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2018 Georgia Code 10-1-234 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 10-1-234 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 10-1-234

TITLE 10 COMMERCE AND TRADE

Section 1. Selling and Other Trade Practices, 10-1-1 through 10-1-915.

ARTICLE 9 GASOLINE MARKETING PRACTICES

10-1-234. Selling controlled product to another distributor for retail sale; selling to other dealers at distress prices.

It shall be an unlawful predatory and unfair business practice for an automotive gasoline distributor who controls a product supply, controls the price of that product and has the power to require the purchase of that product by another automotive gasoline distributor or an automotive gasoline dealer doing business in this state to sell said product at prevailing automotive gasoline distributor prices at any time to another automotive gasoline distributor for resale to automotive gasoline dealers with the purpose or intent that said product will be sold at retail by said automotive gasoline distributor and fails to offer its automotive gasoline dealers an opportunity to purchase an equal volume of product upon the same terms and conditions, excepting expenses for advertising, credit cards, and other expenses relative to its automotive gasoline dealers, when said automotive gasoline distributor is selling said product at distress prices to other automotive gasoline dealers in the dealer's marketing area. As used in this Code section, the term "distress prices" shall not be construed to include or embrace a price established for the purpose of meeting competition.

(Ga. L. 1978, p. 2249, § 6; Ga. L. 1984, p. 1679, § 1; Ga. L. 2017, p. 774, § 10/HB 323.)

The 2017 amendment, effective May 9, 2017, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, revised punctuation in the first sentence of this Code section.

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 1984, p. 1679, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that that Act "shall not apply to or be deemed to affect any cause of action pending" on the effective date of the Act (April 6, 1984).

Law reviews.

- For annual survey of law of business associations, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 57 (1986).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

This section not void for vagueness.

- Parties are sufficiently apprised of proscribed conduct under this section so as not to be deprived of due process of law by its application, so this section is not void for vagueness. Exxon Corp. v. Georgia Ass'n of Petro. Retailers, 484 F. Supp. 1008 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 932, 102 S. Ct. 430, 70 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1981).

O.C.G.A. § 10-1-234 is, while most assuredly not a model of clarity, at least amenable to some sensible construction; thus, it is constitutional because it does alert parties to character of proscribed conduct and does amount to something more than no rule at all. Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 932, 102 S. Ct. 430, 70 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1981).

O.C.G.A. § 10-1-234 violates the due process clause of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I, in that the statute seeks to regulate a business not affected with a public interest. Batton-Jackson Oil Co. v. Reeves, 255 Ga. 480, 340 S.E.2d 16 (1986).

Constitutional evaluation.

- While the void-for-vagueness doctrine is most rigorously applied in the context of penal statutes and in the area of First Amendment rights, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity; thus, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-234 may not escape scrutiny simply because the statute is a commercial regulatory statute. But, because this statute is not concerned with either the First Amendment or the definition of criminal conduct a court must be lenient in evaluating the statute's constitutionality. Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 932, 102 S. Ct. 430, 70 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1981).

Standard for evaluating constitutionality of nonpenal, commercial regulatory statutes.

- Because O.C.G.A. § 10-1-234 is a nonpenal, commercial regulatory statute, the standard for evaluating the statute's constitutionality is whether the statute is so indefinite as to amount to no rule or standard at all. Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 932, 102 S. Ct. 430, 70 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1981).

Section must be substantially incomprehensible to be unconstitutional.

- For O.C.G.A. § 10-1-234 to constitute a deprivation of due process, the statute must be so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all, that is, uncertainty in the statute is not enough for the statute to be unconstitutionally vague; rather, the statute must be substantially incomprehensible. Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 932, 102 S. Ct. 430, 70 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1981).

Section does not conflict with federal Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 751 et seq. Exxon Corp. v. Georgia Ass'n of Petro. Retailers, 484 F. Supp. 1008 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 932, 102 S. Ct. 430, 70 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1981).

Section does not conflict with Sherman Act.

