Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, §§ 20-401(7) and 96-101 are included in the annotations for this section.

Action for commission due under oral agreement.

- Trial court properly denied lessor's motion to strike lessee's counterclaim for commission due under oral agreement to sell aircraft since a commission is earned by providing services and Uniform Commercial Code statute of frauds is applicable to transactions in goods. Harris v. Clark, 157 Ga. App. 549, 278 S.E.2d 132 (1981).

Oral authorization to agent to give lessee of personalty option to buy.

- Where owner of personal property orally authorizes agent to lease it to another for a period of three months and orally authorizes the agent to give to sublessee option to buy, option price being more than $5750.00, the option so given by agent is not binding on owner since the agent's authority rested in parol, in absence of facts sufficient to work an estoppel or show ratification of a completed sale. Collier v. Wilson-Weesner-Wilkinson Co., 58 Ga. App. 44, 197 S.E. 516 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 20-401).

No mention of personalty in deed or contract for sale of farm.

- Where deed to farm land was delivered in accordance with contract of sale and purchase price paid, and where no mention was made in either deed or contract of sale of personalty alleged to have gone with farm, there was no "sale" of personalty and subsequent delivery of such personalty to vendee upon vendee's representation that it was part of the transaction did not prevent its recovery by vendor. Gostin v. Scott, 80 Ga. App. 630, 56 S.E.2d 778 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 96-101).

"Letter of intent" stating terms for proposed sale of plant and equipment therein, which sale was to be contingent on a future agreement as to an inventory of assets, involved a "package deal" for real estate and goods and was thus governed by (and failed under) O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30 rather than the less stringent standards of O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201. Beaulieu of Am., Inc. v. Coronet Indus., Inc., 173 Ga. App. 556, 327 S.E.2d 508 (1985).

Delivery and acceptance of goods removes transaction from statute of frauds.

- Where transfer of title to personal property is consummated by delivery and acceptance there is no requirement of law that it be in writing. Jack Fred Co. v. Lago, 96 Ga. App. 675, 101 S.E.2d 165 (1957) (decided under former § 20-401(7)).

Sufficient evidence that bank was holder of note.

- In a bank's suit against the guarantor of a note, the affidavit of the bank's vice-president established that the note was among the bank's business records and in the bank's possession; as such, the bank submitted competent proof that the bank was the holder of the note for purposes of the bank's summary judgment motion. Salahat v. FDIC, 298 Ga. App. 624, 680 S.E.2d 638 (2009).

Cited in Evans Implement Co. v. Thomas Indus., Inc., 117 Ga. App. 279, 160 S.E.2d 462 (1968); Hale v. Higginbotham, 228 Ga. 823, 188 S.E.2d 515 (1972); Kenimer v. Thompson, 128 Ga. App. 253, 196 S.E.2d 363 (1973); L.M. Berry & Co. v. Blackmon, 129 Ga. App. 347, 199 S.E.2d 610 (1973); Giant Peanut & Grain Co. v. Long Mfg. Co., 129 Ga. App. 685, 201 S.E.2d 26 (1973); R.L. Kimsey Cotton Co. v. Ferguson, 233 Ga. 962, 214 S.E.2d 360 (1975); Hagan v. Jockers, 138 Ga. App. 847, 228 S.E.2d 10 (1976); Smith v. Hornbuckle, 140 Ga. App. 871, 232 S.E.2d 149 (1977); Whitehead v. Capital Auto. Co., 239 Ga. 460, 238 S.E.2d 104 (1977); Hip Pocket, Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 144 Ga. App. 792, 242 S.E.2d 305 (1978); Hatley v. Frey, 145 Ga. App. 658, 244 S.E.2d 604 (1978); Custom Radio Whsles., Inc. v. Hamilton/Avnet Elecs., 147 Ga. App. 110, 248 S.E.2d 187 (1978); Skyway Cycle Sales, Inc. v. Gordon, 148 Ga. App. 150, 251 S.E.2d 118 (1978); Jem Patents, Inc. v. Frost, 156 Ga. App. 311, 274 S.E.2d 707 (1980); Madewell v. Marietta Dodge, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ga. 1980); David J. Joseph Co. v. S & M Scrap Metal Co., 163 Ga. App. 685, 295 S.E.2d 860 (1982); Integrated Micro Sys. v. NEC Home Elec. (USA), Inc., 174 Ga. App. 197, 329 S.E.2d 554 (1985); Seminole Peanut Co. v. Goodson, 176 Ga. App. 42, 335 S.E.2d 157 (1985); Atlanta Dairies Coop. v. Grindle, 182 Ga. App. 409, 356 S.E.2d 42 (1987); Kal-O-Mine Indus., Inc. v. Camp (In re Lumpkin Sand & Gravel, Inc.), 104 Bankr. 529 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989); Isbell v. Credit Nation Lending Serv., LLC, 319 Ga. App. 19, 735 S.E.2d 46 (2012); Brooks Peanut Co. v. Great S. Peanut, LLC, 322 Ga. App. 801, 746 S.E.2d 272 (2013).

