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2018 Georgia Code 15-1-9 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 15-1-9 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 15-1-9

TITLE 15 COURTS

Section 1. General Provisions, 15-1-1 through 15-1-22.

15-1-9. When judge not disqualified.

Any judge, irrespective of his relationship to a party to the case or his interest in the case, shall be qualified to try any civil case in his court where there is no defense filed in the case, except where either party to the case objects to the related judge.

(Ga. L. 1933, p. 187, § 1; Code 1933, § 24-111.)

Cross references.

- Pleadings and motions generally, § 9-11-7 et seq.

Default judgments generally, § 9-11-55.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Cited in Georgia Power Co. v. Watts, 184 Ga. 135, 190 S.E. 654 (1937); Calhoun ex rel. Chapman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 189 Ga. 414, 5 S.E.2d 902 (1939).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Affidavit to disqualify judge as contempt, 29 A.L.R. 1273.

Residence or ownership of property in city or other political subdivision which is party to or interested in action as disqualifying judge, 33 A.L.R. 1322.

Necessity as justifying action by judicial or administrative officer otherwise disqualified to act in particular case, 39 A.L.R. 1476.

Constitutionality of statute making mere filing of affidavit of bias or prejudice sufficient to disqualify judge, 46 A.L.R. 1179.

Right of judge not legally disqualified to decline to act in legal proceeding upon personal grounds, 96 A.L.R. 546.

Disqualification of judge who presided at trial or of juror as ground of habeas corpus, 124 A.L.R. 1079.

Disqualification of judge in pending case as subject to revocation or removal, 162 A.L.R. 641.

Interest of judge in an official or representative capacity, or relationship of judge to one who is a party in an official or representative capacity, as disqualification, 10 A.L.R.2d 1307.

Relationship to attorney as disqualifying judge, 50 A.L.R.2d 143.

Time for asserting disqualification of judge, and waiver of disqualification, 73 A.L.R.2d 1238.

Intervenor's right to disqualify judge, 92 A.L.R.2d 1110.

Disqualification of judge for having decided different case against litigant, 21 A.L.R.3d 1369.

Disqualification of judge because of his or another's holding or owning stock in corporation involved in litigation, 25 A.L.R.3d 1331.

Disqualification of original trial judge to sit on retrial after reversal or mistrial, 60 A.L.R.3d 176.

Disqualification of judge, justice of the peace, or similar judicial officer for pecuniary interest in fines, forfeitures, or fees payable by litigants, 72 A.L.R.3d 375.

Waiver or loss of right to disqualify judge by participation in proceedings - modern state civil cases, 24 A.L.R.4th 870.

Disqualification of judge for bias against counsel or litigant, 54 A.L.R.5th 575.

Prior representation or activity as prosecuting attorney as disqualifying judge from sitting or acting in criminal case, 85 A.L.R.5th 471.

Disqualification of judge for having decided different case against litigant - state cases, 85 A.L.R.5th 547.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 15-1-9

Total Results: 18  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Bridges v. State, 492 S.E.2d 877 (Ga. 1997).

Cited 49 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 24, 1997 | 268 Ga. 700, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 4255

...their testimony; and (4) he did not believe that any testimony commented on Bridges' right to remain silent. [30] See Lamb v. The State, 267 Ga. 464, 479 S.E.2d 719 (1997). [31] Jenkins v. The State, 268 Ga. 468, 491 S.E.2d 54 (1997). [32] See OCGA § 15-1-9.1....
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Widner v. State, 631 S.E.2d 675 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 42 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 26, 2006 | 280 Ga. 675, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 1961

...at 492, 26 S.E.2d 744. Accordingly, the instruction given in this case does not provide grounds for reversal. 4. Finally, Widner contends that the visiting judge who presided over his case had not been properly designated to do so pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(1), [2] which allows a superior court to request such assistance....
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Strozier v. State, 586 S.E.2d 309 (Ga. 2003).

