provided by law. MacNeill v. Steele, 186 Ga. 792, 199 S.E. 99 (1938).

Ante litem notice to city.

- The statutory requirements for ante litem notice to the governing authority of the city generally may not be waived by the city or by an individual, even if that individual is the official directly responsible for the injury or for claims adjustment. City of LaGrange v. USAA Ins. Co., 211 Ga. App. 19, 438 S.E.2d 137 (1993).

Section does not authorize murder defendant to demand that case be tried by judge. Palmer v. State, 195 Ga. 661, 25 S.E.2d 295 (1943).

Contempts affecting public policy cannot be extinguished by settlement.

- Where contempts were matters affecting the public interest, being thus quasi-criminal in nature, they could not be extinguished or rendered moot by any settlement between the parties. Alred v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 205 Ga. 371, 54 S.E.2d 240 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 937, 70 S. Ct. 346, 94 L. Ed. 578 (1950).

Section inapplicable to attempt to release party from liability for gas safety regulation violations.

- The exception in this section, that "a person may waive or renounce what the law has established in his favor, when he does not thereby injure others or affect the public interest," has no application where the contract attempts to release a party from liability for acts violating liquefied gas safety regulations. Bishop v. Act-O-Lane Gas Serv. Co., 91 Ga. App. 154, 85 S.E.2d 169 (1954).

Exculpation from liability for negligence generally.

- One may exculpate oneself from liability for one's own simple negligence, but not for gross negligence. Wade v. Watson, 527 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 731 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1984).

The general rule in Georgia is that one may by careful language exculpate oneself even from liability for one's own negligence, but not from one's own gross negligence or intentional act. Wade v. Watson, 527 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 731 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1984).

Informed consent document signed by a decedent before using a fitness facility's pool was valid and enforceable because: (1) the document was clear and unambiguous; (2) the document was not void as against public policy; and (3) the document contained a covenant not to sue, a disclaimer of liability, and an assumption of risk clause wherein the decedent agreed to hold the facility and its employee harmless from any lawsuits for decedent's death, accidental or otherwise, that arose from any exercise program, whether formal or self-directed. Flood v. Young Woman's Christian Ass'n of Brunswick, Ga., Inc., 398 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2005).

Exculpatory clauses are valid and binding, and are not void as against public policy when a business relieves itself from its own negligence. My Fair Lady of Ga., Inc. v. Harris, 185 Ga. App. 459, 364 S.E.2d 580 (1987), cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 910, 364 S.E.2d 580 (1988); Hembree v. Johnson, 224 Ga. App. 680, 482 S.E.2d 407 (1997).

Exculpatory provision in contract does not relieve one from liability for willful or wanton conduct. Hawes v. Central of Ga. Ry., 117 Ga. App. 771, 162 S.E.2d 14 (1968).

Witness offered is permitted to testify, unless objection or exception distinctly raises question of competency. Sumter County v. Pritchett, 125 Ga. App. 222, 186 S.E.2d 798 (1971).

Defendant's waiver not permitted to injure insurer's right to defend action in own name.

- Although a named, served defendant may waive his right to defend against an action, the defendant's waiver and default cannot be permitted to injure the statutory right of the defendant's insurer to defend the action in its own name, which would be the result if the insurer were held to be bound by the defendant's admissions. Glover v. Davenport, 133 Ga. App. 146, 210 S.E.2d 370 (1974).

Although the named, served uninsured motorist defendant could and did waive the defendant's right to defend against the action, the defendant's waiver and default cannot be permitted to injure the statutory right of the defendant's insurer to defend the action in its own name, which would be the result if the insurer were held to be bound by the defendant's admissions. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Willis, 140 Ga. App. 225, 230 S.E.2d 363 (1976).

Parent not authorized to waive child support.

- The right to child support belongs to the child, not the mother, and after the award has become part of the court's judgment she has no authority to waive it. Johnson v. Johnson, 233 Ga. 664, 212 S.E.2d 835 (1975).

A mother has no right to barter away child support in return for a relinquishment of visitation privileges. Similarly, a father has no right to make a similar arrangement with a third party. Culpepper v. Brewer, 242 Ga. 210, 248 S.E.2d 619 (1978).

Plaintiff's acquiescence in defendant's summary judgment motion not permitted to prevail over defendant insurer.