Requirements for writing to be sufficient.

- Three definite and invariable requirements as to a writing are made by O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201(1): first, it must evidence a contract for the sale of goods; second, it must be "signed," which includes any authentication which identifies the party to be charged; and third, it must specify a quantity. Jinright v. Russell, 123 Ga. App. 706, 182 S.E.2d 328 (1971); Harris v. Hine, 232 Ga. 183, 205 S.E.2d 847 (1974); O.N. Jonas Co. v. Badische Corp., 706 F.2d 1161 (11th Cir. 1983).

Written contract enforceable if showing agreement, basis for relief, and signed by party charged.

- Written agreement signed by party against whom enforcement is sought constitutes valid, enforceable contract if it shows that a contract has been agreed to and there is a reasonably certain basis for granting relief. Mitchell-Huntley Cotton Co. v. Lawson, 377 F. Supp. 661 (M.D. Ga. 1973).

A series of writings may properly be considered to prove the existence of a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more. Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1991).

Required writing need not contain all material terms of contract and material terms stated need not be precise. All that is required is that the writing afford a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction. Harris v. Hine, 232 Ga. 183, 205 S.E.2d 847 (1974); O.N. Jonas Co. v. Badische Corp., 706 F.2d 1161 (11th Cir. 1983); Lipsey Motors v. Karp Motors, Inc., 194 Ga. App. 15, 389 S.E.2d 537 (1989); Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1991).

Only term which must appear in writing is the quantity term which need not be accurately stated, but recovery is limited to amount stated. The price, time, and place of payment or delivery, general quality of the goods, or any particular warranties may all be omitted. Alice v. Robett Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 1377 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1971).

Unsigned invoice is not a writing in confirmation of a contract under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201. Jackson v. Meadows, 153 Ga. App. 1, 264 S.E.2d 503 (1980).

Invoices on printed forms bearing sender's name and address.

- Invoices which are sent on printed forms bearing a party's name and address are "sufficient against the sender" and thus may be considered a written confirmation of an alleged contract within meaning of O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201. Jem Patents, Inc. v. Frost, 147 Ga. App. 839, 250 S.E.2d 547 (1978).

Complete signature of seller is not necessary to constitute authentication. Troutt v. Nash AMC/Jeep, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 399, 278 S.E.2d 54 (1981).

Where the seller does not sign the sales contract, that fact would not render its provisions unenforceable against the buyer as there is no question that the buyer signed it and that it in fact constitutes the agreement under which the sale was made. Frick Forest Prods., Inc. v. International Hardwoods, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 359, 288 S.E.2d 625 (1982).

Purchase orders of the buyer which were not signed by any employee or authorized agent of the manufacturer did not satisfy the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201(1). Entertainment Sales Co. v. SNK, Inc., 232 Ga. App. 669, 502 S.E.2d 263 (1998).

Signature may be printed and may be on any part of document, including billhead or letterhead. Troutt v. Nash AMC/Jeep, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 399, 278 S.E.2d 54 (1981).

A writing is "signed" if it bears any authentication which identifies the party to be charged on the contract. Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1991).

Writing insufficient to evidence contract for the sale of goods. See Alice v. Robett Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 1377 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1971).

