Section does not violate equal protection clause.

- This section, authorizing the jury to consider the "worldly circumstances of the parties" in tort actions where "the entire injury is to the peace, happiness, or feelings of the plaintiff," does not violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Wilson v. McLendon, 225 Ga. 119, 166 S.E.2d 345 (1969).

This section makes no visible and arbitrary classification of rich people on the one hand, and poor people on the other. It applies the same rule to rich and poor by permitting, as to each defendant, the defendant's worldly circumstances to be shown. This is a fair and equitable rule, as to damages assessed for the purpose of deterring gross misconduct, since the assessment of even a small amount of damages would be adequate punishment for a very poor man, whereas, it would require the assessment of a much larger sum to be any punishment for a very wealthy man. Wilson v. McLendon, 225 Ga. 119, 166 S.E.2d 345 (1969).

O.C.G.A. §§ 51-12-5,51-12-5.1, and51-12-6 must be construed together. Mallard v. Jenkins, 186 Ga. App. 167, 366 S.E.2d 775, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 918, 366 S.E.2d 775 (1988).

Former Code 1933, §§ 105-2001, 105-2002, and 105-2003 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 51-12-4,51-12-5, and51-12-6) must be construed in pari materia. Blanchard v. Westview Cem., 133 Ga. App. 262, 211 S.E.2d 135, modified, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1974); Mallard v. Jenkins, 186 Ga. App. 167, 366 S.E.2d 775, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 918, 366 S.E.2d 775 (1988).

In determining the damages allowable when a plaintiff's whole injury was to "peace, happiness, or feelings," former Code 1933, §§ 105-2001, 105-2002, and 105-2003 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 51-12-4,51-12-5, and51-12-6) must be construed together. Westview Cem. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975).

1987 amendment not applied retroactively.

- O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6, as amended by the 1987 Tort Reform Act, applies only to causes of action arising on or after July 1, 1987. Mallard v. Jenkins, 186 Ga. App. 167, 366 S.E.2d 775, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 918, 366 S.E.2d 775 (1988).

Multiple causes of action.

- The trial court did not err in allowing a verdict for punitive damages under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1 to be considered by the jury when an award was made under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6, since a number of distinct tortious acts and causes of action were pled separately, and while the award theoretically could have been based entirely on a claim of injury to the peace and feelings of the plaintiff, it was equally possible that the jury awarded compensatory damages and punitive damages on one of the plaintiff's other claims or on a combination of claims. Alternative Health Care Sys. v. McCown, 237 Ga. App. 355, 514 S.E.2d 691 (1999).

Award against governmental entity not against public policy.

- An award of damages against a governmental entity under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6, which is in part punitive and in part compensatory, does not violate public policy. Ralston v. City of Dahlonega, 236 Ga. App. 386, 512 S.E.2d 300 (1999).

This section prescribes special measure of recovery for cause of action which was disfavored at common law. That measure permits the jury to consider both circumstances relevant to compensation for the extent of the injury and circumstances relevant to deterrence of the wrongdoer. Westview Cem. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975).

Impact rule.

- Georgia follows the so-called "impact rule, " which requires that there must have been actual bodily contact with the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie. The impact which will support a claim for damages for emotional distress must result in a physical injury. Ford v. Whipple, 225 Ga. App. 276, 483 S.E.2d 591 (1997).

Georgia's current impact rule has three elements: (1) a physical impact to the plaintiff; (2) the physical impact causes physical injury to the plaintiff; and (3) the physical injury to the plaintiff causes the plaintiff 's mental suffering or emotional distress and the failure to satisfy all three elements has proven fatal to recovery; while the plaintiff did allege a physical impact from a bruised hand and a damaged fingernail as a result of the impact, the plaintiff did not claim that these physical injuries caused the plaintiff mental suffering or emotional distress; accordingly, the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to the defendants as to the plaintiff's mental distress claim. Wilson v. Allen, 272 Ga. App. 172, 612 S.E.2d 39 (2005).

This section may be invoked only when "the entire injury is to the peace, happiness, or feelings of the plaintiff." Hodges v. Youmans, 129 Ga. App. 481, 200 S.E.2d 157 (1973); Mallard v. Jenkins, 186 Ga. App. 167, 366 S.E.2d 775, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 918, 366 S.E.2d 775 (1988).

"Entire injury" means there is no injury to the "person or purse" in cases contemplated by this section, the tort being of such a nature as to give rise to mental pain and suffering only. Blanchard v. Westview Cem., 133 Ga. App. 262, 211 S.E.2d 135, modified, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1974); Pilkenton v. Eubanks, 139 Ga. App. 673, 229 S.E.2d 146 (1976).

Legal wrongs impute damage.

- Damages for mental pain and anguish are awardable for a violation of a legal right or duty which is an actionable wrong, for a legal wrong imputes damage. Waldrip v. Voyles, 201 Ga. App. 592, 411 S.E.2d 765 (1991).

Recovery for injury to peace, feelings or happiness includes recovery for "wounded feelings;" and the latter is recognized as an alternate form of "punitive damages." Westview Cem. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975).

In proper case, recovery for mental pain and anguish may be grafted upon recovery of actual or nominal damages. Stephens v. Waits, 53 Ga. App. 44, 184 S.E. 781 (1936).

Mental pain and anguish, to be basis of recovery of damages, must be consequences of violation of legal right or duty which is an actionable wrong; there may be damage to a person without legal wrong, but a legal wrong imputes damage. Stephens v. Waits, 53 Ga. App. 44, 184 S.E. 781 (1936).

Damages allowable are, at least in part, "punitive damages." Westview Cem. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975).

Section does not create cause of action.

- The language of this statute does not say or imply that injury to the peace, happiness, or feelings shall always be itself a tort, but rather the reverse. Grand Chapter, O.E.S. v. Wolfe, 172 Ga. 346, 157 S.E. 301 (1931).

In view of the fact that no description or designation is attempted of this class of torts, and in view of the general purposes of the Code, this section obviously does not mean to create new torts, or change the law of damages, but only to declare the preexisting law. Grand Chapter, O.E.S. v. Wolfe, 172 Ga. 346, 157 S.E. 301 (1931).