- Even though the plaintiff acquiesced in the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and a person may waive or renounce what the law has established in one's favor when one does not thereby injure others or affect the public interest, the acquiescence injured the defendant insurer and the plaintiff's nonfeasance will not be permitted to prevail - just as a defendant's voluntary default will not be permitted to prejudice the defendant insurer. J.C. Penny Cas. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 149 Ga. App. 258, 253 S.E.2d 878 (1979).

Contract limiting innkeeper's statutory liability unenforceable.

- A special contract between an innkeeper and a guest purporting to limit the innkeeper's liability to an amount less than that authorized by former Code 1933, § 52-111 (see now O.C.G.A. § 43-21-12) was unenforceable as contrary to public interest and policy. Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 156 Ga. App. 602, 275 S.E.2d 163 (1980), aff'd, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981).

Exculpatory provision nullifying landlord's warranty concerning latent defects unenforceable.

- A landlord's implied warranty concerning latent defects existing at the inception of the lease was sufficiently analogous to a contract for maintenance or repair, so that an exculpatory provision purporting to nullify the effect of the implied warranty was void and unenforceable. The landlord's warranty exists by operation of law in the interest of public safety, and is provided for by former Code 1933, § 61-111 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-7-13). Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 156 Ga. App. 602, 275 S.E.2d 163 (1980), aff'd, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981).

Exculpatory clause signed as condition of receiving dental treatment invalid.

- An exculpatory clause in the consent form signed by a patient as a condition of receiving treatment at a dental school clinic is invalid as contrary to public policy. Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 156 Ga. App. 602, 275 S.E.2d 163 (1980), aff'd, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981).

Simulated aircraft aerial combat.

- Where a parent brought suit to recover the benefits under a policy of life insurance insuring the life of the parent's adult son, the trial court erred in only partially denying the insurer's motion for summary judgment by holding that it had waived the statutory requirement prohibiting the issuance of a valid life insurance policy without the written consent of the insured; under circumstances not qualifying for an exception pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-6(a)(1)-(4), the policy was void ab initio, and unenforceable by the courts; written consent of the insured may not be waived. Time Ins. Co. v. Lamar, 195 Ga. App. 452, 393 S.E.2d 734 (1990).

Although exculpatory clauses signed by a pilot and a safety pilot who flew an aircraft company's plane and engaged in simulated aerial combat were not against public policy under O.C.G.A. § 1-3-7, the clauses were not enforceable if the company was found to have been grossly negligent or to have engaged in willful misconduct, which was an issue to be resolved by the jury; additionally, a jury issue remained as to whether one of the pilots was an independent contractor for purposes of the company's liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(5), and, accordingly, a grant of summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 to the company was error. McFann v. Sky Warriors, Inc., 268 Ga. App. 750, 603 S.E.2d 7 (2004).

"Waiver" defined.

- "Waiver" is a voluntary relinquishment of some known right, benefit or advantage, which, except for the waiver, the party otherwise would have enjoyed. City of Albany v. Mitchell, 81 Ga. App. 408, 59 S.E.2d 37 (1950).

Person may waive statutory benefit where others or public policy not involved.

- A person may lawfully waive the benefit of a statutory provision where the rights of third parties are not involved, unless the waiver violates public policy. Southern Ry. v. Turner, 75 Ga. App. 219, 42 S.E.2d 790 (1947).

Contracting parties may waive or renounce what the law has established in their favor, provided the waiver or renunciation does not thereby injure others or affect the public interest. Young v. John Deere Plow Co., 102 Ga. App. 132, 115 S.E.2d 770 (1960).

A party may waive that which the law provides for one's benefit unless to permit one to do so would injure others or be contrary to public policy. Pfeffer v. Arrendale, 114 Ga. App. 684, 152 S.E.2d 651 (1966).

It is clearly established state law that one may waive a constitutional right. Senters v. Wright & Lopez, Inc., 220 Ga. 611, 140 S.E.2d 904 (1965).

Subrogation may be expressly waived by an insurer pursuant to agreement.

- Homeowners retained the right to sue for damage done to their property, despite payment from their insurer, because language in proof of loss forms granted the insurer subrogation to the homeowners' rights, title, and interest in the property that was damaged, but not to the claim, and in any event the insurer expressly waived its right to subrogation in the release and settlement agreement executed contemporaneously with the issuance of the settlement payment. Rabun & Assocs. Constr., Inc. v. Berry, 276 Ga. App. 485, 623 S.E.2d 691 (2005).

