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2018 Georgia Code 14-5-46 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 14 CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, AND ASSOCIATIONS

Section 5. Miscellaneous Provisions Relating to Corporations, 14-5-1 through 14-5-51.

ARTICLE 3 CORPORATIONS ORGANIZED FOR RELIGIOUS, FRATERNAL, OR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES

14-5-46. Conveyances to churches or religious societies confirmed.

All deeds of conveyance executed before April 1, 1969, or thereafter for any lots of land within this state to any person or persons, to any church or religious society, or to trustees for the use of any church or religious society for the purpose of erecting churches or meeting houses shall be deemed to be valid and available in law for the intents, uses, and purposes contained in the deeds of conveyance. All lots of land so conveyed shall be fully and absolutely vested in such church or religious society or in their respective trustees for the uses and purposes expressed in the deed to be held by them or their trustees for their use by succession, according to the mode of church government or rules of discipline exercised by such churches or religious societies.

(Laws 1805, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 899; Code 1873, § 2343; Code 1882, § 2343; Civil Code 1895, § 2353; Civil Code 1910, § 2826; Code 1933, § 22-409; Code 1933, § 22-5507, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 565, § 1.)

Law reviews.

- For annual survey on real property, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 255 (2012).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Code 1882, § 2343, and former Code 1933, § 22-409, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

General Consideration

Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 14-5-46 abrogates any other provision of Georgia law because by the statute's terms the statute refers to the validity of deeds of conveyance for the uses and purposes expressed in the deed, not to the imposition of a trust in favor of any use or purpose as expressed in other documents. Timberridge Presbyterian Church, Inc. v. Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc., 307 Ga. App. 191, 705 S.E.2d 262 (2010).

There is no implied trust on local church property for the benefit of the general church. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041, 90 S. Ct. 680, 24 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1970).

Interpretation of language of deeds.

- The trustees of a local church properly obtained property by a deed stating the property was granted to the local church, its successors, and assigns, in fee simple, because the language of the deed contemplated successors and assigns, which the parent church, being hierarchical, had become under its disciplinary rule that "The Association (parent church) shall hold all church property, regardless if members vote to change the church to some other faith." Crumbley v. Solomon, 243 Ga. 343, 254 S.E.2d 330 (1979).

O.C.G.A. § 14-5-46 is limited on the statute's face to "deeds of conveyance," and nothing in the language of O.C.G.A. § 14-5-46 limits the statute's application to the rules of a national church; in applying neutral principles of law, a court cannot ignore relevant statutes, documents of the local body, or the actual language of the relevant deeds, in favor of the rules of the national body, and O.C.G.A. § 14-5-46 is to be read in harmony with the principles established for the resolution of church property disputes: a court applies neutral principles of law to the intents, uses, and purposes contained in the deeds of conveyance, as well as the mode of church government or rules of discipline exercised by such churches or religious societies, on the local, regional, and national level as those pertain to the property at issue. Timberridge Presbyterian Church, Inc. v. Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc., 307 Ga. App. 191, 705 S.E.2d 262 (2010).

Because the deeds at issue did not convey property to trustees, nor to the regional body representing a national church or the national church, but simply to a local church, O.C.G.A. § 14-5-46 could not be applied without reference to other statutory and case law, particularly when the imposition of a trust was alleged in the absence of any reference in the deeds; the requirements of the Georgia Trust Act, O.C.G.A. § 53-12-20, were consistent with determining the intentions of the parties by applying neutral principles of law to all the relevant deeds, statutes, constitutions, and charters of the local and national churches. Timberridge Presbyterian Church, Inc. v. Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc., 307 Ga. App. 191, 705 S.E.2d 262 (2010).

Adverse possession.

- Possession of property for the use of a church by the constituent membership in possession of the church as such an entity is recognized by statute in this state, and if continued adversely for the prescriptive period, it will support prescriptive title. Slaughter v. Land, 194 Ga. 156, 21 S.E.2d 72 (1942); Bridges v. Henson, 216 Ga. 423, 116 S.E.2d 570 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-409).

Cited in Carden v. LaGrone, 225 Ga. 365, 169 S.E.2d 168 (1969); Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322 (1976); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S. Ct. 3020, 61 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1979).