Letter stating buyer's willingness to purchase seller's output where seller had not begun producing goods.

- Letter outlining nature of buyer's operations, seller's efforts and expertise, and stating that buyer had informed seller of buyer's being "willing and able to purchase" all seller's output at a cost no greater than buyer's own cost of production is, as a matter of law, insufficient as a writing under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201, because at time the letter was written, seller had taken no action to begin producing goods referred to in the letter. Accordingly, no contract could have existed at the time the letter was written. Maderas Tropicales v. Southern Crate & Veneer Co., 588 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1979).

Signed check used as down payment on store, with notation "For Binder on Store," meets all requirements of a writing sufficient to indicate that contract for sale was made between parties. The check does not prove a contract, but would authorize introduction of oral evidence toward that end. Jinright v. Russell, 123 Ga. App. 706, 182 S.E.2d 328 (1971).

One party signing written confirmation.

- O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201 allows formation of enforceable contract even though only one party signs written confirmation. Edwards v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 379 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ga. 1974).

Effect of failure to answer written confirmation within 10 days of receipt.

- Between merchants, failure to answer written confirmation of contract within 10 days of receipt is tantamount to a writing under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201(2) and is sufficient against both parties under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201(1). The only effect, however, is to take away from the party who fails to answer the defense of the statute of frauds; burden of persuading trier of fact that a contract was in fact made orally prior to written confirmation is unaffected. Edwards v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 379 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ga. 1974).

Written confirmation between merchants enforceable only as to quantity specified.

- Between merchants, requirement of a writing is satisfied by a writing in confirmation of contract which is received within a reasonable time by party against whom enforcement is sought and which is sufficient to bind the sender, but is enforceable only with respect to quantity of goods shown in the writing. Maderas Tropicales v. Southern Crate & Veneer Co., 588 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1979).

Confirmation order of broker sufficient writing.

- As there was evidence from which it could be inferred that a peanut commodities broker's confirmation order was a writing that was signed by both parties to the transaction, through the broker as their agent, and that the confirmation was signed by the sender's agent such that it was sufficient against the sender, the seller could not rely on a defense under the Statute of Frauds to the buyer's claims. Brooks Peanut Co. v. Great S. Peanut, LLC, 322 Ga. App. 801, 746 S.E.2d 272 (2013).

Invoices held to be written confirmation of the contract between merchants within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201(2). Dalesso v. Reliable-Triple Cee of N. Jersey, Inc., 167 Ga. App. 372, 306 S.E.2d 415 (1983).

Where the sale of goods involves two parties who are merchants, the invoices for the sale constitute written confirmation of the agreement; in addition, buyer's acceptance of the delivered goods takes the agreement out of the statute of frauds due to partial performance. Bicknell v. Joyce Sportswear Co., 173 Ga. App. 897, 328 S.E.2d 564 (1985).

Italian companies that sold goods to a Georgia corporation were not required to obtain a certificate of authority from the State of Georgia prior to doing business in Georgia, and Georgia courts had jurisdiction over actions which the Italian companies filed against the Georgia corporation after they delivered goods, submitted invoices for payment, but were not fully paid. Imex Int'l v. Wires Eng'g, 261 Ga. App. 329, 583 S.E.2d 117 (2003).

Farming corporation as "merchant."

- Evidence supported a finding that defendant farming corporation was a "merchant" bound by an oral agreement to sell 5,000 bushels of soybeans, which agreement was confirmed in writing to which the corporation made no response. Thunderbird Farms, Inc. v. Abney, 178 Ga. App. 335, 343 S.E.2d 127 (1986).

Preprinted "limited warranty" language.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(7), preprinted "limited warranty" language on the back of a confirmation had no effect because it directly contradicted the full warranty language that was typed on the front of the preprinted confirmation form; the court erred when it relied on this warranty to bar claims for lost profits or other special damages. Authentic Architectural Millworks, Inc. v. SCM Group USA, Inc., 262 Ga. App. 826, 586 S.E.2d 726 (2003).

"Merchants" as including farmers who orally "book" crops.