There is an effective waiver only when it is wholly voluntary and comes from the defendant without any solicitation or coercion whatsoever from either the state or the court. Farmer v. State, 128 Ga. App. 416, 196 S.E.2d 893 (1973).

Necessary elements.

- Waiver need not be supported by consideration, is unilateral in character, must be made with knowledge and intent, and can be established by a certain course of conduct. Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Corr, 133 Ga. App. 296, 211 S.E.2d 156 (1974).

Waiver is a matter of intent.

- The evidence must so clearly indicate an intent to relinquish a known right as to exclude any other reasonable explanation. Allstate Fin. Corp. v. Dundee Mills, Inc., 800 F.2d 1073 (11th Cir. 1986).

Implied waiver is not more efficacious, nor more highly regarded, than express waiver in writing. Pittman v. Elder, 76 Ga. 371 (1886).

Question of whether one has waived right upon which one relies is matter of fact to be determined by a jury or the trier of the facts upon all the evidence. City of Albany v. Mitchell, 81 Ga. App. 408, 59 S.E.2d 37 (1950).

Children's support rights nonwaivable.

- Children, legitimate or illegitimate, are not property, and absent a clear legislative declaration otherwise their support rights may not be bartered away by their parents. Worthington v. Worthington, 250 Ga. 730, 301 S.E.2d 44 (1983).

Defendant has right to waive jury trial in misdemeanor case.

- Whatever may be the decisions in other states as to the right to waive trial by jury in cases of misdemeanor, the Georgia Supreme Court does not think there can be any doubt that the defendant had this right under our law. Logan v. State, 86 Ga. 266, 12 S.E. 406 (1890).

Defendant may waive every minor right and privilege.

- As the prisoner may waive even a trial itself, and be capitally punished upon the defendant's own confession of guilt, the defendant may waive every minor right or privilege. The greater includes the less, or the whole the parts. Logan v. State, 86 Ga. 266, 12 S.E. 406 (1890); Vaughn v. State, 88 Ga. 731, 16 S.E. 64 (1892).

Person instituting action may settle with defendant where fine or penalty goes to person alone.

- The rule seems to be that where the public, or a portion thereof, are interested in a fine or penalty, the person or informer who brings the action cannot settle or compound with the defendant so as to deprive the public of its interest therein. But where the penalty or fine goes alone to the informer or person who institutes the action therefor, one may settle or compound with the defendant, or withdraw one's suit, or waive one's right to recover the penalty or fine. Mathis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 94 Ga. 338, 21 S.E. 564, 21 S.E. 1039, 47 Am. St. R. 167 (1894).

Parties to nonstatutory arbitration agreement may waive that arbitrator be sworn.

- The parties to an agreement to submit their differences to nonstatutory arbitration may expressly waive that the arbitrator be sworn, even if, under the terms of the submission, the arbitrator is required to be sworn. Southern Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 113 Ga. 1088, 39 S.E. 489 (1901).

Materialman not required to obtain personal judgment against owner in order to maintain foreclosure proceedings.

- Where materials are sold to an owner either directly or through another as one's agent, the materialman may, upon proper pleadings and evidence, obtain a personal judgment against the owner for the price or value of the materials, but the materialman is not obliged to seek or obtain such a judgment in order to maintain foreclosure proceedings. Robinson v. Reese, 175 Ga. 574, 165 S.E. 744 (1932).

Nonliability agreement not void, except where statutorily prohibited or public duty owed.

- Except in cases prohibited by statute, or where a public duty is owed, as by a common carrier of goods or passengers, a party may by a valid contract relieve oneself from liability to another party for particular injuries or damages and for ordinary negligence, and such an agreement is not void as against public policy. King v. Smith, 47 Ga. App. 360, 170 S.E. 546 (1933).

Except in cases prohibited by statute and cases where a public duty is owed, the general rule is that a party may exempt oneself by contract from liability to the other party for injuries caused by negligence; and the agreement is not void for contravening public policy. Hawes v. Central of Ga. Ry., 117 Ga. App. 771, 162 S.E.2d 14 (1968).

A party may exempt oneself by contract from liability to another party for injuries caused by negligence, and the agreement is not void for contravening public policy. Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 156 Ga. App. 602, 275 S.E.2d 163 (1980), aff'd, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981).

Warranty of suitability in bailment for hire.