Church Schisms

1. In General

When local church estopped to deny existence of trust.

- When the trustees of a local church held church property and participated in making the association's (parent church) disciplinary rule that "The Association shall hold all church property, regardless if all members vote to change the church to some other faith," and did not contest its validity for 30 years, the local church could not deny the existence of a trust for the benefit of the general church. Crumbley v. Solomon, 243 Ga. 343, 254 S.E.2d 330 (1979).

When church documents irrelevant.

- Church documents that speak to resolution of doctrinal disputes and are silent as to which persons have the right to enjoy and to use the church property in the event of a schism at the local level are irrelevant to the question of which factions within the local congregation have the right to control the actions of the title holder, and thereby the use of property. Jones v. Wolf, 244 Ga. 388, 260 S.E.2d 84 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1080, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980).

Statute inapplicable if no deed of conveyance.

- O.C.G.A. §§ 14-5-46 and14-5-47 were not applicable to a national church's action to quiet title in property held by a local church because there was no deed of conveyance to the trustees of the local church; two recorded title affidavits executed by lifetime attendees of the local church, one 79 years old and the other 80, asserted there had never been a question concerning the church's right of ownership of the property, but recorded affidavits relating to land are not conveyances or a legal proceeding by which one could attack the title to realty or cure a defect in the title, O.C.G.A. § 44-2-20. Kemp v. Neal, 288 Ga. 324, 704 S.E.2d 175 (2010).

2. Presumption of Majority Rule

Presumptive rule of majority representation.

- Georgia has adopted for use in church local schism cases a presumptive rule of majority representation, defeasible upon a showing that the identity of the local church is to be determined by some other means, which presumption is overcome under Georgia law by an application of "neutral principles" of law, that is, state statutes, corporate charters, relevant deeds, and the organizational constitutions of the denomination. Jones v. Wolf, 244 Ga. 388, 260 S.E.2d 84 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1080, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980).

Principle of presumptive majority rule in local schism cases may be overcome by reliance upon neutral statutes, corporate charters, relevant deeds, and the organizational constitutions of the denomination. Jones v. Wolf, 244 Ga. 388, 260 S.E.2d 84 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1080, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980).

3. Hierarchical and Congregational Churches Distinguished

Hierarchical churches are those organized as a body with other churches having similar faith and doctrine with a common ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head. Crumbley v. Solomon, 243 Ga. 343, 254 S.E.2d 330 (1979).

If church government is hierarchical, "neutral principles of law" determine whether the local church or parent church has the right to control local property. Crumbley v. Solomon, 243 Ga. 343, 254 S.E.2d 330 (1979).

"Neutral principles" are state statutes, corporate charters, relevant deeds, and the organizational constitutions of the denomination. Crumbley v. Solomon, 243 Ga. 343, 254 S.E.2d 330 (1979).

In a church property dispute between majority and minority factions of a local congregation, neutral principles of law, including the governing documents of the local and general churches, the title instruments, and the policy reflected in O.C.G.A. §§ 14-5-46 and14-5-47, showed that the property was impressed with an implied trust in favor of the Episcopal Church. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the Episcopal Church, the Georgia diocese, and a minority faction was proper because the Georgia bishop recognized the minority faction as the true church entitled to control of the church property. Rector v. Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Ga., Inc., 290 Ga. 95, 718 S.E.2d 237 (2011), cert. dismissed, 566 U.S. 1007, 132 S. Ct. 2439, 182 L. Ed. 2d 1059 (2012).

In a church property dispute, neutral principles of law, derived from the governing documents adopted by local and national churches, supported by the policy reflected in O.C.G.A. §§ 14-5-46 and14-5-47, and not contradicted by the deeds at issue, demonstrated that an implied trust in favor of the Presbyterian Church of the U.S.A. existed on a local church's property to which a corporation held legal title. Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc. v. Timberridge Presbyterian Church, Inc., 290 Ga. 272, 719 S.E.2d 446 (2011), cert. denied, 567 U.S. 916, 132 S. Ct. 2772, 183 L. Ed. 2d 638 (2012).

A congregational church is one strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and one that so far as church government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority. Crumbley v. Solomon, 243 Ga. 343, 254 S.E.2d 330 (1979).

