Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, §§ 22-404, 22-1102, Ga. L. 1946, p. 687, § 4 and former Code Section 14-2-63, which were repealed by Ga. L. 1988, p. 1070, § 1, effective July 1, 1989, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Legislative power to declare residence.

- Legislature, under the Constitution, has the power to declare the residence of a corporation. Jones v. Chandler, 88 Ga. App. 103, 76 S.E.2d 237 (1953) (decided under Ga. L. 1946, p. 687, § 4).

Legislative right to designate venue.

- The right of the General Assembly to create a corporation carries with it the power to designate its venue. Davenport v. Petroleum Delivery Serv. of Ga., Inc., 134 Ga. App. 418, 214 S.E.2d 692, aff'd, 235 Ga. 116, 218 S.E.2d 848 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

Venue provisions of former § 14-2-63 were cumulative. Savannah Laundry & Mach. Co. v. Owenby, 186 Ga. App. 130, 366 S.E.2d 787, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 918, 366 S.E.2d 787 (1988) (decided under former § 14-2-63).

Special venue statutes not exclusive.

- There is no authority that special venue statutes are exclusive and the inference in the cases is that they are cumulative of other venue statutes. Jahncke Serv., Inc. v. Department of Transp., 134 Ga. App. 106, 213 S.E.2d 150 (1975), later appeal, 137 Ga. App. 179, 223 S.E.2d 228 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

Residence of foreign corporation.

- A foreign railway company can have a residence in this state, which will subject it to suit in the courts; whenever it is present in any county of this state conducting therein a part of the business for which it was organized, it becomes a resident of such county. Jones v. Chandler, 88 Ga. App. 103, 76 S.E.2d 237 (1953) (decided under Ga. L. 1946, p. 687, § 4).

Foreign corporation without agent or office to do business.

- In the event that a corporation does have an agent or office for the purpose of doing business within the state, the venue will be in the county where such office exists. However, if a foreign corporation doing business within this state does not have an agent or office for the purpose of doing business, but does have an agent for the purpose of service, venue may be laid in any county. Diamond Alkali Co. v. Godwin, 100 Ga. App. 799, 112 S.E.2d 365 (1959), aff'd, 215 Ga. 839, 114 S.E.2d 40 (1960) (decided under Ga. L. 1946, p. 687, § 4).

Removal rights of foreign corporation.

- Lower appellate court properly reversed the grant of removal to a Maryland foreign limited liability company sued in Georgia because applying O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4), if the principal place is in a county in Georgia, a corporate defendant sued for tort in a complaint asserting jurisdiction under subsection (b)(4) has a right to remove to a court in that county, but if that place is not in Georgia, the right to remove is not applicable. Pandora Franchising, LLC v. Kingdom Retail Group, LLLP, 299 Ga. 723, 791 S.E.2d 786 (2016).

Removal precluded by Georgia Motor Carrier Act.

- In a wrongful death action based on a motor vehicle accident, the state court of one county erred in denying the plaintiff's motion to remand the case to another county because the general provision for venue for a defendant corporation provided that a plaintiff could file certain causes of action against a corporation in the county where a plaintiff's cause of action originated; if there was a separate basis for venue, the plain language of the general provision precluded a corporation from removing the case to the county where its principal place of business was located; and the Georgia Motor Carrier Act, O.C.G.A. § 40-1-50 et seq., supplied an independent basis for venue against a motor carrier in the county where the cause of action or some part thereof arose. Blakemore v. Dirt Movers, Inc., 344 Ga. App. 238, 809 S.E.2d 827 (2018).

Impleading of a third-party defendant is an independent suit or case and must satisfy within itself the jurisdiction and venue requirements of the Constitution of the State of Georgia. Central of Ga. R.R. v. Georgia Kraft Co., 140 Ga. App. 8, 230 S.E.2d 74 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

Presumption of continuing valid venue.

- When an action was brought against a contractor alleging that it was an out-of-state corporation doing business in Rabun County, with such an allegation being admitted by the contractor, and thereafter the complaint was amended by adding additional party defendants, any contention by defendants that venue was lacking because contractor was not transacting business in Rabun County when the plaintiffs filed the amended complaint is without merit because under the doctrine of continuity, the transaction of business by the contractor is presumed to have continued in Rabun County, absent any evidence to the contrary. Tomberlin Assocs., Architects, Inc. v. Free, 174 Ga. App. 167, 329 S.E.2d 296 (1985) (decided under former § 14-2-63).