Cited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 15, 2003 | 277 Ga. 78, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2748

...ell. She bled to death later that morning from a gunshot wound to the lower abdomen. 1. Strozier contends that the judgments of conviction are void because the order appointing the senior judge who presided over the trial was insufficient under OCGA § 15-1-9.2(b)....
...s unable to preside because of disability, illness, or absence; or (3)[a] majority of the judges of the requesting court determines that the business of the court requires the temporary assistance of an additional judge ... as provided for in [OCGA] § 15-1-9.1." [4] He also argues that he did not participate in an aggravated assault on Gemes; however, the record reveals that Count 16 of the indictment charging the crime against Gemes was dead-docketed after trial and no judgment of conviction w...
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Massey v. State, 458 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 10, 1995 | 265 Ga. 632

...mprisonment, and aggravated assault. The judge who presided over appellant's trial and who sentenced appellant after the jury returned guilty verdicts was a pro hac vice magistrate designated by the Chief Magistrate of Fulton County pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.1 to assist the superior court....
...were upheld because factually distinct conduct supported each conviction. The conviction and sentence for false imprisonment must be vacated. 2. The magistrate who presided over appellant's trial was designated to do so pursuant to the terms of OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2), (e), and (f) and, as a consequence, was statutorily vested with the ability to discharge all duties and exercise all powers and authority of the superior court. OCGA § 15-1-9.1(g). The magistrate was also constitutionally empowered to exercise the judicial power of the superior court. Ga. Const.1983, Art. VI, § I, Par. III. Appellant contends his judgment of conviction is null and void because OCGA § 15-1-9.1 violates the constitutional requirement that superior court judges be elected since it authorizes persons not elected to superior court to sit as superior court judges....
...Rather, he was a judge of the magistrate court, qualified to serve on the superior court, who was requested by the superior court in time of need to exercise the judicial power of superior court, to which request the magistrate court assented. OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2) does not authorize the judiciary to make appointments to the benches of other courts; instead, it permits a designated judicial officer from one court to exercise the power of a requesting court in an effort to assist the requesting court in limited circumstances....
...nent, part-time superior court judgeship. We disagree. A judge does not have statutory or inherent authority to create a judicial office and make indefinite appointments thereto. Cramer v. Spalding County, 261 Ga. 570(3a), 409 S.E.2d 30 (1991). OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2) authorizes the judiciary to request judicial assistance from other Georgia courts when, among other things, the requesting court requires the temporary assistance of an additional judge or judges. The order designating a specified, qualified judge to assist a requesting court must contain the time period of the assistance and must be filed and recorded on the minutes of the clerk of the court requesting the assistance. OCGA § 15-1-9.1(f)....
...In division two, the majority opinion addresses whether the designation of the magistrate to preside over Massey's criminal trial in superior court violates the constitutional requirement that superior court judges be elected. It concludes that a designation under OCGA § 15-1-9.1 is not an appointment; therefore, a magistrate is not a superior court judge....
...Because Spaulding's service did not amount to a permanent, part-time judgeship, his designation to the superior court bench did not violate the constitutional mandate of elected superior court judges. 2. Similarly, the assignment orders did not violate the designation statute. OCGA § 15-1-9.1 provides that the chief judge of any court may make a written request to the chief judge of any other court within the county when a majority of the requesting courts' judges determines that the court's business requires the temporary assistance of an additional judge....
...A judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County denied the portion of appellant's motion for new trial that raised concerns about the appointment of the magistrate to preside. [2] During the hearing on the portion of appellant's motion for new trial in which appellant claimed that OCGA § 15-1-9.1 violated the constitutional requirement that superior court judges be elected, defense counsel informed the court that he also contended that the statute was an unconstitutional effort by the legislative branch to control the procedures o...
...rticle I, § II, Par. III of the state Constitution. In the order entered after the hearing, the trial court stated specifically that it was denying Grounds One and Two of appellant's motion for new trial. Neither of those grounds asserted that OCGA § 15-1-9.1 was an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine. We decline to pass upon this attack on the constitutionality of § 15-1-9.1 as it does not clearly appear that the point was properly raised in the trial court and distinctly passed on by the trial court....
...the trial court to act sua sponte, we conclude that defense counsel did not withdraw his motion but only wished to assert it at another time, and that the trial court deemed the timing of the motion unnecessary to resolution of the merits. [1] OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(C) (1994). [2] See Cramer v. Spalding County, 261 Ga. 570, 572, 409 S.E.2d 30 (1991). [3] See Dozier v. Wild, ___ So.2d ___, 1995 WL 15686, 1995 Fla.App. Lexis 252 (Fla.Ct.App. Jan. 18, 1995). [4] See OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)....
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Cramer v. Cnty. of Spalding, 409 S.E.2d 30 (Ga. 1991).