- Construing "merchants" in O.C.G.A. § 11-2-104(1) as not excluding as a matter of law farmers who orally "book" crops such as soybeans for sale protects them equally as well as the buyer. If the market price declines after the booking, they are assured of the higher booking price; the buyer cannot renege as O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201 would apply. Goldkist, Inc. v. Brownlee, 182 Ga. App. 287, 355 S.E.2d 773 (1987).

Deposition testimony of merchant's representative sufficient to form oral agreement.

- When a car dealer admitted that a contract existed for the sale of a specific quantity of goods, namely, one vehicle, via the dealer's representative's deposition, but on different terms and conditions than those alleged by the car's potential buyer, the oral agreement between the parties was enforceable under the exception to the statute of frauds set forth in O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201(3)(b). Jones v. Baran Co., LLC, 290 Ga. App. 578, 660 S.E.2d 420 (2008).

Objection requirements of O.C.G.A. §§ 11-2-201(2),11-2-202, and11-2-207 applied to work orders issued by a home improvement store to a contractor for the purchase of carpeting because the contractor's installation service was incidental to the purchase of carpeting by the store's customers. On the other hand, change orders that dealt with services that the contractor was asked to provide over and above the initial installation of the carpeting were not subject to the requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code. Ricciardelli v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., F. Supp. 2d (DC Jan. 15, 2009).

When insufficient contract enforceable.

- A contract which is otherwise insufficient may still be enforceable if party against whom enforcement is sought admits by pleading or testimony that a contract of sale was in fact made. Jackson v. Meadows, 153 Ga. App. 1, 264 S.E.2d 503 (1980).

A contract which is within statute of frauds at time of filing petition or cross action can become enforceable by admissions in the case itself by party charged, but not by admissions made outside the case prior to filing of petition or cross action. Garrison v. Piatt, 113 Ga. App. 94, 147 S.E.2d 374 (1966).

Failure to object to goods constituted acceptance and formed contract.

- Under the merchant rule in O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201(2), a hospital's failure to object in writing to a medical supplier's invoice for pumps within ten days of receipt constituted the hospital's acceptance of the goods and formed an enforceable contract, even though the hospital's purchase order noted that the purchase was contingent on approval by the hospital's board of directors. Ardus Med., Inc. v. Emanuel County Hosp. Auth., 558 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (S.D. Ga. 2008).

Party admitting contract may not claim benefit of statute of frauds.

- Party charged cannot admit fact of parol contract and at same time claim benefit of statute of frauds. Garrison v. Piatt, 113 Ga. App. 94, 147 S.E.2d 374 (1966).

O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201(3)(b) was designed to prevent the statute of frauds itself from becoming an aid to fraud, by prohibiting one claiming the benefit of the statute who admits in the case the oral contract sued upon. Garrison v. Piatt, 113 Ga. App. 94, 147 S.E.2d 374 (1966).

An oral agreement for the sale of a horse for $35,000 was enforceable under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201(3)(b); the seller admitted that a contract was made for the sale of one horse. Rowland v. Scarborough Farms, LLC, 285 Ga. App. 831, 648 S.E.2d 151 (2007).

Petition for enforcement of contract otherwise valid not demurrable.

- Because it is clearly the intent of the legislature that enforceability of contract, which on its face may be within statute of frauds, is tested by answer, testimony, or plea of party charged, and not merely by allegations in the petition or cross action brought to enforce the contract, it follows that a petition upon such a contract which is valid in other respects is not demurrable because it shows on its face that it is within the statute of frauds. Garrison v. Piatt, 113 Ga. App. 94, 147 S.E.2d 374 (1966).

Agreement found outside of statute of frauds due to partial performance. See Dan Gurney Indus., Inc. v. Southeastern Wheels, Inc., 168 Ga. App. 504, 308 S.E.2d 637 (1983).

Parol defense.

- In action on account by seller, O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201 does not prohibit setting up by parol evidence a defense based upon term of contract of sale as to when payments on account become due. Giant Peanut Co. v. Carolina Chems., Inc., 129 Ga. App. 718, 200 S.E.2d 918 (1973).

Secured transactions.

