TITLE 33 INSURANCE

Section 24. Insurance Generally, 33-24-1 through 33-24-98.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

33-24-6. Consent of insured to insurance contract; exceptions; reliance by insurer on statements in application.

No life or accident and sickness insurance contract upon an individual, except a contract of group life insurance or of group or blanket accident and sickness insurance, shall be made or effectuated unless at the time of the making of the contract the individual insured, being of competent legal capacity to contract, applies for a life or accident and sickness insurance contract or consents in writing to the contract, except in the following cases:
1. A spouse may effectuate insurance upon the other spouse;
2. Any person having an insurable interest in the life of a minor or any person upon whom a minor is dependent for support and maintenance may effectuate insurance upon the life of or pertaining to the minor;
3. An application for a family policy may be signed by either parent, by a stepparent, or by husband or wife;
4. A publicly owned corporation may effectuate insurance upon its employees in whom it has an insurable interest;
5. A corporation not described in paragraph (4) of this subsection may effectuate insurance upon its employees in whom it has an insurable interest, and a trustee of a trust established by a corporation providing life, health, disability, retirement, or similar benefits may effectuate insurance upon employees for whom such benefits are to be provided if the insurance contract or contracts held by such corporation or trustee cover at least two employees. For purposes of this paragraph, any employee of a group of corporations consisting of a parent corporation and its directly or indirectly owned subsidiaries shall be considered to be an employee of each corporation within that group; or
6. A corporation described in paragraph (4) or (5) of this subsection or the trustee of a trust established by such corporation for its sole benefit may exchange any policy which was issued to itself on the life of an employee or retiree of the corporation, or which was issued to another corporation or the trustee of a trust established by such other corporation for its sole benefit on the life of an employee or retiree of such other corporation, and the exchanging corporation has acquired by purchase, merger, or otherwise all or part of such other corporation's business for a new policy of insurance on such individual's life issued to the exchanging corporation.
1. If a contract of life insurance is issued as authorized in paragraph (4) or (5) of subsection (a) of this Code section, the insurer shall be required to give written notice of such life insurance in accordance with paragraph (3) of this subsection and provide the employees an opportunity to refuse to participate. For all contracts of life insurance issued or delivered for issuance in this state after July 1, 2003, pursuant to paragraph (4) or (5) of subsection (a) of this Code section, the written consent of each individual proposed to be insured shall be obtained prior to the issuance of a policy on such individual. Written consent shall include an acknowledgment that the corporation may maintain life insurance coverage on such individual after such individual's employment with the corporation has terminated.
2. If a contract of life insurance is issued as authorized in paragraphs (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of this Code section, the insurer shall be required to give written notice of such life insurance in accordance with paragraph (3) of this subsection.
3. At the time of the issuance or delivery of the contract of insurance, notice of the issuance of the policy shall be delivered to the insured in person or by depositing the notice in the United States mail, to be dispatched by at least first-class mail to the home, business, or other address of record of the insured. The insurer may obtain a receipt provided by the United States Postal Service as evidence of mailing such notice or obtain such other evidence of mailing as prescribed or accepted by the United States Postal Service. The insurer shall not be required to provide the notice set forth in this subsection with respect to any application for credit life insurance; any insured who is older than the age of majority and who has signed or otherwise acknowledged the application in writing; any application for insurance covering the life of a minor; or any application for a contract of life insurance with a face amount of less than $10,000.00.
An insurer shall be entitled to rely upon all statements, declarations, and representations made by an applicant for insurance relative to the insurable interest which such applicant has in the insured; and no insurer shall incur any legal liability except as set forth in the policy, by virtue of any untrue statements, declarations, or representations so relied upon in good faith by the insurer.
As used in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) of subsection (a) of this Code section, the term "employee" shall include any and all directors, officers, employees, or retired employees. The term "employee" shall include any former employee, but only for the purpose of replacing existing life insurance that will be surrendered in exchange for new life insurance in an amount not exceeding the insurance being surrendered.

(Code 1933, § 56-2407, enacted by Ga. L. 1960, p. 289, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 389, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 132, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1000, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1721, § 4; Ga. L. 1995, p. 776, § 3; Ga. L. 2003, p. 482, § 2; Ga. L. 2009, p. 635, § 1/HB 80.)

