When both parties are at fault, but defendant slightly more so, small damage award is proper.

- When evidence authorizes jury to find that both parties are at fault, but defendant slightly more so, so as to give plaintiff a cause of action, a verdict for a small amount of damages is proper and should not be disturbed. Hunt v. Western & A.R.R., 49 Ga. App. 33, 174 S.E. 222 (1934).

Damages for breach of contract of marriage were governed by former Civil Code 1895, §§ 3803, 3905, and 3907 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 13-6-4,51-12-4, and51-1-26). Parker v. Forehand, 99 Ga. 743, 28 S.E. 400 (1896).

Humiliation and wounded feelings are not elements of damage in action for breach of contract. Harris v. Cleghorn, 121 Ga. 314, 48 S.E. 959 (1904).

When the amount awarded is less than that shown by the evidence, it cannot be said to be palpably unreasonable or excessive. Thompson Enters., Inc. v. Coskrey, 168 Ga. App. 181, 308 S.E.2d 399 (1983).

Variance between $118.00 allowed and $130.00 warranted by evidence is insufficient to set verdict aside. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Lovelace, 26 Ga. App. 286, 106 S.E. 6 (1921).

Sufficient evidence to calculate damages and interest.

- Sufficient evidence was adduced to permit calculation of the amount of the damages, and hence the amount of interest, should the jury find in the jury's discretion that an award of interest was appropriate. Wheels & Brakes, Inc. v. Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 167 Ga. App. 532, 307 S.E.2d 13 (1983).

Award held proper.

- As the testimony established a possible range of damages up to $30,000, the $13,750 damages were within the authorized range for purchaser's breach of a contract to purchase house and lot. Separk v. Caswell Bldrs., Inc., 209 Ga. App. 713, 434 S.E.2d 502 (1993).

Jury's verdict for a vehicle lessee against a dealer in the amount of $10,700 was proper because the evidence showed that the lessee was unable to get a tag decal for the vehicle due to problems caused by the dealer's error in listing the information for a different vehicle in the lease; there was testimony on damages from which the jury could have determined such with reasonable certainty, including, inter alia, loss of use of the vehicle, higher payments on the lease, a higher residual value to buy the vehicle at the end of the lease, and ownership of a less expensive vehicle than what the lessee actually paid. Cent. Auto Sales, Inc. v. Poore, 272 Ga. App. 221, 612 S.E.2d 59 (2005).

In a trespassing case, damages awarded under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 did not show undue bias on the part of jurors because an owner did not seek the replacement value of trees that were improperly cut. Bullard v. Bouler, 272 Ga. App. 397, 612 S.E.2d 513 (2005).

Amount of a jury's verdict of $48,612 in favor of a builder in the builder's breach of contract action against homeowners was not against the weight of the evidence because the jury's actual damage award was well within the range of payment to which the builder was contractually entitled and was otherwise authorized by the legal evidence submitted at trial. Harris v. Tutt, 306 Ga. App. 377, 702 S.E.2d 707 (2010).

Award not excessive.

- In an action for breach of a construction contract, since the award was less than the contract price and was not extremely in excess of the actual costs spent to complete the construction project, it was not so excessive as to warrant interference under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-4. Pool Markets S., Inc. v. Coggins, 195 Ga. App. 50, 392 S.E.2d 552 (1990).

Jury's award of $200,000 in damages was upheld because the award was not so excessive as to justify an inference of gross mistake or bias. Green v. Proffitt, 248 Ga. App. 477, 545 S.E.2d 623 (2001).

Appellate court declined to set aside the amount of the verdict for pain and suffering and wrongful death after a juvenile in a child care institution was accidentally electrocuted because $1,000,000 for pain and suffering and $2,000,000 for wrongful death were not excessive as a matter of law. Ga. Dep't of Human Res. v. Johnson, 264 Ga. App. 730, 592 S.E.2d 124 (2003).