The burden is on defendant to establish its plea to the jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Rocker v. Windsor Forest, Inc., 112 Ga. App. 363, 145 S.E.2d 291 (1965) (decided under Ga. L. 1946, p. 687, § 4).

Jurisdiction over corporation as joint defendant.

- A court otherwise without jurisdiction over a domestic corporation may acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the court's having jurisdiction of a joint defendant. Byrd v. Moore Ford Co., 116 Ga. App. 292, 157 S.E.2d 41 (1967) (decided under Ga. L. 1946, p. 687, § 4).

No jurisdiction over nonresident absent determination of liability of resident.

- Absent a determination of liability of the resident defendant, the trial court had no jurisdiction to render a final judgment against the nonresident defendant corporation even if it was in default. Byrd v. Moore Ford Co., 116 Ga. App. 292, 157 S.E.2d 41 (1967) (decided under Ga. L. 1946, p. 687, § 4).

Action against nonresident motor common carrier.

- Even though a nonresident interstate motor common carrier was registered in Georgia and had a registered agent for service of process, venue of a personal injury action against the carrier and nonresident driver was proper only in the county in which the accident occurred. Southern Drayage, Inc. v. Williams, 216 Ga. App. 721, 455 S.E.2d 418 (1995).

Corporation subject to attachment when about to leave domicile county.

- For a mercantile corporation that does business in one county and has its principal office and place of business, and therefore its domicile or residence in that county, but all the officers of the corporation reside in another county and the corporation has decided to discontinue its business in the county in which it is domiciled, and the business of the corporation and the stock of goods belonging to it are about to be removed to the other county and the principal office and place of business in the city of the corporation's domicile is to be discontinued, the inference is authorized that the corporation is actually removing or about to remove from the county of its domicile and it is therefore subject to attachment. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Lawrence, 53 Ga. App. 111, 184 S.E. 922 (1936), rev'd on other grounds, 184 Ga. 83, 190 S.E. 346 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, ch. 22-15).

Abandonment of issue on appeal.

- In a breach of contract action, because the company failed to set forth any argument in the company's appellate brief that the trial court erred in failing to transfer the case because it was not jointly liable with the resident co-defendants, either as joint tortfeasors or as joint obligors, the appellate court deemed the issue of venue abandoned on appeal. Liberty Capital, LLC v. First Chatham Bank, 338 Ga. App. 48, 789 S.E.2d 303 (2016).

Indemnity action.

- In an indemnity action brought by a defendant in a third-party complaint, the cause of action originated in the place where the act or omission to act by the defendant occurred, not where the original suit was filed. Central of Ga. R.R. v. Georgia Kraft Co., 140 Ga. App. 8, 230 S.E.2d 74 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

Sale of product in county where suit brought.

- Venue may not be had over a manufacturer simply because a retailer, which is a separate legal entity, sells its product in the county in which suit is brought. Barnes v. Destiny Indus., Inc., 185 Ga. App. 630, 365 S.E.2d 488 (1988).

Suit against insurance company.

- For administrator of insured's estate who sued insurance company on alleged agreement to settle claim on behalf of its insured, the venue provisions of former § 56-1201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 33-4-1) rather than those of former § 22-404 were applicable even though it was not a claim between the insurer and its insured, since the suit arose out of the insurance company's role as insurer. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lott, 246 Ga. 423, 271 S.E.2d 833 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

Venue of action when Certificate of Need contested.

- Trial court did not err in the court's denial of the motion to transfer venue in a case involving an application for a Certificate of Need (CON) because the company began the process of purchasing property and applied for a CON to develop a psychiatric hospital in Coweta County; therefore, the company engaged in business activities such that venue was proper there. Tanner Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Vest Newnan, LLC, 337 Ga. App. 884, 789 S.E.2d 258 (2016).

Obligation to determine where venue existed.

- Because venue did not lie in the county where an individual filed a negligence action and a corporation's registered agent was not located in the same county as the corporation's principal office, the trial court could not simply deny the corporation's and its insurer's Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 19.1(B) motion to transfer; it was obligated by O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-501,14-2-510(b), and14-2-1622(a)(2) to determine the county or counties in which venue properly lay. Coastal Transp., Inc. v. Tillery, 270 Ga. App. 135, 605 S.E.2d 865 (2004).

Dismissal of distribution EMCs was proper.

