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2018 Georgia Code 15-11-19 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 15-11-19 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 15-11-19

TITLE 15 COURTS

Section 11. Juvenile Code, 15-11-1 through 15-11-747.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

15-11-19. Rights of parties to proceedings.

  1. A party has the right to be present, to be heard, to present evidence material to the proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, to examine pertinent court files and records, and to appeal the orders of the court; provided, however, that the court shall retain the discretion to exclude a child from any part or parts of any proceeding under Article 3 of this chapter if the court determines that it is not in such child's best interests to be present. An attorney for an excluded child shall not be excluded from the proceedings.
  2. A person afforded rights under this chapter shall be advised of such rights at that person's first appearance before the court.

(Code 1981, §15-11-19, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)

Law reviews.

- For article discussing due process in juvenile court procedures in California and Georgia, in light of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), see 8 Ga. St. B. J. 9 (1971). For article, "Termination of Parental Rights: Recent Judicial and Legislative Trends," see 30 Emory L. J. 1065 (1981). For survey article on appellate practice and procedure, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 21 (2007). For comment, "School Bullies - They Aren't Just Students: Examining School Interrogations and the Miranda Warning," see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 731 (2008).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002, pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-31 and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-7(a), which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Right to cross-examine adverse witnesses guaranteed by former Code 1933, § 24A-2002 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19) was afforded upon request according to former Code 1933, § 24A-2201 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-56 and15-11-65). A.C.G. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 156, 205 S.E.2d 435 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002).

Private interview of child by father's counsel not necessary.

- Requiring a child to submit privately and alone to an interview by his father's counsel is not necessary. The father's rights provided by statute are adequate and proper to ensure him a fair hearing. In re L.L.W., 141 Ga. App. 32, 232 S.E.2d 378 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002).

Former Code 1933, § 24A-2002 was implementation of constitutional right of due process. In re L.L.W., 141 Ga. App. 32, 232 S.E.2d 378 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002).

Fair trial required.

- Adjudicatory phase of a delinquency proceeding is the functional equivalent of the trial in the regular criminal or civil process, and a juvenile charged with delinquency is entitled by right to have the court apply those common law jurisprudential principles which experience and reason have shown are necessary to give the accused the essence of a fair trial; those principles include the privilege against self-incrimination and the right of cross-examination under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-7(a) and (b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-19 and15-11-28). In the Interest of J.C., 257 Ga. App. 657, 572 S.E.2d 21 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-7).

Right to confront accusers.

- Under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-7(a), juveniles were entitled to confront their accusers through cross-examination during a delinquency proceeding's adjudicatory phase. In the Interest of J.C., 257 Ga. App. 657, 572 S.E.2d 21 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-7).

Minor with mental disability may confess.

- Mere showing that one who confessed to crime may have suffered from some mental disability is not a sufficient basis upon which to exclude the statement. Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 282 S.E.2d 301 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-31).

Age alone is not determinative of whether a person can waive one's rights. Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 282 S.E.2d 301 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-31).

Waiver of rights upheld on appeal absent clear error.

- Question of whether or not a defendant is capable or incapable of making a knowing and intelligent waiver of the defendant's rights is to be answered by the trial judge and will be accepted by an appellate court unless such determination is clearly erroneous. Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 282 S.E.2d 301 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-31).

Transfer hearings must meet essentials of due process and fair treatment.

- Transfer hearings are critically important proceedings affecting important rights of the juvenile. While a hearing need not conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing, the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. R.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d 810 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002).

When former Code 1933, §§ 24A-2002 and 24A-2501 are read together, a juvenile faced with the possible transfer of the juvenile's case from juvenile court to "the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense" has the right to an evidentiary hearing at which the juvenile must be given "the opportunity to introduce evidence and otherwise be heard in his own behalf and to cross-examine adverse witnesses." R.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d 810 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002).

Statutory provisions regarding transfer of juvenile case must be followed.

- Under former Code 1933, § 24A-2501 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-561), the juvenile court had discretion to determine whether there are "reasonable grounds" to order the transfer only after conducting an evidentiary hearing required under former paragraph (a)(1) of that section. The juvenile court may not simply "waive" juvenile jurisdiction and deny appellant the right to an evidentiary hearing on the "reasonable grounds" for the transfer. R.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d 810 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002).

Court must conduct evidentiary hearing on transfer.

- If the juvenile court judge refused to conduct a hearing at which evidence bearing upon the "transfer criteria" listed in former Code 1933, § 24A-2501 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-181,15-11-400,15-11-421,15-11-441, and15-11-582) could be introduced, the judgment of the juvenile court transferring jurisdiction must be reversed and the case remanded for an appropriate evidentiary hearing. R.S. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d 810 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-2002).

Fair trial not found.

- Juvenile did not receive a fair trial since the juvenile was not permitted to confront the state's witness, and was questioned without being sworn or advised of the right to remain silent, and the consequences of foregoing that right. In the Interest of J.C., 257 Ga. App. 657, 572 S.E.2d 21 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-7).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 102, 112.

C.J.S.

- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 199 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 27.