Law reviews.

- For note, "Misrepresentations and Nondisclosures in the Insurance Application," see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 876 (1979).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Common law required insured's knowledge or consent.

- There existed at common law a general rule establishing a public policy against the issuance of a policy of life insurance without the knowledge or consent of the person insured. It was deemed that to allow the insuring of the life of a person without the person's knowledge or consent could be a contributing factor toward the commission of a crime and could create a substantial risk to the unknowing insured person. Wren v. New York Life Ins. Co., 59 F.R.D. 484 (N.D. Ga. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1974).

Knowledge or consent as deterrent to crime.

- To allow the insuring of the life of a person without that person's knowledge or consent could be a contributing factor toward the commission of a crime and could create a substantial risk to the unknowing insured person. Wren v. New York Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1974).

Section requires insured's application or consent in writing.

- While the public policy at common law dealt with "knowledge or consent," the Georgia General Assembly has been even more restrictive by providing that the insured must either apply for the insurance or consent thereto in writing. Wren v. New York Life Ins. Co., 59 F.R.D. 484 (N.D. Ga. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1974).

Verbal authorization of written consent does not comply.

- Purpose of this section is to put consent beyond all question by requiring the consent to be in writing. The very purpose and specific requirement of the section would be rendered meaningless if one could meet its terms by alleging written consent to have been verbally authorized, something that the deceased insured would hardly be in a position to dispute. Wren v. New York Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1974).

Telephone communication which allegedly gives one the right to sign an application for insurance, which is subsequently signed by that party, does not constitute the consent in writing by the insured as required by this section. Wren v. New York Life Ins. Co., 59 F.R.D. 484 (N.D. Ga. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1974).

Consent of insured is not required for placement of group insurance. Bohannon v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1977).

Trusted group policy, in which the individual applies for the coverage of the individual's choice and each application undergoes separate underwriting, as in individual insurance, does not constitute a "group" policy for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-6. Delaware Am. Int'l Life Ins. Co. v. Wood, 630 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Insurance coverage is void ab initio when insured neither signed application nor consented in writing to the issuance of the coverage. Wood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 631 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

When a parent brought suit to recover the benefits under a policy of life insurance insuring the life of the parent's adult child, the trial court erred in only partially denying the insurer's motion for summary judgment by holding that the insurer had waived the statutory requirement prohibiting the issuance of a valid life insurance policy without the written consent of the insured. Under circumstances not qualifying for an exception pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-6(a)(1)-(4), the policy was void ab initio, and unenforceable by the courts; written consent of the insured may not be waived. Time Ins. Co. v. Lamar, 195 Ga. App. 452, 393 S.E.2d 734 (1990).

Issuance of void policy.

- Plaintiff's complaint stated a viable fraud claim based on alleged misrepresentation by the defendant in knowingly issuing a void insurance policy with the purpose of deceiving the plaintiff, on the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the appearance that the policy issued was valid and enforceable, and on the resulting harm to the plaintiff, including the loss of use of funds paid as premiums for the void policy. Loney v. Primerica Life Ins. Co., 231 Ga. App. 815, 499 S.E.2d 385 (1998).

Insurer is not barred by incontestability clauses from arguing that policies are void ab initio because the proposed insured, who was then an adult, neither signed the applications nor consented in writing to the issuance of the coverage as required by subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-6. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Wood, 631 F. Supp. 15 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Running of the incontestability clause is not a bar to an action under subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-6. Wood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 631 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Contracts of insurance written on the franchise plan bear the same legal consequences as any individually written policy, and, therefore, require the signature of the individual insured, exactly the same as under an individual policy. Wood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 255 Ga. 300, 336 S.E.2d 806 (1985); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Wood, 631 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Insurer is entitled to rely on the statements of an applicant as true under subsection (b) (now subsection (c)), and incurs no legal liability except as set forth in the policy by virtue of any untrue statements, declarations, or representations relied on by the insurer. Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Renew, 121 Ga. App. 883, 176 S.E.2d 103 (1970).

Ambiguous questions in application.

- Questions as to applicant's status as smoker calling for "yes" or "no" answers were ambiguous and answers thereto were construed favorably to the insured. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Snead, 231 Ga. App. 406, 499 S.E.2d 173 (1998).