- In suits by classes of former and current members of distribution electric membership corporations (EMCs) seeking to recover millions of dollars in patronage capital from two wholesale EMCs, in which the members lacked privity with the wholesale EMCs which were the only defendants as to whom venue was proper, dismissal of the distribution EMCs was proper. Walker v. Oglethorpe Power Corp., 341 Ga. App. 647, 802 S.E.2d 643 (2017).

Discretion of trial court on venue.

- When a plaintiff brings suit in the same county on two claims arising from the same transaction and the Georgia Constitution designates that county as the venue for one of those claims, the trial court has the discretion to entertain both claims. Liberty Capital, LLC v. First Chatham Bank, 338 Ga. App. 48, 789 S.E.2d 303 (2016).

Cited in Saint Francis Hosp. v. Dion, 123 Ga. App. 360, 181 S.E.2d 72 (1971); Hallmark Properties, Inc. v. Slater, 229 Ga. 432, 192 S.E.2d 157 (1972); Radcliffe v. Boyd Motor Lines, 129 Ga. App. 725, 201 S.E.2d 4 (1973); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Gilland, 130 Ga. App. 788, 204 S.E.2d 469 (1974); Europa Hair, Inc. v. Browning, 133 Ga. App. 753, 212 S.E.2d 862 (1975); Lukas v. Pittman Hwy. Contracting Co., 134 Ga. App. 305, 214 S.E.2d 398 (1975); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 138 Ga. App. 706, 227 S.E.2d 434 (1976); Campbell v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 140 Ga. App. 435, 231 S.E.2d 450 (1976); Thoni Oil Co. v. Tinsley, 140 Ga. App. 887, 232 S.E.2d 162 (1977); Adams v. Upjohn Co., 142 Ga. App. 264, 235 S.E.2d 584 (1977); Woods v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 150 Ga. App. 499, 258 S.E.2d 592 (1979); Lake Lanier Islands Dev. Auth. v. Village Harbor, Inc., 152 Ga. App. 705, 264 S.E.2d 23 (1979); Fosgate v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 154 Ga. App. 510, 268 S.E.2d 780 (1980); Evans v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 159 Ga. App. 834, 285 S.E.2d 263 (1981); Ball v. Brunswick Pulp & Paper Co., 248 Ga. 106, 281 S.E.2d 571 (1981); Cassells v. Bradlee Mgt. Servs., Inc., 161 Ga. App. 325, 291 S.E.2d 48 (1982); Bradlee Mgt. Servs., Inc. v. Cassells, 249 Ga. 614, 292 S.E.2d 717 (1982); Southern Ry. v. Lawson, 174 Ga. App. 101, 329 S.E.2d 288 (1985); Gault v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 208 Ga. App. 134, 430 S.E.2d 63 (1993); Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 231 Ga. App. 11, 497 S.E.2d 596 (1998); M&M Mortg. Co. v. Grantville Mill, LLC, 302 Ga. App. 46, 690 S.E.2d 630 (2010); Mauer v. Parker Fibernet, LLC, 306 Ga. App. 160, 701 S.E.2d 599 (2010); WMW, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 291 Ga. 683, 733 S.E.2d 269 (2012).

"Office" defined.

- "Office," as that term was used in former § 22-404, is synonymous with "place of business." Scott v. Atlanta Dairies Coop., 239 Ga. 721, 238 S.E.2d 340 (1977); Gillis v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 155 Ga. App. 804, 272 S.E.2d 728 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

A corporation that has a place where its business is being carried on, and has an agent in charge of it, performing such acts as are necessary in carrying on its business, has an office and place of business within the meaning of former § 22-404. Musgrove v. Kirksey Ford Sales, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 276, 283 S.E.2d 292 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

The term "office" as used in O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b) includes any place where a particular kind of business is transacted or a service is supplied by a corporation, and an office can be operated without being open to the public. McLendon v. Albany Whse. Co., 203 Ga. App. 865, 418 S.E.2d 130 (1992).

Corporation is deemed to reside in county only if it has office and transacts business there. Hagood v. Garner, 159 Ga. App. 289, 283 S.E.2d 355 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

Office and place of business within statute.

- If a corporation has a place where its business is being carried on, and has an agent in charge of it, performing such acts as are necessary in carrying on its business, it has an office and place of business within the meaning of the statute. Gillis v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 155 Ga. App. 804, 272 S.E.2d 728 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

Office need not be open to public.

