O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 11-2-309 (2019)

Absence of specific time provisions; notice of termination

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section GA-LEGlegis.ga.gov (official) JustiaJustia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

(1) The time for shipment or delivery or any other action under a contract if not provided in this article or agreed upon shall be a reasonable time. (2) Where the contract provides for successive performances but is indefinite in duration it is valid for a reasonable time but unless otherwise agreed may be terminated at any time by either party. (3) Termination of a contract by one party except on the happening of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification be received by the other party and an agreement dispensing with notification is invalid if its operation would be unconscionable.

History

Code 1933, § 109A-2-309, enacted by Ga. L. 1962, p. 156, § 1.

Annotations

Cross references. Effect of absence of specific time provision in contract, § 13-4-20.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Plaintiff did not provide aggregate material within a timely manner. - Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the defendants’ counterclaim for breach of contract because, although the defendants alleged that the plaintiff was required to provide aggregate material within a specific schedule, but, on numerous occasions, it had failed to do so, the defendants failed to point to evidence of the contractual terms imposing the specific schedules, or, in other words, the dates by which

the plaintiff had to deliver the aggregate material for seven projects; and, without pointing to evidence of the contractually required delivery dates for the materials for the seven projects, the defendants could not show that the plaintiff failed to deliver the materials in a timely manner. Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Martin Marietta Aggregates, 339 Ga. App. 435, 793 S.E.2d 615, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 641 (2016), cert. denied, No. S17C0691, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 475 (Ga. May 30, 2017).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 67 Am. Jur. 2d, Sales, §§ 295, 296. Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms. 6 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Commercial Code, § 2:118. C.J.S. 77A C.J.S., Sales, §§ 139, 140. U.L.A. Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 2309. ALR. Vendor’s acceptance of payment ten-

dered after time specified as waiver of provision making time of essence of contract, 9 A.L.R. 996. Rights and remedies upon cancelation of sales agency, 32 A.L.R. 209; 52 A.L.R. 546; 89 A.L.R. 252. Buyer’s duty to give seller instructions to ship where former has not exercised his option under contract to require shipment before time specified, 119 A.L.R. 1495. Termination by principal of distributorship contract containing no express provision for termination, 19 A.L.R.3d 196.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7 cases, 1983–2016 · leading case: Atlanta Fiberglass USA, LLC v. KPI, Co., 911 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Atlanta Fiberglass USA, LLC v. KPI, Co., 911 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Ga. 2012). · cites it 4× “” O.C.G.A. § 11-2-309(2). This provision is qualified only by the following: “Termination of a contract by one party except on the happening of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification be received by the other party .”
Jeff Goolsby Homes Corp. v. Smith, 308 S.E.2d 564 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 2× “See also OCGA § 11-2-309 (1) (formerly Code Ann. § 109A-2—309 (1) (Ga.”
Stephens v. Crittenden Tractor Co., 370 S.E.2d 757 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 2× “In the absence of any language specifying the time for making such repairs, the warranty was thus subject to the provision of OCGA § 11-2-309 (1) imposing a “reasonable time” requirement on action taken pursuant to this warranty.”
Drug Line, Inc. v. Sero-Immuno Diagnostics, Inc., 458 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 11-2-309 (3) adds no substance to Drug Line’s arguments.”
Club Car, Inc. v. Club Car (Quebec) Imp., Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (S.D. Ga. 2003). · cites it 2× “” O.C.G.A. § 11-2-309; see Jones v. Destiny Industries, Inc.”
Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Martin Marietta Aggregates, 793 S.E.2d 615 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 2× “It argued that under OCGA § 11-2-309, Martin Marietta had to deliver the material within a reasonable time.”
Lundy v. Low, 408 S.E.2d 144 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 11-2-309 (1) and (2) provides in part that “[t]he time for shipment or delivery .”
— 11-2-309(2) — 1 case
Atlanta Fiberglass USA, LLC v. KPI, Co., 911 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Ga. 2012). “” O.C.G.A. § 11-2-309(2). This provision is qualified only by the following: “Termination of a contract by one party except on the happening of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification be received by the other party .”
— 11-2-309(3) — 1 case
Atlanta Fiberglass USA, LLC v. KPI, Co., 911 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Ga. 2012). “” O.C.G.A. § 11-2-309(2). This provision is qualified only by the following: “Termination of a contract by one party except on the happening of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification be received by the other party .”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.