Cited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 26, 1991 | 261 Ga. 570

...The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the county's complaint. AUTHORITY OF STATE COURT JUDGES 3. Judge Cramer cites three possible sources for his authority to appoint and pay an assistant judge and assistant solicitor—OCGA § 15-7-25(a) and OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b), Unif.Superior Ct....
...d then finance the positions with court funds. (a) A chief judge may make a written request for assistance to another judge if the requesting court determines that the court's business requires "the temporary assistance" of an additional judge. OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(1) (1989 Supp.). [2] When Judge Cramer sought assistance in 1989, the statute required him to identify the time period for which assistance was sought and, if applicable, the specific cases. OCGA § 15-1-9.1(c) (1989 Supp.) (deleted 1990)....
...It is particularly critical when, as in this case, the requesting court is a part-time judge of a one-person court who makes the appointment without any other judge's approval. See Dominguez v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 197 Ga.App. 664, 665, 399 S.E.2d 269 (1990) (criticizing the "seemingly limitless terms of § 15-1-9.1" as an unreined method of judicial administration)....
...(b) OCGA § 15-7-25 authorizes a retired judge or judge emeritus of a state court to serve as a state court judge upon the call of that court's judge. This provision, however, does not obviate the need for a requesting judge to follow the procedure for seeking assistance outlined in § 15-1-9.1 and court rules....
...Because the county attorney did not appear in court on behalf of the assistant solicitor, he cannot be disqualified under Tilley v. King, 190 Ga. 421, 9 S.E.2d 670 (1940). [2] This subsection still applies when assistance is needed from a judge in the same county. OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2) (1990)....
...If assistance is needed from a judge outside the county, a superior court judge or chief judge may make a request for judicial assistance to the administrative judge of the judicial administrative district where the requesting court is located. OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(1) (1990)....
...The written designation, which applies only when the request is for a judge outside the county, shall identify "the time period covered, the specific case or cases for which assistance is sought if applicable, and the reason that assistance is needed." OCGA § 15-1-9.1(f) (1990).
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Smith v. Guest Pond Club, Inc., 586 S.E.2d 623 (Ga. 2003).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 15, 2003 | 277 Ga. 143, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2714

...Savings &c. Assn. v. Ford Mountain Investments, 261 Ga. 619, 620, 409 S.E.2d 36 (1991). [3] See Gregory, Georgia Civil Practice, § 8-1 (2d ed.). [4] OCGA § 9-11-65(a)(2). [5] See Brevard Fed. Savings &c., 261 Ga. at 620, 409 S.E.2d 36. [6] See OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2) (permitting the chief judge of a particular court to request assistance from the judge of a different court, who will sit by designation). [7] Id. [8] See OCGA § 15-1-9.1(c) (when requested by a judge of either a requesting or an assisting court, all judges of that particular court shall vote on whether to ratify the decision to permit a fellow judge to sit by designation on another court)....
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Lucas v. Lucas, 539 S.E.2d 807 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 30, 2000 | 273 Ga. 240

...838, 388 S.E.2d 688 (1990). 3. Finally, Mr. Lucas contends that the judgment is void because it was rendered by a state court judge improperly acting as a superior court judge. However, the designation of the state court judge to serve in superior court comports with OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(D), providing for the permanent assistance of an additional judge from another court in the same county....
...so issued a temporary protective order, and Mr. Lucas's proffer of evidence on the motion for new trial indicates that it would appear to a court faced with these circumstances that an immediate decision was desirable. Mr. Lucas now argues that OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(D) is unconstitutional, but he made no such assertion in the trial court....
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Lewis v. McDougal, 583 S.E.2d 859 (Ga. 2003).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 10, 2003 | 276 Ga. 861, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2185

