...ia law allowed a juvenile defendant to directly appeal an order transferring a case from juvenile to superior court because such orders were determined to be final judgments. See, e.g., J.T.M. v. State, 142 Ga. App. 635, 236 S.E.2d 764 (1977) ; OCGA § 15-11-3, as it provided in 2012.1 When the General *326Assembly significantly revised Georgia's Juvenile Code, see Ga....

...aw allowed a juvenile defendant to directly appeal an order transferring a case from juvenile to superior court because such orders were determined to be final judgments. See, e.g., J. T. M. v. State, 142 Ga. App. 635 (236 SE2d 764) (1977); OCGA § 15-11-3, as it provided in 2012.1 When the General Assembly 1 In all cases of final judgments of a juvenile court judge, appeals shall be taken to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court in the same manner as appeals from the superior court....

...d support. Both parties filed motions for contempt in superior court, which were resolved in a consent order entered in 2005. The parties soon filed contempt motions again and also sought modification of custody and *405 visitation. Pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-30.1(b), the superior court transferred the action to the juvenile court for investigation and determination. Father requested child support in accordance with OCGA § 19-6-15. See OCGA §§ 15-11-28(c)(1), 15-11-30.1(b)....

...their own attorney fees." Father filed a motion to set aside the final judgment and a motion for new trial which were denied on May 20, 2009. Father appeals from that order pursuant to our grant of his application for discretionary appeal. See OCGA § 15-11-3....

...It follows that OCGA § 16-6-3 "is not invalid as depriving [appellant] of equal protection of the law." Barnes v. State, supra at 305 (1). 2. Appellant enumerates the general grounds, urging that the evidence did not show his delinquency "beyond a reasonable doubt" as required by OCGA § 15-11-33 (c)....

...Appellant's motion was denied after it was heard by another juvenile court judge and the denial of the motion is enumerated as error. Appellant's motion stated no viable grounds for the recusal or disqualification of the juvenile court judge. OCGA § 15-11-3 (g)....

...Reilly, for appellant. Joe W. Hendricks, Jr., District Attorney, Warren S. Summers, Sr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 3. C. B. further contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his motions for supersedeas pending appeal. Pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-3, there is no statutory right to super-sedeas in juvenile proceedings, but the juvenile court has discretion to grant or deny supersedeas....

...f the juvenile court judge be set at a certain amount, to be paid by the Consolidated Government. The recipients of the order filed a notice of appeal. See Darden v. Ravan, 232 Ga. 756, 758 (1) (208 SE2d 846) (1974). The issues are governed by OCGA § 15-11-3, which provides for the creation of circuit-wide juvenile court judgeships and provides a method for compensation of juvenile court judges. The recipients of the order argue that the judges of the superior court cannot fix the salary of the juvenile court judge without the approval of the Columbus Council. They rely upon the following language of OCGA § 15-11-3 (d) (1): “Except as otherwise provided by law, the compensation of the juvenile judge shall be set by the ....

...for which [the juvenile judge] is appointed.” The superior court judges urge that the above language applies only when circuit-wide juvenile judges have been selected, and until that occurs, the method of compensation of the juvenile court judge is as it was before July 1, 1983. They cite language of OCGA § 15-11-3 (b): “All juvenile court judgeships, their methods of compensation, selection, and operation, established on or before July 1, 1983, shall continue until such time as a circuit-wide juvenile court judge is appointed ....

...nsation of the juvenile court judge was set prior to July 1, 1983. See Ga. L. 1951, pp. 292-293, § 3. Because no circuit-wide juvenile court judge has been appointed, the method of fixing compensation employed prior to July 1, 1983 continues. OCGA § 15-11-3 (d) (l)’s plain language is that the approval of the governing authority is required only when another method has not been provided by law.2 OCGA § 15-11-3 (b) clearly states that in a county where a circuit-wide judge has not been appointed, such as Muscogee, the method of compensation remains as it was prior to July 1, 1983, and that method did not require approval of the Columbus Council....

...ion, selection and operation leaves those matters *121unaffected. Decided February 23, 1998. Eugene H. Polleys, Jr., for appellants. Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Denney, Peace, Allison & Kirk, John W. Denney, for appellees. Considering OCGA § 15-11-3 (d) (1) compels the conclusion that the superior court judges do not require approval of the Council to fix compensation....

...s the circumstances allow. Thus, we find that the statute is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process. 3. C.B. further contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his motions for supersedeas pending appeal. Pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-3, there is no statutory right to supersedeas in juvenile proceedings, but the juvenile court has discretion to grant or deny supersedeas....