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2018 Georgia Code 15-11-63 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 15-11-63 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 15-11-63

TITLE 15 COURTS

Section 11. Juvenile Code, 15-11-1 through 15-11-747.

ARTICLE 2 JUVENILE COURT ADMINISTRATION

15-11-63. Clerks and other personnel.

  1. The judge of the juvenile court shall have the authority to appoint clerks and any other personnel necessary for the execution of the purposes of this chapter.
  2. The salary, tenure, compensation, and all other conditions of employment of such employees shall be fixed by the judge, with the approval of the governing authority of the county. The salaries of the employees shall be paid out of county funds.
  3. Any employee of the court may be removed for cause by the judge of the court, the reasons therefor to be assigned in writing.

(Code 1981, §15-11-63, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242.)

Cross references.

- Officers of the court and court personnel, Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia, Rule 2.1 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-24, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Service by a correctional officer on incarcerated father.

- Personal service of a summons and a petition of deprivation by a correctional officer upon an incarcerated father was sufficient as the service procedures in the Civil Practice Act were not adopted nor were those procedures binding on the juvenile court, and the correctional officer was acting under the direction of the court for the purposes of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-39.1(c) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-161,15-11-282,15-11-424, and15-11-531). In the Interest of A.J.M., 277 Ga. App. 646, 627 S.E.2d 399 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-24).

Cited in In the Interest of D. H., 332 Ga. App. 274, 772 S.E.2d 70 (2015).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 24A-603, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Appointment of juvenile court personnel by superior court judge.

- Superior court judge sitting as a juvenile court judge may appoint supporting personnel for the juvenile court. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U77-11 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-603).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63

Total Results: 4  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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In re L. C., 273 Ga. 886 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 11, 2001 | 548 S.E.2d 335

Sears, Justice. The appellant, L. C., is a juvenile who was found to have committed an aggravated assault, a designated felony under OCGA § 15-11-63 (a) (2) (B) (ii). The juvenile court placed L. C. in the restrictive custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-63 (e)....
...The court ordered that L. C. be confined to a youth development center for 12 months, and that L. C. then be placed under intensive supervision for 12 months. On appeal, L. C. raises several constitutionality challenges to the designated felony statute, OCGA § 15-11-63,1 including that it violates his constitutional right to a jury *887trial....
...We conclude that the statute does not violate a juvenile’s constitutional right to a jury trial, and that L. C. did not properly raise and obtain a ruling on the other constitutional challenges he asserts on appeal. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court. 1. L. C. contends that OCGA § 15-11-63 is unconstitutional because it does not grant juveniles a right to a jury trial. More specifically, L. C. contends that fundamental fairness requires that juveniles have a right to a jury trial in proceedings under OCGA § 15-11-63 because OCGA § 15-11-63 is designed to punish juvenile offenders and is substantially similar to a criminal proceeding....
...d emphasized both that the goal of the juvenile system was rehabilitation and treatment and that an adjudication of delinquency was not considered a conviction of a crime.4 L. C. acknowledges the holdings in McKeiver and A. B. W., but contends that § 15-11-63, which was enacted in 1980,5 well after the decisions in McKeiver and A....
...W., has radically revised the treatment of juveniles found to have committed a designated felony, making the treatment of juveniles in such cases more like that of adults in criminal proceedings. We disagree. First, contrary to L. C.’s contention, the potential period of commitment of juveniles under § 15-11-63 is not radically different from the potential confinement of the juveniles in A. B. W. and McKeiver. For example, in A. B. W., the period of initial commitment could have been as much as two years in an institution,6 with the possibility of an extension of two additional years.7 Under § 15-11-63, a child is placed in the custody of the *888Department of Juvenile Justice for an initial period of five years.8 The child must be confined in a youth development center for a period of “not less than 12 nor more than 60 months.”9 Af...
...d to be placed under intensive supervision for a period of 12 months.10 Thus, as in L. C.’s case, a child could be confined for only 12 months in a youth development center, and then released under intensive supervision for another 12 months. OCGA § 15-11-63 also provides that a juvenile court may discharge a child from custody after one year.11 Moreover, we conclude that the central purpose of OCGA § 15-11-63 remains the rehabilitation and treatment of the child and not punishment. For example, OCGA § 15-11-63 (e) (2) (B) provides that, while in a youth development center, a child at any time “may be permitted to participate in all youth development center services and programs and shall be eligible to receive special medical and treatment se...
...allowed to participate in state sponsored programs for evaluation and services under the Division of Rehabilitation Services of the Department of Labor and Division of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance Abuse.12 Furthermore, under OCGA § 15-11-63 (e) (2) (D), the Department of Juvenile Justice is required to report to the court at least every six months regarding the “status, adjustment, and progress of the child.” In addition, in deciding whether restrictive custody under § 15-11-63 is required, a juvenile court is required to consider the “needs and best interests of the child.”13 Finally, like the adjudication in A....
...the child in any civil service application or *889appointment.”14 Decided June 11, 2001. David L. Whitman, for appellant. Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Jeanette J. Fitzpatrick, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. Thus, although OCGA § 15-11-63 has some punitive aspects, one of its primary functions is the treatment and rehabilitation of the child and an adjudication under it is not a criminal conviction. For these reasons, we conclude that an order of restrictive custody under § 15-11-63 is not sufficiently like a criminal adjudication to invoke a constitutional right to a trial by jury....
...In this regard, we note that numerous courts have considered whether a constitutional right to a jury trial is required under similar statutes and have reached the same result we reach today.15 2. As for L. C.’s other constitutional challenges to OCGA § 15-11-63, we conclude that they were not properly raised below, as L....
...on appeal are not properly before this Court. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. The juvenile court’s order in this case was entered June 21, 2000. At that time, the designated felony statute was OCGA § 15-11-37. Effective July 1, 2000, former OCGA § 15-11-37 was redesignated as OCGA § 15-11-63. See Ga. Laws 2000, p. 20. Other than the redesignation, only minor editorial changes were made to the statute. Accordingly, all references in this opinion are to § 15-11-63. McKeiver v....
...528 (91 SC 1976, 29 LE2d 647) (1970); A. B. W. v. State, 231 Ga. 699 (203 SE2d 512) (1974). McKeiver, 403 U. S. at 545-550. A. B. W., 231 Ga. at 701-702. See Ga. Laws 1980, p. 1013. See Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 709, 735, 738. Id. at 739. OCGA § 15-11-63 (e) (1) (A). OCGA § 15-11-63 (e) (1) (B). OCGA § 15-11-63 (e) (1) (C). OCGA § 15-11-63 (e) (2) (C). OCGA § 15-11-63 (e) (2) (B). OCGA § 15-11-63 (c) (1). OCGA § 15-11-72. State v....
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In re C. P., 274 Ga. 599 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 5, 2001 | 555 S.E.2d 426