If church government is congregational, a majority of its members control its decisions and local church property. Crumbley v. Solomon, 243 Ga. 343, 254 S.E.2d 330 (1979).

Trustees

Trustees empowered to act regardless of recordation of appointment.

- Deeds to land made to trustees of religious societies are valid, and trustees of such societies, whether original trustees or successor trustees, are empowered to act for such societies in relation to such property whether the appointment of the trustees has been recorded or not. Jackson v. Oliphant, 88 Ga. App. 313, 76 S.E.2d 625 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-409).

Trustee had no authority to act.

- In a quiet title action involving church property, the trial court erred in making the legal conclusion that the founding pastor held the church property in fee simple absolute instead of in trust for and on behalf of the religious corporation as Georgia law expressly authorizes the creation of religious land trusts and the deed expressly referred to the pastor as a trustee. As such, the trial court erred in ruling that fee simple absolute title to the property vested in another congregation by virtue of a 1998 warranty deed executed by the pastor as the pastor had no legal authority to transfer the property without the consent and approval of the religious corporation. Second Refuge Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ, Inc. v. Lollar, 282 Ga. 721, 653 S.E.2d 462 (2007).

Trust attaches to office not office holder.

- Title to property conveyed to a bishop for use of the church in fee simple, does not attach to the bishop's person, but to the office of bishop, and passes to the bishop's successor in office. Beckwith v. Rector, 69 Ga. 564 (1882) (decided under former Code 1882, § 2343).

Suits by trustees against holdover tenants.

- Trustees of an unincorporated religious society, holding title in themselves to the society's real property, may bring a dispossessory proceeding (or distress warrant for rent) through their secretary and agent against a tenant in possession of the property who is holding over and beyond the term and who refuses to pay rent. Jackson v. Oliphant, 88 Ga. App. 313, 76 S.E.2d 625 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 22-409).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

C.J.S.

- 77 C.J.S., Religious Societies, § 83.

ALR.

- Consolidation or merger of churches of same denomination as affecting property rights, 66 A.L.R. 177.

Undue influence in nontestamentary gift to clergyman, spiritual adviser, or church, 14 A.L.R.2d 649.

Determination of property rights between local church and parent church body: modern view, 52 A.L.R.3d 324.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 14-5-46

Total Results: 5  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Second Refuge Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ, Inc. v. Lollar, 653 S.E.2d 462 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 21, 2007 | 282 Ga. 721, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 3601

...73, 75, 60 S.E.2d 166 (1950); Hale v. Scarborough, 279 Ga.App. 614, 616, 631 S.E.2d 812 (2006). [6] Imerys Marble Co., supra, 276 Ga. at 403, 577 S.E.2d 555; Hardman v. Dahlonega-Lumpkin County Chamber of Commerce, 238 Ga. 551, 553, 233 S.E.2d 753 (1977). [7] OCGA § 14-5-46....
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Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc. v. Timberridge Presbyterian Church, Inc., 719 S.E.2d 446 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 21, 2011 | 290 Ga. 272, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 4008

