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Call Now: 904-383-7448(Code 1933, § 109A-2 - 511, enacted by Ga. L. 1962, p. 156, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 143, § 11.)
- For article discussing the resolution of conflicting claims to goods between an unsecured seller of goods and a creditor of a buyer claiming under an after-acquired property clause, see 28 Mercer L. Rev. 625 (1977).
- In light of the similarity in the provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 96-106 are included in the annotations for this section.
Unless credit is specifically agreed on or is custom of trade, purchase money is due immediately, and seller may demand payment before delivering goods. Douglas Motor Sales, Inc. v. Cy Owens, Inc., 99 Ga. App. 890, 109 S.E.2d 874 (1959) (decided under Code 1933, § 96-106).
- Where goods are sold for cash to be paid on delivery, payment of purchase price is condition precedent to sale; and where purchase price is not paid, title remains in seller, notwithstanding possession of goods by buyer. Fact that payment is to be made by check does not alter above rule. Douglas Motor Sales, Inc. v. Cy Owens, Inc., 99 Ga. App. 890, 109 S.E.2d 874 (1959) (decided under Code 1933, § 96-106).
- In action alleging wrongful repossession of automobile, where creditor declared entire principal due upon default of debtor, the latter may tender payment by any means current in the ordinary course of business and if seller demands payment in legal tender, seller must give reasonable extension of time. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Barnes, 126 Ga. App. 444, 191 S.E.2d 121 (1972).
- In action on contract for sale of stand of timber, payment to be made as timber was cut, averment that plaintiff admitted defendant in possession of premises and defendant commenced cutting and sawing operations must be taken as referring to an entry under a mere license to cut and remove timber in accordance with the contract, defendant to acquire title only to the product as the same was sawed, stacked, and paid for. Pope v. Barnett, 49 Ga. App. 59, 163 S.E. 517 (1932) (decided under Code 1933, § 96-106).
- When payment is stopped on check after defendant purchasers are in possession of automobiles, conversion of automobiles is established by plaintiff seller and prima facie case made out. Douglas Motor Sales, Inc. v. Cy Owens, Inc., 99 Ga. App. 890, 109 S.E.2d 874 (1959) (decided under Code 1933, § 96-106).
Cited in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Spicer, 144 Ga. App. 383, 241 S.E.2d 273 (1977); Harris v. Harbin Lumber Co. (In re Ellison), 31 Bankr. 545 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983).
- 67 Am. Jur. 2d, Sales, § 668.
6 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Commercial Code, § 2:404.
- 77A C.J.S., Sales, § 207 et seq. 86 C.J.S., Tender, § 21 et seq.
- Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 2-511.
- Tender by check, 23 A.L.R. 1284; 51 A.L.R. 393.
Acceptance of cashier's check from debtor as absolute or conditional payment, 45 A.L.R. 1487.
Right of judgment creditor to demand that debtor's tender of payment be in cash or by certified check rather than by uncertified check, 82 A.L.R.3d 1199.
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