O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 11-3-117 (2019)

Other agreements affecting instrument

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section GA-LEGlegis.ga.gov (official) JustiaJustia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

Subject to applicable law regarding exclusion of proof of contempo347 raneous or previous agreements, the obligation of a party to an instrument to pay the instrument may be modified, supplemented, or nullified by a separate agreement of the obligor and a person entitled to enforce the instrument, if the instrument is issued or the obligation is incurred in reliance on the agreement or as part of the same transaction giving rise to the agreement. To the extent an obligation is modified, supplemented, or nullified by an agreement under this Code section, the agreement is a defense to the obligation.

History

Code 1981, § 11-3-117, enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 1306, § 3; Ga. L. 1997, p. 143, § 11.

Annotations

Law reviews. For article discussing parol evidence in

the law of commercial paper, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 53 (1978). For comment on Geiger Fin. Co. v. Graham, 123 Ga. App. 771, 182 S.E.2d 521 (1971), see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 400 (1972).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Modification of obligation. - Although it was true that the obligation of a party to an instrument could be modified, the bank was entitled to summary judgment on its breach of contract claim, which alleged that the obligors executed two promissory notes, that the notes were later in default, that the obligors did not have a defense, especially since the obli-

gors did not show how modification agreements, to which the obligors were not parties, relieved them of their obligations on the notes. Reece v. Chestatee State Bank, 260 Ga. App. 136, 579 S.E.2d 11, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 160 (2003), cert. denied, No. S03C1021, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 561 (Ga. June 9, 2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, §§ 52, 127, 131 et seq., 300. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, § 671. 69 Am. Jur. 2d, Secured Transactions, § 448. C.J.S. 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, §§ 90, 10 et seq. U.L.A. Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 3117.

ALR. Negotiability as affected by provisions for extension of time, 77 A.L.R. 1085. Waiver of demand and notice as affecting indorsers other than the one above whose name it immediately appears, 110 A.L.R. 1228.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 3 cases, 1990–2003 · leading case: Reece v. Chestatee State Bank, 579 S.E.2d 11 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
Reece v. Chestatee State Bank, 579 S.E.2d 11 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 4× “The appellants’ reliance on OCGA § 11-3-117 is misplaced. That Code section provides, in pertinent part: [T]he obligation of a party to an instrument to pay the instrument may be modified, supplemented, or nullified by a separate agreement of the obligor and a person entitled to…”
LaBanz v. Bank South, 400 S.E.2d 357 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “The court, in denying that motion for directed verdict, evidently rejected Joseph’s contention that the endorsement was restrictive as defined in OCGA §§ 11-3-205 and 11-3-206, concluding instead that the endorsements were in blank, as covered by OCGA § 11-3-204 (2).”
First Guar. Bank v. Nw. Georgia Bank, 417 S.E.2d 348 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “It held that under OCGA § 11-3-117, Northwest had authority to negotiate the money order payable to it “for Lucille Knight” without obtaining her indorsement so that Northwest is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law with respect to the indorsement of the money order.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.