...at issue to TPC Inc. Thus, the absence of language in the deeds creating a trust in favor of the national church is of limited value in deciding the question before us, and we turn to consideration of other neutral principles. (b) Statutes (1) OCGA § 14-5-46 OCGA § 14-5-46, which is entitled "Conveyances to churches or religious societies confirmed," provides: All deeds of conveyance executed before April 1, 1969, or thereafter for any lots of land within this state to any person or persons, to any church or...
...§ 22-5507, to church property disputes. See, e.g., Holiness Baptist Assn. v. Barber, 274 Ga. 357, 358-359, 552 S.E.2d 90 (2001); Crumbley, 243 Ga. at 344-345, 254 S.E.2d 330; Carnes, 236 Ga. at 37-38, 222 S.E.2d 322. However, the Court of Appeals held that OCGA § 14-5-46 could not be applied here to support the creation of a trust because "the deeds . . . do not convey the property to trustees, nor to the Presbytery or PCUSA, but simply to `Timberridge Presbyterian Church' or `Timberridge Presbyterian Church, Inc.'" Timberridge, 307 Ga.App. at 194, 705 S.E.2d 262. By its plain language, OCGA § 14-5-46 applies (1) if there is a deed "to any person or persons," "to any church or religious society," or "to trustees" for the use of any church and (2) if the deed is "for the purpose of erecting churches or meeting houses." Thus, the statute is not limited to deeds to trustees or that contain trust language, and indeed this Court applied OCGA § 14-5-46 to a deed that did not contain any trust language in Barber....
...at 358-359, 552 S.E.2d 90. There, the deed conveying the local church property was simply "to named individuals as `Deacons of Vickers Holiness Baptist Church [the local church] and their successors in office.'" Id. *452 at 359, n. 7, 552 S.E.2d 90. Citing OCGA § 14-5-46, we held that it is undisputed that the Association [the general church] remains a hierarchy, that the [local] Church has been a member of the Association for over 30 years, and that the Church is subject to the Association's discipline....
...Such discipline unquestionably provides that the Association "shall hold all church property," thereby implying a trust for the benefit of the Association. Barber, 274 Ga. at 359, 552 S.E.2d 90 (citation and footnotes omitted). Although the Court of Appeals' reason for not applying OCGA § 14-5-46 was erroneous, we note that this Court and the Court of Appeals have failed to analyze another component of the statutory text in our modern cases, namely, whether the property was conveyed "for the purpose of erecting churches or meeting houses." See, e.g., Barber, 274 Ga....
...at 37-38, 222 S.E.2d 322; Rector, etc., of Christ Church v. Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Ga., 305 Ga.App. 87, 90-92, 699 S.E.2d 45 (2010), aff'd 290 Ga. 95, 718 S.E.2d 237 (2011). Compare Harris v. Brown, 124 Ga. 310, 314, 52 S.E. 610 (1905) (holding that OCGA § 14-5-46's predecessor applied only to deeds conveying property for the purpose of erecting a church building and therefore did not apply to the deed in question, which conveyed property for the purpose of erecting both church and school buildings). Instead, we appear to have viewed OCGA §§ 14-5-46, 14-5-47, and their predecessors, which date back more than two centuries, see Ga....
...Wolf 's focus on local and parent church governing documents as an important neutral principle. See 443 U.S. at 602-606, 99 S.Ct. 3020. See, e.g., Barber, 274 Ga. at 359, 552 S.E.2d 90; Carnes, 236 Ga. at 38, 222 S.E.2d 322 (stating broadly that "Code Ann. § 22-5507 [now OCGA § 14-5-46] recognizes and validates deeds conveying land for church purposes according to the limitations set out in the deed and for use `according to the mode of church government or rules of discipline'"). In any event, although OCGA § 14-5-46 may weigh in favor of the trial court's judgments under our precedents, we need not rely on it to resolve this case. (2) OCGA § 53-12-20 Instead of focusing on OCGA § 14-5-46, the Court of Appeals relied heavily, and incorrectly, on Georgia's generic express trust statute....
...ship between a local and general church." Carnes, 236 Ga. at 35, 222 S.E.2d 322. Instead, our decision derives from the specific language of the governing documents adopted by the local and general churches, supported by the policy reflected in OCGA § 14-5-46 and not contradicted by the deeds at issue....
...The majority minimizes reliance on OCGA § 53-12-20, Georgia's express trust statute, even as persuasive authority, and strongly criticizes the Court of Appeals for incorrectly relying on it. Even the majority takes issue with the applicability of OCGA § 14-5-46....
...nalyze another component of the statutory text in our modern cases, namely, whether the property was conveyed `for the purpose of erecting churches or meeting houses.'" (Emphasis in original.) Maj. Op. at 452. Nonetheless, the majority looks to OCGA § 14-5-46 as an expression of "this State's policy of looking to `the mode of church government or rules of discipline' in resolving church property disputes, even when the statutory text does not squarely apply." Id. at 452. This argument begs the question why OCGA § 53-12-20 cannot likewise be used, at a minimum, as an expression of the State's policy. Despite its apparent inapplicability, the majority asserts that OCGA § 14-5-46 "weigh[s] in favor of the trial court's judgments under our precedents ...," id....
...simply relying on the articles, to reach this conclusion. The majority maintains that "[o]ur decision derives from the specific language of the governing documents adopted by the local and national churches, supported by the policy reflected in OCGA § 14-5-46 and not contradicted by the deeds at issue." Id....
...For the reasons stated in this dissent, it is time to reform the standard employed. NOTES [1] The parties do not dispute that the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) is a hierarchical denomination. See Timberridge, 307 Ga.App. at 192, 705 S.E.2d 262. [2] When a conveyance that falls within OCGA § 14-5-46 is made to trustees, OCGA § 14-5-47 provides: All trustees to whom conveyances are or shall be executed, for the purposes expressed in Code Section 14-5-46, shall be subject to the authority of the church or religious society for which they hold the same in trust and may be expelled from said trust by such church or society, according to the form of government or rules of discipline by which they may be governed....
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Kemp v. Neal, 704 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 30, 2010 | 288 Ga. 324, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 3907