If no tort is committed, the fact that there are wounded feelings, humiliation, and fright will not give rise to a cause of action. Barry v. Baugh, 111 Ga. App. 813, 143 S.E.2d 489 (1965).

This section does not create a cause of action for injury to peace, feelings, or happiness but prescribes the measure of recovery when such a cause of action exists. Westview Cem. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975); Sanders v. Brown, 178 Ga. App. 447, 343 S.E.2d 722 (1986); Reeves v. Edge, 225 Ga. App. 615, 484 S.E.2d 498 (1997).

Damages for mental pain and suffering are allowable.

- Under Georgia law, pain and suffering includes mental suffering, but mental suffering is not a legal item of damages unless there has been physical suffering as well. Anxiety, shock, and worry are examples of what might be included under mental pain and suffering, and loss of capacity to work, labor, and enjoy life, separately from monetary earnings, may be considered as items causing mental suffering. MacDonald v. United States, 900 F. Supp. 483 (M.D. Ga. 1995).

Vindictive damages permitted only when defendant acts maliciously.

- If a tort is committed through mistake, ignorance, or mere negligence, the damages are limited to the actual injury received, for vindictive or punitive damage are recoverable only when a defendant acts maliciously, willfully, or with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others. Molton v. Commercial Credit Corp., 127 Ga. App. 390, 193 S.E.2d 629 (1972).

In cases contemplated by this section, recovery is allowed only when there is a willful and intentional tort. Blanchard v. Westview Cem., 133 Ga. App. 262, 211 S.E.2d 135, modified, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1974); Pilkenton v. Eubanks, 139 Ga. App. 673, 229 S.E.2d 146 (1976).

Damages to purse or person.

- When damage is caused by acts which are wanton, willful, and voluntary, and the injury is not actual, so far as it affects purse or person, but the only natural effect is mental suffering and wounded feelings, a recovery may be had. Stephens v. Waits, 53 Ga. App. 44, 184 S.E. 781 (1936).

While for mere negligence one cannot recover damages for mental pain and anguish unless there has been damage to person or purse, for a wanton and willful tort or for a reckless disregard of the rights of others, equivalent to an intentional tort by the defendant, the injured party may recover for the mental pain and anguish suffered therefrom. Pollard v. Phelps, 56 Ga. App. 408, 193 S.E. 102 (1937); Lumley v. Pollard, 61 Ga. App. 681, 7 S.E.2d 308 (1940); Blanchard v. Westview Cem., 133 Ga. App. 262, 211 S.E.2d 135, modified, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975); Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., 184 Ga. App. 404, 361 S.E.2d 505, cert. denied, 184 Ga. App. 910, 361 S.E.2d 505 (1987).

Recovery for wounded feelings.

- If a tort is willfully committed, then under this section damages may be recovered for wounded feelings alone. Barry v. Baugh, 111 Ga. App. 813, 143 S.E.2d 489 (1965).

This section was intended to apply to cases when one party injured another from motive of malice. Greer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 139 Ga. App. 74, 227 S.E.2d 881 (1976).

When no physical injury is present, damages under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 are available only for willful torts. Wheat v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 196 Ga. App. 26, 395 S.E.2d 351 (1990).

Malicious arrest.

- O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 described the appropriate measure of damages for a claim of malicious arrest. Little v. Chesser, 256 Ga. App. 228, 568 S.E.2d 54 (2002).

Malicious conduct not directed at plaintiff.

- Even malicious, wilful, or wanton conduct will not warrant a recovery for the infliction of emotional distress if the conduct was not directed toward the plaintiff. Ryckeley v. Callaway, 261 Ga. 828, 412 S.E.2d 826 (1992).

If mental pain and suffering is not accompanied by physical injury or pecuniary loss, recovery is allowed only if the conduct was malicious, willful, or wanton. Westview Cem. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975); Hall County Mem. Park v. Baker, 145 Ga. App. 296, 243 S.E.2d 689 (1978); Sanders v. Brown, 178 Ga. App. 447, 343 S.E.2d 722 (1986).

Recovery for mental suffering caused by intentional wrong.

- While mental suffering, unaccompanied by injury to purse or person, affords no basis for action predicated upon wrongful acts merely negligent, such damages may be recovered in those cases where the plaintiff has suffered at the hands of the defendant a wanton, voluntary, or intentional wrong the natural result of which is the causation of mental suffering and wounded feelings. Tuggle v. Wilson, 248 Ga. 335, 282 S.E.2d 110 (1981).

If damages for mental pain and suffering sought under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 are not accompanied by physical or pecuniary loss, recovery is allowed only if the conduct complained of was malicious, wilful, or wanton. Brunswick Gas & Fuel Co. v. Parrish, 179 Ga. App. 495, 347 S.E.2d 240 (1986).

When the complaint alleges an established tort - wrongful foreclosure - and seeks damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 for mental distress as a result of its intentional commission, established law in Georgia will allow the award of damages for such a claim. Clark v. West, 196 Ga. App. 456, 395 S.E.2d 884 (1990).

In an abusive litigation claim, the former employee was entitled to forgo special damages and pursue general damages for mental distress for malicious, wilful, or wanton misconduct in the underlying litigation. Coen v. Aptean, Inc., Ga. App. , S.E.2d (June 4, 2018).

When damages are recovered under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6, any additional recovery under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5 would be double recovery. Westview Cem. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975); Alford v. Oliver, 169 Ga. App. 865, 315 S.E.2d 299 (1984).

A plaintiff is not entitled under O.C.G.A. §§ 51-12-5 and51-12-6 to a double finding of damages for wounded feelings, nor can the jury assess damages for the double purpose of punishment and prevention, or damages for humiliation and mortification and also damages to punish and deter the defendant from repeating the trespass or wrong. Baldwin v. Davis, 188 Ga. 587, 4 S.E.2d 458 (1939); Westview Cem. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975).

When general damages sued for include an injury to the peace, feelings, and happiness of the plaintiff, as provided under former Code 1933, § 105-2003 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6), no exemplary damages may be awarded on account of the wounded feelings of the plaintiff under former Code 1933, § 105-2002 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5), but exemplary damages under former Code 1933, § 105-2002, in order to deter the wrongdoer from repeating the trespass, may be recovered. Davis v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 93 Ga. App. 633, 92 S.E.2d 619 (1956).