...While the habeas corpus court's reading of Hicks was accurate, the holding in Hicks is flawed. In that case, which involved a request for judicial assistance from a court in the same county, as does the present case, the Court of Appeals relied upon the provisions of OCGA § 15-1-9.1(f), setting out what a designation of a judge to sit in another court must include. However, this Court had noted earlier that since a 1990 amendment of OCGA § 15-1-9.1 (Ga.L.1990, p....
...But subsequent to the amendment, the statute does not specify the content of an order for intra-county designation. Thus, the holding in Hicks, which was decided after the amendment, was erroneous and that decision must be overruled to the extent it holds that an intra-county designation order must comply with OCGA § 15-1-9.1(f)....
...[1] Since Hicks was decided wrongly, it does not support the habeas corpus court's conclusion that the designation order was insufficient. The record in the present case contains a document which includes a request from the chief judge of the requesting court, which is presumed to be a valid request (OCGA § 15-1-9.1(c))....
...urred by the holdings in Massey v. State, 265 Ga. 632(2), (3), 458 S.E.2d 818 (1995), and Smith v. State, 250 Ga.App. 128(1), 550 S.E.2d 683 (2001), which are disapproved to the extent they require intra-county designation orders to comply with OCGA § 15-1-9.1(f).
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Earl v. Mills, 570 S.E.2d 282 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 30, 2002 | 275 Ga. 503, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 2806

...Hoffecker, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. BENHAM, Justice. Appellant John R. Earl is a resident of Cherokee County who filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the "Family Court" established by a standing order issued pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(D) by appellee Frank C....
...onstitutional since it is not among the classes of courts listed in the Georgia Constitution as those in which the judicial power of the State is vested exclusively. Ga. Const., 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I. [1] The complaint also alleged that OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(D), the statute pursuant to which the standing order was issued, was unconstitutional in that it authorized members of the judicial branch to exercise power constitutionally reserved to the legislative and executive branches, and that OCGA § 15-1-9.1(a)(3) was unconstitutionally vague and in conflict with § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)....
...649(1), 340 S.E.2d 591 (1986)), and no such showing was made in the case at bar. Appellant contended that the actions contemplated by the standing order were unconstitutional, as was the statute on which the standing order was partially based, OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(D), because, by permitting judges to request the permanent assistance of other judges, it authorized members of the judiciary to create judgeships and thereby exercise authority given in the Georgia Constitution to the General Assembly....
...While this Court held in Massey v. State, 265 Ga. 632(2), 458 S.E.2d 818 (1995), and Smith v. Langford, 271 Ga. 221, 223, 518 S.E.2d 884 (1999), that the designation of magistrates and senior judges to assist superior court judges on a temporary basis pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(C) did not violate the constitutional provision that all superior court judges are to be elected (Art....
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Troncone v. Troncone, 409 S.E.2d 516 (Ga. 1991).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 18, 1991 | 261 Ga. 662

...Weeks, Judge of the Superior Court, Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit, State of Georgia for one day, October 18, 1989, for the purpose of commencing and handling the Rule NISI calendar to be called at 9:30 a.m. and any other matters that may arise. This request is made in compliance with Georgia Law 1983, Code Section 15-1-9.1....
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Jersawitz v. Riley, 500 S.E.2d 579 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 26, 1998 | 269 Ga. 546

...Jack Jersawitz was charged with criminal trespass and his case was eventually assigned to Judge Yvette Miller of the State Court of Fulton County. Jersawitz filed a motion to recuse Judge Miller and the entire Fulton County judiciary. Pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.1, Chief Judge Carnes of the State Court of Fulton County designated Judge Riley, an Atlanta Municipal Court judge, to assist the State Court of Fulton County by hearing the motion to recuse and, if the motion was granted, by convening a trial on the criminal trespass charge....
...Upon being designated by Chief Judge Carnes, Judge Riley was "vested with the ability to discharge all duties and exercise all powers and authority" of the State Court of Fulton County, although the designation did not make him a judge of that court. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. III; OCGA § 15-1-9.1; Massey v....
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Williams v. Heard, 302 Ga. 114 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 13, 2017 | 805 S.E.2d 1