...nce are executed for the use of a church or religious society are subject to the authority of the church for which they hold same in trust and may be expelled from that trust according to the rules of discipline by which they may be governed (OCGA §§ 14-5-46, 14-5-47), these statutes are not applicable to the case before us because there is no deed of conveyance to the trustees of Williams Chapel....
...The statutes and the provisions of the Book of Discipline relied upon by Presiding Justice Carley's dissent speak in terms of deeds and documents of conveyance when discussing express and implied trusts of real property used for church purposes. See OCGA §§ 14-5-46, 14-5-47....
...Furthermore, this analysis would make the enumerations addressed in Divisions 3 and 4 moot. Where, as here, no funds are donated by the general church to purchase and develop the local church property, [n]o trust in favor of the general church may be implied under the general trust statutes ([cits.]). . . . However, [OCGA § 14-5-46] recognizes and validates deeds conveying land for church purposes according to the limitations set out in the deed and for use "according to the mode of church government or rules of discipline.....
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Holiness Baptist Ass'n, Inc. v. Barber, 552 S.E.2d 90 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 17, 2001 | 274 Ga. 357, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 2839

...t to the Association's discipline. Such discipline unquestionably provides that the Association "shall hold all church property," thereby implying a trust for the benefit of the Association. [7] Crumbley v. Solomon at 345, 254 S.E.2d 330; see OCGA §§ 14-5-46; 14-5-47....
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Rector of Christ Church v. Bishop of Episcopal Diocese of Georgia, Inc., 718 S.E.2d 237 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 21, 2011 | 290 Ga. 95, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 3631