ALR.

- Power of juvenile court to require children to testify, 151 A.L.R. 1229.

Applicability of rules of evidence in juvenile delinquency proceeding, 43 A.L.R.2d 1128.

Voluntariness and admissibility of minor's confession, 87 A.L.R.2d 624.

Defense of infancy in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 83 A.L.R.4th 1135.

Applicability of rules of evidence to juvenile transfer, waiver, or certification hearings, 37 A.L.R.5th 703.

Juvenile's guilty or no contest plea in adult court as waiver of defects in transfer or certification proceedings, 74 A.L.R.5th 453.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19

Total Results: 15  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Hanifa v. State, 505 S.E.2d 731 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 157 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 21, 1998 | 269 Ga. 797

...Since the evidence supports the trial court's determination that the statement was voluntarily given, the trial court did not err in ruling in favor of the admissibility of the statement. Yorker v. State, 266 Ga. 615(4), 469 S.E.2d 158 (1996). Hanifa also complains that the authorities violated OCGA § 15-11-19(a)(3) because they failed to bring her before the juvenile court or to contact a juvenile intake officer. The statute's requirements are directed at persons "taking a child into custody...." OCGA § 15-11-19(a)....
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State v. McBride, 401 S.E.2d 484 (Ga. 1991).

Cited 54 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 18, 1991 | 261 Ga. 60

...They were immediately *488 taken to police headquarters and interrogated individually. Chris and Phillip were each interrogated in the presence of a juvenile court officer. The trial court found that with regard to Chris McBride and Phillip McBride, the police violated OCGA § 15-11-19(a)(4) in that they failed to take the juveniles immediately before the superior court. The trial court also found that the officers violated OCGA § 15-11-19(c) in that they failed to contact the parents of the juveniles....
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Rhode v. State, 552 S.E.2d 855 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 49 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 1, 2001 | 274 Ga. 377, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 2957

...Rhode also argues that these juvenile confessions should have been suppressed because law enforcement officers did not, prior to their making, bring him before a juvenile court or contact a juvenile court intake officer for a determination of whether he should have been released or detained. See OCGA § 15-11-19(a)(3); OCGA § 15-11-31(b)....
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Worthy v. State, 324 S.E.2d 431 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 45 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 7, 1985 | 253 Ga. 661

...339 (1) (223 SE2d 703) (1976); Williams v. State, 238 Ga. 298 (1) (232 SE2d 535) (1977); Corn v. State, 240 Ga. 130 (3) (240 SE2d 694) (1977). The defendant also challenges the admissibility of his confession because he was not taken before an impartial juvenile intake officer. See OCGA § 15-11-19 (a) (3)....
...ot taken before a duly authorized intake officer. One purpose of requiring that a juvenile court intake officer be notified of the arrest of a juvenile is to insure that the juvenile is detained, if at all, as prescribed in the Juvenile Code. OCGA §§ 15-11-19 (a) (3), 15-11-20....
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Gilliam v. State, 492 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. 1997).

Cited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 6, 1997 | 268 Ga. 690, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 3718

...tly take him before juvenile authorities, and because his mother was not present during the police interviews. Failure of the police to promptly take Gilliam before the juvenile court or to contact a juvenile court intake officer as provided by OCGA § 15-11-19(a)(3) does not, as a matter of law, make the confession inadmissible....
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In the Interest of R. D. F., 466 S.E.2d 572 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 29, 1996 | 266 Ga. 294, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 362

...474, 475, 378 S.E.2d 898 (1989) (holding that unlike rulings on speedy trial motions under OCGA § 17-7-170, there is no right of direct appeal from rulings denying motion to dismiss for non-compliance with OCGA § 15-11-26). The failure to comply with OCGA § 15-11-26(a), like the failure to comply with OCGA §§ 15-11-19 and 15-11-21, results in dismissal of the petition without prejudice, [2] see Sanchez, supra at 411, 229 S.E.2d 66, and we disapprove any interpretation of Sanchez to the contrary....
...2260, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973)); E.S. v. State of Ga., 134 Ga.App. 724(1), 215 S.E.2d 732 (1975) (citing OCGA § 17-7-170). Compare Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family & Children Services, supra at 411, 229 S.E.2d 66 (holding that a non-compliance with the provisions of OCGA §§ 15-11-19(a) and 15-11-21(c) will result in a dismissal without prejudice)....
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Lattimore v. State, 265 Ga. 102 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 6, 1995 | 454 S.E.2d 474

...Appellant contends the denial of his motion to suppress his custodial statement was error because (a) the statement was made while he was in custody as the result of an illegal arrest under color of a warrant not supported by probable cause and (b) because the statement was obtained in violation of OCGA § 15-11-19....
...(b) Two days after the warrant was issued, appellant, accompanied by his father, turned himself in to the Department of Youth Services. Appellant was arrested there and taken to the police department where he gave the statement he sought to suppress. It is uncontroverted that the police did not comply with OCGA § 15-11-19 *104 (a)....
...Lattimore's motion for new trial, filed on March 4, 1994, was denied in its amended form on June 6, 1994. A notice of appeal was filed on July 6, 1994 and the appeal was docketed in this Court on July 21, 1994. This appeal was submitted for decision without oral argument on September 12, 1994. [2] OCGA § 15-11-19 (a) requires a person taking a child into custody "with all reasonable speed and without first taking the child elsewhere" to (1) release the child without bond to his custodian; (2) take the child to a medical facility when applicable; (...
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Howe v. State, 301 S.E.2d 280 (Ga. 1983).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 5, 1983 | 250 Ga. 811

