Purpose.

- Intent of the General Assembly in enacting this section was to permit the parties in civil cases to examine the individual jurors making up the two panels before interposing their challenges. Keebler v. Willard, 90 Ga. App. 66, 81 S.E.2d 842 (1954).

Larger purpose of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 is to enable counsel to identify those prospective jurors counsel desires to remove from the panel by use of peremptory strikes as opposed to challenges for cause. Henderson v. State, 251 Ga. 398, 306 S.E.2d 645 (1983).

Purpose of voir dire.

- Single purpose of voir dire is the ascertainment of the impartiality of jurors, their ability to treat the cause on the merits with objectivity, freedom from bias, and prior inclination. Freeman v. State, 132 Ga. App. 615, 208 S.E.2d 625 (1974); Thompson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 704, 269 S.E.2d 474 (1980); McKinney v. State, 155 Ga. App. 930, 273 S.E.2d 888 (1980), overruled on other grounds, 184 Ga. App. 607, 362 S.E.2d 65 (1987).

Voir dire should allow both parties an opportunity to ascertain the ability of the prospective jurors to decide the case on its merits with objectivity and freedom from bias and prior inclination. Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 283 S.E.2d 238 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 103 S. Ct. 3551, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1398 (1983).

Extent of questioning during voir dire.

- Georgia Supreme Court holds that the subject matter of the action as to which voir dire is permitted under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 extends beyond the crimes charged in the indictment and the sentences the charges carry to other critical facts of the case that experience, reason, and common sense indicate will be so influential for at least some prospective jurors that those jurors will be unable to consider all of the evidence in the case with three limitations: 1) the issue is not whether the prospective juror will consider a critical fact to be very important or worthy of great weight; 2) voir dire questions must be framed properly to reveal the prospective juror's general view on the critical fact and whether that view is so strong that it would substantially impair the juror in considering all three sentencing options; and 3) decisions as to what, if any, facts of a particular criminal case beyond the charges and sentencing options qualify as critical in terms of risking juror partiality can be difficult and context-specific. Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (2012).

Limitation of voir dire as to a seated juror was not an abuse of discretion because the inquiry into the number of times the juror had been previously called for service was not relevant to the juror's ability to be impartial in the case to be tried. Taylor v. State, 344 Ga. App. 439, 810 S.E.2d 333 (2018).

Section applies to both misdemeanors and felonies.

- This section is all-inclusive and applies to misdemeanor as well as felony cases. A denial of the right is an error requiring a reversal. Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 657, 200 S.E.2d 454 (1973).

Improper voir dire restricted.

- Trial court did not violate Uniform Superior Court Rule 10.1, O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133, U.S. Const., amends. 6 and 14, or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Paras. I and XI, by restricting improper voir dire examination of prospective jurors concerning racial bias, pretrial publicity, and self-defense. Walker v. State, 258 Ga. 443, 370 S.E.2d 149 (1988).

Burden on state to show deprivation of voir dire harmless.

- If a defendant in a criminal case has been deprived of his or her rights to examine prospective jurors on voir dire, the burden is on the state to show that the error was harmless. The burden the state must meet is the "highly probable" test. This applies even though the defendant did not exhaust his or her peremptory strikes. Henderson v. State, 251 Ga. 398, 306 S.E.2d 645 (1983).

Reference in O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 to "the usual voir dire questions put by the court" is to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-164 insofar as felony trials are concerned and this latter section establishes the test for disqualification for favor. Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 276 S.E.2d 224 (1981).

To disqualify juror who tried case and swore that the juror had not formed an expressed opinion, and had no bias or prejudice, there should be affidavits of at least two witnesses, or what is equivalent thereto, against such oath of the juror; otherwise it is but oath against oath, and the verdict will not be set aside on the ground of the incompetency of the juror. Williams v. State, 180 Ga. 595, 180 S.E. 101 (1935).

Failure to qualify alternate who did not serve on jury harmless.

- If venireperson's name was not called before the 12 venirepersons who tried the case were selected and no alternate actually sat on the jury, any error in qualifying the person as a prospective juror was harmless. Wilcox v. State, 250 Ga. 745, 301 S.E.2d 251 (1983), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925, 108 S. Ct. 287, 98 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1987).

Standard for new trial for juror offense.

- New trials will not be granted unless the movant can demonstrate that a juror failed to answer, or to answer honestly, a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. Gainesville Radiology Group v. Hummel, 263 Ga. 91, 428 S.E.2d 786 (1993).

