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O.C.G.A.Title 15Chapter 11

O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1 (2020)

Purpose of chapter

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2020 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest cited 1985–2025 84citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 84 opinions since 1985, 8 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (13 cases).

The purpose of this chapter is to secure for each child who comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court such care and guidance, preferably in his or her own home, as will secure his or her moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare as well as the safety of both the child and community. It is the intent of the General Assembly to promote a juvenile justice system that will protect the community, impose accountability for violations of law, provide treatment and rehabilitation, and equip juvenile offenders with the ability to live responsibly and productively. It is the intent of the General Assembly to preserve and strengthen family relationships, countenancing the removal of a child from his or her home only when state intervention is essential to protect such child and enable him or her to live in security and stability. In every proceeding, this chapter seeks to guarantee due process of law, as required by the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Georgia, through which every child and his or her parent and all other interested parties are assured fair hearings at which legal rights are recognized and enforced. Above all, this chapter shall be liberally construed to reflect that the paramount child welfare policy of this state is to determine and ensure the best interests of its children.

History

Code 1981, § 15-11-1, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.

Annotations

Cross references. - Programs and protection for children and youth, T. 49, C. 5.

Law reviews. - For comment on Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979), regarding

juvenile commitment to state mental hospitals upon application of parents or guardians, see 29 Emory L. J. 517 (1980). For comment, ‘‘Victim Offender Mediation: When Divergent Paths and Destroyed Lives Come Together for Healing,’’ see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 577 (2016). For comment, ‘‘Pre-Adjudication Access to Counsel for Juveniles,’’ see 69 Emory L.J. 359 (2019).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-101 and former Code Section 15-11-1, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor’s notes at the beginning of the chapter. Legislative intent for exclusive custody and control of committed juvenile. - Ga. L. 1963, p. 81 and Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, when construed in pari materia, evidence a legislative intent that, once the juvenile court judge in the judge’s discretion commits a juvenile to the Division for Children and Youth (now Department of Human Resources), custody and control of the juvenile is thereby and thereafter exclusively in the department. In re R.D., 141 Ga. App. 843, 234 S.E.2d 680 (1977); In re R.L.M., 171 Ga. App. 940, 321 S.E.2d 435 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1). Purpose of Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, as stated in Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1 was to ‘‘assist, protect, and restore’’ a child, and

therein was specific statutory intent that Ga. L. 1971, p. 709 shall be liberally construed to that end. P.R. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 346, 210 S.E.2d 839 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-101). Construction with former juvenile code provisions. - Stated purpose of the juvenile code to protect and restore children whose well-being was threatened supported a finding that the term ‘‘subsistence’’, as used in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-36), included expenses that might be incurred due to the need for emergency medical treatment of a child in the physical custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice. In the Interest of J.S., 282 Ga. 623, 652 S.E.2d 547 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1). Juvenile court’s primary responsibility is to consider the welfare of the child. Gardner v. Lenon, 154 Ga. App. 748, 270 S.E.2d 36 (1980) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 31); In re B.H., 190 Ga. App. 131, 378 S.E.2d 175 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1).

Authority to require letters of apology. - Juvenile court had the authority to order a juvenile defendant to write a 300-word letter of apology to a bailiff and a 500-word essay on appropriate behavior in court. In the Interest of P.W., 289 Ga. App. 323, 657 S.E.2d 270 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1). Orders terminating parental rights not beyond reach of court. - Legislature has declared that Ga. L. 1971, p. 709 should be construed toward the end of providing for a child’s welfare, ‘‘preferably in his own home.’’ To this end, the appellate courts will not declare orders terminating parental rights, removing the child permanently from the child’s own home, to be beyond the reach of the court issuing the order. To the contrary, the juvenile court judge who has second thoughts about such an action should take whatever steps necessary to ensure the correctness of the judge’s action. In re P.S.C., 143 Ga. App. 887, 240 S.E.2d 165 (1977) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1). Preference for preservation of family counsels against deprivation evidence. - Former statute counseled against any unreasoned expansion of the type of evidence which will suffice to show deprivation, and probable continued deprivation, causing or likely to cause serious harm to a child, because of the Code’s expressed preference for preservation of the family unit. Leyva v. Brooks, 145 Ga. App. 619, 244 S.E.2d 119 (1978) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1). Commitment of delinquent for purpose of rehabilitation or treatment. - Commitment of a delinquent child to a facility operated under the direction of the juvenile court, or to another local public authority, or to the Division of Children and Youth (now Department of Human Resources), or to the Department of Corrections is for essentially the purpose of rehabilitation or treatment. A.B.W. v. State, 231 Ga. 699, 203 S.E.2d 512 (1974) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1). Confinement of juvenile implies need of supervision, correction, and training. - Confinement as provided for by the juvenile code necessarily deprives the parents of their prima facie prerogative of training and supervision, and im-