- While it appeared that O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24, rather than O.C.G.A. § 11-2-725, would most likely apply to defendant collection attorney's state court deficiency action against plaintiff consumer, and it was not for the federal court to say what the Georgia courts would hold, the uncertainty meant there was no intentional unfair conduct and the consumer's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim was dismissed; language in O.C.G.A. § 11-2-201 excluded "secured transactions" from § 11-2-201. Almand v. Reynolds & Robin, P.C., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (M.D. Ga. 2007).

Summary judgment.

- Lender and attorney were properly granted summary judgment against a home buyer's breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy claims, as: (1) there was no evidence of a written purchase agreement for the home and the land it was placed on; and (2) a simple reading of the contract by the buyer would have protected against any alleged misrepresentations; moreover, to the extent that the home buyer's claim of a conspiracy depended upon the viability of the fraud and breach of contract claims, it also failed. Parrish v. Jackson W. Jones, P.C., 278 Ga. App. 645, 629 S.E.2d 468 (2006).

Because an oral contract concerning the disposal of car skeletons on property operated as a junkyard did not violate the O.C.G.A. §§ 11-2-201 and11-2-725, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against a seller on his counterclaim for fraud, due to the option holder's repudiation of the contract in filing for specific performance. Henry v. Blankenship, 284 Ga. App. 578, 644 S.E.2d 419 (2007).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 15A Am. Jur. 2d, Commercial Code, § 94. 67 Am. Jur. 2d, Sales, §§ 180-207. 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statute of Frauds, §§ 427, 428, 497 et seq.

6 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Commercial Code, § 2:11.

C.J.S.

- 77A C.J.S., Sales, § 68 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 2-201.

ALR.

- Acceptance of checks by telegraph or telephone, 2 A.L.R. 1146; 13 A.L.R. 989.

Admissibility of parol evidence to vary or explain the contract implied from the regular endorsement of a bill or note, 4 A.L.R. 764; 11 A.L.R. 637; 22 A.L.R. 527; 35 A.L.R. 1120; 54 A.L.R. 999; 92 A.L.R. 721.

When goods remaining in custody of seller or some third person deemed to have been received by buyer, within exception to statute of frauds, 4 A.L.R. 902.

Installation of fixtures as part performance which will take parol lease out of statute of frauds, 10 A.L.R. 1495.

Effect of the statute of frauds upon the right to modify, by subsequent parol agreement, a written contract required by the statute to be in writing, 17 A.L.R. 10; 29 A.L.R. 1095; 80 A.L.R. 539; 118 A.L.R. 1511.

Statute of frauds: warranty or guaranty in respect of the subject-matter of a contract between third persons, which does in terms embrace such an obligation, 19 A.L.R. 1033.

Admission by pleading of a parol contract as preventing pleader from taking advantage of the statute of frauds, 22 A.L.R. 723.

Pleadings, depositions, testimony, or statements in court as constituting a sufficient writing within the statute of frauds, 22 A.L.R. 735.

Effect of statute of frauds upon the right to modify by subsequent parol agreement, a written contract required by the statute to be in writing, 29 A.L.R. 1095; 80 A.L.R. 539; 118 A.L.R. 1511.

Trade custom or usage to explain or supply essential terms in writing required by statute of frauds (or Sales Act) in sale of goods, 29 A.L.R. 1218.

Necessity of statement in writing of consideration or price for sale of goods or choses in action in order to satisfy statute of frauds, 30 A.L.R. 1163; 59 A.L.R. 1422.

Oral contract to enter into written contract as within statute of frauds, 58 A.L.R. 1015.

Contracts relating to corporate stock as within provisions of statute of frauds dealing with sales of goods, etc., 59 A.L.R. 597.

Doctrine of part performance as sustaining action at law based on contract within statute of frauds, 59 A.L.R. 1305.

Necessity and sufficiency of statement in writing of consideration or price for sale of goods or choses in action in order to satisfy statute of frauds, 59 A.L.R. 1422.

Oral agreement between joint obligors as to extent of liability inter se, 65 A.L.R. 822.

