Rule was not changed by NIL.

- Statutory rule in this section, first in the Code of 1895, was not altered but was given substantial effect with respect to negotiable instruments by the former Negotiable Instruments Law. Hill v. Daniel, 52 Ga. App. 427, 183 S.E. 662 (1936). See now O.C.G.A. § 11-3-403.

Deposit without instrument.

- This section is not applicable when an administrator of an estate deposits funds of the estate (which were lost by failure of the bank), but when there was no instrument executed by the agent. Gatewood v. Furlow, 19 Ga. App. 74, 90 S.E. 973 (1916).

Checks drawn by spouse.

- Instrument signed by one as agent, without more, is the individual undertaking of the maker, such words being generally words of description. So checks drawn by the husband and signed by him with the word "agent" added to his name, without more, were the individual checks of the husband, and did not put the payee upon notice that they were drawn on funds which did not belong to the husband, but which belonged to the wife. McRitchie v. Atlanta Trust Co., 170 Ga. 296, 152 S.E. 834 (1930).

One adding "trustee" after name is individually liable.

- Addition of the word "trustee" after the name of the signer of a note, without more, is mere descriptio personae, and the debt is that of the maker individually. Crusselle v. Chastain, 76 Ga. 840 (1886); McRitchie v. Atlanta Trust Co., 170 Ga. 296, 152 S.E. 834 (1930).

Adding "President" after name.

- One signing, "J. L. DeGive, President" was apparently individually liable. Candler v. DeGive, 133 Ga. 486, 66 S.E. 244 (1909).

Adding "Treas." or "V.P." after name.

- Abbreviations and letters, "Treas.," and "V.P.," following the names respectively of two endorsers on a promissory note, are mere words of description, and the obligation incurred by such endorsers is personal. Morris v. Reed, 14 Ga. App. 729, 82 S.E. 314 (1914).

Adding "adm'r" after name.

- It is clear that if "F" had signed an instrument as "TMF, adm'r" it would have been F's individual undertaking. Gatewood v. Furlow, 19 Ga. App. 74, 90 S.E. 973 (1916).

Adding "with Power of Attorney" after name.

- When endorsed on a note and mortgage were several names, the last of which was "H. A. Burge with Power of Attorney" and the power of attorney is not included in the record, at most this could only indicate an ordinary individual endorsement. Hastey v. Roberts, 149 Ga. 479, 100 S.E. 569 (1919).

Adding "administrator" after name.

- Certiorari bond payable on the bond's face to a named individual, followed by the word "administrator" which fails within itself to furnish the means whereby the actual principal for whose benefit the bond is executed can be ascertained with absolute and legal certainty, amounts to nothing more than an undertaking in favor of the named individual, and the word "administrator" is to be taken merely as descriptio personae under this section. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Monroe, 26 Ga. App. 332, 106 S.E. 209, cert. denied, 26 Ga. App. 801 (1921).

Adding "agent" after name.

- If an agent signs a note with the agent's own name alone and adds to the agent's signature the word "agent," and if there is nothing in the note to indicate who is the principal, the agent will be personally liable, just as if the word agent was not added. Harp v. First Nat'l Bank, 173 Ga. 768, 161 S.E. 355 (1931).

Checks drawn by husband.

- Two checks drawn by the plaintiff's husband and signed by him with the word "agent" added to his signature, without more, were the individual checks of the husband, and did not put the payee upon notice that the checks were drawn on funds which did not belong to the husband, nor did such signature to these checks impose upon the payee the duty of inquiring whether the checks were drawn on the funds of the drawer or upon someone else. McRitchie v. Atlanta Trust Co., 170 Ga. 296, 152 S.E. 834 (1930).

Action on note signed as administrator is action against individual.

- Action against "A, administrator," on a promissory note containing the words "I promise to pay," and signed "B Estate, A, administrator (L.S.)," is an action against A as an individual. Glisson v. Weil & Co., 117 Ga. 842, 45 S.E. 221 (1903).

Action by or against one adding "administrator" or "executor" to name is action by or against individual.

- Action by one with the word "administrator" or "executor" added to one's name, especially on a contract made by that one, will ordinarily be treated as being one's individual action; and likewise when the action is against that one. Wadley v. Oertel, 140 Ga. 326, 78 S.E. 912 (1913).

Execution against one "as agent for" another is against former alone.

- Execution against SJW as agent for Mrs. MW is against SJW alone, the words, "as agent for," etc., being merely descriptio personae. Wynn v. Irvine's Ga. Music House, 109 Ga. 287, 34 S.E. 582 (1899).