A plaintiff cannot recover compensatory damages for injury to peace, feelings, and happiness (mental pain and suffering alone arising out of a willful tort) and exemplary damages for "wounded feelings." This would amount to a recovery of double damages which is not allowed. Blanchard v. Westview Cem., 133 Ga. App. 262, 211 S.E.2d 135, modified, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1974).

When the only injury is to the peace, feelings, or happiness, the award of exemplary (punitive) damages in addition to an award of damages for mental anguish amounts to a double recovery and is unauthorized. Greenwood Cem. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 232 S.E.2d 910 (1977).

Damages awarded under both former Code 1933, §§ 105-2002 and 105-2003 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 51-12-5 and51-12-6) constitutes prohibited double recovery. Gibson's Prods., Inc. v. Edwards, 146 Ga. App. 678, 247 S.E.2d 183 (1978).

No damages were allowable under both former Code 1933, §§ 105-2002 and 105-2003 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 51-12-5 and51-12-6), inasmuch as any additional recovery under the former when damages were allowable under former § 105-2003 would be a double recovery, even though the trial court endeavored to carefully leave out the language of former § 105-2002 "as compensation for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff." Simmons v. Edge, 155 Ga. App. 6, 270 S.E.2d 457 (1980).

Although the plaintiff proved mental anguish damages under this Code section, the plaintiff was not entitled to an additional award of $40,000 in punitive damages because of the rule set forth in Westview Cem. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975). Waldrip v. Voyles, 201 Ga. App. 592, 411 S.E.2d 765 (1991).

Failure to object to charge constitutes waiver.

- Failure to object that the trial court erred by charging the jury on damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 51-12-5 and51-12-6 before the jury returned its verdict in an action for wrongful dispossession, trespass, conversion, and theft constituted a waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal, and there was no substantial error which would require review under the exception set forth in O.C.G.A. § 5-5-24(c). Sanders v. Hughes, 183 Ga. App. 601, 359 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 907, 359 S.E.2d 396 (1987).

Under this section, jury is permitted to consider worldly circumstances of parties. Westview Cem. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975).

The jury is not restricted to consideration of circumstances relevant to compensation (i.e., the extent of the injury) but is entitled to consider as well circumstances relevant to deterrence (i.e., any aggravated aspects of the defendant's misconduct plus the defendant's "worldly circumstances"). Westview Cem. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975).

Proper measure of damages, as prescribed by this section, is limited only by enlightened conscience of impartial jurors. Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S.E.2d 802 (1950).

Jury determines award.

- The amount of an award for mental pain and suffering rests ordinarily in the sound and intelligent discretion of the jury. Georgia Power Co. v. Braswell, 48 Ga. App. 654, 173 S.E. 763 (1934).

In an action for wounded feelings, the measure of damages must be determined by the enlightened consciences of impartial jurors. Turner v. Joiner, 77 Ga. App. 603, 48 S.E.2d 907 (1948).

Questions concerning the amount of damages to be awarded for mental pain and suffering are for the enlightened conscience of the jury. Curl v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 243 Ga. 842, 257 S.E.2d 264 (1979).

Award for future pain and suffering.

- Since the plaintiff's pain and suffering will continue in the future, the plaintiff is entitled to damages for the future pain and suffering, the standard for such award being the enlightened conscience of the judge. Since the plaintiff is receiving an award for damages not yet suffered, the judge is to take that into consideration when arriving at an amount. MacDonald v. United States, 900 F. Supp. 483 (M.D. Ga. 1995).

Verdict will not be set aside as excessive by Court of Appeals unless it manifestly appears from record that it was result of prejudice, bias, corruption, or gross mistake. Holtsinger v. Scarborough, 71 Ga. App. 318, 30 S.E.2d 835 (1944).

The appellate court does not have as broad discretionary powers as are conferred on trial judges in setting aside verdicts as excessive; when a case comes before the appellate court, after the refusal of a new trial by the presiding judge, it comes not only with the presumption in favor of the verdict, but also stamped with the approval of the judge who tried the case, and when no prejudice or bias or corrupt means in reaching the verdict appear, such court is not authorized to set it aside as being excessive. Shepherd Constr. Co. v. Vaughn, 88 Ga. App. 285, 76 S.E.2d 647 (1953).

In order to set a verdict aside as excessive the evidence must be shown to be so unreasonable as to show that it was the result of passion, prejudice, partiality, or undue bias on the part of the jury. Calloway v. Rossman, 150 Ga. App. 381, 257 S.E.2d 913 (1979).

Verdict may not be set aside merely because judge might find differently.

- When a jury's verdict as to damages may be larger than some of the individual members of the court would have found had they been on the jury trying the case, the court cannot set it aside for that reason. Western & Atl. R.R. v. Burnett, 79 Ga. App. 530, 54 S.E.2d 357 (1949).

Judge cannot order that verdict be written off.

- The judge has no power to say that a verdict in a case should not exceed a specified sum, and to require the plaintiff to write off a portion of the damages, and thereupon refuse a new trial. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v. Harper, 70 Ga. 119 (1883).

Mere fact that evidence would authorize larger verdict, nothing more appearing, is insufficient to authorize reversal of the judgment of the jury based thereon. Curl v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 243 Ga. 842, 257 S.E.2d 264 (1979).