Statute of frauds: sufficiency of identification of vendor or purchaser in memorandum, 70 A.L.R. 196.

Failure to comply with statute of frauds as to a part of a contract within the statute as affecting the enforceability of another part not covered by the statute, 71 A.L.R. 479.

Reformation of memorandum relied upon to take an oral contract out of the statute of frauds, 73 A.L.R. 99.

Extrinsic writing referred to in written agreement as part thereof for purposes of statute of frauds, 73 A.L.R. 1383.

Oral promise of officer, director, or stockholder in relation to bank deposit as within statute of frauds, 95 A.L.R. 1137.

Requirement of written contract as condition to mechanic's lien as affected by an oral modification, or a modification partly oral and partly written, of a written contract, or a subsequent modification in writing not registered or filed as required by statute, 108 A.L.R. 434.

Acceptance which will take oral sale or contract for sale of goods out of statute of frauds as affected by cancelation of order or repudiation of contract before goods were shipped or delivered to buyer, 113 A.L.R. 810.

Effect of statute of frauds upon the right to modify by subsequent parol agreement a written contract required by the statute to be in writing, 118 A.L.R. 1511.

Statute of frauds as applied to agreements of repurchase or repayment on sale of corporate stock or other personal property, 121 A.L.R. 312.

Provision in sale contract to effect that only conditions incorporated therein shall be binding, 127 A.L.R. 132; 133 A.L.R. 1360.

Terms "bags," "bales," "cars," or other terms indefinite as to quantity or weight, as satisfying statute of frauds, 129 A.L.R. 1230.

Statute of frauds as applicable to a contract to be responsible for another's funeral expenses, 134 A.L.R. 633.

Contract to fill in land as one for sale of goods within statute of frauds, 161 A.L.R. 1158.

Printed, stamped, or typewritten name as satisfying requirement of statute of frauds as regards signature, 171 A.L.R. 334.

Deposit in mail or notice of claim required as condition of action against, or liability of, governmental body, as a giving of notice within required period, 175 A.L.R. 299.

Memorandum which will satisfy statute of frauds, as predicable in whole or part upon writings prior to the oral agreement, 1 A.L.R.2d 841; 30 A.L.R.2d 972.

Undelivered lease or contract (other than for sale of land), or undelivered memorandum thereof, as satisfying statute of frauds, 12 A.L.R.2d 508.

Effect of attempted cancelation or erasure in memorandum otherwise sufficient to satisfy statute of frauds, 31 A.L.R.2d 1112.

Buyer's note as payment within contemplation of statute of frauds, 81 A.L.R.2d 1355.

Applicability of parol evidence rule in favor of or against one not a party to contract of release, 13 A.L.R.3d 313.

Construction and application of UCC § 2-201(3)(b) rendering contract of sale enforceable notwithstanding statute of frauds, to extent it is admitted in pleading, testimony, or otherwise in court, 88 A.L.R.3d 416.

Farmers as "merchants" within provisions of UCC Article 2, dealing with sales, 95 A.L.R.3d 484.

Construction and application of UCC § 2-201(3)(c) rendering contract of sale enforceable notwithstanding statute of frauds with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been received and accepted, 97 A.L.R.3d 908.

Promissory estoppel as basis for avoidance of UCC statute of frauds (UCC § 2-201), 29 A.L.R.4th 1006.

Sales: "specially manufactured goods" statute of frauds exception in UCC § 2-201(3)(a), 45 A.L.R.4th 1126.

Sales: construction of statute of frauds exception under UCC § 2-201(2) for confirmatory writing between merchants, 82 A.L.R.4th 709, 38 A.L.R.5th 191.

Satisfaction of statute of frauds by e-mail, 110 A.L.R.5th 277.

Applicability of UCC Article 2 to mixed contracts for sale of consumer goods and services, 1 A.L.R.7th 3.

Applicability of UCC Article 2 to mixed contracts for sale of goods and services: distributorship, franchise, and similar business contracts, 8 A.L.R.7th 4.

Applicability of UCC Article 2 to mixed contracts for sale of business goods and services: manufacturing, construction, and similar contracts, 15 A.L.R.7th 7.