"Agency".

- "Agency" is the relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on one's behalf and subject to one's control, and consent by the other so to act. Smith v. Merck, 206 Ga. 361, 57 S.E.2d 326 (1950); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1972); Flournoy v. City Fin. of Columbus, Inc., 679 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1982).

Word "agency" may refer to that relationship created by express or implied contract or by law, whereby one party delegates the transaction of some lawful business with more or less discretionary power to another, who undertakes to manage the affair and to render an account thereof. Smith v. Merck, 206 Ga. 361, 57 S.E.2d 326 (1950).

Consent essential for liability for other's act.

- Relationship of master and servant cannot be imposed upon a person without the person's consent, express or implied; hence, the defendant was free to select the defendant's own servant, and was responsible for the acts of the defendant's servant within the scope of the defendant's employment, but the defendant was not responsible for the act of an assistant permitted, without the defendant's authority, to act for the defendant. Carter v. Bishop, 209 Ga. 919, 76 S.E.2d 784 (1953).

No liability beyond scope of agency.

- Beyond the scope of agency, a principal is not bound by the acts of the agent. Abercrombie v. Ford Motor Co., 81 Ga. App. 690, 59 S.E.2d 664, rev'd on other grounds, 207 Ga. 464, 62 S.E.2d 209 (1950).

Agency relationship may arise by implication as well as by express authority. Greenbaum v. Brooks, 110 Ga. App. 661, 139 S.E.2d 432 (1964).

Agent or servant is frequently employed by contract or express agreement, but this is not necessary to establish the relationship, which may arise by implication as well as expressly. Griffin v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S.E. 10, 1916F L.R.A. 216, 1917D Ann. Cas. 994 (1915).

Confidential relationship rising to agency.

- Confidential relationship between employer and employee may rise to agency dimensions when a showing is made of a relationship which in fact justifies the reposing of confidence in one party by another. Remediation Servs., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 209 Ga. App. 427, 433 S.E.2d 631 (1993).

Law of agency is not confined to business transactions. Hubert v. Harpe, 181 Ga. 168, 182 S.E. 167, answer conformed to, 52 Ga. App. 262, 183 S.E. 98 (1935).

Manual service.

- "Agency" relates to business transactions, while the work of a servant relates to manual service. Headrick v. Fordham, 154 Ga. App. 415, 268 S.E.2d 753 (1980).

Contractual relationships.

- Relationship between a gas station and the company that leased property and sold gas to the station was a purely contractual one between two independent businesses, not an agency or joint venture. Wells v. Vi-Mac, Inc., 226 Ga. App. 261, 486 S.E.2d 400 (1997).

Trial court erred in granting a rental company summary judgment in a car owner's action alleging that the company breached a settlement agreement because the company was obligated to pay any settlement amounts negotiated by the company's agent, an independent third party administrator, and issues of fact remained as to whether the company issued payment according to the terms of the settlement agreement, which were also disputed. Hearn v. Dollar Rent A Car, Inc., 315 Ga. App. 164, 726 S.E.2d 661 (2012).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying a temporary staffing agency's motion for a new trial based on the failure of a widow and a hospital to spontaneously disclose their litigation agreement because there was nothing in the record to show that the agency's ignorance of the litigation agreement rendered the trial fundamentally unfair; even if the widow benefitted from the hospital's efforts to enforce the hospital's right to indemnity, such incidental benefit did not make the hospital the widow's agent. Med. Staffing Network, Inc. v. Connors, 313 Ga. App. 645, 722 S.E.2d 370 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0940, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 533 (Ga. 2012).

Agency held not created by business relationship.

- Trial court erred by denying summary judgment to a subcontractor on the contractor's breach of fiduciary claim because the evidence did not raise an issue of fact regarding the existence of a special agency or any other confidential relationship between the parties as the business relationship was an arms-length one and even adversarial. UWork.com, Inc. v. Paragon Techs., Inc., 321 Ga. App. 584, 740 S.E.2d 887 (2013).

Control by employer determines agency relationship.

- Test to be applied in determining whether the relationship of the parties constitutes an agency is whether the contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time and manner of executing the work, as distinguished from the right merely to require results in conformity to the contract. Greenbaum v. Brooks, 110 Ga. App. 661, 139 S.E.2d 432 (1964); McMullan v. Georgia Girl Fashions, Inc., 180 Ga. App. 228, 348 S.E.2d 748 (1986).

Agent creates obligations on behalf of principal.

- An employee performs work for the master, but an agent, within the ambit of the employee's authority, represents the employee's principal in some business dealing and is vested with authority, real or ostensible, to create obligations on behalf of the employee's principal, bringing third parties into contractual relations with the principal. Lagerstrom v. Beers Constr. Co., 157 Ga. App. 396, 277 S.E.2d 765 (1981).

Apparent authority to do act is created as to a third person when the statements or conduct of the alleged principal reasonably cause the third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on the principal's behalf by the purported agent. Hinely v. Barrow, 169 Ga. App. 529, 313 S.E.2d 739 (1984).

Apparent authority to offer stock in a company did not arise from the fact that the person making the offer was a part owner of the company and a company officer, particularly as a promise of transfer of company stock was not ordinary company business. Reindel v. Mobile Content Network Co., LLC, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Ga. 2009).

No principal/agent relation exists if employee has no delegated authority to act for the business except to pay bills in the absence of the owner and if the employee has no authority to purchase, to contract, to hire or fire, or even supervise other personnel. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 169 Ga. App. 177, 312 S.E.2d 177 (1983).

Dual agent.

- Acts of an individual in procuring liability insurance for a company, of which the individual was the chairperson, and issuing liability insurance policies on behalf of an insurer of which the individual was the president, had been occurring and recurring for more than 30 years with the knowledge and consent of all parties, and made the individual a dual agent. The individual's misconduct in procuring a policy which did not cover certain acts of employees could not be imputed to either of the principals, who were not actually at fault. Edwards-Warren Tire Co. v. Cole, Sanford & Whitmire, 188 Ga. App. 395, 373 S.E.2d 83 (1988).

Liability for subagent's acts.

- Unless a primary agent, expressly or impliedly authorized by the principal as owner of an automobile to drive the automobile on the business of the owner, is personally expressly or impliedly authorized to appoint a subagent for that purpose, the owner will not be liable for the negligence of the latter. Carter v. Bishop, 209 Ga. 919, 76 S.E.2d 784 (1953).

Liability when employment of subagent is ratified.

- If a servant who is employed to do certain work for a master employs another person to assist the master, the master is liable for the negligence of the assistant only when the servant had authority, express or implied, to employ the assistant, or when the act of employment is ratified by the master. Carter v. Bishop, 209 Ga. 919, 76 S.E.2d 784 (1953).

If one who is employed to drive a motor vehicle, without the consent of and against specific instructions of the master, engages a substitute driver, the master is not liable for the negligence of the substitute driver unless the act of the servant employing the substitute driver is ratified by the master. Carter v. Bishop, 209 Ga. 919, 76 S.E.2d 784 (1953); Burke County Bd. of Educ. v. Raley, 104 Ga. App. 717, 123 S.E.2d 272 (1961).

Independent contractor may also be agent; thus, a person may be an independent contractor and at the same time act as an agent for a particular purpose. National Home Life Assurance Co. v. Hawkins, 151 Ga. App. 60, 258 S.E.2d 913 (1979).

Existence of agency relationship must be determined from all facts and circumstances. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1972).

Contract of agency signed by both parties is not essential to the creation of the principal-agent relationship. Clyde Chester Realty Co. v. Stansell, 151 Ga. App. 357, 259 S.E.2d 639 (1979).

