O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 13-11-8 (2019)

Attorneys’ fees

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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In any action to enforce a claim under this chapter, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of its attorney including but not limited to trial and appeal and arbitration, in an amount to be determined by the court or the arbitrators, as the case may be.

History

(Code 1981, § 13-11-8, enacted by Ga. L. 1994, p. 1398, § 1.)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For annual survey of construction law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 109 (2004). JUDICIAL DECISIONS Evidence supported award. - An award of attorney fees entered against a home builder, pursuant to both O.C.G.A. §§ 13-6-11 and 13-11-8, was upheld on appeal because an award pursuant to the latter statute did not require a finding of bad faith, and evidence of the home builder’s stubborn litigiousness and the unnecessary trouble and expense the home builder caused the two contractors supported an award under the former statute. Hampshire Homes, Inc. v. Espinosa Constr. Servs., 288 Ga. App. 718, 655 S.E.2d 316 (2007). Award of attorney’s fees properly denied since contract related to single residence. - Trial court properly denied attorney fees to a contractor in a breach of contract suit brought under the Georgia Prompt Pay Act, O.C.G.A. § 13-11-1 et seq., against a homeowner for the failure of the homeowner to pay for the installation of a wrought iron fence as O.C.G.A. § 13-11-10 specifically provided that the Act did not apply to contracts involving single family

residences and no evidence to support a bad faith litigation award was made. Since § 13-11-10 specifically provided that the Act did not apply, there was no other statutory basis under the Act to support the contractor’s claim for attorney fees. Pipe Solutions, Inc. v. Inglis, 291 Ga. App. 328, 661 S.E.2d 683 (2008). Award of attorney’s fees properly denied in a maritime contract case. - American rule barring the shifting of attorneys’ fees was a feature of maritime law and O.C.G.A. § 13-11-8 of the Georgia Prompt Payment Act (GPPA), O.C.G.A. § 13-11-1 et seq., was in direct conflict with that principle; thus, defendant subcontractor, a prevailing party in a suit involving a maritime contract (a dredging contract), was not entitled to fees. Further, a clearly established exception existed wherein the subcontractor was free to contract for the indemnification of attorneys’ fees but chose not to include such a provision in the contract. Misener Marine Constr., Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 594 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 2010).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 2004–2023 · leading case: Misener Marine Constr., Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 594 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 2010).
Misener Marine Constr., Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 594 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 2010). · cites it 2× “O.C.G.A. § 13-11-8 ("In any action to enforce a claim under this chapter, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of its attorney including but not limited to trial and appeal and arbitration, in an amount to be determined by the court or…”
Pioneer Constr., Inc. v. May (In re May), 518 B.R. 99 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2014). · cites it 6× “Second, the Plaintiff may have been entitled to its attorneys’ fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-11-8 of Georgia’s Prompt Pay Act: In any action to enforce a claim under the Georgia Prompt Pay Act, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of its…”
Yates Paving & Grading Co. v. Bryan Cnty., 594 S.E.2d 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 4× “[a]n award of attorney fees on appeal serves [the] same purpose as [an] award of attorneys’ fees for [the] confirmation stage, that is, encouraging early payment of valid arbitration awards and discouragement of nonmeritorious protracted confirmation challenges.”
Hampshire Homes, Inc. v. Espinosa Constr. Servs., Inc., 655 S.E.2d 316 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2× “Not only does Hampshire Homes ignore that the court also awarded attorney fees under OCGA § 13-11-8 (which does not require any such finding), but Hampshire Homes also waived this argument when it failed to make a post-judgment motion challenging the sufficiency of the trial…”
Steve Bishop v. Michael W. Goins, 809 S.E.2d 280 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “2d 756 (2004) (Appellate attorney fees may be recovered under the Georgia Prompt Pay Act, pursuant to OCGA § 13-11-8, which provides in pertinent part, "[i]n any action to enforce a claim under [the Act], the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the…”
Pipe Solutions, Inc. v. Inglis, 661 S.E.2d 683 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “” 13 OCGA § 13-11-8 authorizes the recovery of reasonable attorney fees in connection with an action to enforce a claim under the Act.”
W. Sur. Co. v. Dep't of Transp., 757 S.E.2d 272 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 13-11-8 provides: “In any action to enforce a claim under this chapter, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of its attorney including hut not limited to trial and appeal and arbitration, in an amount to be determined by the court…”
Elec. Works CMA, Inc. v. Baldwin Technical Fabrics, LLC, 703 S.E.2d 124 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 4× “8 OCGA § 13-11-8 provides that [i]n any action to enforce a claim under this chapter, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of its attorney including but not limited to trial and appeal and arbitration, in an amount to be determined by the…”
Qc Constr. LLC v. Cypress Contracting & Dev. Corp (M.D. Ga. 2023). · cites it 7× “48 for services performed on the construction site in Warner Robins.”
Fatt Katt Enter., Inc. v. Rigsby Constr., Inc. (11th Cir. 2019). · cites it 2× “Rigsby sought and obtained attorney’s fees as the “prevailing party” in the action under O.C.G.A. § 13-11-8. Fatt Katt now appeals the directed verdict and award of attorney’s fees.”
W. Sur. Co. v. the State of Georgia Dep't of Transp. (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “35 OCGA § 13-11-8 provides that “[i]n any action to enforce a claim under this chapter, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of its attorney including but not limited to trial and appeal and arbitration, in an amount to be determined by…”
Triangle Grading & Paving, Inc. v. Rhino Servs., LLC (M.D.N.C. 2023). “) According to Rhino, it has fully performed all conditions precedent and all of its obligations under the Subcontract, Triangle has received payment from GDOT for the GDOT Project, and thus Triangle breached the Subcontract when it failed to pay Rhino all amounts due under the…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.