plies that the juvenile is, within the terms of the juvenile law, one who is in need of supervision beyond the control of the juvenile’s parents and in need of correction and training which the parents cannot provide. Young v. State, 120 Ga. App. 605, 171 S.E.2d 756 (1969) (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1). Deprivation was supported by sufficient evidence. - Deprivation finding was supported by sufficient evidence which showed that the child victim suffered multiple fractures all over the body which indicated that the fractures occurred at different times, and the child had no disease predisposing the child to the fractures, and a doctor testified that the injuries were consistent with abusive non-accidental trauma. In the Interest of T.J., 273 Ga. App. 547, 615 S.E.2d 613 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1). Because the Department of Family and Children Services presented clear and convincing evidence of a parent’s inability to control a son to the extent necessary for that child’s mental, physical, and emotional health, and the parent was afforded sufficient due process, the juvenile court’s deprivation finding was upheld on appeal; moreover, absent evidence of a custody dispute, the proceeding was not a pretextual custody battle which divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction. In the Interest of D.T., 284 Ga. App. 336, 643 S.E.2d 842 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1). Under the circumstances in the mother’s case, the juvenile court correctly found that the evidence of the children’s deprivation was clear and convincing under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-1 and 15-11-2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-1 and 15-11-2) in that the evidence demonstrated that the minor children were not receiving adequate support for the children’s mental health issues. The uncontrolled behavior of the children related to those issues was negatively affecting the children’s academic and social well-being and there was also clear and convincing evidence that the mother was not utilizing available resources to address the children’s problems, and that the mother had attempted to have one of the children

hospitalized because she could not control the child; moreover, one of the children also exhibited severe mental health issues, including cutting herself and attacking other children, that were not adequately addressed. In the Interest of D. Q., 307 Ga. App. 121, 704 S.E.2d 444 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1). Custody questions may be resolved by juvenile court. - Generally, the purpose of former O.C.G.A. T. 15, C. 11 was not to settle questions of custody by and between the parents of a minor child or children. However, it was proper for the juvenile court to decide custody issues when properly transferred to that court by the superior court. Neal v. Washington, 158 Ga. App. 39, 279 S.E.2d 294 (1981) (decided under former Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1). No equal protection violation. - Treating deprived children who were placed in the legal custody of the Department of Families and Children Services because there was no relative committed to the child who was available for immediate placement differently from deprived children who did have a committed parent or guardian available for immediate placement did not violate the equal protection clause or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II as the classes were not similarly situated and the laws were rationally related to the goal of minimizing government intervention while ensuring that children were reared in a familial environment. In the Interest of A.N., 281 Ga. 58, 636 S.E.2d 496 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1).

Entry of Alford plea by juvenile. - Juvenile court erred by denying a juvenile’s request to enter an Alford plea since the Georgia General Assembly did not expressly prohibit the entry of Alford pleas in juvenile court, and the juvenile court was required to construe O.C.G.A. § 15-11-580 liberally to ensure the juvenile’s best interests. In the Interest of B. C., 333 Ga. App. 763, 777 S.E.2d 52 (2015). Commitment to Department of Juvenile Justice proper. - Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice harmonized with the goals set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1 and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In the Interest of B. Q. L. E., 297 Ga. App. 273, 676 S.E.2d 742, cert. denied, No. S09C1197, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 787 (Ga. 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1). Juvenile court had no authority to impose attorney fees. - Juvenile court properly concluded that the court had no authority to impose attorney fees under the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, because the juvenile court had not adopted O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, and there was no implicit attorney fee award for frivolous litigation in the former Juvenile Court Code, former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1 et seq.; the Act does not apply to juvenile courts. In re T.M.M.L., 313 Ga. App. 638, 722 S.E.2d 386 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1). Cited in In the Interest of C. A. J., 331 Ga. App. 788, 771 S.E.2d 457 (2015); In the Interest of D. H., 332 Ga. App. 274, 772 S.E.2d 70 (2015).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Appoint guardian in deprivation proceedings. - Under the principle that the former Juvenile Court Code was to be liberally construed toward the protection of the child whose well-being is threatened, deprivation proceedings arising from child abuse and neglect by a parent or caretaker present a conflict of interest, wherein the provisions of Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1 concerning the appointment of a