Payment of compensation is not necessary ingredient of principal and agent. Carmichael v. Silvers, 90 Ga. App. 804, 84 S.E.2d 668 (1954).

Payment of compensation does not alone create agency.

- If landowners entered into a contract of sale with a prospective purchaser, conditioned upon furnishing satisfactory title, designating a certain firm of brokers as the owners' agent, and stipulating that, in the event the sale was consummated, the purchaser would pay such brokers' commission, the mere fact that the purchaser undertook to pay such commission did not of itself alone create the relation of principal and agent between the purchaser and the brokers under former Civil Code 1910, §§ 3569 and 3574. Richardson v. DuPree, 32 Ga. App. 3, 122 S.E. 707, cert. denied, 32 Ga. App. 807 (1924).

Contracts of agency involve assuming legal rights and duties.

- Contracts of agency, to be cognizable in law, must, like other agreements, have reference to the assumption of legal rights and duties, as opposed to engagements of a mere civic or social character, or of such other nature as to exclude monetary values. Huckeby v. Smith, 42 Ga. App. 719, 157 S.E. 234 (1931).

Obligations imposed on agent as soon as agency created.

- At the very moment a property owner accepts the offer of a corporation engaged in the real estate business to sell the property, the latter becomes the owner's agent, and thereupon all the obligations of an agent to a principal become operative. Smith v. Harvey-Given Co., 182 Ga. 410, 185 S.E. 793 (1936), later appeal, 183 Ga. 783, 190 S.E. 19 (1937).

Sales of securities.

- To hold an individual to be an agent who has participated or aided in making sales of securities, the court must find that the individual was so entangled in the actual sale of the security that the individual's activities were at least a substantial factor in the purchaser's decision to buy the security and that the individual's activities were either authorized or ratified by the issuer. In re N. Am. Acceptance Corp. Sec. Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

Creating agency under franchise agreement.

- Franchise agreement giving no control, or right of control, over the methods or details of doing the work of the franchisee does not create an agency relationship. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Newton, 157 Ga. App. 436, 278 S.E.2d 85 (1981).

When indicia of agency were missing from a franchise agreement, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the franchisor in a suit for false imprisonment based on actions of the franchisee and the franchisee's employees. McMullan v. Georgia Girl Fashions, Inc., 180 Ga. App. 228, 348 S.E.2d 748 (1986).

Franchise contract under which one operates a type of business on a royalty basis does not create an agency or a partnership relationship. Whitco Produce Co. v. Bonanza Int'l, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 92, 267 S.E.2d 627 (1980).

No agency relationship created by franchise agreement.

- Franchisor's motion for j.n.o.v. on the real estate investment company's negligence claim was improperly denied as there was no evidence that the franchisee was an actual agent of the franchisor for purposes of vicarious liability because the franchise agreement contained no provisions giving the franchisor supervisory control over the day-to-day activities of the franchisee; the franchisor did not exercise supervisory control over the franchisee's escrow account; and the owner of the franchisee clarified that individual franchisees could get help and advice, but that franchisees had their own decisions to make, and that the franchisor did not have to approve individual real estate deals before the franchisee could accept the deals. New Star Realty, Inc. v. Jungang PRI USA, LLC, Ga. App. , 816 S.E.2d 501 (2018).

No agency relationship created by franchise agreement.

- Franchisor's motion for j.n.o.v. on the real estate investment company's negligence claim was improperly denied as there was no evidence that the franchisee was an actual agent of the franchisor for purposes of vicarious liability because the franchise agreement contained no provisions giving the franchisor supervisory control over the day-to-day activities of the franchisee; the franchisor did not exercise supervisory control over the franchisee's escrow account; and the owner of the franchisee clarified that individual franchisees could get help and advice, but that franchisees had their own decisions to make, and that the franchisor did not have to approve individual real estate deals before the franchisee could accept the deals. New Star Realty, Inc. v. Jungang PRI USA, LLC, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (June 14, 2018).

Ineffective agreement to modify sublease did not create agency relationship between the plaintiff (sublessee) and the lessee whereby the plaintiff had the right to exercise a lease renewal option as the lessee's agent, since the agreement by the agreement's terms purported to grant the plaintiff the same rights as held by the lessee and did not purport to authorize the plaintiff to assert those rights on behalf of the lessee. Regional Pacesetters, Inc. v. Halpern Enters., Inc., 165 Ga. 777, 300 S.E.2d 180 (1983).

Nurse is agent of hospital rather than a patient's attending psychiatrist as the nurse works for the hospital and not a particular psychiatrist, taking only such orders from hospital psychiatrists as are indicated on a patient's chart. Myers v. State, 251 Ga. 883, 310 S.E.2d 504 (1984).

Liability for child's tort.

- Relationship of principal and agent must appear in order to create liability on the father for the tort of the minor child. Lacey v. Forehand, 27 Ga. App. 344, 108 S.E. 247 (1921).

Principal/agency relationship may exist between husband and wife as to establishment of a boundary line. Barron v. Chamblee, 199 Ga. 591, 34 S.E.2d 828 (1945).

Services performed by spouse for another.

- When a husband and wife are living together, the husband is entitled to the services of the wife, and any valuable services which she may render to another are rendered by the husband, by and through the instrumentality of the wife as his agent. Cooper v. Cooper, 59 Ga. App. 832, 2 S.E.2d 145 (1939).

Where an aged father comes to live in the home of his son, and, while living there, the father becomes ill and is cared for by the son's wife during his sickness, and his wants are ministered to by her, and the son and his wife are living together, the services thus rendered to the father are rendered by the son, through the agency of the wife. If the husband then agrees with his wife that she perform the services and shall herself be entitled to compensation therefor from the father, such agreement is in the nature only of an assignment by the husband to the wife of the husband's right of title and interest in any chose in action which he may have against the father to recover for the services rendered, which are rendered by the husband through the agency and instrumentality of the wife. Such an agreement, even if it confers on the wife the right to her earnings under the alleged contract, creates no contract where none existed and confers upon her no right which the husband did not possess to recover of the father's estate. Cooper v. Cooper, 59 Ga. App. 832, 2 S.E.2d 145 (1939).

Husband permitted to manage wife's property.

- If a wife permitted her husband to manage and control her property or allowed him so to deal with it as to induce others to believe that it was his property or that he was acting as her authorized agent, such facts were sufficient to establish the agency in favor of persons who dealt with him in such belief, when she knew that her husband was so managing and controlling her property and made no objection thereto. Aronoff v. Woodard, 47 Ga. App. 725, 171 S.E. 404 (1933).

Foreclosure sale valid when no duties violated.

- Foreclosure sale was valid because there was no defect in the assignment of the power of sale from the nominee to the lender when the security deed did not lack any essential terms regarding the nominee's role, rights, or duties under O.C.G.A. § 10-6-1 and no consideration was needed under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-64(a). The lender did not violate the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) by recording the sale post-petition because the Chapter 13 debtor retained no interest in the property after the sale. Bishop v. GMAC Mortg., LLC (In re Bishop), 470 Bankr. 633 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2011).

No express or implied consent to sign arbitration agreement.

- Nursing home was not entitled to compel arbitration of a wrongful death suit because the plaintiff, the decedent's child, did not have the decedent's power of attorney or the decedent's express or implied consent to sign the arbitration agreement on the decedent's behalf; the child, by signing the agreement, did not express an intent to surrender any of the child's own rights; and the child was not estopped by signing it from pursuing a wrongful death claim in the child's individual capacity. Hogsett v. Parkwood Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Feb. 14, 2014).