...tion and is not a juvenile traffic offense. . . .” OCGA § 15-11-2 (6) (A). An “unruly child” is statutorily defined as “a child who . . . [h]as committed an offense applicable only to a child. . . .” OCGA § 15-11-2 (12) (C). Under OCGA § 15-11-63 (a) (2) (B), a “designated felony act” that might result in a child being placed in restrictive custody is one “[i]f done by an adult, would be one or more of the following crimes:. . .” Fornication is not a felony (see OCGA § 16-6-18) and is not one of the designated felonies listed in § 15-11-63 (a) (2) (B).
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In Re Cp, 555 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 2001).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 5, 2001 | 274 Ga. 599, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 3327

...and the crime does not fall under subparagraph (C) of paragraph (12) of this Code section and is not a juvenile traffic offense...." OCGA § 15-11-2(6)(A). An "unruly child" is statutorily defined as "a child who ... [h]as committed an offense applicable only to a child...." OCGA § 15-11-2(12)(C). [2] Under OCGA § 15-11-63(a)(2)(B), a "designated felony act" that might result in a child being placed in restrictive custody is one "[i]f done by an adult, would be one or more of the following crimes: ..." Fornication is not a felony (see OCGA § 16-6-18) and is not one of the designated felonies listed in § 15-11-63(a)(2)(B).
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In Re Lc, 548 S.E.2d 335 (Ga. 2001).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 11, 2001 | 273 Ga. 886, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 1861

