O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
This article shall be known and may be cited as the “Georgia Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act.”
History
Code 1981, § 10-1-620, enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 1585, § 2.
Annotations
Law reviews. For annual survey on business associations, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 55 (2013).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Anti-encroachment provision construed. - Under the Georgia Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-620 et seq., a corporate dealership’s relevant market area, the area for which the dealer has standing to resist competition by a new or relocated dealership of the same franchisor, is the area located within an eight-mile radius of
where a dealer qualified as such because the dealer is engaged in the business of selling new motor vehicles, sells those vehicles, or when a dealer qualified as such because the dealer engages exclusively in the repair of motor vehicles. WMW, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 291 Ga. 683, 733 S.E.2d 269, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 777 (2012).
Notes of Decisions
DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC v. Clemente, 668 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 4× “The trial court ruled that Chrysler Motors had a legal duty enforceable under OCGA §§ 51-1-6 4 and 51-1-8 5 to prevent Metro from presenting an unreasonable risk of harm to the public based on the Georgia Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act, OCGA § 10-1-620 et seq. (the…”
Wmw, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 714 S.E.2d 689 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 4× “The trial court concluded that WMW does not have standing and granted American Honda Motor Company, Inc.”
WMW, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 733 S.E.2d 269 (Ga. 2012).
· cites it 2× “1585-1647, which is codified as amended at OCGA §§ 10-1-620 to 10-1-670. Like other statutes, the Franchise Practices Act must be construed as an integrated whole.”
Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 819 F. Supp. 1555 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
· cites it 2× “The first substantive motion before the court is Defendant Ford Motor’s motion for summary judgment on the constitutionality, under the Constitution of the State of Georgia, of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-620, et seq. (the “Franchise…”
Coffee v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Ga. 1998).
· cites it 4× “; (2) violation of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-620 et seq.; (3) breach of contract; (4) promissory estoppel; (5) fraud; (6) negligent misrepresentation; (7) tortious interference with business relations; and (8) tortious interference with…”
Coffee v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1376 (S.D. Ga. 1998).
· cites it 2× “; (2) violation of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-620 et seq.; (3) breach of contract; (4) promissory estoppel; (5) fraud; (6) negligent misrepresentation; (7) tortious interference with business relations; and (8) tortious interference with…”
Toirkens v. Willett Toyota, Inc., 384 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 2× “Said statute is contained within the Georgia Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act, OCGA § 10-1-620 et seq.J and thus applies to transactions between automobile manufacturers and their franchisees, not to transactions between car dealers and their retail customers.”
Hickman v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 982 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
· cites it 2× “Plaintiff, Lynda Hickman, brings this action pursuant to the Georgia Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-620 et seq., alleging improper rejection of her application to purchase a new motor vehicle dealership.”
Moore v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 439 S.E.2d 43 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 2× “Moore demanded a jury trial. As noted in the prior appeal, after presentation of Moore’s case, the trial court granted Suzuki’s motion for directed verdict.”
Doug Howle's Paces Ferry Dodge, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 382 S.E.2d 364 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 2× “nt thereto was denied (the corporations in the interim had undergone certain restructuring and changes in nomenclature); (2) Chrysler and Chrysler Motors’ joint motions as to all claims advanced by Howie as an individual were denied; (3) Chrysler and Chrysler Motors’ joint…”
Nissan North Am., Inc. v. Walker-Jones Nissan, LLC, 812 S.E.2d 130 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 2× “The Transfer Statute provides a mechanism for a franchisor, such as Nissan, to reject a proposed change in management or *134 ownership or a proposed sale of the dealership if the franchisor can show that its decision is not arbitrary and that the proposed new manager, owner, or…”
Lucid Grp. USA, Inc. v. State of Georgia (Ga. 2026).
· cites it 4× “This case concerns the constitutionality of two provisions of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act, OCGA § 10-1-620 et seq. The first of these provisions, OCGA § 10-1-664.”
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