- A bailee may renounce the warranty of suitability established in the bailee's favor by O.C.G.A. § 44-12-63 by use of an exculpatory clause in the contract for bailment for hire. Hall v. Gardens Servs., Inc., 174 Ga. App. 856, 332 S.E.2d 3 (1985).

Where public policy does not absolutely bar or disqualify inadmissible testimony, inadmissibility may be waived Albany Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Henderson, 198 Ga. 116, 31 S.E.2d 20 (1944).

Required written notice to damage recovery for livestock loss or injury waivable.

- A contract requiring notice in writing as a condition precedent to the recovery of damages for loss or injury to a shipment of livestock may be waived by the conduct of the carrier. Southern Ry. v. Turner, 75 Ga. App. 219, 42 S.E.2d 790 (1947).

Party can waive hearing.

- Although a party is entitled to an opportunity for a hearing, there is no requirement that there must be a hearing. The party can waive the hearing. Scocca v. Wilt, 243 Ga. 2, 252 S.E.2d 401 (1979).

Consequential damages.

- To the extent that consequential damages are recoverable in breach of contract actions, a clause excluding such damages is valid and binding unless prohibited by statute or public policy. Mark Singleton Buick, Inc. v. Taylor, 194 Ga. App. 630, 391 S.E.2d 435 (1990).

Waiver of right to jury trial in probate proceeding.

- Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to review the probate court's decision under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I and O.C.G.A. § 15-6-8(4)(E) to deny probate of the decedent's 1988 will and the parties' waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to deny probate of the will. Mosley v. Lancaster, 296 Ga. 862, 770 S.E.2d 873 (2015).

Jury trial.

- Before a defendant could effectively waive the right to a jury trial and demand a bench trial, the state's consent had to be obtained, in addition to the trial court's agreement to conduct a bench trial pursuant to the defendant's demand. Zigan v. State, 281 Ga. 415, 638 S.E.2d 322 (2006).

Obtaining Sunday hearing waives legal hearing.

- To insist on a hearing upon Sunday, and to obtain it and then give bail, is to waive a legal hearing. Weldon v. Colquitt, 62 Ga. 449, 35 Am. R. 128 (1879).

Failure to object waives personal jurisdiction.

- Where the justice of a district in which the defendant resided was disqualified, and suit was brought without objection in another district, the presiding justice of which had jurisdiction of the subject matter, the defendant thereby waived objection to the jurisdiction of the defendant's person. Dozier v. Allen, 65 Ga. 254 (1880).

Failure to object to a motion for a new trial amounts to a waiver. Moore v. Rosser, 76 Ga. 329 (1886).

Any point of practice which, if sound, would be fatal to a motion for a new trial should be presented to the trial court by a motion to dismiss the application for a new trial, and if not so presented will be considered as having been waived. Walker v. Neil, 117 Ga. 733, 45 S.E. 387 (1903); Hopkins v. Jackson, 147 Ga. 821, 95 S.E. 675 (1918); Town of Fairburn v. Brantley, 161 Ga. 199, 130 S.E. 67 (1925).

Where evidence brief is not filed by day set, subsequent acts of parties may waive. Moxley v. Kinloch, 80 Ga. 46, 7 S.E. 123 (1887). ; see also Hilt v. Young, 116 Ga. 708, 43 S.E. 76 (1902).

Tax return irregularities are waivable by identifying property on which fieri facias will be levied. National Bank v. Danforth, 80 Ga. 55, 7 S.E. 546 (1887).

Refusal of telegraph company to pay damages on oral demand waives formal demand in writing. Hill v. Western Union Tel. Co., 85 Ga. 425, 11 S.E. 874, 21 Am. St. R. 166 (1890).

Agent of the company is a competent party to waive. Hill v. Western Union Tel. Co., 85 Ga. 425, 11 S.E. 874, 21 Am. St. R. 166 (1890).

Arraignment and plea rights are waived when defendant goes to trial before jury on merits, and fails, until after the verdict, to bring to the attention of the court that the defendant has not been formally called upon to enter a plea to the indictment. Waller v. State, 2 Ga. App. 636, 58 S.E. 1106 (1907); Harris v. State, 11 Ga. App. 137, 74 S.E. 895 (1912); Perry v. State, 19 Ga. App. 619, 91 S.E. 939 (1917); Brown v. State, 19 Ga. App. 619, 91 S.E. 939 (1917); Caswell v. State, 27 Ga. App. 76, 107 S.E. 560, cert. denied, 27 Ga. App. 835 (1921).