Upon admitting a parent to a nursing home, an adult child's signature on an arbitration agreement did not bind the parent because the child was not the parent's agent by virtue of being the child and there was no evidence that the parent had authorized the child to act for the parent as required by O.C.G.A. § 10-6-1. McKean v. GGNSC Atlanta, LLC, 329 Ga. App. 507, 765 S.E.2d 681 (2014).

Motion to enforce an arbitration agreement was properly denied as a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement did not exist because, although the decedent's daughter signed a nursing home admission agreement and an arbitration agreement, the decedent did not personally assent to the arbitration agreement; and the daughter did not have express or implied authority to sign the arbitration agreement on the decedent's behalf as the decedent did not execute any written document expressly authorizing the daughter to act for the decedent, and none of the words or conduct of the decedent could have caused the nursing home to believe that the decedent consented to having the arbitration agreement signed on the decedent's behalf by the daughter. United Health Servs. of Ga., Inc. v. Alexander, 342 Ga. App. 1, 802 S.E.2d 314 (2017).

Nursing home patient's authorization of the patient's brother-in-law (BIL) to act as the patient's agent for health care decisions allowed the BIL to sign an admission agreement for a nursing facility, but it did not encompass signing a voluntary arbitration agreement that was not a precondition to admission or the furnishing of services at the facility. Coleman v. United Health Servs. of Ga., 344 Ga. App. 682, 812 S.E.2d 24 (2018).

Agency held created.

- Landlord's agent having authority generally to look after the landlord's farming business in a certain community, whose conduct in respect to the agent's dealings with one of the landlord's tenants will, in the language of the landlord, be "satisfactory" to the landlord, is an agent, having such general authority that it may be inferred that the agent possesses authority to bind the landlord in the purchase of supplies such as fertilizer furnished to the tenant which is necessary in the farming operations. Jolly v. Chattahoochee Fertilizer Co., 28 Ga. App. 194, 110 S.E. 639 (1922).

If a corporation receives funds from a bank with direction to place them on call loan for the bank and the corporation undertakes to place the funds on call loan, a fiduciary relationship of principal and agent arises between the parties. Bank of Dania v. Farmers' & Traders' Bank, 169 Ga. 846, 151 S.E. 803 (1930).

When, in order to secure an unpaid balance on the purchase price of an automobile, the defendant executed a retention of title note to a third-party motor company, payable in installments in certain definite amounts on various consecutive dates, and, before the payment and maturity of any of the installments, the third-party motor company, without the defendant's knowledge, transferred the note to the plaintiff bank, and the defendant thereafter continued to pay to the motor company certain installments as they fell due, which payments the motor company transmitted to the bank, which accepted the same in payment of the installments due, such a course of dealing was sufficient to authorize the inference that the bank had constituted the motor company its secret agent in dealing with the defendant to collect the installments as they fell due, despite the fact that the defendant had found out from the bank that it held the note, the defendant asking the bank at that time if the motor company had remitted the payments to it and the bank informing the defendant that it had, and that the defendant had continued to make payments to the motor company. Powell v. Bank of Manchester, 46 Ga. App. 264, 167 S.E. 343 (1933).

When for some time alleged agent of the defendant purchased agricultural products for the defendant with drafts drawn upon the defendant, on which drafts the plaintiff bank advanced to the defendant's agent the cash, the defendant was bound by such acts of the agent and estopped to deny that such person was acting as the defendant's agent or set up that the defendant was not liable for the amount of the plaintiff 's money advanced on such unpaid drafts for the purchase of the farm products for the defendant which the defendant received and retained. Rowland v. Farmers Bank, 52 Ga. App. 50, 182 S.E. 81 (1935).

Evidence supported findings that a stepchild, who bought a salvage business from a stepparent, had a legal right to control its operation and the stepchild created a relation of principal and agent by telling the stepparent that the stepparent could continue as operator. Vessell v. Walker, 231 Ga. App. 713, 499 S.E.2d 688 (1998).

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-6-1, a verbal authorization from a decedent was sufficient to create a valid agency relationship between the decedent and a brother and a wife so as to allow them to withdraw money for the decedent from the accounts on a periodic basis; the equal dignity rule did not apply in this case because the instruments at issue were not subject to the statute of frauds. Rowland v. Rowland, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Nov. 16, 2005).

Trial court properly determined that a police officer who did moonlighting as a security guard for an apartment complex was acting as an agent, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-6-1, for the owners of the complex when the officer retrieved a rape kit and held it for a period of time, as there was no police purpose for having done so, nor was there any purpose from a police standpoint to have the kit processed, as the police case was closed; the officer's order to have the rape kit destroyed, even though the rape victim's lawyer had asked that the evidence relevant to the rape be preserved, constituted spoliation of evidence that was attributable to the owners, and sanctions against the owners for that conduct were proper. Bouve & Mohr, LLC v. Banks, 274 Ga. App. 758, 618 S.E.2d 650 (2005).

Joint insured clause of a fidelity bond that gave a holding company the right to "act for" the company's subsidiary, a bank, created an agency relationship and did not entitle the trustee in the holding company's bankruptcy case to pursue a breach of contract action based on the insurer's failure to pay the bank's claim; the cause of action was not part of the bankruptcy estate. Lubin v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 677 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2012)(Unpublished).

In a breach of fiduciary duty and fraud action wherein an investment company obtained a jury verdict in the company's favor as against a site manager, the manager's spouse, and others, the trial evidence supported the conclusion that a fiduciary relationship arose between the site manager and the investment company as the investment company entrusted significant financial responsibility and authority to the site manager, who engaged in a financial kickback scheme diverting thousands of dollars from the investment company. Wright v. Apt. Inv. & Mgmt. Co., 315 Ga. App. 587, 726 S.E.2d 779 (2012).

Agency held not created.

- By using intermediaries as channels of transmission for papers, relying upon the intermediaries inspection of property and examination of titles, made at the borrower's instance, and forwarding the money through the intermediaries also at the borrower's instance, the lender does not constitute such intermediaries as agents to make the loan and is not chargeable with the consequences of dealings between the intermediaries and the borrower, whether those dealings be public or private, known or unknown. Davis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 196 Ga. 304, 26 S.E.2d 618 (1943).

When, in an action by a landowner for the negligent burning of an outbuilding, pasture land, and personal property thereon, the evidence showed that the defendant's fiance went to his property, which adjoined that of the plaintiff 's, to clean up around the house and while so doing started a trash fire which she allowed to spread, causing the damage sued for, that she did this while the defendant was at work, and that the defendant had no notice of her actions until he was notified of the fire, the evidence was insufficient to show the relationship of principal and agent between the defendant and his fiance so as to charge the defendant with her negligence in the burning of the plaintiff 's property, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant testified that though he did not know at that time that his fiance was out at his place, had he known it, it would have been all right with him. Basinger v. Huff, 98 Ga. App. 288, 105 S.E.2d 362 (1958).

Chief underwriter of an insurance company who was authorized under a reinsurance treaty to cede a portion of insurance risks to reinsurers, who were, in the normal course of business, liable from the moment the reinsurance was ceded to the reinsurers, was not an agent of the reinsurers, because the reinsurers had no right to regulate the underwriter's conduct, the reinsurers obligations would not have been affected by the underwriter's death, retirement, or replacement, and the reinsurers were liable under the treaty regardless of the identity of the underwriter. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1972).

Since the evidence simply showed that the plaintiff was solicited by A as A's "working partner"; that plaintiff did not meet or converse with B before entering into an agreement with A to become a partner; that plaintiff gave A a check for "half dealership partnership investment"; and that plaintiff and A, as partners, signed a "Dealership Agreement" with B, there was no showing of an agency relationship between A and B. McCulley v. Dunson, 149 Ga. App. 551, 254 S.E.2d 877 (1979).