guardian ad litem would apply. 1976 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 76-131 (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1). Juvenile Court Code (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1 et seq.) and the Children and Youth Act (see now O.C.G.A. § 49-5-1 et seq.) should be read in pari materia. 1980 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 80-53 (decided under Ga. L. 1971, p. 709, § 1).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 13 et seq. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, § 1 et seq. C.J.S. - 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 5 et seq. U.L.A. - Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 1.

ALR. - Parent’s involuntary confinement, or failure to care for child as result thereof, as evincing neglect, unfitness, or the like in dependency or divestiture proceeding, 79 A.L.R.3d 417.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENIn the Interest of T.b., a Child, 874 S.E.2d 101 (Ga. 2022).
cites § 15-11-1 4×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“Juvenile-court proceedings are governed by the Juvenile 9 Code, OCGA § 15-11-1 et seq. Accordingly, to determine whether insanity defenses under OCGA §§ 16-3-2 and 16-3-3 are available to children charged with delinquency in juvenile-court proceedings, we turn first to the…”
Later courts cite it for
“conduct cannot be characterized as a 'crime' unless, at a minimum, the conduct satisfies both the 'act' element and the 'intention' element of the statutory offense.” · 1 citing court
2
GREENIn the Interest of B. Q. L. E., 676 S.E.2d 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 15-11-1 8×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“cites OCGA § 15-11-1, which mandates that the Juvenile Proceedings Chapter 4 be liberally construed to this end: (1) That children whose well-being is threatened shall be assisted and protected and restored, if possible, as secure law-abiding members of society; (2) That each…”
3
GREENBishop v. State, 462 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1995).
cites § 15-11-1 4×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“The decision to prosecute a minor in superior court, with the goal of inflicting severe punishment on the child for the act, rather than in juvenile court, where the goal is to restore the child as a secure, law-abiding member of society (OCGA § 15-11-1), has an everlasting…”
The case’s holding
A statute conferring superior court jurisdiction over all juveniles accused of a felony does not violate the separation of powers, due process, or equal protection clauses.
4
GREENKenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
cites § 15-11-1 2×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“See O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-1 (“This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end .”
The case’s holding
A state waives its right to seek abstention under the Younger doctrine by voluntarily removing a case from state court to federal court.
Later courts cite it for
“who have had, or are subject to the risk of having, their adoption delayed or denied on the basis of their race or color,” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENIn re Interest of I.L.M., 816 S.E.2d 620 (Ga. 2018).
cites § 15-11-1 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“In July 2015, the Juvenile Court of Cherokee County terminated the parental rights of a father and a mother as to their three minor children, I.L.M., I.T.M., and B.M. On October 8, 2015, in a separate case, the Cherokee County Department of Family and Children Services ("DFCS")…”
6
GREENIn the Interest of E. P. N., 388 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 15-11-1 4×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“Regarding appellant's first enumeration of error of lack of jurisdiction, the juvenile court clearly had jurisdiction over the subject matter in this case, that is, termination of parental rights.”
The case’s holding
On appeal, a termination of parental rights stands if any rational trier of fact could find by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent's custody rights were lost.
Later courts cite it for
“(t)he appropriate standard of appellate review . . . is whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent's rights to custody were lost. . . .” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENIn the Interest of B. H., 378 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 15-11-1 4×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“” Thus, the reason the mother was deprived of custody was her refusal to protect the child by even considering the possibility that the father could have abused the child and her consequent unwillingness to remove the child from the danger presented by living with the father.”
Later courts cite it for
“this is so regardless of specific fault on the part of the mother. cits.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENIn the Interest of MMA, 332 S.E.2d 39 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 15-11-1 8×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“However, "the purpose of the Juvenile Court Code of Georgia [OCGA § 15-11-1 et seq.] is not to settle questions of custody by and between the parents of a minor child .”
9