...According to the interrogating officer, she simply told her son to tell the truth. She remained with Howe during the rest of the interview and the signing of the written statement. A juvenile officer was called and was present during the interview, although he did not remain in the same room at all times. See OCGA § 15-11-19 (a) (3) (Code Ann....
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McKoon v. State, 465 S.E.2d 272 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 8, 1996 | 266 Ga. 149, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 175

...McKoon contends that his initial custodial statement, given while en route to the sheriff's department, was improperly admitted because it was (a) coerced by the officer's remark that he wanted to try the keys at the Stroud residence; (b) made in violation of OCGA § 15-11-19(a)(4); (c) given outside the presence of a family member; and (d) after he requested the assistance of counsel....
...See generally Spence v. State, 252 Ga. 338(2), 313 S.E.2d 475 (1984). McKoon also asserts that the statutory procedural safeguards protecting the rights of juveniles were violated because he was not brought directly before the superior court as required by OCGA § 15-11-19(a)(4). Since the statement at issue was knowingly and intelligently given before the officers had an opportunity to take McKoon anywhere, OCGA § 15-11-19(a)(4) was neither implicated nor violated....
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Burnham v. State, 265 Ga. 129 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 13, 1995 | 453 S.E.2d 449

...of two officers; and there was no evidence that appellant had previously refused to give a statement or subsequently repudiated the statement. Appellant contends his statement was not voluntary because his *133 parents were not contacted (see OCGA § 15-11-19 (c))[5] and because his guardian who was present when he was questioned "did not act on [his] behalf." OCGA § 15-11-19 (c) requires officers who take a juvenile into custody to notify promptly the court and the child's parent, guardian, or other custodian that the child is in custody and the reasons for that custody. The police notified appellant's guardian of his arrest and, within an hour of that arrest, the guardian was at police headquarters with appellant. By notifying appellant's guardian of his arrest and the grounds therefor, the police complied with § 15-11-19 (c)....
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Brown v. Scott, 464 S.E.2d 607 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 4, 1995 | 266 Ga. 44

...ts of office. See Fowler v. Mitcham, 249 Ga. 400, 401, 291 S.E.2d 515 (1982). A juvenile intake officer is appointed by the judge of the juvenile court to determine whether a child who has been taken into custody should be released or retained. OCGA § 15-11-19....
...s police officers and juvenile intake officers. We conclude that the superior court was correct. When the police take a juvenile into custody, they must bring him immediately before the juvenile court or contact a juvenile court intake officer. OCGA § 15-11-19(a)(3)....
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State v. Whetstone, 264 Ga. 135 (Ga. 1994).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 25, 1994 | 441 S.E.2d 842, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 1433

...NOTES [1] Our opinion herein is further buttressed by our review of the statutory mandates which direct law enforcement officers to take suspect juveniles "with all reasonable speed and without first taking the child elsewhere" to an appropriate facility (OCGA § 15-11-19) and only those facilities authorized by OCGA § 15-11-20 (a)....
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Barber v. State, 481 S.E.2d 813 (Ga. 1997).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 24, 1997 | 267 Ga. 521, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 611

...e crimes for which he was convicted. [3] 2. We find no merit to Barber's contention that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a statement that Barber *814 made to the police. [4] Furthermore, the failure of the police to comply with OCGA § 15-11-19(a)(3) did not, by itself, render Barber's statement inadmissible....
...State, 264 Ga. 861, 862, 452 S.E.2d 505 (1995); McKoon v. State, 266 Ga. 149, 150, 465 S.E.2d 272 (1996). [5] Lattimore v. State, 265 Ga. 102, 104(2)(b), 454 S.E.2d 474 (1995). In Lattimore, we held that "incriminating statements obtained in violation of [OCGA § 15-11-19] are not rendered per se inadmissible, State v....
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Simon v. State, 269 Ga. 208 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 19, 1998 | 497 S.E.2d 231

...r in admitting Simon’s statement into evidence. See Roper v. State, 263 Ga. 201, 203 (2) (429 SE2d 668) (1993). McKoon v. State, 266 Ga. 149, 150 (2) (465 SE2d 272) (1996); Berry v. State, 267 Ga. 605, 610 (8) (481 SE2d 203) (1997). See OCGA § 15-11-19 (a) (3). Barber v....
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Thompson v. State, 260 Ga. 820 (Ga. 1991).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 31, 1991 | 400 S.E.2d 312

...n Division 4 of Woodard v. State, supra at 826. 5. The trial court did not err in denying the appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant appeared in juvenile court for a detention hearing pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-19, and a detention order was issued....