O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 11-3-110 (2019)

Identification of person to whom instrument is payable

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) The person to whom an instrument is initially payable is determined by the intent of the person, whether or not authorized, signing as, or in the name or behalf of, the issuer of the instrument. The instrument is payable to the person intended by the signer even if that person is identified in the instrument by a name or other identification that is not that of the intended person. If more than one person signs in the name or behalf of the issuer of an instrument and all the signers do not intend the same person as payee, the instrument is payable to any person intended by one or more of the signers.

(b) If the signature of the issuer of an instrument is made by automated means, such as a check-writing machine, the payee of the instrument is determined by the intent of the person who supplied the name or identification of the payee, whether or not authorized to do so.

(c) A person to whom an instrument is payable may be identified in any way, including by name, identifying number, office, or account number. For the purpose of determining the holder of an instrument, the following rules apply:

(1) If an instrument is payable to an account and the account is identified only by number, the instrument is payable to the person to whom the account is payable. If an instrument is payable to an account identified by number and by the name of a person, the instrument is payable to the named person, whether or not that person is the owner of the account identified by number.

(2) If an instrument is payable to:

(i) A trust, an estate, or a person described as trustee or representative of a trust or estate, the instrument is payable to the trustee, the representative, or a successor of either, whether or not the beneficiary or estate is also named;

(ii) A person described as agent or similar representative of a named or identified person, the instrument is payable to the represented person, the representative, or a successor of the representative;

(iii) A fund or organization that is not a legal entity, the instrument is payable to a representative of the members of the fund or organization; or

(iv) An office or to a person described as holding an office, the instrument is payable to the named person, the incumbent of the office, or a successor to the incumbent.

(d) If an instrument is payable to two or more persons alternatively, it is payable to any of them and may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced by any or all of them in possession of the instrument. If an instrument is payable to two or more persons not alternatively, it is payable to all of them and may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced only by all of them. If an instrument payable to two or more persons is ambiguous as to whether it is payable to the persons alternatively, the instrument is payable to the persons alternatively.

History

Code 1981, § 11-3-110, enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 1306, § 3.

Annotations

Law reviews. For comment on Fulton Nat’l Bank v. Didschuneit, 92 Ga. App. 527, 88 S.E.2d 853 (1955), holding defendant bank liable for cashing check payable to joint payees

on the authorized signature of only one of the payees, see 18 Ga. B.J. 346 (1956). For comment on Trust Co. v. Refrigeration Supplies, Inc., 241 Ga. 406, 246 S.E.2d 282 (1978), discussing liability of collecting and payor banks for payment of check over missing endorsement of copayee, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 677 (1979).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ANALYSIS GENERAL CONSIDERATION ALTERNATE PAYEES JOINT PAYEES General Consideration Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, §§ 14-403, 14-412, and 109A-3-116 and former Code Section 11-3-116 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Purpose of former statute regarding scope of endorsement. - Purpose of former Code 1933, § 14-403, which required endorsement of the entire instrument or the unpaid residue, was to prevent payee or payees from varying or enlarging contract initially made by maker of instrument. When a maker executed a negotiable instrument payable to one payee or more, jointly, the maker subjected to one lawsuit, and if the payee in instrument transferred it to two or more endorsees severally, such endorsement subjected maker to two or more suits to which the maker had not been liable at time executed instrument. Hodson v. Scoggins, 102 Ga. App. 44, 115 S.E.2d 715, 1960 Ga. App. LEXIS 551 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 14-403). Possession as evidence of title. - Possession of a negotiable instrument is presumptive evidence of title, but it is not

