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- For comment, "The Georgia Fair Business Practices Act: Business As Usual," see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 453 (1993).
- Company's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) made applicable in bankruptcy through Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012, was denied because nothing in the language of Georgia's Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), O.C.G.A. § 10-1-370 et seq., required the debtor to be a consumer or required a consumer to be injured; therefore, the "consumer" issue was irrelevant to standing under the UDTPA. Johnston Indus. Ala., Inc. v. Nat'l Contract Assocs. (In re Johnston Indus.), 300 Bankr. 821 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003).
- Sole remedy provided under O.C.G.A. § 10-1-373 is injunctive relief. Lauria v. Ford Motor Co., 169 Ga. App. 203, 312 S.E.2d 190 (1983).
Sole remedy available under O.C.G.A. § 10-1-373 was injunctive relief; however, a plaintiff had to establish a likelihood of damage to plaintiff by a deceptive trade practice of another. Moore-Davis Motors, Inc. v. Joyner, 252 Ga. App. 617, 556 S.E.2d 137 (2001).
Because a marketer did not seek injunctive relief, an insurer's verbal cancellation of a written contract with the marketer to sell health, medical, and surgical insurance products did not give rise to a cause of action under Georgia's Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-370 et seq., specifically O.C.G.A. § 10-1-372(a), because an injunction was the sole remedy available under O.C.G.A. § 10-1-373. Med S. Health Plans, LLC v. Life of the S. Ins. Co., F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. May 19, 2008).
In a deceptive trade case, the trial court erred in granting permanent injunctive relief at the interlocutory hearing as the defendant had no notice that the trial court intended at that hearing to consider the merits of permanent injunctive relief. McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC v. PruittHealth-Toccoa, LLC, 297 Ga. 94, 772 S.E.2d 660 (2015).
Proof of neither direct competition nor actual confusion is required to obtain relief under O.C.G.A. § 10-1-373. All that is required is that use of name cause confusion to others using reasonable care. Giant Mart Corp. v. Giant Disct. Foods, Inc., 247 Ga. 775, 279 S.E.2d 683 (1981).
Proof of falsity is sufficient to sustain a finding of irreparable injury for purposes of a preliminary injunction. Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Medical Sys., 765 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
- Plaintiff who can prove actual lost sales is entitled to an injunction even though the decline in the plaintiff's sales is mostly attributable to factors other than the plaintiff's competitor's allegedly false or misleading representations. Because detailed proof of individual lost sales goes to the issue of damages, it is not a prerequisite for equitable relief. Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Medical Sys., 765 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
Proof of monetary damages may not be necessary to sustain every cause of action based on the plaintiff's disparagement claim, but a showing that some customer's buying decision was adversely affected is a threshold requirement for each. Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Medical Sys., 870 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
- This part authorizes injunctions restraining use of a family name previously appropriated by another as a trade name, where under all the circumstances, such as the other descriptive words of the trade name, the type of business carried on, the geographical area in which the trade name has acquired a meaning, and other distinguishing factors, there remains a likelihood of confusion and misunderstanding among the general public. Baker Realty Co. v. Baker, 228 Ga. 766, 187 S.E.2d 850 (1972).
- If the right to protection of a trade name exists, the injured party may seek both injunctive relief and damages. Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Assocs., 254 Ga. 734, 334 S.E.2d 308 (1985).
Chapter 11 debtor was entitled to a preliminary injunction under the Lanham Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-373 and10-1-451, against a competing user of its trade name "Reliable Heating and Air" because the debtor clearly demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claims and demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm if an injunction were not issued. Reliable Air, Inc. v. Jape (In re Reliable Air, Inc.), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2007).
- The denial of an interlocutory injunction against alleged deceptive trade practices will not be reversed unless it appears that the trial court has abused the court's discretion. Baker Realty Co. v. Baker, 228 Ga. 766, 187 S.E.2d 850 (1972).