Leasing director who was an at-will employee of a real estate broker was not an agent of the broker because the director was not authorized to obligate the broker by entering into contracts on its behalf. Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgt. Co. v. McLane, 269 Ga. 604, 503 S.E.2d 278 (1998), reversing McLane v. Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgt. Co., 225 Ga. App. 818, 486 S.E.2d 30 (1997).

Real estate broker was not acting as an agent for its real estate director, an at-will employee, in negotiations with a client regarding the payment of commissions when the director had not authorized the broker to create obligations on the director's behalf during the negotiations. Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgt. Co. v. McLane, 269 Ga. 604, 503 S.E.2d 278 (1998), reversing McLane v. Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgt. Co., 225 Ga. App. 818, 486 S.E.2d 30 (1997).

No agency was created since there was no evidence showing that employees could create obligations on behalf of their employer or bring third parties into contractual relations with their employer. The employees were not agents owing a fiduciary duty to the employer. Physician Specialists in Anesthesia, P.C. v. Wildmon, 238 Ga. App. 730, 521 S.E.2d 358 (1999).

When the homeowners contracted with a home builder independent of any dealing with the developer and the realtor, and that contract failed to contain any evidence that an agency was established between the developer, realtor, and the homebuilder, the developer and realtor were entitled to a directed verdict on the homeowners' breach of contract and fraudulent conversion claims; further, since those two claims provided the only basis for a verdict, the homeowners were not entitled to recover litigation expenses. Fountainhead Dev. Corp. v. Dailey, 263 Ga. App. 677, 588 S.E.2d 768 (2003).

Because no evidence was presented that a lessee's child acted as an agent for the lessee when the lease on the rented premises was entered into, and the lessee never ratified the child's actions on the lease, the lessee was not liable for unpaid rents on the leased premises; as a result, since such was the basis for the lessor's counterclaim, an award of attorney's fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 was reversed. Ellis v. Fuller, 282 Ga. App. 307, 638 S.E.2d 433 (2006).

Mobile home dealer failed to show that a debtor which resold loans to a bank was acting as the bank's agent; actual authority had not been shown as there was no evidence that the bank had the right to control the time, manner, and method of the debtor's work, and the facts that the debtor earned money from the loans it sold to the bank and that the bank required that the loans it purchased meet certain criteria did not show such control. Satisfaction & Serv. Hous., Inc. v. SouthTrust Bank, Inc., 283 Ga. App. 711, 642 S.E.2d 364 (2007).

Mobile home dealer failed to show that a debtor which resold loans to a bank had apparent authority to act as the bank's agent; the dealer had not provided any evidence that the bank engaged in any conduct that caused the dealer to believe that the debtor was the bank's agent. Satisfaction & Serv. Hous., Inc. v. SouthTrust Bank, Inc., 283 Ga. App. 711, 642 S.E.2d 364 (2007).

Because a decedent patient's husband did not have the actual or apparent authority to bind the decedent to an arbitration agreement, which was part of the documents the husband signed for the decedent to be cared for by a nursing home, the agreement was not enforceable against the decedent or the decedent's estate; thus, the trial court properly denied the nursing home's motion to compel arbitration of the wrongful death claims filed by the decedent's administrator. Ashburn Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Poole, 286 Ga. App. 24, 648 S.E.2d 430 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 611 (Ga. 2007).

Because: (1) evidence demonstrating an agency relationship between the grantees and the grantor of a security deed was lacking, and (2) the mere lapse of time was insufficient to establish the affirmative defense of laches, partial summary judgment was properly entered in the trustee's favor on that claim based on mutual mistake as well as an order invalidating the foreclosure sale upon that deed. Thus, any testimony as to the intent of the parties upon entering into the security deed was immaterial. Harvey v. Bank One, N.A., 290 Ga. App. 55, 658 S.E.2d 824 (2008).

Jury issue as to agency determination.

- In a disputed commodities transaction, there was at least a jury issue regarding which party or parties the merchants' broker represented in brokering the sale at issue and in signing and sending the confirmation of sale order. Brooks Peanut Co. v. Great S. Peanut, LLC, 322 Ga. App. 801, 746 S.E.2d 272 (2013).

Cited in Burkhalter v. Ford Motor Co., 29 Ga. App. 592, 116 S.E. 333 (1923); Stanford v. Smith, 173 Ga. 165, 159 S.E. 666 (1931); Long v. Dye, 42 Ga. App. 726, 157 S.E. 359 (1931); Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Brady, 175 Ga. 43, 164 S.E. 674 (1932); Flescher Knitting Mills v. Union Dry Goods Store, 58 Ga. App. 659, 199 S.E. 646 (1938); Jewell v. Martin, 67 Ga. App. 295, 20 S.E.2d 93 (1942); Groover v. Brandon, 200 Ga. 153, 36 S.E.2d 84 (1945); Weathers Bros. Transf. Co. v. Jarrell, 72 Ga. App. 317, 33 S.E.2d 805 (1945); Puckett v. Reese, 203 Ga. 716, 48 S.E.2d 297 (1948); McDilda v. State, 85 Ga. App. 348, 69 S.E.2d 627 (1952); Light v. Smith, 86 Ga. App. 591, 71 S.E.2d 844 (1952); Long Tobacco Harvesting Co. v. Brannen, 99 Ga. App. 541, 109 S.E.2d 90 (1959); Burke County Bd. of Educ. v. Raley, 104 Ga. App. 717, 123 S.E.2d 272 (1961); NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E.2d 816 (1965); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Thornton, 111 Ga. App. 636, 142 S.E.2d 422 (1965); Bonner v. Cotton, 223 Ga. 843, 159 S.E.2d 61 (1968); Butler v. Moore, 125 Ga. App. 435, 188 S.E.2d 142 (1972); Builders Homes of Ga., Inc. v. Wallace Pump & Supply Co., 128 Ga. App. 779, 197 S.E.2d 839 (1973); Boyd v. State, 133 Ga. App. 431, 211 S.E.2d 387 (1974); Pendley v. Jessee, 134 Ga. App. 138, 213 S.E.2d 496 (1975); National Life Assurance Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp., 136 Ga. App. 311, 220 S.E.2d 793 (1975); Youngblood v. Mock, 143 Ga. App. 320, 238 S.E.2d 250 (1977); Patterson v. Duron Paints of Ga., Inc., 144 Ga. App. 123, 240 S.E.2d 603 (1977); Dollar v. First Bank, 153 Ga. App. 789, 266 S.E.2d 566 (1980); Krofft Dev. Corp. v. Quo Modo, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 403, 280 S.E.2d 368 (1981); Stewart v. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co., 159 Ga. App. 91, 282 S.E.2d 728 (1981); Howell v. Greene Real Estate Co., 162 Ga. App. 766, 292 S.E.2d 520 (1982); Pope v. Kem Mfg. Corp., 249 Ga. 868, 295 S.E.2d 290 (1982); Hutchens v. State, 174 Ga. App. 507, 330 S.E.2d 436 (1985); Crowe v. Fleming, 749 F. Supp. 1135 (S.D. Ga. 1990); Moore v. Harry Norman, Inc., 199 Ga. App. 233, 404 S.E.2d 793 (1991); Transouthern Freight Sys. v. Astley, 201 Ga. App. 521, 411 S.E.2d 501 (1991); Gaskins v. Gaona, 209 Ga. App. 322, 433 S.E.2d 408 (1993); McDaniel v. Hensons', Inc., 229 Ga. App. 213, 493 S.E.2d 529 (1997); Woodmen of the World v. Jordan, 231 Ga. App. 517, 499 S.E.2d 900 (1998); Augusta Surgical Ctr., Inc. v. Walton & Heard Office Venture, 235 Ga. App. 283, 508 S.E.2d 666 (1998); Rains v. Dolphin Mtg. Corp., 241 Ga. App. 611, 525 S.E.2d 370 (1999); S. Exposition Mgmt. Co. v. Genmar Indus., 250 Ga. App. 702, 551 S.E.2d 830 (2001); Triad Health Mgmt. of Ga., III, LLC v. Johnson, 298 Ga. App. 204, 679 S.E.2d 785 (2009); Kitchens v. Brusman, 303 Ga. App. 703, 694 S.E.2d 667 (2010); Griffin v. State Bank, 312 Ga. App. 87, 718 S.E.2d 35 (2011); Crop Production Services, Inc. v. Moye, 345 Ga. App. 228, 812 S.E.2d 565 (2018).

