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2018 Georgia Code 15-11-53 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 15-11-53 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 15-11-53

TITLE 15 COURTS

Section 11. Juvenile Code, 15-11-1 through 15-11-747.

ARTICLE 2 JUVENILE COURT ADMINISTRATION

15-11-53. Practice of law by judges.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any full-time juvenile court judge to engage in any practice of law outside his or her role as a juvenile court judge.
  2. It shall be unlawful for a part-time judge of any juvenile court to engage directly or indirectly in the practice of law in his or her own name or in the name of another as a partner in any manner in any case, proceeding, or matter of any kind in the court to which he or she is assigned or in any other court in any case, proceeding, or any other matters of which it has pending jurisdiction or has had jurisdiction.
  3. It shall be unlawful for any juvenile court judge, full time or part time, to give advice or counsel to any person on any matter of any kind whatsoever which has arisen directly or indirectly in court, except such advice or counsel as a judge is called upon to give while performing the duties of a juvenile court judge.

(Code 1981, §15-11-53, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)

Cross references.

- Judges shall regulate their extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Validity and application of state statute prohibiting judge from practicing law, 17 A.L.R.4th 829.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 15-11-53

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Menard v. Fairchild, 328 S.E.2d 721 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 24, 1985 | 254 Ga. 275

...In this workers' compensation case the State Board made an award in favor of a natural child arising out of the accidental death of his father. The Superior Court of Bibb County reversed, holding, among other things, that the termination of the father's parental *276 rights to the child pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-53 [1] precluded an award. An application to appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals and we granted certiorari to determine if the conclusive presumption of dependency created by OCGA § 34-9-13 (b) (3) [2] is defeated by termination of parental rights under OCGA § 15-11-53....
...477 (317 SE2d 225) (1984), to hold Housing Systems, Inc. was not a statutory employer. The right of Christopher to a claim for benefits was decided adversely to him on the theory such rights *277 were terminated by the Juvenile Court in its order under OCGA § 15-11-53. 1. Our function in this case is to determine the intention of the legislature in enacting OCGA § 15-11-53....
...oned, deprived, or unsupported. An adoption does more. A new relationship between the child and the adopting parents is created. Old ties may interfere with the new relationship. Consider the effect of an order terminating parental rights under OCGA § 15-11-53 and compare that section with the effect of a decree of adoption under OCGA § 19-8-14 (a). [3] The former merely terminates the rights and obligations flowing between a parent and child. They remain parent and child. The latter alters their status. They are no longer parent and child. Notice that the termination statute, OCGA § 15-11-53, provides that the order terminates "....
...of parent and child. After an adoption decree the status of parent and child no longer exists between the natural parent and child but exists between the child and the adopting parent. OCGA § 19-8-14 (a) (2). As we view the legislative intent OCGA § 15-11-53 was aimed at putting an end to the rights and obligations between parent and child, but not as to any third party....
...kers' compensation benefits arising out of the death of Alfred Michael Bird. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the Justices concur, except Marshall, P. J., and Bell, J., who dissent as to Division 1 and the judgment. NOTES [1] OCGA § 15-11-53....