O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 10-1-233 (2019)

Acts of distributor violating article

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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It shall be a violation of this article for any gasoline distributor who has a marketing agreement with a gasoline dealer, directly or indirectly, through any officer, agent, or employee, to commit any of the following acts: (1) To terminate or cancel such marketing agreement without good cause prior to the expiration date; (2) To terminate or cancel an existing marketing agreement prior to this expiration date or to fail to enter into subsequent agreements without having first given written notice setting forth all the reasons for such action to the gasoline dealer at least 60 days in advance of such termination, cancellation, or expiration of the existing agreement; provided, however, that such notice shall not be required of a gasoline distributor acting with reasonable cause to believe the dealer is maliciously and willfully damaging the property rights of the gasoline distributor or if the dealer has voluntarily abandoned the marketing relationship or after five days’ notice has failed to pay his just debts when due to the distributor; (3) By the use of coercion, intimidation, or threats, to force or induce such gasoline dealer to deal exclusively in products manufactured, distributed, or sponsored by the gasoline distributor or to participate in promotions. Hours of operation which are set in any

SELLING/OTHER TRADE PRACTICES

written agreement in effect prior to July 1, 1978, can only be changed by mutual consent. It shall also be the duty of the distributor to advise the dealer in writing prior to execution of the agreement the projected potential gallonage and the dealer shall acknowledge same in writing prior to execution of the marketing agreement that he is willing to accept same; (4) To engage in any acts which have the purpose, intent, or effect of fixing or maintaining prices or of forcing or inducing adherence to prices at which such gasoline distributor’s products are to be resold by such gasoline dealers, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to prohibit recommendation, suggestion, urging, or discussion; (5) To require a gasoline dealer, at the time of entering into a marketing agreement, to assent to a release, assignment, novation, waiver, or estoppel which would relieve any person from liability imposed by this article; (6) To require or prohibit any change in management of any gasoline dealer unless such requirement or prohibition of change shall be for good cause, which cause shall be stated in writing by the gasoline distributor; (7) To impose standards of performance upon the gasoline dealer other than those in the marketing agreement; (8) To provide any term or condition in any marketing agreement, or other agreement ancillary or collateral thereto, which term or condition directly or indirectly violates this article; (9) After July 1, 1978, to require operation in excess of a six-day week or in excess of a 12 hour day if the dealer can prove it results in substantially lessening the profits earned in his entire operation to the extent that it is not economically feasible to continue said operation; provided, however, that this paragraph shall in no way impair the obligation of contracts made prior to July 1, 1978; and provided, further, that this paragraph shall not impair the writing of a contract for hours in excess of the hours expressed in this paragraph or impair the right to enforce the hours contained in any contract until sufficient evidence is available to a dealer to exercise the rights provided in this article; and provided, further, that this paragraph shall not be applicable to dealers or distributors who operate a food or convenience store in conjunction with the retail sale of automotive gasoline and related products.

History

Ga. L. 1973, p. 438, § 4; Ga. L. 1978, p. 2249, §§ 4, 5; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 8.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Paragraph (6) of O.C.G.A. § 10-1-233 is unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution in that the paragraph purports to regulate an industry not affected with a public interest. O’Brien v. Union Oil Co., 699 F. Supp. 1562, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13210 (N.D. Ga. 1988). Paragraph (6) of O.C.G.A. § 10-1-233 is contrary to public policy in that the paragraph adversely impacts upon the rights of gasoline distributors with respect to the individual personal service

contracts between themselves and their retailers. O’Brien v. Union Oil Co., 699 F. Supp. 1562, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13210 (N.D. Ga. 1988). Paragraphs (8) and (9) of this section are not preempted by the federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2801 et seq. Exxon Corp. v. Georgia Ass’n of Petro. Retailers, 484 F. Supp. 1008, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7715 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff’d, 644 F.2d 1030, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13419 (5th Cir. 1981).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 1 case, 1988–1988 · leading case: O'BRIEN v. Union Oil Co. of California, 699 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
O'BRIEN v. Union Oil Co. of California, 699 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ga. 1988). · cites it 20× “Specifically, plaintiff contends that in refusing to approve the proposed purchaser as a retailer/tenant and in deciding against renewing plaintiff’s lease, defendant committed acts proscribed by § 10-1-233. This section provides in relevant part: It shall be a violation of this…”
— 10-1-233(1) — 1 case
O'BRIEN v. Union Oil Co. of California, 699 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ga. 1988). “Specifically, plaintiff contends that in refusing to approve the proposed purchaser as a retailer/tenant and in deciding against renewing plaintiff’s lease, defendant committed acts proscribed by § 10-1-233. This section provides in relevant part: It shall be a violation of this…”
— 10-1-233(2) — 1 case
O'BRIEN v. Union Oil Co. of California, 699 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ga. 1988). “Specifically, plaintiff contends that in refusing to approve the proposed purchaser as a retailer/tenant and in deciding against renewing plaintiff’s lease, defendant committed acts proscribed by § 10-1-233. This section provides in relevant part: It shall be a violation of this…”
— 10-1-233(6) — 1 case
O'BRIEN v. Union Oil Co. of California, 699 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ga. 1988). “Specifically, plaintiff contends that in refusing to approve the proposed purchaser as a retailer/tenant and in deciding against renewing plaintiff’s lease, defendant committed acts proscribed by § 10-1-233. This section provides in relevant part: It shall be a violation of this…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.