Ratification creates agency.

- One acts as agent for another whenever the principal ratifies the acts done on the principal's behalf. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ansley, 111 Ga. App. 784, 143 S.E.2d 422 (1965).

Unauthorized agent.

- Act of one holding oneself out as an agent in consummating a sale for one's principal may be ratified by the principal, even if the agent was unauthorized in the first place to make the sale. Harris v. Underwood, 208 Ga. 247, 66 S.E.2d 332 (1951).

Principal bound.

- Unauthorized act of an agent, when subsequently ratified, will bind the principal. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Blount, 33 Ga. App. 642, 127 S.E. 892, cert. denied, 33 Ga. App. 829 (1925).

Ratification of particular act is coextensive with act, and only makes the person who performed the act a special agent pro hac vice. Merchants' Bank v. Rawls, 7 Ga. 191, 50 Am. Dec. 394 (1849).

Acceptance of benefits flowing from acts of agent is "implied ratification," whether the principal intends to ratify the agency or not. Lewis v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 139 Ga. App. 855, 229 S.E.2d 765 (1976).

Action against principal who benefitted from act.

- If the principal has obtained the benefits of a transaction in which a draft was given by the agent, the injured party may bring an action on the original transaction against the principal. Rowland v. Farmers Bank, 52 Ga. App. 50, 182 S.E. 81 (1935).

Knowledge of act required.

- Unauthorized act of an agent, done in the principal's behalf, cannot be ratified without actual knowledge of the act. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Blount, 165 Ga. 193, 140 S.E. 496 (1927), answers conformed to, 37 Ga. App. 756, 142 S.E. 183 (1928).

Knowledge of all material facts required.

- In order to allege a good cause of action as to ratification, it must be shown that the ratifying body, such as a city council, had full knowledge of all material facts in connection with the transaction in question. City of Atlanta v. Smith, 84 Ga. App. 815, 67 S.E.2d 480 (1951).

Ratification presumed unless act repudiated.

- If a principal is informed by an agent of what the agent has done, unless the principal repudiates the act promptly or within a reasonable time, a ratification will be presumed. Harris v. Underwood, 208 Ga. 247, 66 S.E.2d 332 (1951).

By accepting the benefits of a pest treatment contract, by making payments on the contract, and by filing an earlier suit claiming breach of the contract, a customer and the customer's spouse ratified the contract even if the signature on the contract was irregular, and were bound by the contract's arbitration clause. Lankford v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 266 Ga. App. 228, 597 S.E.2d 470 (2004).

Mere act of pleading stranger's act as satisfaction is of itself ratification. Jordan v. Belvin, 57 Ga. 719, 196 S.E. 132 (1938).

Knowingly accepting notes to principal's order.

- When certain foreign bills of exchange were drawn by the defendants as shipping agents and factors of the plaintiff, payable to the plaintiff's order, though not signed by the defendants as agents, but drawn so as to enable the plaintiff to receive the proceeds thereof, according to the usage and custom of the cotton trade, and the plaintiff received such bills, without objection and with full knowledge of such facts, it amounts to ratification, and the defendants are not individually liable to the principal as the drawers of the bills. Jones v. J.W. Lathrop & Co., 44 Ga. 398 (1871).

Expressing regret, offering to pay for damage, not ratification.

- Action of the defendant and the defendant's spouse a few days after a fire caused by the spouse, in going to the plaintiff and expressing regret for the damage and offering to pay for the damage, was not such a ratification of the spouses's acts as would charge the defendant with the spouse's negligence as the defendant's agent. Basinger v. Huff, 98 Ga. App. 288, 105 S.E.2d 362 (1958).

Nightclub not liable for injuries inflicted by patron.

- Doctrine of ratification was inapplicable in an action for injuries at defendant's nightclub from actions of a patron since the evidence showed that the unidentified patron acted in an individual capacity and not as one holding oneself out as acting in the name of or under the authority of the defendant. Ginn v. Renaldo, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 618, 359 S.E.2d 390 (1987).

Knowledge, acquiescence, obtaining benefits was ratification of lease agreement.

- Company was liable for rent due on a lease that was assigned to the company's subsidiary, although permission had only been obtained to assign the lease directly to the company, under a piercing the corporate veil theory; it was found that the company ratified the original tenant's conduct in having the lease assigned to it, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-6-1, since the company was aware of the tenant's assignment, acquiesced therein, and obtained the benefits from such assignment. Multi-Media Holdings, Inc. v. Piedmont Ctr., 15 LLC, 262 Ga. App. 283, 583 S.E.2d 262 (2003).

Evidence of spouse's actual or apparent authority insufficient.

- Although it was undisputed that the patient did not sign the arbitration agreement personally, the operator asserted that the patient's spouse was the patient's agent and, therefore, had the authority to bind the patient to the agreement by signing the spouse's name; in Georgia, an agency relationship was created whenever one person, expressly or by implication, authorized another to act for the person or subsequently ratified the acts of another in the person's behalf, O.C.G.A. § 10-6-1, and because the operator had not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the patient expressly authorized the operator to act on the patient's behalf in signing the arbitration agreement, an agency relationship was created, if at all, by implication. Under Georgia law, the agent's authority shall be construed to include all necessary and usual means for effectually executing it; even assuming that the version of events put forth by the operator's witnesses was true, the operator failed to meet the operator's burden of proving that the patient's spouse had actual or apparent authority to bind the patient by signing the arbitration agreement; accordingly, the arbitration agreement was not enforceable against the patient pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4, and the operator's motion to compel arbitration and stay discovery was denied. Gentry v. Beverly Enterprises-Georgia Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (S.D. Ga. 2009).

Parent liable when child operates car with consent.

- When a mother keeps an automobile to be used for the comfort and pleasure of her family, including her minor son as a member thereof, his driving the car for the comfort and pleasure of himself and his friends, allegedly with her knowledge and consent and as her agent and chauffeur, is her business or affair within the meaning of the rule of law that the master is liable for the negligence of a servant acting within the scope of the servant's employment and in regard to the master's business. Griffin v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S.E. 10, 1916F L.R.A. 216, 1917D Ann. Cas. 994 (1915).

Use of vehicle solely for owner's benefit.

- It is not necessary to show a true master-servant relationship or the payment of compensation, but if the owner of a vehicle expressly procures another to do something solely for the owner's benefit, an agency relationship exists, regardless of whether the direction is couched as a request or as a demand, and regardless of whether the agent receives monetary compensation. Walker Hall, Inc. v. Fincher, 120 Ga. App. 193, 169 S.E.2d 745 (1969); Reese v. Sanders, 153 Ga. App. 654, 266 S.E.2d 313 (1980).

