O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 11-9-505 (2019)

Filing and compliance with other statutes and treaties for consignments, leases, other bailments, and other transactions

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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(a) Use of terms other than “debtor” and “secured party.” A consignor, lessor, or other bailor of goods, a licensor, or a buyer of a payment intangible or promissory note may file a financing statement, or may comply with a statute or treaty described in subsection (a) of Code Section 11-9-311, using the terms “consignor,” “consignee,” “lessor,” “lessee,” “bailor,” “bailee,” “licensor,” “licensee,” “owner,” “registered owner,” “buyer,” “seller,” or words of similar import, instead of the terms “secured party” and “debtor”. (b) Effect of financing statement under subsection (a) of this Code section. This part applies to the filing of a financing statement under subsection (a) of this Code section and, as appropriate, to compliance that is equivalent to filing a financing statement under subsection (b) of Code Section 11-9-311, but the filing or compliance is not of itself a factor in determining whether the collateral secures an obligation. If it is determined for another reason that the collateral secures an obligation, a security interest held by the consignor, lessor, bailor, licensor, owner, or buyer which attaches to the collateral is perfected by the filing or compliance.

History

Code 1981, § 11-9-505, enacted by Ga. L. 2001, p. 362, § 1.

Annotations

RESEARCH REFERENCES U.L.A. Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 9505.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 12 cases, 1983–2001 · leading case: Chen v. Profit Sharing Plan of Bohne, 456 S.E.2d 237 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).

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Chen v. Profit Sharing Plan of Bohne, 456 S.E.2d 237 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 12× “” In an order granting summary judgment in favor of the Profit Sharing Plan, the trial court found (in pertinent part) that the Profit Sharing Plan did not wrongfully convert the Blankenship note and security deed and that the demand letter purportedly transmitted to Chen on…”

Hansford v. Burns, 526 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 18× “The trial court concluded that Bums’ foreclosure on the busi *410 nesses was authorized by OCGA § 11-9-505. Under the procedure of strict foreclosure, a creditor in possession may retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt.”

McClintock v. Wellington Trade, Inc., 371 S.E.2d 893 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 4× “Furthermore, OCGA § 11-9-505 (2) allows a debtor to renounce or modify his rights by signing a statement after default.”

Kim v. McCullom, 474 S.E.2d 654 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 4× “When this conditional tender was rejected by McCullom, Kim filed a motion for modification of judgment or, in the alternative, for entry of satisfaction of judgment seeking to enforce her right of redemption pursuant to OCGA § 11-9-506 or to have the judgment *440 declared…”

Barney v. Morris, 309 S.E.2d 420 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 3× “OCGA § 11-9-504 (1) (Code Ann. § 109A-9 — 504). Where the secured party is in possession of the collateral after default, it may propose to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation.”

SGE Mortg. Funding Corp. v. Accent Mortg. Servs., Inc. (In Re SGE Mortg. Funding Corp.), 278 B.R. 653 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2001). · cites it 4× “The central issue in Chen was whether Plan’s letter to Chen was adequate notice under O.C.G.A. § 11-9-505(2). The trial court found that the notice did satisfy the requirements of § 11-9-505(2).”

Malley Motors, Inc. v. Davis, 359 S.E.2d 394 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 11-9-505 (1). Plaintiffs could not have both.”

Edward McGill, Inc. v. Wise, 352 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 8× “However, the trial court did rule either sua sponte or on the basis of an undisclosed motion by Wise that proper objection to McGill’s retention of the collateral had been made as a matter of law pursuant to OCGA § 11-9-505 (2). Therefore, the trial court ordered the sale of the…”

Willis v. Healthdyne, Inc., 382 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 2× “Appellant, however, argues that the mere cancellation of the certificate does not constitute a sale or other disposition of the stock under OCGA § 11-9-504 and that OCGA § 11-9-505 (2) provides for the only situation in which collateral can be retained by a secured party in…”

Ricker v. First Fed. of Lacrosse-Madison, 452 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “As recognized in McCullough , under OCGA § 11-9-505 (2) a creditor may propose to keep seized collateral in satisfaction of the debt so long as he gives required notice and no one objects, but this is a permissive and not mandatory remedy.”

Flateau v. Reinhardt, Whitley & Wilmot, 469 S.E.2d 222 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “The secured party’s exercise of this option after obtaining possession of the secured property would obviate the necessity for filing a foreclosure petition, although the defendant named in the writ could still make an appearance and file any legal or equitable defense or…”

Oraka v. Jaraysi, 486 S.E.2d 69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 22× “Under the UCC financing statement, appellee gave notice on December 21, 1994, to appellants that he was, under OCGA § 11-9-503, repossessing all equipment and business assets; appellee stated that he would only give credit as a set-off for the deficiency of the purchase assigned…”

— 11-9-505(2) — 2 cases

SGE Mortg. Funding Corp. v. Accent Mortg. Servs., Inc. (In Re SGE Mortg. Funding Corp.), 278 B.R. 653 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2001). “The central issue in Chen was whether Plan’s letter to Chen was adequate notice under O.C.G.A. § 11-9-505(2). The trial court found that the notice did satisfy the requirements of § 11-9-505(2).”

Kim v. McCullom, 474 S.E.2d 654 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). “When this conditional tender was rejected by McCullom, Kim filed a motion for modification of judgment or, in the alternative, for entry of satisfaction of judgment seeking to enforce her right of redemption pursuant to OCGA § 11-9-506 or to have the judgment *440 declared…”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.