Bond payable to city recorder individually is not city contract.

- Bond made payable to the city recorder who tried the case in which the defendant was convicted, or to the recorder's successors in office, if given to the obligee in the obligee's personal capacity only, would not be a valid contract with the city. Soles v. City of Vidalia, 92 Ga. App. 839, 90 S.E.2d 249 (1955) (bond construed as payable to obligee in official capacity).

Application with "Agt." after name is individual application.

- When an application to establish and lay out a public road is signed by a named person with the letters "Agt." after the person's name, without more, such instrument is the person's individual application for such road. Commissioners of Decatur County v. Curry, 154 Ga. 378, 114 S.E. 341 (1922).

Stock issued with "guardian" after name is individually owned.

- Legal title to bank stock purchased by and issued to W, "guardian," was prima facie in W individually and on W's death descended to W's personal representative; and W's successor in the trust had no right, under the facts of this case, to recover from the bank money paid for the stock. Williams v. Farmers State Bank, 22 Ga. App. 656, 97 S.E. 249 (1918).

Only principal is bound if agency specified and principal name in contract.

- When in the body or on the face of the instrument the agency is distinctly specified and the principal indicated, and the contract is substantially in the name of such principal, the latter and not the agent is liable, though the instrument is signed by the agent only, provided, of course, the agent has authority to bind the principal. Rawlings v. Robson, 70 Ga. 595 (1883); Bank of Univ. v. Hamilton, 78 Ga. 312 (1886); Wadley v. Oertel, 140 Ga. 326, 78 S.E. 912 (1913); Ocilla S.R.R. v. Morton, 13 Ga. App. 504, 79 S.E. 480 (1913); Harp v. First Nat'l Bank, 173 Ga. 768, 161 S.E. 355 (1931).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the relative after the home healthcare agency sued the relative for a balance due on a contract the relative signed to have nursing services provided to the relative's father. The relative clearly signed in a representative capacity the contract that the home healthcare agency drafted and provided for the relative to sign, the principal, the relative's father, was clearly named in the document as such, and it was evident that the contract was substantially in the name of the principal; accordingly, there was no issue for the jury to decide because the contract obligated the father, not the relative, to pay. Associated Servs. of Accountable Prof'ls, Ltd. v. Workman, 265 Ga. App. 348, 593 S.E.2d 882 (2004).

Agent not personally liable for stock assessment.

- When the trustee of a person non compos mentis, who succeeded to the trust upon the death of the original trustee, entered stock on the books of the bank in the name of "Billups Phinizy, Trustee Marion Daniel Phinizy," the words "Trustee Marion Daniel Phinizy" were not merely descriptio personae, and therefore the trustee was not personally liable for the stock assessment. Gormley v. Phinizy, 46 Ga. App. 431, 167 S.E. 757 (1933).

Principal must be party to sealed instrument to be liable thereon.

- When a contract is made by an agent under seal, no one but a party to the instrument is liable to be sued thereon; and, therefore, if made by an agent or attorney, it must be in the name of the principal in order that the agent may be a party because otherwise the agent is not bound by it. Harp v. First Nat'l Bank, 173 Ga. 768, 161 S.E. 355 (1931).

Context may show agent signed in representative capacity.

- Executory contract between "FCM, administrator of the estate of EPM" and H, was an agreement by FCM in FCM's representative capacity, under former Civil Code 1910, §§ 3570 and 3594. Miller v. Hines, 145 Ga. 616, 89 S.E. 689 (1916).

When two attorneys in fact were expressly authorized by power of attorney to execute a security deed in the names of the principals "or otherwise" and the security deed executed refers to the heirs of an estate (the principals) the security deed would be construed to be a conveyance by them in behalf of themselves and as attorneys in fact for the other heirs at law. Cocke v. Bank of Dawson, 180 Ga. 714, 180 S.E. 711 (1935).

Deeds in which the named grantor was decedent's estate and which were signed in the name of the estate and of the two executors were deeds by the executors of the estate in their official capacity, and purported to convey properties belonging to the estate, and were not the personal deeds of the individuals designated as executors. Harrison v. Harrison, 214 Ga. 393, 105 S.E.2d 214 (1958).

While it is the general rule that a signature with the added word "administrator" or "executor" will ordinarily be treated as that of one in one's individual capacity, the added word being generally merely descriptio personae, this is not an inflexible rule when the context makes it clear that it is signed in a representative capacity, although the added words are not "as administrator" or "as executor." Fisher v. Pair, 69 Ga. App. 492, 26 S.E.2d 187 (1943); Evans v. Smithdeal, 143 Ga. App. 287, 238 S.E.2d 278 (1977).