GREENIn the Interest of D. T., 643 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 15-11-1 2×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“OCGA§ 15-11-1 (1).” In the Interest of B.”
10
GREENBagby v. State, 552 S.E.2d 807 (Ga. 2001).
cites § 15-11-1 4×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“See OCGA § 15-11-1. It is firmly established that criminal statutes must be strictly construed against the State.”
11
GREENIn the Interest of S. H., 469 S.E.2d 810 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 15-11-1 2×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“argues that the juvenile court violated his due process rights by adjudicating him delinquent and depriving him of his liberty when he was not competent to understand the nature of the pro *571 ceedings or assist in his own defense. We agree. The stated purpose of the Juvenile…”
Later courts cite it for
“the juvenile charged with delinquency is entitled by right to have the court apply those common law jurisprudential principles which experience and reason have shown are necessary to give the accused the essence of a fair trial; wjithout question, these include the right to adequate notice of the charges, appointment of counsel, the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront opposing witnesses.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENIn the Interest of A. N., 636 S.E.2d 496 (Ga. 2006).
cites § 15-11-1 2×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“See OCGA § 15-11-1. The laws in question are rationally related to the achievement of this goal because, in cases where a committed adult or relative is available for immediate placement, a deprived child may be placed with this familial figure and governmental intrusion into…”
Later courts cite it for
“placement or a change of legal custody by the court outside the department of human services shall relieve the department of further responsibility for the child so placed.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENIn re Tidwell, 632 S.E.2d 690 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 15-11-1 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“and OCGA § 15-11-1 et seq. are to be considered in pari materia.”
14
GREENIn the Interest of A. A., 667 S.E.2d 641 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 15-11-1 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“OCGA § 15-11-1 (1).” In the Interest of B.”
Later courts cite it for
“although a parent may plead the fifth amendment in juvenile protection proceedings, if a parent does so, the trial court may infer that a truthful answer would be harmful” · 1 citing court
15
GREENKenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
cites § 15-11-1 2×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“In answering this question, the Court is guided by the Georgia Code’s direction that statutory provisions governing juvenile proceedings “shall be liberally construed to the end .”
16
GREENIn the Interest of M. R., 444 S.E.2d 866 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 15-11-1 2×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“‘A termination hearing seeks above all else the welfare of the child, with due regard for the rights of the natural and adoptive parents.”
The case’s holding
Termination is proper where clear and convincing evidence shows a parent failed to comply with a reunification plan for over a year.
17
GREENIn the Interest of D. Q., 704 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 15-11-1 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“The juvenile court also found that the mother’s explanation of their present living arrangements was not credible, and put the children at risk for abuse.”
18
GREENIn the Interest of Q. H., 662 S.E.2d 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 15-11-1 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“See OCGA § 15-11-1 (1). See In the Interest of J.”
19
GREENIn the Interest of B. G., 484 S.E.2d 293 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 15-11-1 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“As OCGA § 15-11-1 makes clear, the laws allowing termination of parental rights are designed to protect children.”
20
GREENIn the Interest of Davis, 546 A.2d 1149 (Pa. 1988).
cites § 15-11-1 2×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 15-11-1
“Comparison of our Juvenile Act with the juvenile act of Georgia, Ga.Code Ann. § 15-11-1 to 15-11-65 (1985 & Supp.”
Later courts cite it for
“a juvenile has the same substantial interest in retaining his liberty as an adult.” · 3 citing courts

Show all 84 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198520052025

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 1997. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.61Ga.17N.D. Ga.3N.D.2Pa.1
By subsection
(1)13 cases
Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005).“In answering this question, the Court is guided by the Georgia Code’s direction that statutory provisions governing juvenile proceedings “shall be liberally construed to the end .”
In re Aps, 696 S.E.2d 483 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
In re Qh, 662 S.E.2d 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
In re Tj, 615 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
In re Dt, 643 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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