Cited in Thorpe v. Wray, 68 Ga. 359 (1882); Central R.R. v. Roach, 70 Ga. 434 (1883); Georgia R.R. v. Olds, 77 Ga. 673 (1886); Stovall v. Caverly, 139 Ga. 243, 77 S.E. 29 (1913); Pynetree Paper Co. v. Wood, 23 Ga. App. 604, 99 S.E. 222 (1919); Hotel Equip. Co. v. Liddell, 32 Ga. App. 590, 124 S.E. 92 (1924); Evans v. Caldwell, 52 Ga. App. 475, 184 S.E. 440 (1936); Jackson v. Ely, 56 Ga. App. 763, 194 S.E. 40 (1937); Investment Sec. Corp. v. Cole, 57 Ga. App. 97, 194 S.E. 411 (1937); Morris v. Stanford, 58 Ga. App. 726, 199 S.E. 773 (1938); Atlantic Co. v. Farris, 62 Ga. App. 212, 8 S.E.2d 665 (1940); Barbre v. Scott, 75 Ga. App. 524, 43 S.E.2d 760 (1947); Phillips v. Smith, 76 Ga. App. 705, 47 S.E.2d 156 (1948); Georgia Automatic Gas Co. v. Fowler, 77 Ga. App. 675, 49 S.E.2d 550 (1948); Criswell Baking Co. v. Milligan, 77 Ga. App. 861, 50 S.E.2d 136 (1948); Kelly v. Adams, 84 Ga. App. 450, 66 S.E.2d 144 (1951); Sharpe v. Frost, 94 Ga. App. 444, 95 S.E.2d 309 (1956); Garner v. Mears, 97 Ga. App. 506, 103 S.E.2d 610 (1958); Haggard v. Shaw, 100 Ga. App. 813, 112 S.E.2d 286 (1959); Turpin v. North Am. Acceptance Corp., 119 Ga. App. 212, 166 S.E.2d 588 (1969); S.S. Kresge Co. v. Carty, 120 Ga. App. 170, 169 S.E.2d 735 (1969); Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973); Wilson v. Strange, 235 Ga. 156, 219 S.E.2d 88 (1975); Wright v. Thompson, 236 Ga. 655, 225 S.E.2d 226 (1976); Gaddy v. Gilbert, 140 Ga. App. 508, 231 S.E.2d 403 (1976); Jones v. Spindel, 239 Ga. 68, 235 S.E.2d 486 (1977); Spencer v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Stewart v. Williams, 243 Ga. 580, 255 S.E.2d 699 (1979); Wilkinson v. Davis, 148 Ga. App. 696, 252 S.E.2d 201 (1979); Davis v. Hospital Auth., 154 Ga. App. 654, 269 S.E.2d 867 (1980); Spencer v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 118 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Alewine v. City Council, 505 F. Supp. 880 (S.D. Ga. 1981); Duncan v. Poythress, 515 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Sheppard v. Tribble Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 163 Ga. App. 732, 294 S.E.2d 572 (1982); Hayes v. Irwin, 541 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Northside Motors, Inc. v. O'Berry, 167 Ga. App. 155, 305 S.E.2d 894 (1983); McCall v. Allstate Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 869, 310 S.E.2d 513 (1984); Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 763, 320 S.E.2d 872 (1984); Anderson v. Housing Auth., 171 Ga. App. 841, 321 S.E.2d 378 (1984); Atlantic Zayre, Inc. v. Williams, 172 Ga. App. 43, 322 S.E.2d 83 (1984); Munford, Inc. v. Anglin, 174 Ga. App. 290, 329 S.E.2d 526 (1985); Kesler v. Veal, 182 Ga. App. 444, 356 S.E.2d 254 (1987); Carlin v. Fuller, 196 Ga. App. 54, 395 S.E.2d 247 (1990); Cassidy v. Wilson, 196 Ga. App. 6, 395 S.E.2d 291 (1990); Woodall v. Hayt, Hayt & Landau, 198 Ga. App. 624, 402 S.E.2d 359 (1991); Hudson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 201 Ga. App. 351, 411 S.E.2d 291 (1991); Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Tatum, 208 Ga. App. 111, 430 S.E.2d 18 (1993); H. J. Russell & Co. v. Jones, 250 Ga. App. 28, 550 S.E.2d 450 (2001); Middlebrooks v. Hillcrest Foods Inc., 256 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2001); Barnett Bank v. Hazel, 251 Ga. App. 836, 555 S.E.2d 195 (2001); Land v. Boone, 265 Ga. App. 551, 594 S.E.2d 741 (2004); Kelley v. Cooper, 325 Ga. App. 145, 751 S.E.2d 889 (2013).

Evidence of parties' circumstances admissible.

- In cases of willful torts when the entire injury is to the plaintiff's peace, feelings, or happiness (and thus is no injury to the person or purse), evidence of the worldly circumstances of the parties, which would not be relevant in the usual tort case, is admissible, as is other evidence referred to in this section. Blanchard v. Westview Cem., 133 Ga. App. 262, 211 S.E.2d 135, modified, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1974).

Direct evidence as to mental suffering is unnecessary in order that there may be an award therefor. Georgia Power Co. v. Braswell, 48 Ga. App. 654, 173 S.E. 763 (1934).

Evidence of defendant's present worth is relevant, but evidence of defendant's past and earnings is not. Williamson v. Weeks, 142 Ga. App. 149, 235 S.E.2d 587 (1977).

Evidence of worldly circumstances was not admissible on issue of punitive damages under former Code 1933, § 105-2002 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5) as distinguished from vindictive damages under former Code 1933, § 105-2003 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6). Bob Maddox Dodge, Inc. v. McKie, 155 Ga. App. 263, 270 S.E.2d 690 (1980).

Evidence of worldly circumstances is not admissible.

- Certified question was answered in the negative because the plain and explicit terms of the revised statute did not provide for evidence of a defendant's worldly circumstances to be admitted in a case in which the only injury was to a plaintiff's peace, happiness, or feelings. Holland v. Caviness, 292 Ga. 332, 737 S.E.2d 669 (2013).

Interrogatories regarding defendant's wealth appropriate.

- When a plaintiff elects to press at trial only a claim properly within this section, then properly drawn interrogatories searching into a defendant's wealth could be appropriate and the answers admissible. Hodges v. Youmans, 129 Ga. App. 481, 200 S.E.2d 157 (1973).

A tort victim can inquire into the defendant's worldly circumstances only when the entire injury is to peace, happiness, or feelings, and not when the victim has sustained other compensable injuries which the victim opts to forego. Brunswick Gas & Fuel Co. v. Parrish, 179 Ga. App. 495, 347 S.E.2d 240 (1986) (decided prior to 1987 amendment).