Words added to signature may take case out of section.

- When the evidence discloses that the advertising contract was signed as follows: "Ann Zior, Sec.-Tres. authorized agent for Ejax Oil Stabilizer," the addition of the name of the purported principal to the agent's signature is prima facie sufficient to take the case beyond the purview of this section. Radio Station WTMP v. Zior, 102 Ga. App. 38, 115 S.E.2d 627 (1960).

Cited in Terrell v. Harris, 42 Ga. App. 760, 157 S.E. 387 (1931); First Christian Church v. Jefferson Std. Life Ins. Co., 183 Ga. 167, 187 S.E. 729 (1936); Higginbotham v. Adams, 192 Ga. 203, 14 S.E.2d 856 (1941); McCoy v. Sasnett, 77 Ga. App. 819, 49 S.E.2d 913 (1948); Harris v. Porter's Social Club, Inc., 215 Ga. 687, 113 S.E.2d 134 (1960); Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Simon, 122 Ga. App. 524, 177 S.E.2d 803 (1970); Jolly v. Egerton, 132 Ga. App. 243, 207 S.E.2d 634 (1974).

Between immediate parties parol evidence may show only principal bound.

- As between the immediate parties, it may be shown by parol evidence that the instrument was, to the knowledge of the parties, intended to be the obligation of the principal and not of the agent and that it was given and accepted as such. Ocilla S.R.R. v. Morton, 13 Ga. App. 504, 79 S.E. 480 (1913). (See O.C.G.A. § 10-6-87 and notes thereto).

When a promissory note was made payable to the order of a named person, followed merely by the word "trustee," and such payee in like manner endorsed the note and delivered the note to a third person, in a suit on the note by the endorsee against the maker and the endorser, although under the rule of descriptio personae the manner of the endorser's signature indicated prima facie that the endorser signed as an individual and that the endorser's obligation as endorser was the endorser's individual undertaking, the endorser was nevertheless entitled to show by parol that the endorser in fact acted in the transaction merely as the trustee or agent of the plaintiff endorsee, and that the endorser's endorsement of the note, though in blank, was, under this agreement with the endorsee, made solely for the transfer of title as the true rightful owner. Kaiser v. Simmons, 52 Ga. App. 355, 183 S.E. 343 (1936). See § 10-6-87 and notes thereto.

Only slight evidence of trust required.

- Prima facie, a judgment in favor of EJD, executor of MG, is EJD's individual property under this section, but this presumption may be removed by slight evidence tending to show that EJD holds the same in trust for the estate. Dozier v. McWhorter, 117 Ga. 786, 45 S.E. 61 (1903).

Pleading may be amended to delete "agent".

- Pleading alleging that the contract, the breach of which is the wrong complained of, was made by the defendant as agent, without more, is amendable by striking the word "agent" therefrom. Such contract is the individual undertaking of the maker under this section. Hearn v. Gower, 1 Ga. App. 265, 57 S.E. 916 (1907).

Mortgage held inadmissible when signer's authority not shown.

- When a mortgage on realty was signed "Trustees North Ga. Col. School (Seal). H. A. Burge, Cor. Sect. (Seal)," it was erroneous to admit the mortgage in evidence on the trial of a claim to the property, over timely objection that "there was no evidence shown where H. A. Burge had any authority to sign any mortgage," the evidence failing to disclose any such authority. Hastey v. Roberts, 149 Ga. 479, 100 S.E. 569 (1919).

If one undertakes obligation in fictitious or trade name, such obligation is one's own individually. Horn v. Wright, 157 Ga. App. 408, 278 S.E.2d 66 (1981).

Action against "X, administratrix of estate of Y, deceased," is suit against X individually, the additional words being merely descriptio personae. Horn v. Wright, 157 Ga. App. 408, 278 S.E.2d 66 (1981).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency, §§ 167 et seq., 192 et seq., 302 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 2A C.J.S., Agency, § 250 et seq.

ALR.

- Personal liability of broker for breach of contract by his principal, 6 A.L.R. 641.

Regulations, rules, custom, or usage of stock or produce exchange or of stock or produce broker as affecting customers, 79 A.L.R. 592.

Right to join agent and undisclosed principal in same action, 118 A.L.R. 701.

Exceptions to rule which permits suit by or against undisclosed principal, 130 A.L.R. 664.