- An office (place of business) may be operated to perform services for or transact a particular kind of business for the corporation without being open to the public. Gillis v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 155 Ga. App. 804, 272 S.E.2d 728 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

The term "office," as used in paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b) of former Code 1933, § 22-404, was any "place where a particular kind of business is transacted or a service is supplied" by a corporation, and which could be operated without being open to public. Musgrove v. Kirksey Ford Sales, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 276, 283 S.E.2d 292 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

Office must be maintained at time action filed.

- The fact that defendant corporation had an office in a county at the time the cause of action arose does not constitute grounds for venue in that county under paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b) of former § 14-2-63 unless the corporation had an office at the time the action was filed. Jernigan v. Patterson Contracting Co., 169 Ga. App. 963, 315 S.E.2d 679 (1984) (decided under former § 14-2-63).

Dissolved corporation.

- The county in which a corporation maintained its registered office prior to its dissolution was the proper venue as to an action which is commenced against the corporation subsequent to its dissolution, and not the county in which the cause of action originated. Savannah Laundry & Mach. Co. v. Owenby, 186 Ga. App. 130, 366 S.E.2d 787, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 918, 366 S.E.2d 787 (1988).

Trial court erred in denying the defendants' motion to dismiss and in finding that venue was proper in DeKalb County, because while it was undisputed that the cause of action arose in DeKalb County, by March 2013, when the plaintiff filed the renewal suit, the defending orthopedic practice had been administratively dissolved and no longer had an office or transacted business there; thus, venue was where the practice last maintained a registered office prior to dissolution, which was in Fulton County. Ross v. Waters, 332 Ga. App. 623, 774 S.E.2d 195 (2015).

In a products liability action against a nonresident automobile manufacturer whose agreement with a dealership provided that the agreement did not make either party the agent or legal representative of the other for any purpose whatsoever, and the manufacturer's sales representatives came only when requested for consultation, intermittent visits by service representatives were not sufficient to establish that the manufacturer maintained an office and place of business and thus failed to establish that venue was proper in that county. Barrow v. GMC, 172 Ga. App. 287, 322 S.E.2d 900 (1984) (decided under former § 14-2-63).

Uncontradicted sworn affidavit of an officer of a corporation stating it maintains no office in the county where suit was filed is sufficient to establish lack of venue. Barnes v. Destiny Indus., Inc., 185 Ga. App. 630, 365 S.E.2d 488 (1988) (decided under former § 14-2-63).

Venue in a borrower's action for fraud against a corporate lender was proper in Coffee County, even though the lender, a foreign corporation registered to do business in Georgia, had its registered office in Fulton County, because it transacted business in Coffee County. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Brown, 198 Ga. App. 653, 402 S.E.2d 753 (1991).

Office and transacting business.

- Venue for two lawsuits arising out of the collision of two vehicles was proper in the county where the lawsuits were originally filed not only because the accident occurred there, but also because no dispute existed but that the owner of the truck involved in the collision had an office and transacted business in that county, and, thus, the trial court in the county to which the lawsuits were removed did not err in entering an order that remanded the lawsuits back to the original county. Mohawk Indus. v. Clark, 259 Ga. App. 26, 576 S.E.2d 16 (2002).

Trial court's order that venue was proper in Twiggs County was proper in a declaratory judgment action between an owner and a corporation arising from leases between the parties for facilities because one of the facilities at issue was located in Twiggs County and the corporation's subsidiary, a co-defendant, had an office and transacted business in Twiggs County. Mariner Healthcare, Inc. v. Foster, 280 Ga. App. 406, 634 S.E.2d 162 (2006).

Registered office is in addition to other residences.

- The registered office shall be in addition to, and not in limitation of, any other residences that any domestic corporation may have by reason of other laws. Thus, if it has an office and transacts business or has a principal office located in another county, service in the other county would establish venue there. Victoria Corp. v. Fulton Plumbing Co., 150 Ga. App. 540, 258 S.E.2d 252 (1979), reversed on other grounds, 272 Ga. 188, 526 S.E.2d 339 (2000) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

Foreign LLC's principal place of business was not LLC's registered office in Georgia.

- Under O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-510(b)(4) and14-11-1108(b), venue for a Georgia corporation's suit against a foreign LLC lay in the county where the tort occurred, Thomas County; the provision allowing the LLC to transfer venue to the LLC's principal place of business did not apply because the statute permitted transfer only to a county in Georgia and the LLC's principal place of business was in Maryland as shown in the LLC's application for a certificate of authority under O.C.G.A. § 14-11-702(a)(6). Kingdom Retail Group, LLC v. Pandora Franchising, LLC, 334 Ga. App. 812, 780 S.E.2d 459 (2015), aff'd, 299 Ga. 723, 791 S.E.2d 786 (2016).