...OCGA § 21-2-523, governing jurisdiction and proceedings in election contest cases, was enacted in 1964. See Ga. L. 1964, Ex. Sess., p. 179. This statute was amended in 1991 with the current language: “superior court judge or senior judge.” Ga. L. 1991, p. 611, § 2. But OCGA § 15-1-9.3 was not enacted until 1992....
...ee Ga. L. 1992, p. 1114. In 1998, former OCGA § 47-10-130 was repealed along with other Code sections, and the language, providing for senior judge status for state court judges, probate court judges, and juvenile court judges, is now found in OCGA § 15-1-9.3....
...or superior court judge must be selected to preside over the dismissal of this contest action. Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur. Heard amended her petition on June 14, 2016, and June 27, 2016. See OCGA § 15-1-9.3 (a) (1) (retired state court judge or juvenile court judge may be appointed as senior judge “of the type of court from which the judge retired” (emphasis supplied)). See also OCGA § 15-1-9.2 (a) (judge of superior court or former judge of superior court may become senior judge); OCGA § 15-1-9.2 (a.l) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section, any Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia, Judge of the Court of Appeals, superior court judge, state court judge, magistrate court judge, or juvenile court judge who ceases holding office as a judge ....
...a Justice of the Supreme Court, Judge of the Court of Appeals, or judge of the superior court.”). There is no indication from the record here that Judge Ellerbee has been appointed by the governor as a senior superior court judge pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.2 (a.2).
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Moreland v. State, 619 S.E.2d 626 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 19, 2005 | 279 Ga. 641, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 2863

...ier of fact to find him guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 2. Moreland contends the judge who presided over the trial was not properly appointed under OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)....
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Smith v. Langford, 518 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. 1999).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 14, 1999 | 271 Ga. 221, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 2231

...He argued that it was unconstitutional for a non-elected senior judge to discharge the duties of the elective office of a judge of the superior courts. The Superior Court of Stephens County refused to restrain Judge Langford from serving and also denied Smith's request to find OCGA §§ 15-1-9.2 [2] and *886 47-8-61 [3] unconstitutional....
...ted one, the Constitution allows a senior judge to exercise judicial power in the superior courts when the assistance of a senior judge is necessary. The Constitution clearly provides that such service will be done as provided by statute, and OCGA §§ 15-1-9.2 and 47-8-61 are simply the statutory enactments pursuant to the Constitution....
...Const., Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. I. In Massey v. State, 265 Ga. 632, 458 S.E.2d 818 (1995), the criminal defendant challenged the constitutionality of the appointment of a magistrate to preside over the defendant's trial in superior court. See OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2), (e), (f), and (g)....
...state courts, superior courts, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court. The creation of the position of senior judge does not establish a separate judicial forum. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] See OCGA § 9-6-60. [2] OCGA § 15-1-9.2 (1998) provides: (a) The office of senior judge of the superior courts is created, and judges of the superior courts or former judges of the superior courts may become senior judges as follows: (1) Any judge of the superior courts who ret...
...eside because of disability, illness, or absence; or (3) A majority of the judges of the requesting court determines that the business of the court requires the temporary assistance of an additional judge or additional judges as provided for in Code Section 15-1-9.1....
...ite service. However, as Judge Langford's appointment in this case demonstrates, lifetime status as a senior judge does not amount to unbounded service. Appointment to serve as a senior judge in superior court is governed by the restrictions of OCGA § 15-1-9.2(b), (c).
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Earl v. Mills, 598 S.E.2d 480 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 28, 2004 | 278 Ga. 128, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 2123

