O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 11-9-504 (2019)

Indication of collateral

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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A financing statement sufficiently indicates the collateral that it covers if the financing statement provides: (1) A description of the collateral pursuant to Code Section 11-9108; or (2) An indication that the financing statement covers all assets or all personal property.

History

Code 1981, § 11-9-504, enacted by Ga. L. 2001, p. 362, § 1.

Annotations

Law reviews. For article discussing Uniform Commercial Code provisions establishing a security interest in fixtures as a means of protecting sellers, see 16 Mercer L. Rev. 404 (1965). For comment on United States v. Crittenden, 563, F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1977), see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 692 (1977). For article, “The Revisions to Article IX of the Uniform Commercial Code,” see 15 Ga. St. B.J. 120 (1977). For article discussing the Uniform Commercial Code provisions regarding the sufficiency of “The Description of Collateral

in Security Agreements and Financing Statements,” see 28 Mercer L. Rev. 611 (1977). For article, “Fixture Financing Under Georgia’s New Article 9,” see 16 Ga. St. B.J. 110 (1980). For article, “H.B. 712: New Requirements for Financing Statements and Continuation Statements Filed in Georgia,” see 22 Ga. St. B.J. 6 (1985). For article, “H.B. 1364: Revised Requirements for Financing Statements and Continuation Statements Filed in Georgia,” see 23 Ga. St. B.J. 50 (1986). For annual survey of law of real property, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 319 (1986). For annual survey article on commercial law, see 50 Mercer L. Rev. 193 (1998).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Article 9 are included in the annotations for this Code section. For a table of comparable provisions, see the table at the beginning of the Article. Construction with O.C.G.A. § 10-136. - Trial court properly granted judgment to a debtor, finding that a repossessor failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 10-1-36, and therefore was precluded from collecting a deficiency from the

debtor following the sale of the debtor’s vehicle, as the repossessor waived strict compliance with § 10-1-36 by admitting that it received a facsimile notice sent by the debtor, and raised no issue as to the timeliness of the notice or whether it was received by the proper person, and failed to send the required notice thereunder to the debtor’s address shown on the contract or later designated by the debtor, opting instead to send said notice to a post office box. Consumer Portfolio Servs. v.

Rouse, 282 Ga. App. 314, 638 S.E.2d 442, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1377 (2006). Applicability to financing statements, not security agreements. - Requirement that identification of collateral indicate type of collateral is applicable to financing statements, not security agreements. Personal Thrift Plan of Perry, Inc. v. Georgia Power Co., 242 Ga. 388, 249 S.E.2d 72, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1223 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-9-302). “Type” of collateral construed. - This section allows a secured party to file a financing statement which describes the property only by its “type.” A type of collateral is, for example, goods, accounts, chattel paper, general intangibles, etc. Woodrum v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 940 F.2d 1507, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 20890 (11th Cir. 1991) (decided under former Code Section 11-9-402). Serial number alone does not “indi-

cate the type” of collateral. Personal Thrift Plan of Perry, Inc. v. Georgia Power Co., 242 Ga. 388, 249 S.E.2d 72, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1223 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-9-302). Notice not required to lessee of vehicle. - Lessor was not required to comply with the notice provisions of O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-36 and 11-9-504 because the motor vehicle lease agreement the lessor entered into with the lessee was intended to be a true lease and not to evince a secured transaction; the lessor retained a meaningful reversionary interest in the car because the option price was more than nominal since the purchase option price was approximately one-third of the car’s value, and the agreement contained no provision purporting to grant the lessee equity in the vehicle prior to exercise of the purchase option. Aniebue v. Jaguar Credit Corp., 308 Ga. App. 1, 708 S.E.2d 4, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 103 (2011).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions decided under former Code Section 11-9402 are included in the annotations for this Code section. For a table of comparable provisions, see the table at the beginning of the Article.

Duty of superior court clerks. - Clerks of superior court are not required to determine that property subject to a U.C.C. financing statement is properly described before recording the statement. 1982 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U82-38. (decided under former Code Section 11-9-402).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 68A Am. Jur. 2d, Secured Transactions, §§ 32, 192 et seq., 310, 311, 329 et seq., 352-354, 365, 395. C.J.S. 76 C.J.S., Records, § 4. U.L.A. Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 9504. ALR. What amounts to a conditional sale, 17 A.L.R. 1421; 43 A.L.R. 1247; 92 A.L.R. 304; 175 A.L.R. 1366. Violation of statute as to form of, or terms to be included in, conditional sale contract, as invalidating entire transaction or merely its effect to reserve title in vendor, 144 A.L.R. 1103. Priority as between federal tax lien and

mortgage to secure future advances or expenditures by mortgagee, 90 A.L.R.2d 1179. Sufficiency of description of crops under UCC §§ 9-203(1)(b) and 9-402(1), 67 A.L.R.3d 308; 100 A.L.R.3d 10; 100 A.L.R.3d 940. Sufficiency of designation of debtor or secured party in security agreement or financing statement under UCC § 9-402, 99 A.L.R.3d 478. Sufficiency of address of debtor in financing statement required by UCC § 9402(1), 99 A.L.R.3d 807. Sufficiency of address of secured party in financing statement required under UCC § 9-402(1), 99 A.L.R.3d 1080. Effectiveness of original financing statement under UCC Article 9 after change in

debtor’s name, identity, or business structure, 99 A.L.R.3d 1194. Sufficiency of secured party’s signature on financing statement or security agreement under UCC § 9-402, 100 A.L.R.3d 390.