...See Rector, Wardens and Vestrymen of Christ Church in Savannah v. Bishop of Episcopal Diocese of Georgia, Inc., 305 Ga.App. 87, 699 S.E.2d 45 (2010) (" Christ Church v. Bishop "). Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied in part on OCGA §§ 14-5-46 and 14-5-47 in concluding that the property of Christ Church is impressed with an implied trust in favor of the Episcopal Church. We granted CCS's petition for certiorari to decide whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in applying the neutral principles doctrine, particularly with respect to OCGA §§ 14-5-46 and 14-5-47. As explained below, although those courts may have erred to some extent in their reliance on OCGA §§ 14-5-46 and 14-5-47, they correctly concluded that neutral principles of law show that the property of Christ Church at issue is held in trust for the benefit of the Episcopal Church....
...Given that the instruments of title neither include nor prohibit a trust in favor of the general church, they have a limited role in the neutral principles analysis in this case, and so we turn to consideration of other neutral principles. See id. (b) Statutes. (1) OCGA §§ 14-5-46 and 14-5-47. OCGA § 14-5-46, which is entitled "Conveyances to churches or religious societies confirmed," provides: All deeds of conveyance executed before April 1, 1969, or thereafter for any lots of land within this state to any person or persons, to any church or...
...ses expressed in the deed to be held by them or their trustees for their use by succession, according to the mode of church government or rules of discipline exercised by such churches or religious societies. When a conveyance that falls within OCGA § 14-5-46 is made to trustees, OCGA § 14-5-47 also applies: All trustees to whom conveyances are or shall be executed, for the purposes expressed in Code Section 14-5-46, shall be subject to the authority of the church or religious society for which they hold the same in trust and may be expelled from said trust by such church or society, according to the form of government or rules of discipline by which they may be governed. The trial court and the Court of Appeals held that OCGA §§ 14-5-46 and 14-5-47 apply to Christ Church's property and support the conclusion that the property is subject to a trust in favor of the Episcopal Church due to "the mode of church government [and] rules of discipline" of the Episcopal Church and the Georgia Diocese....
...CCS offers at least eight arguments why these two statutes, which date back more than two centuries, see Ga. Laws 1805, pp. 15-16, are inapplicable by their terms, purpose, or historical context. [5] One or more of CCS's arguments against directly applying OCGA §§ 14-5-46 and 14-5-47 to some or all of the property at issue in this case may have merit....
...at ___ - ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (citing Holiness Baptist Assn. v. Barber, 274 Ga. 357, 358-359, 552 S.E.2d 90 (2001); Crumbley v. Solomon, 243 Ga. 343, 344-345, 254 S.E.2d 330 (1979); and Carnes, 236 Ga. at 37-38, 222 S.E.2d 322). We have treated OCGA §§ 14-5-46 and 14-5-47 and their predecessors as expressing this State's policy of looking to "the mode of church government or rules of discipline" in resolving church property disputes—a policy fully consistent with Jones v....
...at ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602-606, 99 S.Ct. 3020). See also Barber, 274 Ga. at 359, 552 S.E.2d 90; Jones v. Wolf, 244 Ga. 388, 389, 260 S.E.2d 84 (1979) (" Jones II ") (on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, "applying [the predecessors *244 to OCGA §§ 14-5-46 and 14-5-47] to the present litigation" by looking to "church documents" to the extent they assist in determining "which persons have the right to enjoy and to use the church property in the event of a schism at the local level"); Carnes, 236 Ga. at 38, 222 S.E.2d 322 (stating broadly that "Code Ann. § 22-5507[now § 14-5-46] recognizes and validates deeds conveying land for church purposes according to the limitations set out in the deed and for use `according to the mode of church government or rules of discipline'")....
...rust" (emphasis in original)). Indeed, in discussing the neutral principles approach, the Jones v. Wolf Court focused on "the state statutes governing the holding of church property, " 443 U.S. at 603, 99 S.Ct. 3020 (emphasis added), of which OCGA §§ 14-5-46 and 14-5-47 are the most prominent in Georgia's Code....
...between a local and general church." Carnes, 236 Ga. at 35, 222 S.E.2d 322. Instead, our decision derives from the specific provisions of the governing documents adopted by the local and national churches, supported by the policy reflected in OCGA §§ 14-5-46 and 14-5-47 and not contradicted by the title instruments at issue....
...*258 to succeed and the right to own property from us and we have taken the economy down the same trajectory we take the legal protection of our property. Even the language of the two state statutes that the majority claims to have followed, OCGA §§ 14-5-46 and 14-5-47, are used only after the statutory language is changed by filtering these statutes through prior cases that all parties agree misinterpreted these statutes to say what they do not say. OCGA § 14-5-46 is filtered through Carnes v....
...ntended application. After summarily discounting the value of examining deeds and other instruments of title as neutral principles here, the majority proceeds to misapply three state statutes, each one a neutral principle under Jones, namely—OCGA §§ 14-5-46, 14-5-47, and 53-12-20....
...y means by it, or how it should apply in future cases, but even if we did know, this is the functional equivalent of a judicially-created state statute involving a new type of implied trust and it is void as being contrary to an actual statute, OCGA § 14-5-46....