...judge of the juvenile court of the Blue Ridge Circuit entered a second "standing order" superseding the original standing order that precipitated the lawsuit. [1] The second standing order is the focus of this appeal and was entered pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2), which governs the means by which a court seeks judicial assistance from another court in the county of the requesting court....
...n" of superior court was unconstitutional since it is not among the classes of courts listed in the Georgia Constitution as those in which the judicial power of the State is vested exclusively (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I); [5] and OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(D), which authorizes an intra-county request for permanent judicial assistance and which appellant contends appellee relied upon to form the Family Division of superior court, is unconstitutional in that it authorizes members of the...
...After examining the second standing order against appellant's challenges, the trial court granted summary judgment to appellee Judge Mills. The trial court found the second standing order was an intra-county request for judicial assistance governed by OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(D); the use of juvenile court judges in the superior court pursuant to an intra-county request for judicial assistance did not violate the constitutional requirement that superior court judges be elected; the Blue Ridge courts had n...
...urt judges; the second standing order had not created additional judgeships; the judicial assignments were not unconstitutional since they were temporary and in furtherance of assisting the functions of the superior court; and the provisions of OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(D) "are not unconstitutional as creating permanent judicial assisting positions." This appeal followed....
...VI, Sec. I, Par. III ("Provided the judge is otherwise qualified, a judge may exercise judicial power in any court upon the request and with the consent of the judges of that court and of the judge's own court under rules prescribed by law."). OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)-(m) contain the constitutionally-required "rules prescribed by law." The statute "recognizes that our courts, faced with ever-increasing demands on the judiciary, must be given flexibility to effectively utilize members of the judiciary in mutual assistance." Massey v....
...al position constitutionally required to be filled by election (1983 Ga. Const., Art. VI, § VII, Par. I) or by gubernatorial appointment until election (1983 Ga. Const., Art. V, § II, Par. VIII) is created by the exercise of the authority given in § 15-1-9.1(b)(2) to request intra-county judicial assistance. Furthermore, OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2) does not authorize the judiciary to make appointments to the bench; instead it provides the means to do that which is authorized by the Georgia Constitution — it permits a judicial officer from one court to exercise the power of a...
...[6] Accordingly, the intra-county request and response was neither an unconstitutional creation of a class of court nor an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative authority by members of the judiciary. 3. Earl takes issue with the trial court's determination upholding the constitutionality *484 of OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(D), which authorizes an intra-county request for judicial assistance when "[a] majority of the judges of the requesting court determines that the business of the court requires the permanent assistance of an additional judge or additional judges." (Emphasis supplied). Compare OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(C), which authorizes an intra-county request for judicial assistance when "[a] majority of the judges of the requesting court determines that the business of the court requires the temporary assistance of an additional judge or additional judges." The trial court made conflicting findings on this issue, finding the standing order's assignments to be temporary, and then concluding that OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(D) was not unconstitutional "as creating permanent judicial assisting positions." Because we agree with the trial court's assessment that the request for judicial assistance and the response thereto provided for temporary assistance...
...istance. Because the request and response for judicial assistance is for a specified time of limited duration and any court may withdraw from participation after giving 30 days' notice, it is temporary in nature and, accordingly, the subject of OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(C)....
...[7] Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. All the Justices concur, except FLETCHER, C.J., who concurs in judgment only. NOTES [1] "A chief judge of a requesting court or assisting court shall be presumed to act with the consent of all judges of the court." OCGA § 15-1-9.1(c)....
...[5] "The judicial power of the state shall be vested exclusively in the following classes of courts: magistrate courts, probate courts, juvenile courts, state courts, superior courts, Court of Appeals and Supreme Court." Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I. [6] Since OCGA § 15-1-9.1(f), which requires a written designation identifying the time period covered and the cases for which assistance is sought, is not applicable to an intra-county response to a request for judicial assistance ( Lewis v....
...I, which requires superior court judges to be elected, and Ga. Const.1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. III, which sets no temporal limitation on its authorization of a qualified judge to exercise judicial power in a court that requests assistance, we note that the 1998 amendment to OCGA § 15-1-9.1(b), adding subsection (D), provides the statutory authority to request permanent judicial assistance that was missing when Massey v....
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DeKalb Cnty. v. Adams, 272 Ga. 401 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 1, 2000 | 529 S.E.2d 610, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 1606