Sufficiency of debtor’s signature on security agreement or financing statement under UCC §§ 9-203 and 9-402, 3 A.L.R.4th 502.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 100 cases, 1983–2019 · leading case: Reeves v. Habersham Bank, 331 S.E.2d 589 (Ga. 1985).
Reeves v. Habersham Bank, 331 S.E.2d 589 (Ga. 1985). · cites it 35× “” OCGA § 11-9-504 (1). However, in order for a secured party to recover any deficiency between the sale price of the collateral and the debt owed, the secured party must have strictly complied with the requirements of OCGA § 11-9-504 (3), which, stated briefly, are that the…”
Branan v. Equico Lessors, Inc., 342 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1986). · cites it 31× “The “Uniform Commercial Code — Secured Transactions” is found at Chapter 9 of OCGA Title 11.”
Emmons v. Burkett, 353 S.E.2d 908 (Ga. 1987). · cites it 21× “We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court • of Appeals correctly concluded that the appellee creditor, who had sold a small portion of the debtor’s collateral without the notice required by OCGA § 11-9-504 (3), was not barred from obtaining an in personam…”
United States Ex Rel. Farmers Home Admin. v. Kennedy, 348 S.E.2d 636 (Ga. 1986). · cites it 26× “The bankruptcy court ruled that FmHA could not recover any deficiency on Daniel’s notes and voided the Kennedys’ second security deed because FmHA did not give notice to Daniel and the Kennedys of the sale of Daniel’s personalty as required by OCGA § 11-9-504 (3). The district…”
Hassell v. First Nat. Bank of Newton Cty, 461 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 12× “ote as a guarantor for no consideration; (2) there was a novation pursuant to OCGA § 10-7-21 which discharged his liability under the note; (3) the Bank took actions that increased his risk and discharged or released his obligation on the note pursuant to OCGA § 10-7-22; and (4)…”
Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Design Eng'g & Constr. Int'l Inc., 335 S.E.2d 625 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 20× “Held : OCGA § 11-9-504 (3) provides that "the disposition [of repossessed collateral] including the method, manner, time, place, and terms must be commercially reasonable.”
Davis v. Concord Com. Corp., 434 S.E.2d 571 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 8× “Pursuant to OCGA § 11-9-504, a secured party after default may sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral.”
Metter Banking Co. v. Millen Lumber & Supply Co., 382 S.E.2d 624 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 6× “See OCGA § 11-9-504 (2); Granite Equip. Leasing Corp.”
Fid. Nat'l Bank v. Winslow (In Re Winslow), 39 B.R. 869 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984). · cites it 5× “OCGA § 11-9-504(3). The debtor filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff was not entitled to collect any deficiency resulting from the sale.”
Mejia v. Citizens & S. Bank, 332 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 4× “The sole issue for resolution on appeal is whether the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, in particular OCGA § 11-9-504 (3) which requires notice to a defaulting buyer of his right to demand a public sale of the vehicle, are applicable to this “motor vehicle lease”…”
Woods v. Gen. Elec. Credit Auto Lease, Inc., 369 S.E.2d 334 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 6× “Specifically, appellant assumes that appellee was a “secured party” and holder of a “security interest” in the automobile, and that therefore the notice and commercial reasonableness requirements of OCGA § 11-9-504 apply to this case. The appellee asserts that OCGA § 11-9-504 is…”
Calcote v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 345 S.E.2d 616 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 10× “OCGA § 11-9-504 (3) provides, in pertinent part, that “reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor.”
— 11-9-504(1) — 2 cases
Cong. Fin. Corp. v. Com. Tech., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 637 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
— 11-9-504(3) — 15 cases
Fid. Nat'l Bank v. Winslow (In Re Winslow), 39 B.R. 869 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984). “OCGA § 11-9-504(3). The debtor filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff was not entitled to collect any deficiency resulting from the sale.”
Bennett v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 315 S.E.2d 431 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
Lamar v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of Am., Inc. (In Re Lamar), 249 B.R. 822 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000).
Almand v. Reynolds & Robin, P.C., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (M.D. Ga. 2007).
Cong. Fin. Corp. v. Com. Tech., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 637 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
— 11-9-504(a)(l) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.