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Call Now: 904-383-7448Voluntary statements made in the course of intake screening of a child alleged to be or adjudicated as a delinquent child or in the course of his or her treatment, any evaluation, or any other related services shall be inadmissible in any adjudication hearing in which such child is the accused and shall not be considered by the court except such statement shall be admissible as rebuttal or impeachment evidence.
(Code 1981, §15-11-479, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-1402, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-19, and former Code Section 15-11-47, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Rule as to confessions of juveniles should be same as that for confessions of adults because law enforcement officers cannot be certain when officers question a juvenile what kind of case may develop, and the statutory safeguards are applicable to both criminal and juvenile cases. Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321, 240 S.E.2d 824 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1402) Jackson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 375, 246 S.E.2d 407 (1978);(decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1402).
- Failure to comply with the statutory safeguards renders a confession of a juvenile inadmissible in evidence. Bussey v. State, 144 Ga. App. 875, 243 S.E.2d 99 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1402).
Failure to comply with the statutory safeguards renders confession of a juvenile inadmissible even in a criminal case where a juvenile is tried as an adult. Manning v. State, 162 Ga. App. 494, 292 S.E.2d 95 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19).
- Confession obtained from a juvenile in violation of the statute was inadmissible in a hearing to determine the delinquency of a juvenile. J.J. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 660, 218 S.E.2d 668 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1402).
- Because the undisputed evidence established that a juvenile defendant was informed of the right to have a parent present during an interview with police in which a custodial statement was obtained, but did not invoke that right, there was no error in allowing the juvenile defendant's statement into evidence. Green v. State, 282 Ga. 672, 653 S.E.2d 23 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-47).
- Juvenile defendant's confession was admissible despite the fact that the defendant was not taken before an impartial juvenile intake officer but a member of the county police department since the defendant's mother was present during the juvenile's interrogation and it was not alleged that the officer failed to perform any duty imposed upon the officer. Worthy v. State, 253 Ga. 661, 324 S.E.2d 431 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19).
Issue of whether officer to whom juvenile was taken and to whom the juvenile made a confession was a "juvenile court intake officer" did not affect the admissibility of the statement since Miranda warnings were given and the juvenile's mother was present. Houser v. State, 173 Ga. App. 378, 326 S.E.2d 513 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19).
Language of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-133,15-11-501, and15-11-502) requiring the bringing of a child before juvenile authorities was directory and did not serve to render inadmissible a juvenile's confession if the juvenile's rights were otherwise protected, such as if the juvenile's father was present and was continually apprised of the questioning. W.G.C. v. State, 173 Ga. App. 528, 327 S.E.2d 522 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19).
- Police officer's failure to bring juvenile initially to juvenile court did not render the 14-year old's confession inadmissible since the confession was obtained only after the juvenile waived the juvenile's rights knowingly and voluntarily, and with the knowledge and consent of both the juvenile's mother and legal guardian. In re J.D.G., 207 Ga. App. 698, 429 S.E.2d 118 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19).
Since the defendant's statement was knowingly and intelligently given before officers had an opportunity to take the juvenile anywhere, former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-133,15-11-501, and15-11-502) was neither implicated nor violated. McKoon v. State, 266 Ga. 149, 465 S.E.2d 272 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-19, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
- Officers of the juvenile division of the sheriff's department may not also serve as juvenile court intake officers for purposes of compliance with former statutory provisions. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-66 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19).
No results found for Georgia Code 15-11-479.