Minor's privilege is personal.

- Minor's exemption under O.C.G.A. § 13-5-3 from contractual liability is a personal privilege which others may not assert as a defense; binding settlement agreement was reached between an insurer and a minor injured party even though: (1) a contract of a minor is voidable under O.C.G.A. § 13-3-20(a); (2) judicial approval pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 29-2-16(e) postdated the settlement agreement; and (3) no guardian had been appointed for the minor at the time the agreement was reached. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Kay, 264 Ga. App. 139, 589 S.E.2d 711 (2003).

False and fraudulent representations as to age may estop infant from asserting infancy defense.

- False and fraudulent representations by infant touching the infant's apparent majority will estop the infant from setting up the infant's disability, where other party to contract has acted in good faith to the infant's injury and without fault or negligence on the infant's part; and further appears that contract is fair and reasonable, and infant has received, enjoyed, and consumed its irrestorable benefits. Hood v. Duren, 33 Ga. App. 203, 125 S.E. 787 (1924).

Bona fide holder of instrument before due and without notice not protected from infancy defense.

- Plea of infancy goes to capacity to contract, and bona fide holder before due and without notice is not protected therefrom. Howard v. Simpkins, 70 Ga. 322 (1883).

Repossession of collateral does not void contract of minor.

- Repossession of collateral does not void contract as to surety, and result is not changed when maker is a minor. Murphy v. Bank of Dahlonega, 151 Ga. App. 264, 259 S.E.2d 670 (1979).

Section does not affect proper method of suing and serving infants.

- Exemption of infant generally from liability on the infant's contract is a personal privilege, but this does not affect proper method of suing and serving an infant. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lanham, 124 Ga. 859, 53 S.E. 395 (1906); Miller v. Luckey, 132 Ga. 581, 64 S.E. 658 (1909).

Cited in Elder v. Woodruff Hdwe. & Mfg. Co., 9 Ga. App. 484, 71 S.E. 806 (1911); Levy v. McPhail, 33 Ga. App. 784, 127 S.E. 793 (1925); McIntyre v. Ragan, 179 Ga. 360, 175 S.E. 795 (1934); Holland v. Peerless Furn. Co., 60 Ga. App. 149, 3 S.E.2d 138 (1939); Tharpe v. Cudahy Packing Co., 60 Ga. App. 449, 4 S.E.2d 49 (1939); Holliday v. Pope, 205 Ga. 301, 53 S.E.2d 350 (1949); Rozenberg v. Sund, 81 Ga. App. 856, 60 S.E.2d 390 (1950); Beckworth v. Beckworth, 255 Ga. 241, 336 S.E.2d 782 (1985).

C.J.S.

- 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 98.

ALR.

- Right of infant to enjoin other party to contract from asserting its validity, 15 A.L.R. 1215.

Stipulations in pass as binding on infant, 41 A.L.R. 1099.

Return of property purchased by infant as condition of recovery of purchase price, 124 A.L.R. 1368.

Failure to disaffirm as ratification of infant's executory contract, 5 A.L.R.2d 7.

Right of infant to disaffirm his sale of personalty and recover it from third person purchasing without notice of infancy, 16 A.L.R.2d 1420.

Right of infant who repudiates contract for services to recover thereon or in quantum meruit, 35 A.L.R.2d 1302.

Agreement to arbitrate future controversies as binding on infant, 78 A.L.R.2d 1292.

Contract, provision thereof, or stipulation waiving wife's right to counsel fees in event of divorce or separation action, 3 A.L.R.3d 716.

Enforceability of covenant not to compete in infant's employment contract, 17 A.L.R.3d 863.

Infant's misrepresentation as to his age as estopping him from disaffirming his voidable transaction, 29 A.L.R.3d 1270.

Automobile or motorcycle as necessary for infant, 56 A.L.R.3d 1335.