...In the topsy-turvy world envisioned by the majority opinion, for what reason would an entity like CCS ever decide to buy or improve property for the benefit of the local community if it would lose its property contrary to the terms of any Georgia statute? B. OCGA §§ 14-5-46 and 14-5-47 Today's majority opinion also misapplies the statutory language of OCGA §§ 14-5-46 and 14-5-47 in a manner that belies the United States Supreme Court's explanation of neutral principles of law in Jones. Enacted in 1804, OCGA § 14-5-46 unambiguously granted CCS full and absolute title in the subject property, providing that: [A]ll deeds of conveyance ....
...to be Holden to them or their trustees for their use, by succession, according to the mode of church government, or the rules of discipline exercised by such churches or religious societies respectively. [Emphasis added.] By its plain language, OCGA § 14-5-46 commands that all deeds will be deemed valid and available in law for the uses contained in those deeds. Thus, this first part of OCGA § 14-5-46 provides that the legal title remains in the grantee, CCS, and that the deed will be deemed valid in law in case of any trust. OCGA § 14-5-46 then provides that all lands conveyed shall be "fully and absolutely vested" in CCS "for the uses and purposes expressed in the deed." The term "absolute" includes in its dictionary definition that, it cannot be taken by government or by government action....
...s societies." The reference to "succession" of trustees by use of "the mode of church government or rules of discipline" refers only to the mode and manner of succeeding trustees. Counsel for the National Church agreed to this interpretation of OCGA § 14-5-46 during oral argument....
...nt in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice." Id. at 603, 99 S.Ct. 3020. In any event, the Dennis Canon does not provide for the succession of trustees and is nowhere even claimed to be incorporated except by this last phrase of OCGA § 14-5-46, which has no application to this case. The majority opinion also misunderstands the unambiguous language of OCGA § 14-5-47, which states that: *274 All trustees to whom conveyances are or shall be executed, for the purposes expressed in Code Section 14-5-46, shall be subject to the authority of the church or religious society for which they hold the same in trust and may be expelled from said trust by such church or society, according to the form of government or rules of discipline by which they may be governed....
...s. Because there are no trustees identified in CCS deeds, OCGA § 14-5-47 is wholly irrelevant to the facts of this case. Perplexingly, however, the majority largely ignores the unambiguous statutory language and instead bases its analysis of OCGA §§ 14-5-46 and 14-5-47 on prior case law....
...Under Jones, case law that interprets a statute is not a neutral principle. The statute is the neutral principle and not the case law. Moreover, all of the parties in this case acknowledge that the case law relied upon by the majority opinion was founded on a mistaken interpretation of OCGA § 14-5-46. For example, the majority relies upon Carnes for the proposition that this Court can utilize the last phrase of OCGA § 14-5-46 to incorporate church government and the rules of church discipline....
...arber, Kemp, and Timberridge, are not neutral principles under Jones, and these prior cases should not control the outcome of this case in ways that conflict with Jones or the applicable state statutes. Rather, it is the unambiguous language of OCGA § 14-5-46, which unambiguously granted CCS full and absolute title in the subject property, that controls the outcome here....
...es under Jones, that either were not considered or properly applied by today's majority opinion. Each provision would, if considered and properly applied, preclude the National Church from obtaining a victory in this case. Property Statutes: • OCGA § 14-5-46—"[A]ll deeds of conveyance....
...The historical narrative detailed at length by the majority under the guise of church governing documents is not a neutral principle under Jones. Moreover, prior cases, including Carnes, that rely on what all parties now agree is the mistaken statutory interpretation of OCGA § 14-5-46 *278 are not neutral principles of law....
...But, prior cases that hold that this code section applies to deeds that do not convey title to trustees are not neutral principles. Thus, OCGA § 14-5-47 has no application to the facts of this case. Nevertheless, the majority relies on cases misapplying both OCGA § 14-5-46 and OCGA § 14-5-47 as controlling "policy" or, in fact, neutral principles here....
...Wolf does not limit neutral principles analysis to documents with specific titles, but rather directs courts to examine "legally cognizable" documents relating to the ownership and control of church property. See also footnote 8 below. [5] CCS makes the following arguments. First, OCGA § 14-5-46 refers to "deeds of conveyance," not land grants, and the express mention of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of all other things....
...Second, the General Assembly did not use "deeds" and "grants" interchangeably during the relevant time period; when it wanted a statute to apply to both, it used "other conveyance" or "conveyances of every kind whatsoever." Third, the General Assembly that enacted the predecessor to OCGA § 14-5-46 was attuned to the distinction between a land grant and a deed because the legislature was rocked by a bribery scandal over the Yazoo land grant in the 1790s....
...regulating land grants to incorporated churches; there was no need to pass this statute to validate another one (the 1789 Act granting land to Christ Church). Fifth, legislatures are presumed not to pass redundant laws, and the predecessor to OCGA §§ 14-5-46 and 14-5-47 was unnecessary for congregations incorporated prior to 1803, which were legally cognizable entities to which the General Assembly had already secured property. Sixth, OCGA § 14-5-46 expressly applies only to "lots of land"-realty-conveyed for "erecting churches," but the trial court and Court of Appeals applied them to a parish house, school building, parking lots, and personal property....