conclusive. One in possession of personal property is presumed to be the owner until the contrary appears, and the burden of rebutting the presumption is upon the party claiming adversely to the one in possession. Hattaway v. Keefe, 191 Ga. App. 315, 381 S.E.2d 569, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 610 (1989) (decided under former Code Section 11-3-116). Ownership between copayees. - This Code section does not control ownership between copayees. Hattaway v. Keefe, 191 Ga. App. 315, 381 S.E.2d 569, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 610 (1989) (decided under former Code Section 11-3-116). Enforcement by principal or agent in own name. - Principal or agent may enforce payment as holder of instrument in own name. Bennett v. Cannon, 114 Ga. App. 479, 151 S.E.2d 828, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 806 (1966) (decided under former Code Section 11-3-117). Alternate Payees One endorsement where payees’ names separated by slash. - Bank’s payment of checks with only one endorsement is not only proper but was required where the two designated payees’ names

are separated by a virgule. Ryland Group, Inc. v. Gwinnett County Bank, 151 Ga. App. 148, 259 S.E.2d 152, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2473 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-3-116). Joint Payees Endorsement by all payees. - Instrument payable to joint payees must be endorsed by all of them. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Atlas Supply Co., 121 Ga. App. 1, 172 S.E.2d 632, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1071 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-3-116). Payment of a check payable to order of two or more payees without endorsement of a joint payee is exercise of dominion and control over check inconsistent with nonsigning payee’s rights amounting to conversion. Situation is analogous to payment of check on forged endorsement, which former Code 1933, § 109A-3-116 acknowledged to be conversion. Trust Co. v. Refrigeration Supplies, Inc., 241 Ga. 406, 246 S.E.2d 282, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1002 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-3-116). Cashing bank’s liability for failure to obtain copayee’s endorsement. - Cashing bank is liable in damages to copayee for its failure to obtain copayee’s endorsement on checks involved. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Atlas Supply Co., 121

Ga. App. 1, 172 S.E.2d 632, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1071 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-3-116). Damaged payee has cause of action against cashing bank for damages sustained where latter fails to obtain endorsements of all copayees on check. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Atlas Supply Co., 121 Ga. App. 1, 172 S.E.2d 632, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1071 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-3-116). Bank not holder of instrument lacking joint payee’s endorsement. - A bank never became a holder in due course where a check made payable jointly to the bank’s customer and a third party was never endorsed by the third party before deposit in the bank. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank v. Sun Belt Elec. Constructors, Inc., 64 B.R. 377, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5426 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (decided under former Code Section 11-3-116). Where payee’s interest in note is specified. - Where instrument is payable to order of three payees and specifically states that interest of third payee is to be $1,000.00, endorsee of such third payee may maintain action for interest in the instrument without endorsement of other two payees and without joining them as parties. Hodson v. Scoggins, 102 Ga. App. 44, 115 S.E.2d 715, 1960 Ga. App. LEXIS 551 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 14-412).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, §§ 79, 205, 391 et seq. 11 Am Jur. 2d, Banks and Financial Institutions, § 918. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, §§ 586, 646. C.J.S. 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, §§ 13, 128. U.L.A. Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 3110.

ALR. Instruments for payment of money naming in alternative two or more payees, 171 A.L.R. 522. Bank’s liability to nonsigning payee for payment of check drawn to joint payees without obtaining endorsement by both, 47 A.L.R.3d 537.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 4 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2004–2024 · leading case: Hale Haven Props., LLC v. Bank of Am., N.A., 815 S.E.2d 574 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
Hale Haven Props., LLC v. Bank of Am., N.A., 815 S.E.2d 574 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 2× “In this event, your mortgage and note will be transferred to us and you will pay your remaining mortgage debt to us.”
Abdul-Hakim v. Mead Sch. & Off. Prods., 598 S.E.2d 808 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 2× “As discussed in Division 1, supra, however, the record shows that the board did not excuse or ignore an untimely payment, but affirmatively found that Mead timely made the payment. Accordingly, this argument is without merit.”
Consum. Solutions Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Heritage Bank, 684 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 2× “The principles stated in Code Section 11-3-110 apply to special indorsements.”
William Cole Redfearn v. Jaade Moore (Ga. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 5× “” OCGA § 11-3-110 (d). See also Auto–Owners Ins.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.