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(Code 1981, §12-8-96, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 2234, § 5; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1050, § 1.)
- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1997, "lien" was substituted for "liens" in the eighth sentence of subsection (e).
- "Corrective action" referenced in O.C.G.A. § 12-8-96.1(e) does not contemplate environmental cleanup efforts undertaken independently by a party without the involvement of the Director of the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (EPD). Rather, when read in conjunction with O.C.G.A. §§ 12-8-96(a) and12-8-96.1(a), it is clear that "corrective action" taken by a person refers to action taken pursuant to an administrative consent order entered with the EPD Director, or action taken pursuant to an administrative order issued by the EPD Director directing that the necessary action be taken. Walker County v. Tri-State Crematory, 292 Ga. App. 411, 664 S.E.2d 788 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 947 (Ga. 2008).
- Polluting facility's president who negotiated a consent order for the facility did not have "actual notice" that the president could be personally liable for remediation costs under O.C.G.A. §§ 12-8-96(a) and12-8-96.1(a) of Georgia's Hazardous Site Response Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-8-90 et seq., and, therefore, was not liable for such costs. Reheis v. Baxley Creosoting & Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 268 Ga. App. 256, 601 S.E.2d 781 (2004).
Order issued by the Director of the Environmental Protection Division providing each person the opportunity to perform corrective action is a prerequisite to the imposition of individual liability under the Hazardous Site Response Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-8-90 et seq. Reheis v. Baxley Creosoting & Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 268 Ga. App. 256, 601 S.E.2d 781 (2004).
- Homeowners lacked standing to appeal consent orders entered by the Director of the Environmental Protection Division of the Department of Natural Resources until the Director sought to enforce the orders, but the homeowners were authorized to sue those directly responsible for polluting the homeowners' property, irrespective of the homeowners' right of access to the courts; hence, the underlying intent of O.C.G.A. § 12-2-2(c)(3)(B) was to preclude such attacks on the Director's exercise of the administrative authority to determine the scope of remedial measures set forth in consent orders issued under the Hazardous Site Response Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-8-90 et seq. Couch v. Parker, 280 Ga. 580, 630 S.E.2d 364 (2006).
Cited in McElmurray v. Augusta-Richmond County, 274 Ga. App. 605, 618 S.E.2d 59 (2005).
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2006-04-25
Citation: 630 S.E.2d 364, 280 Ga. 580
Snippet: proposed administrative consent orders. See OCGA § 12-8-96(a). The Director's proposed orders addressed, in