Corporation generally sued in county of registered office.

- Generally, a corporation must be sued in the county wherein it has its registered office and if it has no registered office, it shall be deemed to reside in the county where its last registered office was located or where its place of business is located, or where it maintains its principal office and place of business. Victoria Corp. v. Fulton Plumbing Co., 150 Ga. App. 540, 258 S.E.2d 252 (1979), reversed on other grounds, 272 Ga. 188, 526 S.E.2d 339 (2000) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

In an action against a trucking company, venue was proper in the county in which the company had its office properly registered with the Secretary of State, not in the county of residence of the company's designated registered agent for service of process. Rock v. Ready Trucking, Inc., 218 Ga. App. 774, 463 S.E.2d 355 (1995).

When an out-of-state seller sued an in-state buyer in Georgia, despite a provision in the parties' contract for the jurisdiction of the courts of Texas, and the seller did not respond, venue was proper in the courts of Georgia under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(1) because the buyer was incorporated in Georgia and was served with process at its registered agent's office in Georgia, and because the parties waived the forum selection clause by either filing suit in Georgia or not responding. Euler-Siac S.P.A. (Creamar Spa) v. Drama Marble Co., 274 Ga. App. 252, 617 S.E.2d 203 (2005).

"Principal office" applies to incorporations prior to 1968.

- The references in subsection (f) (now see subsection (d)) to "principal office" can apply only to corporations incorporated prior to the effective date of the 1968 Corporation Act. Davenport v. Petroleum Delivery Serv. of Ga., Inc., 235 Ga. 116, 218 S.E.2d 848 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

Office designated under prior law.

- The former statutory provisions did not mean a principal office in a factual sense, but meant the principal office which was designated by the corporation under the prior corporation law. Davenport v. Petroleum Delivery Serv. of Ga., Inc., 235 Ga. 116, 218 S.E.2d 848 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

Corporation incorporated under former Code 1933, § 22-404 did not have a "principal office" as required under prior law. It only had a "registered office." Davenport v. Petroleum Delivery Serv. of Ga., Inc., 235 Ga. 116, 218 S.E.2d 848 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

Where tort actions to be filed.

- As to corporations formed after the Corporation Act of 1968, tort actions must be filed either in the county where the corporate agent is registered or, under certain circumstances, in the county where the tort is committed. Buice v. Satellite Sec. Corp., 156 Ga. App. 348, 274 S.E.2d 608 (1980) (decided under former § 22-404).

A foreign corporation's residence for purposes of venue in a tort action is both the county in which it has its registered office and the county in which the tort occurred if the corporation has an office and transacts business in that county. WBC Holdings, Inc. v. Thornton, 213 Ga. App. 48, 443 S.E.2d 686 (1994).

Purpose of 1975 amendment to former

§ 14-2-63. - The purpose of Ga. L. 1975, p. 583 (subsections (c) and (d) of former § 14-2-63 prior to the 1976 amendment to subsection (d), adding the requirement of an office) was to unify the venue requirements for suits against foreign and domestic corporations rather than to dramatically alter the requirement established by judicial construction under former Code 1933, § 22-5301 (repealed by Ga. L. 1975, p. 583), and that the corporation have an agent or a place of business in the county where the tort occurred. C.W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 354, 254 S.E.2d 426 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

Venue of a civil action for libel against a corporate publisher to be laid in any county in which the newspaper is circulated is permitted under paragraph (3) of subsection (b), provided the corporation has an office and transacts business in that county. Carroll City/County Hosp. Auth. v. Cox Enters., 243 Ga. 760, 256 S.E.2d 443 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-404).

In a suit against a newspaper for the publication of a libelous item, the cause of action arises in the county where the edition of the paper containing the item is first generally circulated. Rives v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 110 Ga. App. 184, 138 S.E.2d 100, rev'd on other grounds, 220 Ga. 485, 139 S.E.2d 395 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-1102).

Teenager's motion to remand was properly denied as: (1) a police officer was the only defendant who resided in Toombs County; (2) venue in Toombs County "vanished" when the officer was granted summary judgment, so the teenager could not rely on the joint tortfeasor venue provision of the Georgia Constitution; (3) the newspaper defendants did not have an office in Toombs County so as to preclude venue there pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(3); (4) although the newspaper defendants transacted business in Toombs County, they did not maintain an office there; and (5) venue was not properly based on O.C.G.A. § 14-11-1108(b), even though some defendants were limited liability companies. Torrance v. Morris Publ'g Group, LLC, 281 Ga. App. 563, 636 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 160 (Ga. 2007).