...Whitman, Lawrenceville, for appellant. Daniel J. Porter, Dist. Atty., Jeanette J. Fitzpatrick, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee. SEARS, Justice. The appellant, L.C., is a juvenile who was found to have committed an aggravated assault, a designated felony under OCGA § 15-11-63(a)(2)(B)(ii). The juvenile court placed L.C. in the restrictive custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-63(e)....
...The court ordered that L.C. be confined to a youth development center for 12 months, and that L.C. then be placed under intensive supervision for 12 months. On appeal, L.C. raises several constitutionality challenges to the designated felony statute, OCGA § 15-11-63, [1] including that it violates his constitutional right to a jury trial....
...We conclude that the statute does not violate a juvenile's constitutional right to a jury trial, and that L.C. did not properly raise and obtain a ruling on the other constitutional challenges he asserts on appeal. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court. 1. L. C. contends that OCGA § 15-11-63 is unconstitutional because it does not grant juveniles a right to a jury trial. More specifically, L.C. contends that fundamental fairness requires that juveniles have a right to a jury trial in proceedings under OCGA § 15-11-63 because OCGA § 15-11-63 is designed to punish juvenile offenders and is substantially similar to a criminal proceeding....
...nd emphasized both that the goal of the juvenile system was rehabilitation and treatment and that an adjudication of delinquency was not considered a conviction of a crime. [4] L.C. acknowledges the holdings in McKeiver and A.B.W., but contends that § 15-11-63, which was enacted in 1980, [5] well after the decisions in McKeiver and A.B.W., has radically revised the treatment of juveniles found to have committed a designated felony, making the treatment of juveniles in such cases more like that of adults in criminal proceedings. We disagree. First, contrary to L.C.'s contention, the potential period of commitment of juveniles under § 15-11-63 is not radically different from the potential confinement of the juveniles in A.B.W. and McKeiver. For example, in A.B.W., the period of initial commitment could have been as much as two years in an institution, [6] with the possibility of an extension of two additional years. [7] Under § 15-11-63, a child is placed in the custody of the Department of *337 Juvenile Justice for an initial period of five years....
...d to be placed under intensive supervision for a period of 12 months. [10] Thus, as in L.C.'s case, a child could be confined for only 12 months in a youth development center, and then released under intensive supervision for another 12 months. OCGA § 15-11-63 also provides that a juvenile court may discharge a child from custody after one year. [11] Moreover, we conclude that the central purpose of OCGA § 15-11-63 remains the rehabilitation and treatment of the child and not punishment. For example, OCGA § 15-11-63(e)(2)(B) provides that, while in a youth development center, a child at any time "may be permitted to participate in all youth development center services and programs and shall be eligible to receive special medical and treatment service...
...owed to participate in state sponsored programs for evaluation and services under the Division of Rehabilitation Services of the Department of Labor and Division of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance Abuse. [12] Furthermore, under OCGA § 15-11-63(e)(2)(D), the Department of Juvenile Justice is required to report to the court at least every six months regarding the "status, adjustment, and progress of the child." In addition, in deciding whether restrictive custody under § 15-11-63 is required, a juvenile court is required to consider the "needs and best interests of the child." [13] Finally, like the adjudication in A.B.W., an adjudication that restrictive custody is required is not "a conviction of a crime and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction nor operate to disqualify the child in any civil service application or appointment." [14] Thus, although OCGA § 15-11-63 has some punitive aspects, one of its primary functions is the treatment and rehabilitation of the child and an adjudication under it is not a criminal conviction. For these reasons, we conclude that an order of restrictive custody under § 15-11-63 is not sufficiently like a criminal adjudication to invoke a constitutional right to a trial by jury....
...In this regard, we note that numerous court have considered whether a constitutional right to a jury trial is required under similar statutes and have reached the same result we reach today. [15] 2. As for L.C.'s other constitutional challenges to OCGA § 15-11-63, we conclude that they were not properly raised below, as L.C....
...Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] The juvenile court's order in this case was entered June 21, 2000. At that time, the designated felony statute was OCGA § 15-11-37. Effective July 1, 2000, former OCGA § 15-11-37 was redesignated as OCGA § 15-11-63. See Ga. Laws 2000, p. 20. Other than the redesignation, only minor editorial changes were made to the statute. Accordingly, all references in this opinion are to § 15-11-63....
...State, 231 Ga. 699, 203 S.E.2d 512 (1974). [3] McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545-550, 91 S.Ct. 1976. [4] A.B. W., 231 Ga. at 701-702, 203 S.E.2d 512. [5] See Ga. Laws 1980, p. 1013. [6] See Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 709, 735, 738. [7] Id. at 739, 203 S.E.2d 512. [8] OCGA § 15-11-63(e)(1)(A). [9] OCGA § 15-11-63(e)(1)(B). [10] OCGA § 15-11-63(e)(1)(C). [11] OCGA § 15-11-63(e)(2)(C). [12] OCGA § 15-11-63(e)(2)(B). [13] OCGA § 15-11-63(c)(1)....