Quo warranto proceedings.

- This section is applicable to all civil cases and embraces practice in trial of quo warranto proceedings. Hathcock v. McGouirk, 119 Ga. 973, 47 S.E. 563 (1904).

Question as to competency and impartiality of jurors is to be determined before parties begin to strike jury. Atlanta Coach Co. v. Cobb, 178 Ga. 544, 174 S.E. 131 (1934).

Parties are not required to make investigations out of court to determine whether jurors who are summoned are disqualified in their cases, not only is such a duty not placed by the law upon parties and their counsel, but the contrary practice is to be encouraged for obvious reasons. Atlanta Coach Co. v. Cobb, 178 Ga. 544, 174 S.E. 131 (1934).

Removal of disqualified jurors.

- Parties should not be required to use their strikes in an effort to remove disqualified jurors. Jones v. Cloud, 119 Ga. App. 697, 168 S.E.2d 598 (1969).

No exhaustion of peremptory strikes required to show harm.

- In a medical malpractice case, the appellate court erred by concluding that the plaintiff could not prove the plaintiff was harmed by the trial court's refusal to strike four allegedly biased jurors because the plaintiff did not show that the plaintiff had been forced to exhaust the plaintiff's peremptory strikes to eliminate those jurors because the rule in Harris, not requiring exhaustion of peremptory strikes as a condition of establishing harm to criminal cases also applies in civil cases. Stolte v. Fagan, 291 Ga. 477, 731 S.E.2d 653 (2012).

When improper overruling of challenge to juror not reversible error.

- If a challenge is made and improperly overruled and such juror does not serve on the jury trying the case because the juror is stricken by the complaining party, such ruling is not error unless it appears that the party had to exhaust the party's peremptory challenges in order to get rid of the juror. Felker v. Johnson, 53 Ga. App. 390, 186 S.E. 144 (1936).

If the record does not show that a party has to exhaust the party's peremptory strikes in order to exclude a juror properly challenged for cause, the error is not harmful. Sheffield v. Lewis, 246 Ga. 19, 268 S.E.2d 615 (1980).

Juror's indication that evidence will prejudice juror.

- When a juror responds to a voir dire question and by the juror's answer indicates that the juror may be so prejudiced by certain anticipated evidence that the juror cannot render a fair verdict as to the cause of the accident in question, the juror should be excused for cause. Jones v. Cloud, 119 Ga. App. 697, 168 S.E.2d 598 (1969).

Duty of parties to call attention to disqualifications.

- When parties are furnished with a list of the jury, it is their duty, if they know that any of the jurors are disqualified, to call attention to the disqualification, or the disqualification will be held to have been waived. If they have reasonable grounds to suspect that any of the jurors are disqualified, it is their duty to call attention to the fact so that due inquiry may be made of the panel. Atlanta Coach Co. v. Cobb, 178 Ga. 544, 174 S.E. 131 (1934).

Third-party defendants.

- Judge, having the discretion to sever a third-party claim, also has the discretion to grant a third-party defendant six additional strikes. However, there is no right to sever claims against joint tort-feasors and no corresponding right to grant additional strikes. Mercer v. Braswell, 140 Ga. App. 624, 231 S.E.2d 431 (1976).

Codefendants with adverse interests.

- Section does not allow additional strikes to codefendants despite their adverse interests. Mercer v. Braswell, 140 Ga. App. 624, 231 S.E.2d 431 (1976).

Defendants in civil trial.

- In a civil case, the defendants are not entitled to a separate trial, nor is each entitled to strike the full number of jurors, but all of the defendants must join in striking the jury. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 181 Ga. 55, 181 S.E. 755 (1935).

Impleading defendants.

- There is no authority for the proposition that impleading defendants are legally entitled to additional jury strikes. Sheffield v. Lewis, 246 Ga. 19, 268 S.E.2d 615 (1980).

Employee not competent to try case involving employer.

- Failure to remove jurors thus disqualified and fill the panel as provided by this section is ground for new trial. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Bunn, 2 Ga. App. 305, 58 S.E. 538 (1907).

Members of corporation may not serve if corporation defendant.

- To permit the members of the defendant corporation to try the case of their corporation would be in effect to permit the defendant to try the defendant's own case as a juror. To permit a juror to serve in the juror's own case violates the fundamental principle that jury trials must be fair and free from suspicion of bias or prejudice, and is contrary to the principle announced in this section. Bryan v. Moncrief Furnace Co., 168 Ga. 825, 149 S.E. 193 (1929) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-12-123).

Officer, employee, or stockholder of indemnity company, or one related to a stockholder, is disqualified to serve as juror in case involving the company. Atlanta Coach Co. v. Cobb, 178 Ga. 544, 174 S.E. 131 (1934).

Corporate stockholders and mutual insurance company policyholders.

- Stockholders of a corporation which is a party to a suit are automatically disqualified from serving as jurors therein because the stockholders necessarily have a direct interest in the outcome of the case. Similarly, the stockholders of an insurance company or the policyholders of a mutual insurance company, because of their interest in the assets and earnings of the company, may not serve as jurors in the trial of a case in which the company is exposed to liability. Thompson v. Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp., 157 Ga. App. 561, 278 S.E.2d 143 (1981).

Members of electric membership corporation.

- Members of an electric membership corporation are in the same position as the stockholders of a corporation or the policyholders of a mutual insurance company, as regards their right to share in the net earnings of the business. Accordingly, the members of an electric membership corporation are disqualified from service as jurors in the trial of a case in which damages are sought from the corporation. Thompson v. Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp., 157 Ga. App. 561, 278 S.E.2d 143 (1981).

It does not follow that a similar exception, like that provided by O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-136 and15-12-137 to the rule precluding service by jurors with a stake in the outcome of a case, exists for members of electric membership corporations. Indeed, the absence of a similar statute applicable to electric membership corporations members would appear to be authority for a conclusion that no such exception exists. Thompson v. Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp., 157 Ga. App. 561, 278 S.E.2d 143 (1981).

Trial court held to have not erred in refusing to excuse juror for cause. See Cone v. Johnson, 251 Ga. 371, 306 S.E.2d 244 (1983).

Cited in Nobles v. State, 12 Ga. App. 355, 77 S.E. 184 (1913); Pollard v. State, 148 Ga. 447, 96 S.E. 977 (1918); Whitworth v. State, 155 Ga. 395, 117 S.E. 450 (1923); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Scarboro, 42 Ga. App. 423, 156 S.E. 726 (1930); Gossett v. State, 203 Ga. 692, 48 S.E.2d 71 (1948); Pickering v. Wagnon, 91 Ga. App. 610, 86 S.E.2d 621 (1955); American Cas. Co. v. Seckinger, 108 Ga. App. 262, 132 S.E.2d 794 (1963); Derryberry v. Higdon, 116 Ga. App. 381, 157 S.E.2d 559 (1967); Lingo v. State, 224 Ga. 333, 162 S.E.2d 1 (1968); State Hwy. Dep't v. Eagle Constr. Co., 125 Ga. App. 678, 188 S.E.2d 810 (1972); Georgia Power Co. v. Wright, 134 Ga. App. 474, 214 S.E.2d 724 (1975); Wall v. Benningfield, 237 Ga. 173, 227 S.E.2d 13 (1976); Carr v. Carr, 240 Ga. 161, 240 S.E.2d 50 (1977).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury, §§ 104, 105.

C.J.S.

- 50A C.J.S., Juries, § 269 et seq.