Bailment where vehicle furnished as accommodation.

- If the furnishing of an automobile is within what may be said to be a "business" of the owner, one to whom the car is entrusted for such purpose is not a bailee, as in a case of lending, but is a servant or agent; if on the other hand, the car is furnished by the owner merely as an accommodation to the other, with no interest or concern in the purpose for which the other will use it, then its use, whether for recreation or otherwise, is not within the business of the owner, and the transaction is a mere bailment. Hubert v. Harpe, 181 Ga. 168, 182 S.E. 167, answer conformed to, 52 Ga. App. 262, 183 S.E. 98 (1935).

"Loaner" arrangement between car dealers and mechanics and their customers is a bailment, not an agency. Stallings v. Sylvania Ford-Mercury, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 731, 533 S.E.2d 731 (2000).

Family purpose doctrine.

- When the evidence shows that the driver's operation of the car was not on appellee's behalf, agency principles other than the family purpose doctrine do not apply to establish that the driver was appellee's agent in driving the car. Chambers v. Scarboro, 149 Ga. App. 172, 253 S.E.2d 798 (1979).

Hirer of rented automobile not owner's agent.

- If a person rents or hires an automobile from the automobile's owner under a contract by which the hirer or an employee, and none other, is to operate the automobile, and, after a stipulated period of time, return it to the owner, and when it does not appear that the hirer, when using the automobile pursuant to this contract, is on the business of the owner and therefore acting as the owner's agent, the relationship between the parties as established by the contract is not alone sufficient to establish the relationship of principal and agent between the owner of the automobile and the hirer or the latter's employee, when the hirer or the hirer's employee afterwards operates the automobile pursuant to the terms of the contract. Cantrell v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, 40 Ga. App. 840, 151 S.E. 694 (1930).

Spouse driving family car deemed agent.

- When a person maintained an automobile for use by the person's family, including the person's spouse, and which was at the disposal of the spouse to use at any time and was kept for that purpose, and since the spouse, with the person's consent, used the automobile for the purpose of going on a trip, the spouse, in taking and operating the car while on the trip, did so as the authorized agent of the person, and any negligence on the spouse's part in the operation of the automobile pursuant to the purpose for which the spouse was using it was imputable to the person. Petway v. McLeod, 47 Ga. App. 647, 171 S.E. 225 (1933).

Allegation of agency tested by facts alleged.

- If the pleader in seeking to allege an agency relationship sets out the facts as the facts really exist or are deemed to exist, the allegations that the parties are principal and agent is a legal conclusion which must be tested by the facts as alleged. Powell v. Kitchens, 84 Ga. App. 701, 67 S.E.2d 203 (1951).

Agency sufficiently alleged.

- Simple direct allegation that the operator of an automobile, in driving the defendant's family to a designated point in the defendant's automobile, was acting as the defendant's agent, is a sufficient allegation of agency. Garnto v. Henson, 88 Ga. App. 320, 76 S.E.2d 636 (1953).

Since it was alleged that at the defendant's special request an individual was using the defendant's vehicle for the purpose of looking after the needs of the defendant's aged parents and the defendant's sister, two of whom were ill; that the individual had been spending several nights at their home and carrying them groceries and medicines; that the individual was at the time of a collision proceeding toward their home to attend to their needs during the night; that all of these acts were at the defendant's request and for the defendant's benefit; and that this was the purpose for which the car had been entrusted to the individual, which purpose the individual was actually attempting to effectuate at the time of the collision, it could not be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff 's pleading failed on its face to show an agency relationship. Powell v. Kitchens, 84 Ga. App. 701, 67 S.E.2d 203 (1951).

Allegations not showing agency.

- See Cantrell v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, 40 Ga. App. 840, 151 S.E. 694 (1930).

Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege any actual agency relationship between an insurer and either defendant; the complaint alleged no facts as to the level of control, did not elaborate on the nature of control, and made no allegations about any express agency agreement or other facts to suggest that the insurer was a defendant's agent. Moreover, the allegations did not plausibly suggest that the plaintiff justifiably relied on the care or skill of the alleged agent based upon the alleged principal's representation. CHIS, LLC v. Liberty Mut. Holding Co., F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. July 13, 2015).

Debtor failed to allege any facts from which the court could reasonably conclude that anyone other than the manager and sole owner of an LLC had the power to authorize others to act on behalf of the LLC in negotiating a settlement agreement. Nor did the debtor allege any course of dealings or special circumstances from which the court could reasonably infer that any other defendants, their employees, or their attorneys were acting with apparent authority. Rohrig Invs., LP v. Knuckle P'ship, LLLP (In re Rohrig Invs., LP), 584 Bankr. 382 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2018).

Circumstantial evidence.

- Proof of agency may be made by showing circumstances, apparent relations, and the conduct of the parties. Nichols v. Lindsey, 45 Ga. App. 648, 165 S.E. 868 (1932); Ross v. Durrence, 181 Ga. 52, 181 S.E. 581 (1935); Larkins v. Boyd, 205 Ga. 69, 52 S.E.2d 307 (1949); Southern Mills, Inc. v. Newton, 91 Ga. App. 738, 87 S.E.2d 109 (1955); Warnock v. Elliott, 96 Ga. App. 778, 101 S.E.2d 591 (1957); Greenbaum v. Brooks, 110 Ga. App. 661, 139 S.E.2d 432 (1964); Fordham v. Garrett-Schwartz Motor Co., 121 Ga. App. 237, 173 S.E.2d 450 (1970); Bearlund v. Webb, 127 Ga. App. 555, 194 S.E.2d 328 (1972); Davidson v. Ramsby, 133 Ga. App. 128, 210 S.E.2d 245 (1974); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Christian Brokerage Co., 145 Ga. App. 126, 243 S.E.2d 281 (1978); Clyde Chester Realty Co. v. Stansell, 151 Ga. App. 357, 259 S.E.2d 639 (1979); Hadden v. Owens, 154 Ga. App. 467, 268 S.E.2d 760 (1980); Arrington & Blount Ford, Inc. v. Jinks, 154 Ga. App. 785, 270 S.E.2d 27 (1980); Collins v. Martin, 157 Ga. App. 45, 276 S.E.2d 102 (1981).

A claim of agency may be proved, as any other fact, by circumstantial evidence. Greenbaum v. Brooks, 110 Ga. App. 661, 139 S.E.2d 432 (1964); Arrington & Blount Ford, Inc. v. Jinks, 154 Ga. App. 785, 270 S.E.2d 27 (1980); Collins v. Martin, 157 Ga. App. 45, 276 S.E.2d 102 (1981).

Agency may be proved by circumstantial evidence alone. Fordham v. Garrett-Schwartz Motor Co., 121 Ga. App. 237, 173 S.E.2d 450 (1970); Bearlund v. Webb, 127 Ga. App. 555, 194 S.E.2d 328 (1972).

Way to show agency.

- Proof of agency and of the nature of the agency may be made by showing circumstances, apparent relations, and the conduct of the parties; for the relation of principal and agent arises when one, by implication, authorizes another to act for that one. Martin & Hicks v. Bridges & Jelks Co., 18 Ga. App. 24, 88 S.E. 747 (1916).

Breach of fiduciary duty claim survived summary judgment because the plaintiff employer asserted that the defendant, a former employee, was the employer's agent while employed as a plant engineer. The undisputed evidence showed that the employee was intimately involved in the negotiations leading up to and the continuous administration of the contracts with a contractor; and not only was the employee responsible for bringing the contractor to the employer, the employee was charged with supervision and inspection of the contractor's contract work; the employee was authorized to prepare bid documentation and enter into contracts to carry out the employee's work, and the employee was also authorized to oversee contractors, inspect the contractor's work, and verify that the work was completed correctly. GIW Indus. v. JerPeg Contr., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (S.D. Ga. 2008).

