Public officials are not personally liable on authorized contracts.

- Public officials are not liable personally on contracts entered into by the officials within the scope of the officials' authority. Wilson v. Strange, 235 Ga. 156, 219 S.E.2d 88 (1975).

Justices of the inferior court.

- Justices of the inferior court contracting in behalf of the public are not individually liable for the payment of such contracts. Ghent v. Adams, 2 Ga. 214 (1847).

Commissioners contracting for river improvement.

- Commissioners contracting for improvement on Coosa River are not individually liable for obligations assumed in that character. Tucker v. Shorter, 17 Ga. 620 (1855).

Sheriffs.

- When an action is against the defendant as sheriff, to recover on a contract made by the sheriff solely in the sheriff's capacity as sheriff and not in the sheriff's individual capacity, the plaintiff's pleading sets out no liability against the sheriff in the sheriff's individual capacity. Bowden v. Eubanks, 57 Ga. App. 414, 195 S.E. 582 (1938).

Members of county board of education.

- Membership on a county board of education is a public office, and board members cannot be sued in their official capacity for breach of contract made on behalf of or in the name of the board. Knight v. Troup County Bd. of Educ., 144 Ga. App. 634, 242 S.E.2d 263 (1978).

County school superintendents.

- When a county school superintendent's actions were authorized by the county board of education, the superintendent is immune from any individual liability on a contract made on behalf of or in the name of the board. Knight v. Troup County Bd. of Educ., 144 Ga. App. 634, 242 S.E.2d 263 (1978).

Contract showing intent to assume personal liability.

- Officials are not personally liable on contracts entered into by the officials within the scope of their official authority, unless the contract shows that the officials clearly intended to assume a personal liability. Bowden v. Eubanks, 57 Ga. App. 414, 195 S.E. 582 (1938).

Public agent may stipulate to be personally responsible. Aven v. Beckom, 11 Ga. 1 (1852).

Reason for rule.

- There is a manifest distinction between contracts made with private agents and agents acting on behalf of the public as it regards their personal responsibility. The reason for the distinction is that it is not to be presumed either that the public agent means to bind oneself personally in acting as a functionary of the public or that the party dealing with the public agent in the agent's public character means to rely on the agent's individual responsibility. If individuals acting for the public are to be held individually liable upon their official contracts, few would be willing to accept any public trust or office. Ghent v. Adams, 2 Ga. 214 (1847); Aven v. Beckom, 11 Ga. 1 (1852).

Other provisions are applicable to public agents.

- That public agents fall within former Code 1873, § 2186, which prohibited an agent from buying if employed to sell or selling if employed to buy, and former Code 1882, § 2187, which prohibited an agent from making a profit out of the principal's property, appeared clearly from former Code 1873, § 2212; upon the principle "inclusio unius, exclusio alterius," it applies to all agents in common. Mayor of Macon v. Huff, 60 Ga. 221 (1878).

Existence of oral contract held question of fact.

- When the plaintiff contends that an oral contract existed between the plaintiff and the county school superintendent, acting either on behalf of the county board of education or individually, but the only evidence as to the oral contract is the contradicting testimony of the plaintiff and the superintendent, a question of fact exists which must be resolved by the jury. Knight v. Troup County Bd. of Educ., 144 Ga. App. 634, 242 S.E.2d 263 (1978).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees, § 342 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 73A C.J.S., Supp., Public Contracts, § 10.

ALR.

- Liability of receiver in his official capacity for torts or negligence of receivership employees, 10 A.L.R. 1055.