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Call Now: 904-383-7448and that one or more of the circumstances described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (c) of this Code section are applicable.
(Code 1981, §12-8-96.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 2234, § 5; Ga. L. 1993, p. 500, § 7; Ga. L. 2002, p. 927, § 5.)
- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1992, "paragraph" was substituted for "paragraphs" in the undesignated language following subparagraph (d)(1)(C).
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1994, "constituents" was substituted for "constitutents" near the middle of the introductory language in paragraph (d)(1).
- For annual survey of zoning and land use law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 447 (2005). For note on the 2002 amendment of this Code section, see 19 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 59 (2002).
Strict construction of O.C.G.A. § 12-8-96.1(a) does not permit the Director of the Georgia Environmental Protection Division to negotiate consent corrective action orders with corporate officers and ignore the statutorily-mandated due process requirements for subjecting those officers to personal liability for the discharge of hazardous waste. Reheis v. Baxley Creosoting & Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 268 Ga. App. 256, 601 S.E.2d 781 (2004).
- "Corrective action" referenced in O.C.G.A. § 12-8-96.1(e) does not contemplate environmental cleanup efforts undertaken independently by a party without the involvement of the Director of the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (EPD). Rather, when read in conjunction with O.C.G.A. §§ 12-8-96(a) and12-8-96.1(a), it is clear that "corrective action" taken by a person refers to action taken pursuant to an administrative consent order entered with the EPD Director, or action taken pursuant to an administrative order issued by the EPD Director directing that the necessary action be taken. Walker County v. Tri-State Crematory, 292 Ga. App. 411, 664 S.E.2d 788 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 947 (Ga. 2008).
As there was no evidence that a consent or remediation order had been issued, a facility owner could not show a required "corrective action" for purposes of seeking contribution pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 12-8-96.1(e) for an alleged chemical contamination. Barrett Props., LLC v. Roberts Capitol, Inc., 316 Ga. App. 507, 729 S.E.2d 621 (2012).
- County could not seek contribution from owners and operators of a crematorium and from funeral homes that sent bodies there for the costs associated with the county's voluntary cleanup of crematorium property. The cleanup was done without the involvement of the Director of the Environmental Protection Division, and the statute did not contemplate independent activities conducted without the Director's involvement. Walker County v. Tri-State Crematory, 292 Ga. App. 411, 664 S.E.2d 788 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 947 (Ga. 2008).
- In a soil contamination contribution action in which a buyer, in developing the property, disturbed and moved cinders containing arsenic and lead left by the seller and the seller's predecessors, the trial court erred in interpreting the parties' assumption agreement to require the seller to indemnify the buyer; apportionment of fault was required. Viad Corp v. United States Steel Corp., 343 Ga. App. 609, 808 S.E.2d 58 (2017).
- Statute requires that in addition to establishing the lack of a contractual relationship in connection with the release of a hazardous waste, the party asserting the third party defense under subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 12-8-96.1 must also establish the lack of any other relationship between oneself and the third party. Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (M.D. Ga. 1998).
- Defendants sued under O.C.G.A. § 12-8-96.1(a) of the Georgia Hazardous Site Response Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-8-90 et seq., had no right to a jury trial on the issue of whether the actual clean-up costs of the defendants' site were reasonable, but the defendants were entitled to a jury trial on the issue of punitive damages. Reheis v. Baxley Creosoting & Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 268 Ga. App. 256, 601 S.E.2d 781 (2004).
Cited in McElmurray v. Augusta-Richmond County, 274 Ga. App. 605, 618 S.E.2d 59 (2005).
- Secured lender liability: application of security interest exemption from definition of "owner or operator" under § 101(20)(A) of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (42 USCS § 9601(20)(A)), 131 A.L.R. Fed. 293.
Construction and application of §§ 2Q1.2 and 2Q1.3 of United States Sentencing Guidelines (18 USCS Appx 2Q1.2 and 2Q1.3), pertaining to offenses involving hazardous or toxic substances, or other environmental pollutants, 138 A.L.R. Fed 507.
Equitable considerations in allocating response costs to owner or occupant of previously contaminated facility in action pursuant to § 113(f) of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 USCA § 9613(f)), 148 A.L.R. Fed. 203.
Amount and characteristics of wastes as equitable factors in allocation of response costs pursuant to § 113(f)(1) of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 USCA § 9613(f)(1): multiple waste streams, 162 A.L.R. Fed. 371.
No results found for Georgia Code 12-8-96.1.