Venue of employee's action against railroad under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (45 U.S.C. § 51) for injuries received in another state was properly transferred from the county of employee's residence to the county in which the railroad's registered representative and office were located. Neal v. CSX Transp., Inc., 213 Ga. App. 707, 445 S.E.2d 766 (1994).

Venue in auto accident cases.

- In a vehicular collision that occurred in Fulton County between the plaintiff and another driver, who was acting in the course and scope of the driver's employment with the employer, the order transferring venue to another county was reversed as venue was proper in Fulton County because the cause of action originated in Fulton County, where the collision occurred; the other driver's employer did not avail itself of the procedure for removal from Fulton County afforded by O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510; and venue was proper in Fulton County as to the other driver because it was proper as to the employer, the other joint tortfeasor in the case. Burchfield v. West Metro Glass Co., 340 Ga. App. 324, 797 S.E.2d 225 (2017).

Agent to be served in negligent construction and maintenance action.

- In a tort action brought because of the alleged negligent construction and maintenance of rented property belonging to a corporation, the agent of such corporation in charge of its office in that county, and also in charge of the renting, repairing, and keeping in repair of such property, is the agent of such company to be served in that county, and the superior court of the county has jurisdiction of the suit. Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Brazzeal, 62 Ga. App. 683, 9 S.E.2d 773 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-1102).

Negligent handling of toxic chemicals.

- Venue established pursuant to subsection (c) (now see paragraph (2) of subsection (b)) held inappropriate for a homeowner's complaint against exterminator, alleging negligent handling of toxic chemicals, sounded in tort. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Morrison, 187 Ga. App. 780, 371 S.E.2d 407, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 908, 371 S.E.2d 407 (1988) (decided under former § 14-2-63).

Opportunity to amend complaints on venue in tort action.

- Legal guardians alleged sufficient facts to initially support venue of case involving two lawsuits arising from a pickup truck collision in the county where the collision occurred; thus, the trial court in the second county to which the case had been removed did not err in entering a remand order to remand the case to the county in which it was initially filed when the legal guardians amended their complaints to allege they had also learned that the truck owner had an office and transacted business in the county where the lawsuits were initially filed as the initial complaints were not deficient but informed the truck owner of the basis for venue regarding the initial county where the lawsuits were filed. Mohawk Indus. v. Clark, 259 Ga. App. 26, 576 S.E.2d 16 (2002).

Employer having office in county at time of filing suit by employee.

- In a tort action, venue over an employer was assessed based upon the facts existing at the time the action was originally filed because the employer was added as a party to a lawsuit under the relation back provision of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c). Thus, venue under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510 was proper based on the employer's having had an office and transacted business in the county at the time the suit was originally filed. HD Supply, Inc. v. Garger, 299 Ga. App. 751, 683 S.E.2d 671 (2009).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, § 1867 et seq. 36 Am. Jur. 2d, Foreign Corporations, § 470 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 19 C.J.S., Corporations, §§ 798 et seq., 1021.

ALR.

- Prejudice against officer, stockholder, or employee of corporation as ground for change of venue on application of corporation, 63 A.L.R. 1015.

Citizenship, domicil, residence, or location of national corporations, 69 A.L.R. 1346; 88 A.L.R. 873.

Business situs of intangible in state other than domicil of owner as excluding tax at domicil, 79 A.L.R. 344.

Statutory or constitutional provisions as to venue as denial of equal protection of laws, 107 A.L.R. 862.

Situs of corporate stock (or stock in joint stock company) for purpose of attachment, garnishment, or execution, 122 A.L.R. 338.

What constitutes residence of foreign corporation in a county or judicial district within state venue statute, 129 A.L.R. 1286.

Conclusiveness, as regards venue, of designation of place of business in incorporation papers, 175 A.L.R. 1092.

Relationship between "residence" and "domicil" under venue statutes, 12 A.L.R.2d 757.

Foreign corporation's purchase within state of goods to be shipped into other state or country as doing business within state for purposes of jurisdiction or service of process, 12 A.L.R.2d 1439.

Waiver by national bank of statutory right to be sued in district where established or in which it is located, 1 A.L.R.3d 904.

Place where corporation is doing business for purposes of state venue statute, 42 A.L.R.5th 221.