Declarations of alleged agent.

- Declarations of one alleged to be an agent or one assuming to be an agent would not, by themselves, be admissible to prove agency, yet when such declarations of the alleged agent are accompanied by other evidence as to the conduct of the person in the character of agent and an acceptance by the alleged principal of the fruits of the agency, such declarations are admissible in evidence as a part of the res gestae and as such may be considered in the establishment of the agency. Lawhon v. Henshaw, 63 Ga. App. 683, 11 S.E.2d 846 (1940).

Agency is a fact, and one who is in fact the agent of another is as competent to testify that one is such agent as the principal personally would be to testify to the fact of such agency; yet the fact of an agency cannot be proved by mere unsworn declarations of one assuming to be an agent. Lawhon v. Henshaw, 63 Ga. App. 683, 11 S.E.2d 846 (1940).

Agency cannot be established by the declarations of the alleged agent alone. Greble v. Morgan, 69 Ga. App. 641, 26 S.E.2d 494 (1943); Carmichael v. Silvers, 90 Ga. App. 804, 84 S.E.2d 668 (1954); Warnock v. Elliott, 96 Ga. App. 778, 101 S.E.2d 591 (1957).

Agency cannot be proved by declarations of alleged agent. Davis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 196 Ga. 304, 26 S.E.2d 618 (1943).

Declarations of a general agent made while in the employ of the defendant are admissible to prove agency. Carmichael v. Silvers, 90 Ga. App. 804, 84 S.E.2d 668 (1954).

Fact of an agency may be established by proof of circumstances, apparent relations, the conduct of the parties, and the declarations of the alleged agent, though the declarations of the agent are inadmissible if standing alone; but the declarations become admissible as a part of the res gestae of the transaction and as such may be considered in establishing the fact of agency. Brewer v. Southeastern Fid. Ins. Co., 147 Ga. App. 562, 249 S.E.2d 668 (1978).

Trial court did not err in precluding a creative designer, who was employed by a game promoter a supermarket hired, from testifying, in a breach of contract action brought by a vendor the designer hired, that the designer was an agent for the supermarket. Process Posters, Inc. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 263 Ga. App. 246, 587 S.E.2d 211 (2003).

Declarations admissible once agency established.

- Once agency is established, declarations and admissions of the person whose agency is shown, within the scope of one's authority, are admissible in evidence. Ross v. Durrence, 181 Ga. 52, 181 S.E. 581 (1935).

Assertion or denial of agency by stranger.

- Bare assertion or denial of the existence of an agency relationship is a statement of fact when made by one of the purported parties to the relationship, but when made by an outsider, bare assertions are merely conclusions of law. Lewis v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 139 Ga. App. 855, 229 S.E.2d 765 (1976).

Assertion or denial of agency relationship constitutes factual statement when made by purported party to relationship, but such statements, when made by outsiders, constitute mere conclusions of law. Stone v. First Nat'l Bank, 159 Ga. App. 812, 285 S.E.2d 207 (1981).

Agency cannot be established by general reputation in the community as to such agency. Warnock v. Elliott, 96 Ga. App. 778, 101 S.E.2d 591 (1957).

Conduct of principal and agent may be used to rebut the denial of the existence of agency and for the purpose of impeaching the testimony and contentions of the principal and agent as to the existence of the agency or the scope of the powers of the agent. Warnock v. Elliott, 96 Ga. App. 778, 101 S.E.2d 591 (1957).

Only slight evidence needed of husband's agency.

- While proof of the relationship of husband and wife, and that work was done and material furnished to improve real estate belonging to the wife, without more, is not sufficient evidence to establish the fact that she is an undisclosed principal and the husband merely her agent, so as to render her liable for contracts made by him with third persons, yet only slight evidence of the husband's agency is required under the law to charge the wife with being the principal. Gibbs v. Carolina Portland Cement Co., 50 Ga. App. 229, 177 S.E. 760 (1934).

Burden of proof.

- If existence of agency is relied upon, burden of proof rests with party asserting relationship. Carter v. Kim, 157 Ga. App. 418, 277 S.E.2d 776 (1981).

Breach of duty shown.

- In a breach of contract suit brought by a taxpayer against the tax service hired to handle real property assessments regarding an office building, a trial court ruling in favor of the tax service for tax year 2002 was reversed since the taxpayer established that the tax service breached a duty to the taxpayer by failing to protect the taxpayer from an upward reassessment of the taxpayer's property, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(c). However, because the taxpayer failed to show any damage or loss for tax year 2003, the trial court's ruling in favor of the tax service for that year was upheld. AT&T Corp. v. Property Tax Servs., 288 Ga. App. 679, 655 S.E.2d 295 (2007).

Professional basketball player was not liable to inexperienced business people who invested and lost money by hosting sports event-related parties with two men claiming to act as the player's agents because, under O.C.G.A. § 10-6-1, the business people failed to show that the "agents" had express or implied authority to act on the player's behalf. The unrebutted evidence showed that the player had never met the business people prior to being deposed and had no knowledge of the transaction. J'Carpc, LLC v. Wilkins, 545 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2008).

In a breach of contract suit involving an employment contract, the trial court properly entered a judgment in favor of the former employee after a bench trial as there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that even though the person who signed the employment contract was not authorized to execute the employment contract on behalf of the employer, the employer ratified the agreement by failing to ever object to the agreement. In addition, the employer paid the former employee at least two times directly. A & S Group, Inc. v. Murray, 291 Ga. App. 331, 661 S.E.2d 701 (2008).

No breach of duty shown.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a former employee in the former employer's suit asserting breach of contract and breach of the duty of loyalty as the record established that the former employee did not inform the former employer's customers of the resignation from employment, nor did the former employee solicit any business from the former employer's customers, until after the resignation took place. Hanson Staple Co. v. Eckelberry, 297 Ga. App. 356, 677 S.E.2d 321 (2009).

Evidence held insufficient.

- In an action premised on allegations of a breach of a land sales contract between a group of sellers and an investor, because the only evidence showing any authority to act as an agent for the sellers was based on hearsay, and not on a writing, and no exception applied, two of the sellers were entitled to a directed verdict against the investor pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30(4). Dunn v. Venture Bldg. Group, Inc., 283 Ga. App. 500, 642 S.E.2d 156 (2007).

Summary judgment for a neighbor in a negligence suit by landowners arising out of fire damage was proper because a corporation, not the neighbor, owned the land on which the fire was set, and the person performing the burn was employed by the corporation, not the neighbor. There was no showing of agency under O.C.G.A. § 10-6-1 or O.C.G.A. § 51-2-1(a) between the neighbor and the employee. Barrs v. Acree, 302 Ga. App. 521, 691 S.E.2d 575 (2010).

Securities broker-dealer firm could not have been held liable for its former employee's tortious conduct because the firm identified clear and unrefuted record evidence showing that the employee lacked authority to promote a stock within the firm and lacked authority to sell away. Owens v. Stifel Nicolaus & Co., 650 Fed. Appx. 764 (11th Cir. 2016)(Unpublished).

Evidence held sufficient to establish agency relationship between freight forwarder and another common carrier. National Carloading Corp. v. Security Van Lines, 164 Ga. App. 850, 297 S.E.2d 740 (1982).

Giving charge under section held proper.