Conflicting and disputed evidence on the issue of the falsity of the insured's representation on an application created issues of fact that were properly presented to the jury. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Snead, 231 Ga. App. 406, 499 S.E.2d 173 (1998).

Cited in National Indem. Co. v. Berry, 136 Ga. App. 545, 221 S.E.2d 624 (1975); Hairston v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Ga. 1970).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

No consent by parent not guardian of child's property.

- Parent of a minor child, who may be assumed to be the guardian of the person of the child but not the qualified guardian of the child's property, may not execute the written consent on behalf of the child mentioned in this section. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 469.

Applicant with right to change beneficiary must have insurable interest in life of minor insured.

- When the applicant, the lifetime owner of the policy, has control of the policy and therefore may change beneficiaries at any time during the life of the insured without regard to any consent being given by the previous beneficiary or the insured, such lifetime owner must satisfy the requirements of subsection (c) of former Code 1933 § 56-2404 (see O.C.G.A. § 33-24-3) with reference to an insurable interest as well as former Code 1933, § 56-2404 (see O.C.G.A. § 33-34-6) with reference to consent of the insured. In order to satisfy subsection (c) of former Code 1933, § 56-2404, the benefits of the policy must be payable to the individual insured or the insured's personal representative, or to a person having, at the time when such contract was made, an interest in the individual insured; in order to satisfy former Code 1933, § 56-2404 such lifetime owner, in order to come within the exception, must have an insurable interest in the life of the minor whose life is insured. The wording of "no life insurance . . . contract upon an individual . . . shall be made or effectuated," clearly would include the applicant who is the lifetime owner regardless of whether such applicant or owner is the named beneficiary in the policy. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 469.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, §§ 187, 261.

C.J.S.

- 44 C.J.S., Insurance, §§ 479, 480.

ALR.

- Liability in respect of premium where policy is rejected by applicant or prospect, 41 A.L.R. 644.

Divorce of insured and beneficiary as affecting the latter's right in life insurance, 52 A.L.R. 386; 175 A.L.R. 1220.

Right of insurance company, in view of its public interest, to reject applications for insurance (including validity, construction and application of statutes in that regard), 123 A.L.R. 139.

Rights and remedies against insurer, of one upon whose life it has, without his or her consent, issued a policy of life insurance to another, 127 A.L.R. 113.

"Family" insurance, 152 A.L.R. 1169.

Insured's responsibility for false answers inserted by insurer's agent in application following correct answers by insured, or incorrect answers suggested by agent, 26 A.L.R.3d 6.

Insured's ratification, after loss, of policy procured without his authority, knowledge, or consent, 52 A.L.R.3d 235.

Who is "resident" or "member" of same "household" or "family" as named insured, within liability insurance provision defining additional insureds, 93 A.L.R.3d 420.

Estoppel of, or waiver by, issuer of life insurance policy to assert defense of lack of insurable interest, 86 A.L.R.4th 828.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 33-24-6

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Wood v. New York Life Ins., 336 S.E.2d 806 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 4, 1985 | 255 Ga. 300

...upon the two questions certified below. In all three cases Ross Wood signed Kristofer's name to the various applications for insurance. He asserts that he did so with Kristofer's consent, an assertion accepted as fact for summary judgment purposes. Section 33-24-6(a) of the [Official Code of Georgia Annotated] requires that an insured either sign the application for insurance or consent in writing to its issuance. [Fn. omitted.] The insurance companies assert that since Kristofer did not sign the application or consent to them in writing, they are void ab initio. " "Ross Wood contends that § 33-24-6(a) is not applicable in these cases because the policies involved are `contract[s] of group life insurance' and thus excepted from the statute's requirements....

...as opposed to some other kind of insurance?' "The insurance companies acknowledge the foregoing, however, they contend that the policies involved here are not the type of `true group' policies which are intended to be excepted from the provisions of § 33-24-6(a)....

...sured sign the application or consent in writing to its issuance is to protect the insured. The rule is designed to keep an individual from unknowingly becoming worth more dead than alive to a potential beneficiary. Group policies are excepted under § 33-24-6(a) because under a `true group' policy the party who takes out the insurance cannot be the beneficiary....