Cited in Durden v. Carhart & Bro., 41 Ga. 76 (1870); Southwestern R.R. v. Rowan & McCaury, 43 Ga. 411 (1871); Georgia S.R.R. v. Bigelow, 68 Ga. 219 (1881); Thorpe v. Wray, 68 Ga. 359 (1882); City & Suburban Ry. v. Brauss, 70 Ga. 368 (1883); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Perkerson, 112 Ga. 923, 38 S.E. 365, 53 L.R.A. 210 (1901); Anglin v. City of Columbus, 128 Ga. 469, 57 S.E. 780 (1907); Hayes v. City of Atlanta, 1 Ga. App. 25, 57 S.E. 1087 (1907); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Minor, 2 Ga. App. 804, 59 S.E. 81 (1907); Holland v. Williams, 3 Ga. App. 636, 60 S.E. 331 (1908); Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Bishop, 132 Ga. 71, 63 S.E. 1103 (1909); Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Lyon, 18 Ga. App. 266, 89 S.E. 384 (1916); Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Vaughn, 19 Ga. App. 397, 91 S.E. 516 (1917); Stalvey v. Statenville Ry., 27 Ga. App. 174, 107 S.E. 780 (1921); Cohen v. Phipps, 33 Ga. App. 431, 126 S.E. 881 (1925); Willcox v. State Hwy. Bd., 38 Ga. App. 373, 144 S.E. 214 (1928); State Hwy. Bd. v. Willcox, 168 Ga. 883, 149 S.E. 182 (1929); Southern Ry. v. Tudor, 46 Ga. App. 563, 168 S.E. 98 (1933); Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 48 Ga. App. 185, 172 S.E. 680 (1934); Slaughter v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 48 Ga. App. 327, 172 S.E. 723 (1934); Sinclair v. Kelly, 50 Ga. App. 135, 177 S.E. 348 (1934); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Lovett, 50 Ga. App. 763, 179 S.E. 253 (1935); Evans v. Caldwell, 52 Ga. App. 475, 184 S.E. 440 (1936); Pierson v. M. & M. Bus. Co., 74 Ga. App. 537, 40 S.E.2d 561 (1946); Prudential Timber & Farm Co. v. Collins, 144 Ga. App. 849, 243 S.E.2d 80 (1978); Tab Sales, Inc. v. D & D Distribs., Inc., 153 Ga. App. 779, 266 S.E.2d 558 (1980); Graham Bros. Constr. Co. v. C.W. Matthews Contracting Co., 159 Ga. App. 546, 284 S.E.2d 282 (1981); Tuten v. Beckham, 162 Ga. App. 101, 290 S.E.2d 205 (1982); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 319 S.E.2d 470 (1984); Quigley v. Jones, 174 Ga. App. 787, 332 S.E.2d 7 (1985); Leader Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Smith, 177 Ga. App. 267, 339 S.E.2d 321 (1985); Blue Cross of Georgia/Columbus, Inc. v. Whatley, 180 Ga. App. 93, 348 S.E.2d 459 (1986); Wheat Enters., Inc. v. Redi-Floors, Inc., 231 Ga. App. 853, 501 S.E.2d 30 (1998); Morris v. Savannah Valley Realty, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 762, 505 S.E.2d 259 (1998).

C.J.S.

- 25 C.J.S., Damages, §§ 105 et seq., 108 et seq.

ALR.

- Inadequacy of verdict as ground of complaint by party against whom it is rendered, 31 A.L.R. 1091; 174 A.L.R. 765.

Rate of exchange to be taken into account in assessing damages for breach of contract, 50 A.L.R. 1273; 105 A.L.R. 640.

Value of contractor's own services not rendered because of breach, as deductible item in computing damages for breach of contract, 50 A.L.R. 1397.

Power of court to reduce or increase verdict without giving party affected the option to submit to a new trial, 53 A.L.R. 779; 95 A.L.R. 1163.

Measure of damages for breach of contract for sale or purchase of equipment, supplies of gasoline, etc., used in operation of gasoline filling station, 81 A.L.R. 99.

Rule requiring reduction of future payments to present worth as applicable to determination of damages for breach of contract of employment, 90 A.L.R. 1318.

Burden of proving value of relief from performing contract in suit based on defendant's breach preventing or excusing full performance, 17 A.L.R.2d 968.

Right to recover, in action for breach of contract, expenditures incurred in preparation for performance, 17 A.L.R.2d 1300.

Question, as one of law for court or of fact for jury, whether oral promise was an original one or was a collateral promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, 20 A.L.R.2d 246.