In an action under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-18(a) by a parent for furnishing alcoholic beverages to his or her underage child without the parent's consent, when the parent has prayed for general, special, and O.C.G.A. §§ 51-12-5 and51-12-6 damages, and the parent has not yet made an election to forego all other damages in favor of § 51-12-6 damages, the trial court is correct in denying the parent's motion to compel discovery of the defendant's worldly circumstances. If, however, the parent timely amends the parent's complaint to abandon all claims except one for § 51-12-6 damages, the parent will be entitled to discover the defendant's worldly circumstances. Stepperson, Inc. v. Long, 256 Ga. 838, 353 S.E.2d 461 (1987) (decided prior to 1987 amendment).

Evidence of worldly circumstances is admissible only when a party seeks damages only for injury to peace, happiness, or feelings. Collins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 197 Ga. App. 309, 398 S.E.2d 207 (1990).

Charge of section appropriate only when entire injury mental.

- Charge of this section, with its reference to "worldly circumstances," except in a case when the entire injury is to the peace, happiness, or feelings of the plaintiff, is erroneous. Baldwin v. Davis, 188 Ga. 587, 4 S.E.2d 458 (1939).

Error to charge section without confining application to mental damages.

- It is error, though not necessarily reversible error, for a court to charge a jury, without qualification, the provision of this section, without confining the application of this principle to the damage suffered by virtue of pain and suffering. Reese v. Haggard, 75 Ga. App. 654, 44 S.E.2d 290 (1947).

It is error to charge language of both former Code 1933, §§ 105-2002 and 105-2003 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 51-12-5 and51-12-6) so as to permit a double recovery. Baldwin v. Davis, 188 Ga. 587, 4 S.E.2d 458 (1939).

Instructions which permit recovery for wounded feelings under former Code 1933, §§ 105-2002 and 105-2003 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 51-12-5 and51-12-6) are improper and are cause for granting a new trial. Universal Credit Co. v. Starrett, 61 Ga. App. 132, 6 S.E.2d 80 (1939).

Pattern jury charge inaccurate.

- Although the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. I: Civil Cases, § 66.600 still contains language referring to the "worldly circumstances of the parties" and "the amount of bad faith in the transaction," the jury should no longer be instructed using that language because it was deleted from O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 in 1987. Pampattiwar v. Hinson, 326 Ga. App. 163, 756 S.E.2d 246 (2014).

Because an employee chose to pursue punitive damages under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1 rather than O.C.G.A. § 51-2-6, the employee was not entitled to punitive damages on a claim for negligent retention due to the fact that the jury specifically found that the employee had not suffered a physical injury. A finding of physical injury was required for punitive damages under § 51-12-5.1. Tomczyk v. Jocks & Jills Rests., LLC, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2007).

When one suffers pecuniary loss, the court is not authorized to charge this section and to do so is reversible error. Hall County Mem. Park v. Baker, 145 Ga. App. 296, 243 S.E.2d 689 (1978).

Failure to object to charge constitutes waiver.

- Failure to object that the trial court erred by charging the jury on damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 51-12-5 and51-12-6 before the jury returned the jury's verdict in an action for wrongful dispossession, trespass, conversion, and theft constituted a waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal, and there was no substantial error which would require review under the exception set forth in § 5-5-24(c). Sanders v. Hughes, 183 Ga. App. 601, 359 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 907, 359 S.E.2d 396 (1987).

Under this section, jury is permitted to consider worldly circumstances of parties. Westview Cem. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975).

The jury is not restricted to consideration of circumstances relevant to compensation (i.e., the extent of the injury) but is entitled to consider as well circumstances relevant to deterrence (i.e., any aggravated aspects of the defendant's misconduct plus the defendant's "worldly circumstances"). Westview Cem. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d 776 (1975).

Proper measure of damages, as prescribed by this section, is limited only by enlightened conscience of impartial jurors. Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S.E.2d 802 (1950).

Jury decision on damage award.

- The amount of an award for mental pain and suffering rests ordinarily in the sound and intelligent discretion of the jury. Georgia Power Co. v. Braswell, 48 Ga. App. 654, 173 S.E. 763 (1934).

In an action for wounded feelings, the measure of damages must be determined by the enlightened consciences of impartial jurors. Turner v. Joiner, 77 Ga. App. 603, 48 S.E.2d 907 (1948).

Questions concerning the amount of damages to be awarded for mental pain and suffering are for the enlightened conscience of the jury. Curl v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 243 Ga. 842, 257 S.E.2d 264 (1979).

Award for future pain and suffering.

- Since the plaintiff's pain and suffering will continue in the future, the plaintiff is entitled to damages for the future pain and suffering, the standard for such award being the enlightened conscience of the judge. Since the plaintiff is receiving an award for damages not yet suffered, the judge is to take that into consideration when arriving at an amount. MacDonald v. United States, 900 F. Supp. 483 (M.D. Ga. 1995).

Verdict will not be set aside as excessive by Court of Appeals unless it manifestly appears from the record that it was the result of prejudice, bias, corruption, or gross mistake. Holtsinger v. Scarborough, 71 Ga. App. 318, 30 S.E.2d 835 (1944).

The appellate court does not have as broad discretionary powers as are conferred on trial judges in setting aside verdicts as excessive; when a case comes before the appellate court, after the refusal of a new trial by the presiding judge, it comes not only with the presumption in favor of the verdict, but also stamped with the approval of the judge who tried the case, and when no prejudice or bias or corrupt means in reaching the verdict appear, such court is not authorized to set it aside as being excessive. Shepherd Constr. Co. v. Vaughn, 88 Ga. App. 285, 76 S.E.2d 647 (1953).

In order to set a verdict aside as excessive the evidence must be shown to be so unreasonable as to show that it was the result of passion, prejudice, partiality, or undue bias on the part of the jury. Calloway v. Rossman, 150 Ga. App. 381, 257 S.E.2d 913 (1979).

Verdict may not be set aside merely because judge might find differently.

- When a jury's verdict as to damages may be larger than some of the individual members of the court would have found had they been on the jury trying the case, the court cannot set it aside for that reason. Western & Atl. R.R. v. Burnett, 79 Ga. App. 530, 54 S.E.2d 357 (1949).

Judge cannot order that verdict be written off.

- Under this section, the judge has no power to say that a verdict in a case should not exceed a specified sum, and to require the plaintiff to write off a portion of the damages, and thereupon refuse a new trial. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v. Harper, 70 Ga. 119 (1883).