Omission to take an exception to a ruling amounts to a waiver. Hunt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 136 Ga. 766, 72 S.E. 32 (1911).

Person may waive service of the original suit by appearing and pleading to the merits. Town of Fairburn v. Brantley, 161 Ga. 199, 130 S.E. 67 (1925).

Stipulation in deed securing debt that grantees may sell property upon default waives redemption right.

- A stipulation in a deed to secure debt, that upon a default in the payment of the indebtedness thereby secured the grantees may enter upon the premises and collect the rents and profits thereof, and may sell the property at auction to the highest bidder for cash, first giving four weeks notice of the time, terms, and place of the sale by advertisement, constitutes a waiver by the borrower, the grantor in the deed, of the right of redemption given to mortgagors by former Code 1933, § 67-115 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-14-42.1). Livingston v. Hirsch, 172 Ga. 854, 159 S.E. 253 (1931) (see § 11-9-506).

If carrier's agent acts upon oral notice of damaged shipment, required written notice waived.

- Where a contract of shipment requires the owner or shipper to give notice in writing of any damage to the shipment before it is unloaded, such stipulation may be waived. If the carrier's agent, without objection to the form of the notice, receives and acts upon an oral notice, a waiver of the requirement as to its being in writing results. Southern Ry. v. Turner, 75 Ga. App. 219, 42 S.E.2d 790 (1947).

Party signing contract stipulating seller makes no warranty waives implied warranty.

- Where a contract sued on expressly stipulates that the seller makes no warranty, a party who signs the contract will be deemed to have waived the benefits of the statutory law respecting implied warranties in sales contracts. Seigler v. Barrow, 83 Ga. App. 406, 63 S.E.2d 708 (1951).

Debtor under contract may waive defenses to action brought by contract's assignee.

- A debtor under a conditional sale contract, by expressly agreeing not to set up as a defense to an action on the contract by an assignee thereof any claim the assignee may have had against the assignor, waived the assignee's right to plead failure of consideration in an action on the contract by the assignee. Jones v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 88 Ga. App. 24, 75 S.E.2d 822 (1953); Young v. John Deere Plow Co., 102 Ga. App. 132, 115 S.E.2d 770 (1960).

Demurrer or special pleas not made preliminary to trial deemed waived.

- Under the law of this state, a prisoner, upon being arraigned, may demur to the indictment, plead to the jurisdiction of the court, or file a plea in abatement, or in bar, but if such pleas are not made preliminary to the trial, they are held to be waived in contemplation of law. Jones v. Mills, 216 Ga. 616, 118 S.E.2d 484 (1961).

Rights of accused may be waived voluntarily, or by counsel's failure to act.

- Generally, all rights can be waived. This may be done by one accused of a criminal offense where this is done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. It may be done by counsel for the accused by counsel's failure to act timely or by counsel's not acting at all. Mingo v. State, 133 Ga. App. 385, 210 S.E.2d 835 (1974).

Stipulating waiver of prior jeopardy.

- Although the trial court ruled on the motion to suppress after the jury had been sworn and excused, where the record showed that, in the trial court, the appellee stipulated in writing that a jury had never been placed upon the appellee and, consequently, that he had not been placed in jeopardy, the result of such stipulation is that the motion to suppress had, in effect, been ruled upon prior to impanelling of the jury, and the case was properly before the appellate court. State v. Chumley, 164 Ga. App. 828, 299 S.E.2d 564 (1982).

Contracting to abide by restrictive covenants.

- Because a landowner was at liberty to waive a constitutional as well as a legal right, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in restraining the landowner's continuing violation of restrictive covenants by hanging an unapproved non-commercial sign from the landowner's residence after the landowner had validly contracted to abide by the covenants which were mutually applicable to all lot owners. Bryan v. MBC Partners, L.P., 246 Ga. App. 549, 541 S.E.2d 124 (2000).

Defendant acknowledging service and waiving filing cannot object that writ not filed.

- A defendant when sued may acknowledge service, and waive copy, process, and filing before the session of the court, and the defendant will not afterwards as against the plaintiff be heard to object that the writ was not filed before the court. Steadman v. Simmons, 39 Ga. 591 (1869).

Contract exemption releases landlord from liability for all acts, except those willful and wanton.

