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Call Now: 904-383-7448A deed, security deed, bill of sale to secure debt, or any other conveyance of property or interest in property to or by a minor is voidable unless such minor has become emancipated by operation of law or pursuant to Article 10 of Chapter 11 of Title 15. If a minor has conveyed property or an interest in property, the minor may void the conveyance upon arrival at the age of 18; and, if the minor makes another conveyance at that time, it will void the first conveyance without reentry or repossession. If property or an interest in property has been conveyed to a minor and, after arrival at the age of 18, the minor retains the possession or benefit of the property or interest in property, the minor shall have thereby ratified or affirmed the conveyance.
(Orig. Code 1863, § 2653; Code 1868, § 2652; Code 1873, § 2694; Code 1882, § 2694; Civil Code 1895, § 3604; Civil Code 1910, § 4184; Code 1933, § 29-106; Ga. L. 1966, p. 291, § 2; Ga. L. 1969, p. 640, § 2; Ga. L. 1972, p. 193, § 3; Ga. L. 2006, p. 141, § 7/HB 847; Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 4-49/HB 242.)
The 2013 amendment, effective January 1, 2014, substituted "Article 10" for "Article 6" near the end of the first sentence. See Editor's notes for applicability.
- Capacity of minors to enter into contracts, § 13-3-20 et seq.
- Georgia Laws 1972, p. 193, § 10, effective July 1, 1972, provided that the purpose of the Act was to reduce the age of legal majority from 21 years of age to 18 years of age so that all persons, upon reaching the age of 18, would have the rights, privileges, powers, duties, responsibilities, and liabilities previously applicable to persons 21 years of age or over. The section further provided that the Act was not to be construed to have the effect of changing the age from 21 to 18 with respect to any legal instrument or court decree in existence prior to the effective date of the Act when the instrument referred only to "the age of majority" or words of similar import, except that any guardianship of the person or property of a minor under the provisions of Code 1933, T. 49, whether such guardianship was created by court order or decree entered before or after the effective date of the Act or under the will of a testator which was executed after the effective date of the Act, would terminate when the ward for whom such guardianship was created reached 18 years of age.
Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 5-1/HB 242, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective on January 1, 2014, and shall apply to all offenses which occur and juvenile proceedings commenced on and after such date. Any offense occurring before January 1, 2014, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior adjudication for the purpose of imposing a disposition that provides for a different penalty for subsequent adjudications, of whatever class, pursuant to this Act. The enactment of this Act shall not affect any prosecutions for acts occurring before January 1, 2014, and shall not act as an abatement of any such prosecutions."
- For article recommending more consistency in age requirements of laws pertaining to the welfare of minors, see 6 Ga. St. B.J. 189 (1969). For article on 2006 amendment of this Code section, see 23 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 79 (2006). For comment on Ware v. Mobley, 190 Ga. 249, 9 S.E.2d 67 (1940), see 3 Ga. B.J. 65 (1940).
- Prior law was unaffected by fact that 1933 codifiers used word "voidable" instead of "void." Ware v. Mobley, 190 Ga. 249, 9 S.E.2d 67 (1940) commented on in 3 Ga. B.J. 65 (1940).
- Former Code 1933, § 20-201 (see O.C.G.A. § 13-3-20), which declared that generally the contract of an infant was voidable, and former Code 1933, § 29-106 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-41), which contained the declaration that the deed of an infant was voidable at the infant's pleasure on majority, should be construed in pari materia. Ware v. Mobley, 190 Ga. 249, 9 S.E.2d 67 (1940) commented on in 3 Ga. B.J. 65 (1940).
Right of disaffirmance applies to executed as well as to executory contracts. Gonackey v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 6 Ga. App. 381, 65 S.E. 53 (1909).
Deed of an infant is voidable upon infant's disaffirmance during minority or within a reasonable time after attaining majority. Merritt v. Jowers, 184 Ga. 762, 193 S.E. 238 (1937).
- One who, while an infant, executes a deed to real property may in a proper case, upon reaching majority, disapprove the act, not only as against the immediate grantee, but also as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser. Ware v. Mobley, 190 Ga. 249, 9 S.E.2d 67 (1940) commented on in 3 Ga. B.J. 65 (1940).
Infant's duty to disaffirm is not dependent upon other party's doing anything under the deed. Bentley v. Greer, 100 Ga. 35, 27 S.E. 974 (1896).
- Infant may disaffirm the deed within a reasonable time after attaining majority, and if the infant fails to do so, the right of avoidance on the ground of infancy will be lost. What is a "reasonable time" will depend upon the facts of each case, but will not be longer than seven years after the disability is removed. Nathans v. Arkwright, 66 Ga. 179 (1880); McGarrity v. Cook, 154 Ga. 311, 114 S.E. 213 (1922).
- What is a reasonable time within which to disaffirm a deed made during minority after attainment of majority is a question for the jury upon the facts of each particular case, but will not be longer than seven years after the attainment of majority. Merritt v. Jowers, 184 Ga. 762, 193 S.E. 238 (1937).
- No attempted repudiation under deed can be effective unless accompanied by surrender of consideration acquired by the minor thereunder as may still remain in the minor's hands. Merritt v. Jowers, 184 Ga. 762, 193 S.E. 238 (1937).
- Statement by grantor, after reaching majority, that if the promised consideration which the grantor never received was paid the grantor would let the deed stand amounted to ratification, in the absence of proof that the consideration was paid. Ware v. Mobley, 190 Ga. 249, 9 S.E.2d 67 (1940) commented on in 3 Ga. B.J. 65 (1940).
After affirmance, an infant will be estopped from avoiding a deed on the ground of infancy at the date of the deed's execution. McGarrity v. Cook, 154 Ga. 311, 114 S.E. 213 (1922).
- Waivers or estoppels are not ordinarily imputable against infants, but an estoppel by conduct or admission can be imputed to an infant who has reached an age of discretion when fraud can be imputed against the infant. Nichols v. English, 223 Ga. 227, 154 S.E.2d 239 (1967).
Cited in Beckworth v. Beckworth, 255 Ga. 241, 336 S.E.2d 782 (1985); Harris v. Burrell, 159 Bankr. 365 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993).
- 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds, § 162. 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 45 et seq.
- 26A C.J.S., Deeds, § 145 et seq.
- Fraud or undue influence in conveyance from child to parent, 11 A.L.R. 735.
Rights of mortgagee or conditional vendor under a mortgage or conditional sale contract executed by an infant, against the property covered, in the hands of a third person to whom it has been conveyed or transferred by the infant, 69 A.L.R. 1371.
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1985-11-27
Citation: 336 S.E.2d 782, 255 Ga. 241
Snippet: joined the suit as plaintiff and ratified. OCGA § 44-5-41 provides that conveyances of interests in property