Mere fact that evidence would authorize a larger verdict, nothing more appearing, is insufficient to authorize reversal of the judgment of the jury based thereon. Curl v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 243 Ga. 842, 257 S.E.2d 264 (1979).

A $100,000 verdict found not so inadequate as to indicate bias or prejudice. See Van Geter v. Housing Auth., 167 Ga. App. 432, 306 S.E.2d 707 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 196, 312 S.E.2d 309 (1984).

Jurors are not bound to accept as correct opinion evidence concerning value of property, though uncontradicted, and by their verdict, they may fix either a lower or higher value upon the property than that stated in the opinion and estimates of the witnesses. Curl v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 243 Ga. 842, 257 S.E.2d 264 (1979).

Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation are not punitive or vindictive damages. They are recoverable only in cases when other elements of damages are recoverable. Cleary v. Southern Motors of Savannah, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 163, 235 S.E.2d 623 (1977).

Attorney's fees were not usually allowed as an item of damages except in those cases permitted by statute. Such fees were not a part of punitive or vindictive damages, but stand alone and were regulated by former Code 1933, § 20-1404 (see now O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11). Dodd v. Slater, 101 Ga. App. 358, 114 S.E.2d 167 (1960).

No distinction between tort to individual or property.

- This section, in allowing damages for wounded feelings, makes no distinction between personal injury and a tort to property. Brunswick Gas & Fuel Co. v. Parrish, 179 Ga. App. 495, 347 S.E.2d 240 (1986).

An action involving a tort to property can support a claim for wounded feelings under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6. Brunswick Gas & Fuel Co. v. Parrish, 179 Ga. App. 495, 347 S.E.2d 240 (1986).

When injury complained of is only injury to property, there can be no recovery for mental suffering. Kuhr Bros. v. Spahos, 89 Ga. App. 885, 81 S.E.2d 491 (1954), overruled on other grounds, Whiten v. Orr Constr. Co., 109 Ga. App. 267, 136 S.E.2d 136 (1964).

Undue juror bias not shown.

- In a trespassing case, damages awarded under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 did not show undue bias on the part of jurors because an owner did not seek the replacement value of trees that were improperly cut. Bullard v. Bouler, 272 Ga. App. 397, 612 S.E.2d 513 (2005).

When only property damage is shown.

- In a suit alleging a claim for injury to peace, happiness, and feelings after a creditor erroneously took the property of two non-debtors when the creditor executed a writ of possession of a debtor, because one of the non-debtors claimed that only furniture was damaged, the non-debtor failed to properly claim an injury to the non-debtor's peace, feelings, and happiness and, therefore, the creditor was entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Dierkes v. Crawford Orthodontic Care, P.C., 284 Ga. App. 96, 643 S.E.2d 364 (2007).

Damages not justified by "outrage" over concealing of witness.

- Plaintiff's "outrage" and "anger" over the defendant's concealing of a witness from the plaintiff in a prior action did not justify an award of damages under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Bowen, 172 Ga. App. 880, 324 S.E.2d 752 (1984).

Error to charge on mental damages in case involving illegal seizure of car.

- In an action for damages on account of illegal seizure of an automobile under a claim of right, it was error for the court to give in charge to the jury the provisions of former Code 1933, § 105-2003 (O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6), as to damages in torts when the entire injury is to the peace, happiness, and feelings of the plaintiff. Universal Credit Co. v. Starrett, 61 Ga. App. 132, 6 S.E.2d 80 (1939).

False impersonation.

- Petition alleging that the defendant company and named agents and servants thereof, falsely and fraudulently impersonated the plaintiff, invaded the plaintiff's right of privacy, the plaintiff's right to the exclusive use of the plaintiff's own name, represented the plaintiff as betraying confidence and giving secret and confidential prices to a competitor of those who gave the prices, caused the plaintiff's time and that of the plaintiff's employees to be consumed, subjected the plaintiff to embarrassment and chagrin, and caused the plaintiff to be held in contempt and ridicule by the plaintiff's business associates, all for the express purpose of advancing the interests of the defendant company, set out a cause of action. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 52 Ga. App. 662, 184 S.E. 452 (1936).

Fraud action.

- Giving of an instruction based on the language of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 in an action for fraud was error because the measure of damages in such an action is the actual loss sustained as a result of the fraud. Kent v. White, 238 Ga. App. 792, 520 S.E.2d 481 (1999).

Fright as element of damage.

- Fright is an element of damage only when accompanied by a physical injury, or when it directly produces some physical or mental impairment. Williamson v. Central of Ga. Ry., 127 Ga. 125, 56 S.E. 119 (1906).

Mental pain and suffering resulting from delay of message is not element of damage. Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763, 15 S.E. 901, 30 Am. St. R. 183, 17 L.R.A. 430 (1892).

Trespass on burial plots.

- In an action for the continuing trespass of burial plots, evidence was sufficient to support the jury's award of damages under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6. Moody v. Dykes, 269 Ga. 217, 496 S.E.2d 907 (1998).

Because there were damages flowing from the interference with a property right, the heirs' action alleging that a property owner interfered with a family's easement across the owner's land to and from a cemetery and trespassed and created a continuing nuisance within the cemetery, did not fall under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6; therefore, the heirs could plead a claim for punitive damages. Davis v. Overall, 301 Ga. App. 4, 686 S.E.2d 839 (2009).

Mutilation of corpse.

- When recovery was sought for damages because of mutilation of the body of the deceased after death, in the absence of willfulness and wantonness in running over the body, no cause of action in this respect was set forth. Lumley v. Pollard, 61 Ga. App. 681, 7 S.E.2d 308 (1940).

Nervous shock and fright.

- When the action was not for a mere negligent tort, but was for a positive and willful wrong, the plaintiff was able to recover for nervous shock and fright, with or without resulting physical injury. Atlanta Hub Co. v. Jones, 47 Ga. App. 778, 171 S.E. 470 (1933).

Parent's recovery for tort to child.

- Parents of child who is negligently treated and diagnosed at a hospital cannot recover damages for their mental distress and their physical injury stemming from that distress unless they witness the commission of the negligent act. Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., 184 Ga. App. 404, 361 S.E.2d 505, cert. denied, 184 Ga. App. 910, 361 S.E.2d 505 (1987).

