O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
(a) No person who is serving as a full-time juvenile court judge shall at the same time hold the office of judge of any other class of court of this state. (b) No person serving as a juvenile court judge after being elected juvenile court judge pursuant to a local law authorized by a constitutional amendment shall at the same time hold the office of judge of any other class of court of this state. (c) Nothing in this Code section shall prevent any duly appointed or elected juvenile court judge from sitting by designation as a superior court judge pursuant to Code Section 15-1-9.1.
History
Code 1981, § 15-11-56, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.
Annotations
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-3 and 15-11-18 are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor’s notes at the beginning of the chapter. Appointment of retired superior court judge. - Superior court judge who retires under either of the two superior court judges retirement systems may be appointed to serve as a juvenile court judge; however, with one limited exception, his or her eligibility for senior judge status under either system will be suspended or delayed while appointed to that
office. 1991 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 91-9 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-3). Appointment of superior court judge as juvenile court judge. - Senior superior court judge, who was not being appointed in that senior judge capacity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-1-9.1, may be appointed to serve as a part-time state-funded juvenile court judge and, so long as the hours worked annually do not exceed 1040 hours, there is no effect on the senior judge’s retirement. 2000 Op. Atty. Gen. No. U2000-9 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-18).
Notes of Decisions
In re Interest of I.L.M., 816 S.E.2d 620 (Ga. 2018).
· cites it 4× “294, and a simple statutory change of definition from "deprived" to "dependent" was not the only alteration made.”
In the Interest of F. C., 549 S.E.2d 125 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 6× “However, under OCGA § 15-11-56 (c), in all proceedings involving custody of a child, all information helpful in determining the questions presented, including oral and written reports, may be received by the court and relied upon to the extent of its probative value even though…”
In the Interest of R. G., 547 S.E.2d 729 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 6× “They further argue that under OCGA § 15-11-56 (c), such an evaluation is admissible only in dispositional hearings, not in hearings on termination petitions.”
In the Interest of T. A. M., 634 S.E.2d 456 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 2× “” OCGA § 15-11-56 (a). “To the degree any such information contained hearsay, the courts are presumed to have disregarded it.”
In the Interest of C. D. E., 546 S.E.2d 837 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 4× “See also OCGA § 15-11-56 (b) (1). (Citations and punctuation omitted.”
In the Interest of M. C., 653 S.E.2d 120 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 2× “As we have previously noted, “in all proceedings involving custody of a child, all information helpful in determining the questions presented, including oral and written reports, may be received by the court and relied upon to the extent of its probative value even though not…”
Rokowski v. Gilbert, 620 S.E.2d 509 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 2× “1, 4 (2) ( 570 SE2d 79 ) (2002) (construing OCGA § 15-11-56 (a)).”
In the Interest of E. C., 609 S.E.2d 381 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 2× “Pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-56, in a custody matter or dispositional proceeding, “all information helpful in determining the questions presented, including oral and written reports, may be received by the court and relied upon to the extent of its probative value even though not…”
In the Interest of I. L. M., Child., 304 Ga. 114 (Ga. 2018).
· cites it 4× “was decided, a juvenile court had statutory authority to grant a continuance in a deprivation hearing, see former OCGA § 15-11-56 (b),16 but authority for the statement that it could do so for 16 When the opinion of In the Interest of D.”
In the Interest of T. D. B., 597 S.E.2d 537 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 2× “In fact, the court told the parties several times during the hearing that it would be able to separate hearsay from nonhearsay testimony, and that it would assign no weight to hearsay, regardless ofwhether there was an objection.”
In the Interest of W. P. H., 549 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 2× “365 ( 291 SE2d 233 ) (1982); OCGA § 15-11-56 (a), (b) (1). The definition of a deprived child, under OCGA § 15-11-2 (8) (A), focuses upon the child’s needs — not parental fault.”
— 15-11-56(a) — 13 cases
In Re Qh, 662 S.E.2d 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
In Re Tdb, 597 S.E.2d 537 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
In Re Dr, 681 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
In Re Ak, 612 S.E.2d 581 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
In Re Tam, 634 S.E.2d 456 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
— 15-11-56(b)(1) — 1 case
In Re Cde, 546 S.E.2d 837 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
— 15-11-56(c) — 7 cases
In Re Rg, 547 S.E.2d 729 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
In Re Fc, 549 S.E.2d 125 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
In Re Cns, 545 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
In Re Oj, 570 S.E.2d 79 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
In Re Aa, 555 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.