- There being evidence sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that the alleged agent had express authority from the plaintiff to collect the note sued upon, and also that the latter had ratified partial collections thereon made by the former, the court did not err in giving the charge to the jury. National Bank v. Burt, 98 Ga. 380, 25 S.E. 502 (1896).

Correct charge as to execution of instrument.

- While, when a person authorizes another to execute a written instrument for the person, in the person's presence, it is not necessary, in order to constitute the act of the person actually signing the instrument the act and deed of the person authorizing him to do so, that the person so authorizing should touch the pen, a charge by the court that when a person authorizes another in the person's presence to sign the instrument for the person and does touch the pen and make the person's mark, the act of the party making the signature is the act and deed of the person so authorizing, states a correct proposition of law. East Point Lumber Co. v. Chandler, 46 Ga. App. 361, 167 S.E. 787 (1933).

Agent's actual or apparent authority to terminate real estate contract was fact question.

- In a back-up buyer's action against the buyer and sellers of real property, an issue of fact remained regarding whether the buyer's agent's delivery of a termination letter to the sellers constituted substantial compliance with the termination provisions of the buyer's contract, and whether the agent had actual or apparent authority to terminate the contract under O.C.G.A. § 10-6-1. Del Lago Ventures, Inc. v. QuikTrip Corp., 330 Ga. App. 138, 764 S.E.2d 595 (2014).

Jury questions if evidence shows agency.

- If there is any evidence tending to establish the agency, the questions should be submitted to a jury. Warnock v. Elliott, 96 Ga. App. 778, 101 S.E.2d 591 (1957).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a surety because jury questions existed as to whether two subcontractors were the same company, whether an owner acted as an agent on behalf of one of those subcontractors when the owner procured the bonds, and whether the bonds were intentionally written fraudulently based on admissions made by counsel for the surety during the hearing. Choate Constr. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 318 Ga. App. 682, 736 S.E.2d 443 (2012).

Questions regarding existence of agency and extent of agent's authority are generally for the trier of fact. Renfroe v. Warren-Hawkins Am. Legion Post No. 523, 157 Ga. App. 614, 278 S.E.2d 414 (1981).

Issue of the relationship between an insurance agent and an insurance applicant must be reserved for jury determination, even though the insurance agent was not an agent of an insurer. Stewart v. Boykin, 165 Ga. App. 868, 303 S.E.2d 50 (1983).

Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to a private entity operating a county animal control shelter because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the shelter could be held liable for the euthanization of a hospitalized patient's dogs based upon the theory of promissory estoppel since while the releases may have authorized the shelter to euthanize the dogs, the shelter was also authorized to subsequently enter into a promise not to do so; thus, the patient, as a principal, would be entitled to damages suffered as a result of representations made to the patient's authorized agent acting on the patient's behalf to protect the well-being of the patient's dogs. Greenway v. Northside Hosp., 317 Ga. App. 371, 730 S.E.2d 742 (2012).

Jury finding that dual agency existed supported by evidence.

- Jury did not err by concluding that a representative of the plaintiff was a dual agent for the plaintiff and the defendant with regard to the purchase of a helicopter because there was some evidence to support that finding based on the plaintiff's testimony that the plaintiff exercised control over the representative and the representative went to the location to purchase the helicopter, obtained insurance, and otherwise performed other actions on behalf of the plaintiff. Eagle Jets, LLC v. Atlanta Jet, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 386, 740 S.E.2d 439 (2013).

No jury question if evidence shows agency beyond dispute.

- If the evidence for both the plaintiff and the defendant showed beyond dispute that a certain individual was an agent of the defendant when the defendant assaulted the plaintiff, the court erred in giving charge that the jury should determine whether the defendant was an agent or an independent contractor. Carmichael v. Silvers, 90 Ga. App. 804, 84 S.E.2d 668 (1954).

Summary judgment improper.

- Complaint alleging that an agreement had been reached between the plaintiff's neighbor and a representative of an animal control facility for the safekeeping of the plaintiff's dogs while the plaintiff was hospitalized, set forth a claim for promissory estoppel, O.C.G.A. § 13-3-44(a), and the plaintiff, as a principal, would be entitled to damages suffered as a result of representations made to the plaintiff's neighbor, an authorized agent acting on the plaintiff's behalf, to protect the well-being of the plaintiff's dogs. Thus, a grant of summary judgment in favor of the operator of the animal control facility was reversed. Greenway v. Northside Hosp., 317 Ga. App. 371, 730 S.E.2d 742 (2012).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment on its claims against the buyer and the contingent sellers because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the agent's delivery of the termination letter constituted substantial compliance with the termination provisions of the real estate sales contract. Del Lago Ventures, Inc. v. QuikTrip Corp., 330 Ga. App. 138, 764 S.E.2d 595 (2014).

In a fire insurance dispute, issues of fact remained as to whether the agent was a dual agent such that the agent's knowledge that the insured would not be using the covered home as the insured's primary residence was imputable to the insurer. Lee v. Mercury Ins. Co., 343 Ga. App. 729, 808 S.E.2d 116 (2017).

Department of Administrative Services.

- Department of Administrative Services is the state manager for administrative aspects of workers' compensation program and, as such, is an agent for each individual department or instrumentality in its relations with the State Board of Workers' Compensation. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-55.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency, § 14 et seq.

Establishing Agency by the Circumstances in Real Estate Transactions, 45 POF3d 453.

C.J.S.

- 2A C.J.S., Agency, §§ 34, 52.

ALR.

- Right to recover against employee or his bond for money or property, the fruits of an employment involving a violation of law, 2 A.L.R. 906.

Validity of rule or stipulation making messenger in employment of telegraph company agent of sender in taking message to office for transmission, 9 A.L.R. 1235.

One doing work under a cost plus contract as an independent contractor or a servant or an agent, 55 A.L.R. 291.

Regulations, rules, customs, or usage of stock or produce exchange or of stock or produce broker as affecting customers, 79 A.L.R. 592.

Lessee as agent of lessor within contemplation of mechanic's lien laws, 79 A.L.R. 962; 163 A.L.R. 992.

Doctrine of ratification invoked to charge one person with responsibility for the negligence of another not authorized to act for him, 85 A.L.R. 915.

Right of one who deals with another as principal to set up latter's apparent authority as agent, 95 A.L.R. 1319.

Trustee in mortgage securing bonds as agent of obligor or holder of bonds as regards deposit or payment in respect of principal or interest, 96 A.L.R. 1233.

Liability of bank for losses incurred on loans or investments made on recommendation of its officers or employees, 113 A.L.R. 246.

Profession at time of act or contract to be acting for another as a necessary condition of its ratification by latter, 124 A.L.R. 893.

When agency for sale of goods deemed exclusive agency, in the absence of express provision in that regard, 126 A.L.R. 1233.

What amounts to ratification by owner of unauthorized employment by broker or agent of subagent to procure a sale or purchase of property, 136 A.L.R. 1418.

What amounts to ratification by principal or master of libel or slander by agent or servant, 139 A.L.R. 1066.

Variance between allegation and proof as regards identity of servant or agent for whose acts defendant is sought to be held responsible, 139 A.L.R. 1152.

Advertising agency as agent of advertising medium or of advertiser, 53 A.L.R. 1139.

Liability of partners or partnership for libel, 88 A.L.R.2d 474.

Continuation of agency beyond contract period as extending contract for like period, 6 A.L.R.3d 1352.

Hospital's liability for negligence in connection with preparation, storage, or dispensing of drug or medicine, 9 A.L.R.3d 579.

Doctrine of apparent authority as applied to agent of municipality, 77 A.L.R.3d 925.