Provision of alcohol to a minor.

- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a property owner and the party guests, as to a mother's claims that they provided alcohol to a minor, who later was killed in an auto accident, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-18(a), as there was a triable issue of fact when the evidence indicated that the owner allowed the guests to bring kegs of beer to the party, at which most of the other guests were minors, and that the guests knowingly allowed the deceased minor to drink beer from the kegs; the mother was not precluded from recovering damages under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6, as there was a triable issue of fact as to whether these acts were intentional. Mowell v. Marks, 277 Ga. App. 524, 627 S.E.2d 141 (2006).

Slander action.

- In an action for slander, when the entire damage sought to be recovered is for mental suffering and humiliation endured, the only measure for such damage is the enlightened conscience of fair and impartial jurors. Franklin v. Evans, 55 Ga. App. 177, 189 S.E. 722 (1937).

In a slander case, when no special damages were prayed for, and former Code 1933, § 105-2003 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6) was charged, to charge that part of former Code 1933, § 105-2002 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5) which allowed, in a case when there were aggravating circumstances in the commission of the tort, either in the act or the intention, additional damages "as compensation for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff," was erroneous, as allowing double compensation for the same injury, though it was permissible to give that part of former § 105-2002, which allowed additional damages for the purpose of deterring the wrongdoer from a similar trespass. Franklin v. Evans, 55 Ga. App. 177, 189 S.E. 722 (1937).

Fraud and libel.

- In an attorney's claim for fraud against a client, arising out of the client's statement that the client's wife had not filed for divorce, leading the attorney to file an improper divorce claim in another court, the attorney could recover damages for wounded feelings under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 on the attorney's fraud claim. As to the attorney's claim for libel arising out of negative reviews the client posted online, § 51-12-6 did not contain a punitive award provision and, therefore, the attorney was not required to request retraction of the libelous statements in order to recover. Pampattiwar v. Hinson, 326 Ga. App. 163, 756 S.E.2d 246 (2014).

Abusive litigation prosecution.

- Damages for wounded feelings are recoverable under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 in an abusive litigation prosecution, and such recovery may be based on the worldly circumstances of the parties. Vogtle v. Coleman, 188 Ga. App. 159, 372 S.E.2d 642 (1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 259 Ga. 115, 376 S.E.2d 861 (1989).

In an abusive litigation action under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-80 et seq., a plaintiff could not recover for damages to the plaintiff's peace, happiness, or feelings under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6, as there was no allegation of a physical injury, and the plaintiff did not allege a willful tort; there was no support in the record that the assertion of the peer review privilege under O.C.G.A. § 31-7-133(a) constituted a willful tort. Freeman v. Wheeler, 277 Ga. App. 753, 627 S.E.2d 86 (2006).

Trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's abusive litigation claim and holding the plaintiff was required to plead special damages to support an abusive litigation claim and could not instead elect to pursue general damages for mental distress as the plaintiff could forego special damages and pursue an award of general damages for mental distress based on the opposing party's litigation conduct that was malicious, wilful, or wanton. Coen v. Aptean, Inc., Ga. App. , 816 S.E.2d 64 (2018).

Sorrow from miscarriage not element of damage.

- In an action to recover for personal injuries to the plaintiff which resulted in a miscarriage, it is error to charge that sorrow resulting from the miscarriage is an element of damage. Augusta & S.R.R. v. Randall, 85 Ga. 297, 11 S.E. 706 (1890).

Use of profane language not sufficient to justify mental damages.

- When the petition, stripped of the petition's conclusions and confined to the actual facts alleged, merely charged the defendant with having used profane language in the presence of the plaintiff, a female, it therefore did not set out such a willful and intentional tort as would entitle the plaintiff to damages for fright, mental suffering, and wounded feelings. Kitchens v. Williams, 52 Ga. App. 422, 183 S.E. 345 (1936).

Impaired state of mind.

- Recovery for wounded feelings was authorized after the plaintiff sustained an impaired state of mind and ability to find work in light of a felony charge pending against the plaintiff for over three years before it was ultimately dismissed for insufficient evidence to prosecute. Branson v. Donaldson, 206 Ga. App. 723, 426 S.E.2d 218 (1992).

Trespass and nuisance actions.

- Instruction using language from O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 in a trespass and nuisance action was not prejudicial since the measure of damages for discomfort, loss of peace of mind, unhappiness and annoyance of the plaintiff was for the enlightened conscience of the jury. Arvida/JMB Partners v. Hadaway, 227 Ga. App. 335, 489 S.E.2d 125 (1997).

Wrongful eviction of tenant.

- In a suit by the tenant against the landlord, to recover damages for tortious eviction, when the evidence authorizes the jury to infer that the tortious act of the landlord in evicting the tenant was attended with aggravating circumstances, the jury is authorized to find a sum in punitive damages or damages for compensation for the wounded feelings of the tenant. Real Estate Loan Co. v. Pugh, 47 Ga. App. 443, 170 S.E. 698 (1933).

Apartment tenant could not recover for emotional distress absent impact or wilful or wanton conduct.

- Apartment tenant was not entitled to recover damages for emotional distress from the landlord and management company based on their employees' conduct in giving the tenant's former boyfriend a key and the alarm code to the tenant's apartment because the tenant suffered no physical impact and there was no evidence that the defendants' conduct was malicious, wilful, or wanton. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 did not create a cause of action for emotional distress. Phillips v. Marquis at Mt. Zion-Morrow, LLC, 305 Ga. App. 74, 699 S.E.2d 58 (2010).

In an action arising from the unauthorized release of the plaintiff's psychiatric records by a hospital authority, the fact that the plaintiff suffered no physical injury and that the authority's actions were not willful, wanton, and malicious did not end the inquiry because the case was not defined solely by reference to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6. Sletto v. Hospital Auth., 239 Ga. App. 203, 521 S.E.2d 199 (1999).

Error to instruct on punitive and vindictive damages.

- In an action against a veterinarian for the loss of a cat who escaped while in the vet's care, the trial court erred in giving an instruction on punitive and vindictive damages when the plaintiff did not show any physical or pecuniary loss and did not present evidence that the defendant's acts were malicious, willful, or wanton. Carroll v. Rock, 220 Ga. App. 260, 469 S.E.2d 391 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, §§ 668-690.