- Clinic patients whose personal information was hacked from the clinic's database and held for ransom then published on the Dark Web by the hacker failed to state a claim under the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-370 et seq., because although the patients claimed an increased exposure to identity theft, the patients did not allege any future, nonspeculative harm which an injunction under O.C.G.A. § 10-1-372 or O.C.G.A. § 10-1-373(a), would remedy. Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, Ga. App. , 815 S.E.2d 639 (2018).
- O.C.G.A. § 10-1-373(a) of the Georgia Deceptive Trade Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-370 et seq., required the plaintiff dry cleaners to allege they were likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice and the allegations that the defendant natural gas supplier disseminated information about future natural gas prices did not pose any future harm, nor were the dry cleaners entitled to injunctive relief for a hypothetical future harm; thus, the Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims failed. Byung Ho Cheoun v. Infinite Energy, Inc., F.3d (11th Cir. Jan. 27, 2010)(Unpublished).
- Trademark holder was not entitled to summary judgment regarding punitive damages under Georgia state law because O.C.G.A. § 10-1-373 applied only to causes of action for torts arising before July 1, 1987, and this issue was required to be decided only if there was an award of damages in the action for trademark infringement. ITT Corp. v. Xylem Group, LLC, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Aug. 5, 2013).
Cited in Tri-State Culvert Mfg., Inc. v. Tri-State Drainage Prods., Inc., 236 Ga. 157, 223 S.E.2d 202 (1976); Rolls-Royce Motors, Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Ga., Inc., 716 F.2d 833 (11th Cir. 1983); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801 (11th Cir. 1985); Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Ctr., 709 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1989); Intown Enters., Inc. v. Barnes, 721 F. Supp. 1263 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, Inc., 267 Ga. 801, 485 S.E.2d 22 (1997).
- 54A Am. Jur. 2d, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices, § 1066 et seq. 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Trademarks and Tradenames, § 128 et seq.
- 87 C.J.S., Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and Unfair Competition, §§ 336 et seq., 381, 382, 434, 458.
- Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (1966 Revision) (U.L.A.) § 3.
- Right to protection against appropriation of advertising matter or methods, 17 A.L.R. 760; 30 A.L.R. 615; 5 A.L.R. Fed. 625.
Right of producer or distributor to protection against use of his containers, 60 A.L.R. 285.
Doctrine of secondary meaning in the law of trademarks and of unfair competition, 150 A.L.R. 1067.
Punitive or exemplary damages as recoverable for trademark infringement or unfair competition, 47 A.L.R.2d 1117.
Rights and remedies with respect to another's use of a deceptively similar advertising slogan, 2 A.L.R.3d 748.
Right of charitable or religious association or corporation to protection against use of same or similar name by another, 37 A.L.R.3d 277.
Right to private action under state consumer protection Act, 62 A.L.R.3d 169.
Failure to deliver ordered merchandise to customer on date promised as unfair or deceptive trade practice, 7 A.L.R.4th 1257.
Right to private action under state consumer protection act - Equitable relief available, 115 A.L.R.5th 709.
Copyright, Under Federal Copyright Act (17 USCS § 1 et seq.), in Advertising Materials, Catalogs, and Price Lists, 5 A.L.R. Fed. 625.
Total Results: 5
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-05-11
Snippet: Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), OCGA § 10-1- 373 (a),1 and petitioned ex parte for a temporary
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-05-11
Citation: 297 Ga. 94, 772 S.E.2d 660
Snippet: Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), OCGA § 10-1-373 (a), 1 and petitioned ex parte for
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1997-04-04
Citation: 485 S.E.2d 22, 267 Ga. 801, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 1239, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 105
Snippet: confusion or misunderstanding to the public. OCGA § 10-1-373. Moreover, protection would not be dependent upon
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1996-05-20
Citation: 470 S.E.2d 644, 266 Ga. 690, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 1907, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 238
Snippet: principles of equity,” (emphasis supplied) OCGA § 10-1-373 (a), this Court has jurisdiction over this matter
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1987-12-04
Citation: 363 S.E.2d 140, 257 Ga. 710, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2065, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 1036
Snippet: businesses of plaintiffs, OCGA §§ 10-1-372 (a) (8); 10-1-373 (b), and found that the $140,000 in attorney fees