- There presently exists no conflict with the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, sufficient to invalidate this section. Exxon Corp. v. Georgia Ass'n of Petro. Retailers, 484 F. Supp. 1008 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Exxon Corp. v. Busbee, 644 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 932, 102 S. Ct. 430, 70 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1981).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 10-1-234

Total Results: 2  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Strickland v. Ports Petroleum Co., 353 S.E.2d 17 (Ga. 1987).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 16, 1987 | 256 Ga. 669

...les Act was unconstitutional. We affirm both lower court decisions, and inasmuch as we find the statute to be unconstitutional, there is no need to address the other errors enumerated. In Batton-Jackson Oil Co. v. Reeves, id. at p. 482, we held OCGA § 10-1-234 unconstitutional because it "violate[d] the due process clause of our State Constitution, 1983 Georgia Constitution, Art....
...564-565) (emphasis supplied), no matter what other states or the Supreme Court of the United States "may or may not have decided." Cox v. General Electric Co., supra at p. 291. The statute under consideration, in Batton-Jackson Oil Co. v. Reeves, supra, OCGA § 10-1-234, forced the parties to sell and buy gasoline at the prevailing retail price....
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Batton-jackson Oil Co. Inc. v. Reeves, 340 S.E.2d 16 (Ga. 1986).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 1986 | 255 Ga. 480

...May, Jr., Rene J. Mouledoux, Pamela A. Hudak, Hansel & Post, Jule W. Felton, Jr., John G. Parker, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, David T. Steffen, Bruce W. McDiarmid, amici curiae. BELL, Justice. These cases involve, inter alia, the constitutionality of OCGA § 10-1-234, [1] a provision of the Gasoline Marketing Practices Act, OCGA §§ 10-1-230 to 10-1-241....
...-county market area. On June 22, 1982, Reeves brought this action seeking injunctive relief pursuant to the provisions of the Georgia Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, contending that Texaco's and Batton-Jackson's purchasing agreement violated OCGA § 10-1-234, and that as a result, Batton-Jackson and its consignment stations, in particular McDonough Tire and Wrecker Service, had an unfair competitive advantage over his station due to Batton-Jackson's access to gasoline at lower cost....
...On June 1, 1983, the trial court, after a bench trial, entered an order holding that competition by Batton-Jackson in the retail automotive gasoline market damaged Reeves' business and that Texaco was selling gasoline to Batton-Jackson in violation of the § 10-1-234 prohibition against selling gasoline at prevailing distributor prices to a distributor, Batton-Jackson, which Texaco knew was selling a portion of the gasoline at retail....
..., for that gasoline, Texaco charge Batton-Jackson the same price as that charged to other retailers purchasing from Texaco. Both Texaco and Batton-Jackson appeal from the June 1, 1983, order. They argue that the trial court improperly construed OCGA § 10-1-234, and that OCGA § 10-1-234 is unconstitutional for numerous reasons. As we agree with their contention that OCGA § 10-1-234 violates the due process clause of our State Constitution, 1983 Georgia Constitution, Art....
...re warranted in having a feeling of concern in respect of its maintenance."'" Id. at 564 (quoting Justice McReynold's dissent in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (54 SC 505, 78 LE 940) (1934). Here, the first issue for consideration is whether OCGA § 10-1-234 engages in price-fixing....
...That it does so is clearly evidenced by the trial court's order in the instant case. Having concluded that the statute does fix prices, we must next determine whether the gasoline industry is affected with a public interest. If it is not, then OCGA § 10-1-234's regulation of prices is unconstitutional....
...Rio Stores, Inc., supra, 243 Ga. at 601-603. As it cannot be said that the gasoline industry is devoted to the citizens of this state and its use granted to the public, we conclude that the gasoline industry is not affected with a public interest and that OCGA § 10-1-234's regulation of prices is therefore unconstitutional. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Hill, C. J., not participating. NOTES [1] OCGA § 10-1-234, as amended in 1984, provides: "It shall be an unlawful predatory and unfair business practice for an automotive gasoline distributor who controls a product supply, controls the price of that product and has the power to require the purch...