C.J.S.

- 25 C.J.S., Damages, § 114 et seq.

ALR.

- Damages for mental anguish on account of mutilation of corpse, 12 A.L.R. 342.

Right to recover for mental pain and anguish alone, apart from other damages, 44 A.L.R. 428; 56 A.L.R. 657.

Excessiveness of verdict in action by person injured for injuries not resulting in death, 46 A.L.R. 1230; 102 A.L.R. 1125; 16 A.L.R.2d 3.

"Sentimental" losses, including mental anguish, loss of society, and loss of marital, filial, or parental care and guidance, as elements of damages in action for wrongful death, 74 A.L.R. 11.

Recovery for illness, disease, or death claimed to have resulted from worry or mental anguish following breach of contract or tort, 122 A.L.R. 1486.

Mental distress from pregnant woman's apprehension or realization of injury to or loss of child, as element of damages in action for personal injury, 145 A.L.R. 1104.

Excessiveness of damages in action by person injured for personal injuries not resulting in death (for years 1941 to 1950), 16 A.L.R.2d 3.

Recovery by tenant of damages for physical injury or mental anguish occasioned by wrongful eviction, 17 A.L.R.2d 936.

Recovery by contractor or artisan, suing for breach of warranty, of damages for loss of good will occasioned by use in his business of unfit materials, 28 A.L.R.2d 591.

Recovery for mental shock or distress in connection with injury to or interference with tangible property, 28 A.L.R.2d 1070.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of damages for false imprisonment or arrest, 35 A.L.R.2d 273.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of damages for malicious prosecution, 35 A.L.R.2d 308.

Right to recover damages in negligence for fear of injury to another, or shock or mental anguish at witnessing such injury, 29 A.L.R.3d 1337.

Recovery of damages for emotional distress resulting from racial, ethnic, or religious abuse or discrimination, 40 A.L.R.3d 1290.

Recovery for emotional distress or its physical consequences caused by attempts to collect debt owed by third party, 46 A.L.R.3d 772.

Liability in damages for withholding corpse from relatives, 48 A.L.R.3d 240.

Civil liability of undertaker in connection with embalming or preparation of body for burial, 48 A.L.R.3d 261.

Recovery for mental anguish or emotional distress, absent independent physical injury, consequent upon breach of contract in connection with sale of real property, 61 A.L.R.3d 922.

Recovery of damages for emotional distress resulting from discrimination because of sex or marital status, 61 A.L.R.3d 944.

Recovery of damages for emotional distress, fright, and the like, resulting from blasting operations, 75 A.L.R.3d 771.

Recovery for mental or emotional distress resulting from injury to, or death of, member of plaintiff's family arising from physician's or hospital's wrongful conduct, 77 A.L.R.3d 447.

Liability of hospital or similar institution for giving erroneous notification of patient's death, 77 A.L.R.3d 501.

Recovery under Civil Damage (Dram Shop) Act for intangibles such as mental anguish, embarrassment, loss of affection or companionship, or the like, 78 A.L.R.3d 1199.

Recovery of damages for mental anguish, distress, suffering, or the like, in action for wrongful attachment, garnishment, sequestration, or execution, 83 A.L.R.3d 598.

Recovery by debtor, under tort of intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, for damages resulting from debt collection methods, 87 A.L.R.3d 201.

Relationship between victim and plaintiff-witness as affecting right to recover damages in negligence for shock or mental anguish at witnessing victim's injury or death, 94 A.L.R.3d 486.

Immediacy of observation of injury as affecting right to recover damages for shock or mental anguish from witnessing injury to another, 5 A.L.R.4th 833.

Recovery for mental anguish or emotional distress, absent independent physical injury, consequent upon breach of contract or warranty in connection with construction of home or other building, 7 A.L.R.4th 1178.

Liability for wrongful autopsy, 18 A.L.R.4th 858.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of punitive damages awarded in personal injury or death cases, 35 A.L.R.4th 441.

Modern status of intentional infliction of mental distress as independent tort, 38 A.L.R.4th 998.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of compensatory damages for false imprisonment or arrest, 48 A.L.R.4th 165.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of compensatory damages for defamation, 49 A.L.R.4th 1158.

Future disease or condition, or anxiety relating thereto, as element of recovery, 50 A.L.R.4th 13.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of compensatory damages for malicious prosecution, 50 A.L.R.4th 843.

Liability of employer, supervisor, or manager for intentionally or recklessly causing employee emotional distress, 52 A.L.R.4th 853.

Recoverability of compensatory damages for mental anguish or emotional distress for breach of service contract, 54 A.L.R.4th 901.

Excessiveness or adequacy of damages awarded for noneconomic loss caused by personal injury or death of spouse, 61 A.L.R.4th 309.

Excessiveness or adequacy of damages awarded parents' for noneconomic loss caused by personal injury or death of child, 61 A.L.R.4th 413.

Recoverability of compensatory damages for mental anguish or emotional distress for tortiously causing another's birth, 74 A.L.R.4th 798.

Liability for false obituary or news report of death, 85 A.L.R.4th 813.

Plaintiff's rights to punitive or multiple damages when cause of action renders both available, 2 A.L.R.5th 449.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of punitive damages awarded in personal injury or death cases, 12 A.L.R.5th 195.

Liability of employer, supervisor, or manager for intentionally or recklessly causing employee emotional distress - ethnic, racial, or religious harassment or discrimination, 19 A.L.R.6th 1.

Liability of employer, supervisor, or manager for intentionally or recklessly causing employee emotional distress - sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, or accusations concerning sexual conduct or orientation, 20 A.L.R.6th 1.

Pre-emption, by § 541(a) of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 USCS § 1144(a)), of employee's state-law action for infliction of emotional distress, 102 A.L.R. Fed. 205.

Pre-emption, by National Labor Relations Act (29 USCS § 151 et seq.), of employee's state-law action for infliction of emotional distress, 103 A.L.R. Fed. 798.

Pre-emption, by Railway Labor Act (45 USCS § 151 et seq.), of employee's state-law action for infliction of emotional distress, 104 A.L.R. Fed. 548.