...After examining the certificates in question and analyzing the applicable Georgia law, the district court agreed with the insurance companies and concluded that the policies were `franchise' rather than `true group' policies and therefore held that § 33-24-6(a) was applicable. Since Kristofer had not signed the applications or consented to their issuance in writing, the court held that all the contracts were void ab initio. "Wood further contends that even if § 33-24-6(a) does apply to the policies, the insurance companies are barred from raising the defense that Kristofer failed to sign the applications or consent to their issuance in writing because each of the policies contained an incontestability clause, as mandated by [OCGA] § 33-27-3(a) (2), [fn....

..."Whether the policies issued by New York Life Insurance Company, Connecticut General Life Insurance Company and Delaware American International Life Insurance Company on the life of Kristofer L. Wood are `contract[s] of group life insurance' within the meaning of [OCGA] § 33-24-6(a) and thus excepted from the requirement that the insured either sign the application for insurance or consent in writing to its issuance?" 2....

...GA] § 33-27-3(a) (2) bars the insurance companies from now raising the defense that Kristofer neither signed the applications for insurance nor consented in writing to their issuance?" 1. Before answering the first certified question regarding OCGA § 33-24-6 (a), [1] we undertake to examine the arrangements established to obtain insurance from the insurance companies....

...After approving an applicant, New York Life would then issue the applicant a certificate of insurance in an agreed upon amount. Having given this background information we turn to the question of whether the policies issued by the insurance companies fall within the purview of OCGA § 33-24-6 (a), so as to be subject to the requirement that the insured sign the application for insurance or consent in writing to its issuance....

...In the Connecticut General case the district court, Chief Judge Charles A. Moye, Jr., thoroughly reviewed the issue and concluded that the policy, for purposes of OCGA § 33-34-6 (a), was not a group policy and that it was therefore subject to the requirements of OCGA § 33-24-6 (a)....

...sult. As we are in complete agreement with the district court's treatment of this issue, we quote in relevant part from its order in the Connecticut General case: "A careful review of the public policy considerations which underlie the statute [OCGA § 33-24-6 (a)] and of the nature of the Connecticut General coverage leads to the conclusion that the statute is applicable....

...rance on the life of another without his consent, even though the insurance was procured by one having an insurable interest. See e.g., Byrne v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 88 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. 1935). See also 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 241. "Section 33-24-6(a) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Ga....

...Wood, unlike the group policyholder, was not prevented from naming himself beneficiary on the policies, and he did so allegedly by direction of Kristofer. In these circumstances, the necessity for the written consent of the insured is patent and falls within the general requirement of § 33-24-6(a) rather than the exception for a `contract of group insurance.' "This construction of § 33-24-6(a) effectuates the intention of the legislation in enacting that section....

...ingle or blanket insurance policy. In group insurance employees do not make individual applications, and they receive certificates referring to the master policy which is issued to the employer.' *306 By limiting the exception for group insurance in § 33-24-6(a) to the type of `true group' insurance defined in McFarland, the evil that the statute was designed to remedy is eliminated and the legislative purpose is effectuated....

...(Emphasis supplied.) "Contracts of insurance written on the franchise plan `bear the same legal consequences as any individually written policy.' Id. at 181. As a consequence, the necessity for the signature of the individual insured, as required by O.C.G.A. § 33-24-6(a), is exactly the same under a franchise plan as under an individual policy. . . ." 2. As we are in agreement with the district court that the policies in question are subject to the requirements of OCGA § 33-24-6 (a), we must now decide the second certified question....

...attached to the father's failure to obtain the written consent of his son to sign the son's name to the applications for insurance. On this appeal it is without dispute the consent was obtained, but only orally and not in writing. The statute (OCGA § 33-24-6 (a)) requires a writing. I would hold the failure to obtain a writing does not render the contracts of insurance void "ab initio." Therefore, the two-year incontestability clause applies so as to bar the defense. NOTES [1] OCGA § 33-24-6 (a) provides that "[n]o life or accident and sickness insurance contract upon an individual, except a contract of group life insurance or of group or blanket accident and sickness insurance, shall be made or effectuated unless at the time...