- A valid exemption in a lease contract effectively released the landlord from all liability for injury to the tenant's goods on account of ordinary negligence, including all acts and omissions as charged in the petition, except those which constituted willfulness and wantonness. To make an act willful and wanton, specific facts must be alleged and proven. King v. Smith, 47 Ga. App. 360, 170 S.E. 546 (1933).

Acknowledgment that checks in full settlement of salary due estops recovery of deductions made.

- The plaintiff's written acknowledgment that the plaintiff's pay checks were in full settlement of the salary due the plaintiff, and that any deductions from the full amount due were made in accordance with the payee's written request, not having been made under duress, constituted a waiver which did not adversely affect the public interest or violate public policy, and estopped the plaintiff from recovering the deductions so made. Barfield v. City of Atlanta, 53 Ga. App. 861, 187 S.E. 407 (1936).

Where accused assents to juror excuse, no error committed, though verdict rendered by 11 jurors.

- Where the evidence in a criminal trial, though partly circumstantial, was sufficient to authorize a finding that at the time one of the original 12 jurors was excused by the court, and in the presence of the court, the accused was consulted by his counsel, and expressly assented, as the accused had the right to do, no error was committed, even though the verdict was rendered by 11 jurors. Coates v. Lawrence, 193 Ga. 379, 18 S.E.2d 685 (1942).

Too late to attack defective indictment in habeas corpus proceedings if defendant pled guilty.

- If the defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment in which the defendant has incriminated oneself, and the defendant's spouse has testified, it is too late afterwards, in proceedings instituted to secure the release of the defendant by a writ of habeas corpus, to attack the indictment upon that ground. Bradford v. Mills, 208 Ga. 198, 66 S.E.2d 58 (1951).

One going to trial without objection cannot question the constitutionality of the Act creating court which tried him. Senters v. Wright & Lopez, Inc., 220 Ga. 611, 140 S.E.2d 904 (1965).

By pleading to merits of case defendant waives right to object to jurisdiction of court to render a judgment in personam against the defendant and converts an attachment proceeding into an ordinary common-law action. Parker v. Mercer, 111 Ga. App. 108, 140 S.E.2d 915 (1965).

When no objection to evidence when offered, not considered on appeal.

- The failure to object at the time evidence is offered is a waiver of the objection and this ground of the appeal could not be considered. Sumter County v. Pritchett, 125 Ga. App. 222, 186 S.E.2d 798 (1971).

Once incidental right or contractual benefit has been waived or relinquished it cannot be reclaimed. Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Corr, 133 Ga. App. 296, 211 S.E.2d 156 (1974).

Person may not waive coverage under Trial Judges and Solicitors Retirement Fund.

- It is the intention of the General Assembly that any person whose office is within the ambit of the statutory provisions, creating and governing the Trial Judges and Solicitors Retirement Fund, shall participate in this retirement system commencing with the time provided in the provisions and continuing until one ceases to hold the position or office covered by the fund; such a person may not waive or renounce such coverage. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-475.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 17A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, § 256.

C.J.S.

- 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 212.

ALR.

- Waiver of benefit of statute or rule by which allegation in pleading of execution or of consideration of written instrument must be taken as true unless met by verified denial, 67 A.L.R. 1283.

Stipulation of parties as to the law, 92 A.L.R. 663.

Waiver of statutory right to minimum wage or benefit of regulation as to hours of labor, 102 A.L.R. 842; 129 A.L.R. 1145.

Right of employee of public contractor to maintain action against latter based upon statutory obligation as to rate of wages or upon provisions in that regard in the contract between contractor and the public, 144 A.L.R. 1035.

Agreement by a member or members of a class for whose protection a bond is required by statute, to indemnify surety, as contrary to public policy, 154 A.L.R. 838.

Acceptance by building or construction contractor of payments under his contract as a waiver of right of action upon implied warranty as to conditions affecting cost, 173 A.L.R. 308.

Estoppel to assert invalidity of decree of divorce for lack of domicile at the divorce forum or failure to obtain jurisdictions of person, 175 A.L.R. 538.

Validity of contractual stipulation or provision waiving debtor's exemption, 94 A.L.R.2d 967.

Validity, in contract for installment sale of consumer goods, or commercial paper given in connection therewith, of provision waiving, as against assignee, defenses good against seller, 39 A.L.R.3d 518.

Validity of exculpatory clause in lease exempting lessor from liability, 49 A.L.R.3d 321.

Right of accused, in state criminal trial, to insist, over prosecutor's or court's objection, on trial by court without jury, 37 A.L.R.4th 304.