...s’s “grant” of the ex parte recusal motion could not divest Judge Fuller of jurisdiction over this case. Accordingly, we need not address Adams’s argument regarding the propriety of the assignment of the case to Judge Nation pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.1....
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McGuire Props., Inc. v. Byers, 278 Ga. 139 (Ga. 2004).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 28, 2004 | 598 S.E.2d 500

...Shortly thereafter, the court reconvened and entered a “Further Order of Interlocutory Injunction,” specifically enjoining McGuire from “selling or otherwise disposing of any interest in the Property or in the McGuire Security Deed.” 1. Senior Judges Ingram and White acted in this case pursuant to OCGA§ 15-1-9.1 (b) (2) (D)....
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Potts v. Zant, 263 Ga. 634 (Ga. 1993).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 3, 1993 | 437 S.E.2d 325, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 4349

...assification Center in Butts County, Georgia, where Respondent is warden. In his pursuit of habeas corpus relief, petitioner unsuccessfully sought the reassignment of his case upon the retirement of the judge to whom it was assigned pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.1 (b) (3).1 Recognizing that a number of jurisdictions within the *635state have resolved this question in a variety of ways,2 we granted petitioner’s application for interlocutory review to determine whether, upon the retirement of a judge assigned a death penalty habeas case pursuant to § 15-1-9.1, a new judge must be assigned pursuant to that statute. In January 1990, Respondent filed in the Superior Court of Butts County a habeas corpus petition seeking review of his murder conviction and death sentence. The following month, acting in response to a request made pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.1 (b) (3), the president of the Council of Superior Court Judges assigned the habeas petition to Judge Luther Alverson. In December 1992, petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition from his conviction and death sentence for kidnapping with bodily injury and, again acting in response to a request made pursuant to § 15-1-9.1, the president of the Council of Superior Court Judges assigned the habeas petition to Judge Elizabeth Glazebrook....
...Petitioner then sought consolidation of the two petitions and Judge Josephine Holmes Cook, who had succeeded Judge Alverson upon his retirement in 1992, held a hearing on the motion, at which she denied petitioner’s motion to have a new judge assigned to the murder habeas petition pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.1. Judge Cook subsequently consolidated the two habeas petitions, and signed a certificate of immediate review on her denial of petitioner’s motion for assignment of the case to a new judge. OCGA § 15-1-9.1 (b) (3) provides a method by which the superior court located in the county in which death row inmates are incarcerated is afforded relief when the volume of habeas petitions filed in capital cases impairs the business of that court....
...Substantial delay is inevitable when an experienced jurist dies, retires, or is removed from office and is succeeded by one newly elected or appointed. We conclude that a succeeding judge’s assumption of responsibility for a capital habeas corpus case assigned to the judge’s predecessor pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.1 (b) (3) defeats the goal of the statute....
...eassignment. Accordingly, the judgment in this case is reversed and the case remanded to the habeas court with direction that the president of the Council of Superior Court Judges be notified that the case is in need of reassignment pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.1 (b) (3).4 Decided December 3, 1993. Brian Mendelsohn, George E. Bushnell, Jr., for appellant. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Mary Beth Westmoreland, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for appel- Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur. OCGA § 15-1-9.1 (b) (3) provides: When a petition for habeas corpus relief is filed in a case in which the petitioner is under a sentence of death, the chief judge of the court where the petition is filed may make a request for judicial assistance to th...
...hall, under guidelines promulgated by the executive committee of said council, assign the case to a judge of a circuit other than the circuit in which the conviction and sentence were imposed. After the retirement of the judge assigned pursuant to § 15-1-9.1 in Lipham v....
...88-V-1675, the chief judge of the circuit in which the assigned judge sat reassigned the case to another judge in that circuit. Capital Habeas Corpus Guidelines: 1. When the President of the Council of Superior Court Judges (“President”) shall receive pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.1 a request for assistance in a habeas corpus case filed by a prisoner under sentence of death (“capital habeas corpus case”) the President shall request the name of a judge for assignment from the various Administrative Judges, in rota...