Cited in Cade v. State, 207 Ga. 135, 60 S.E.2d 763 (1950); Adler v. Adler, 207 Ga. 394, 61 S.E.2d 824 (1950); Dyer v. State, 86 Ga. App. 835, 72 S.E.2d 781 (1952); Bland v. State, 210 Ga. 100, 78 S.E.2d 51 (1953); Stevens v. Wright Contracting Co., 92 Ga. App. 373, 88 S.E.2d 511 (1955); Hooks v. State, 215 Ga. 869, 114 S.E.2d 6 (1960); Whaley v. Sim Grady Mach. Co., 107 Ga. App. 96, 129 S.E.2d 362 (1962); Britten v. State, 221 Ga. 97, 143 S.E.2d 176 (1965); Roach v. State, 221 Ga. 783, 147 S.E.2d 299 (1966); Harris v. State, 120 Ga. App. 359, 170 S.E.2d 743 (1969); Hart v. State, 227 Ga. 171, 179 S.E.2d 346 (1971); Mitchell v. City of Newnan, 125 Ga. App. 761, 188 S.E.2d 917 (1972); Hodges v. Carpenter, 127 Ga. App. 358, 193 S.E.2d 199 (1972); Durham v. State, 129 Ga. App. 5, 198 S.E.2d 387 (1973); Shouse v. State, 231 Ga. 716, 203 S.E.2d 537 (1974); Hinson v. DOT, 135 Ga. App. 258, 217 S.E.2d 606 (1975); Hall v. State, 135 Ga. App. 690, 218 S.E.2d 687 (1975); Akin v. Patton, 235 Ga. 51, 218 S.E.2d 802 (1975); Head v. State, 235 Ga. 677, 221 S.E.2d 435 (1975); Holloway v. State, 137 Ga. App. 124, 222 S.E.2d 898 (1975); Johnson v. Jackson, 140 Ga. App. 252, 230 S.E.2d 756 (1976); Robinson v. State, 238 Ga. 291, 232 S.E.2d 561 (1977); Mitchell v. State, 239 Ga. 456, 238 S.E.2d 100 (1977); Lamb v. State, 241 Ga. 10, 243 S.E.2d 59 (1978); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. King, 145 Ga. App. 840, 244 S.E.2d 905 (1978); Smith v. State, 148 Ga. App. 1, 251 S.E.2d 13 (1978); Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981); Wallace v. State, 248 Ga. 255, 282 S.E.2d 325 (1981); Hughes v. State, 161 Ga. App. 824, 288 S.E.2d 916 (1982); Tucker v. State, 249 Ga. 323, 290 S.E.2d 97 (1982); Georgia Power Co. v. Bishop, 162 Ga. App. 122, 290 S.E.2d 328 (1982); Mathis v. State, 249 Ga. 454, 291 S.E.2d 489 (1982); Page v. State, 249 Ga. 648, 292 S.E.2d 850 (1982); Goins v. State, 164 Ga. App. 37, 296 S.E.2d 229 (1982); Dunn v. State, 251 Ga. 731, 309 S.E.2d 370 (1983); Deering v. State, 168 Ga. App. 835, 310 S.E.2d 720 (1983); Whittington v. State, 252 Ga. 168, 313 S.E.2d 73 (1984); Ivester v. State, 252 Ga. 333, 313 S.E.2d 674 (1984); McCulligh v. State, 169 Ga. App. 717, 314 S.E.2d 724 (1984); Anderson v. State, 169 Ga. App. 729, 314 S.E.2d 735 (1984); Carter v. State, 252 Ga. 502, 315 S.E.2d 646 (1984); Thomas v. State, 171 Ga. App. 306, 319 S.E.2d 511 (1984); Battle v. Strother, 171 Ga. App. 418, 319 S.E.2d 887 (1984); Fugitt v. State, 254 Ga. 521, 330 S.E.2d 714 (1985); Thurmond v. Board of Comm'rs, 174 Ga. App. 570, 330 S.E.2d 787 (1985); Amerson v. State, 177 Ga. App. 97, 338 S.E.2d 528 (1985); Shadix v. State, 179 Ga. App. 644, 347 S.E.2d 298 (1986); Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 349 S.E.2d 717 (1986); McGraw v. State, 199 Ga. App. 389, 405 S.E.2d 53 (1991); Lawhorn v. State, 200 Ga. App. 451, 408 S.E.2d 425 (1991); Taylor v. State, 202 Ga. App. 445, 414 S.E.2d 687 (1992); Gilbert v. State, 262 Ga. 840, 426 S.E.2d 155 (1993); Harper v. State, 222 Ga. App. 393, 474 S.E.2d 288 (1996); Hamilton v. State, 274 Ga. 582, 555 S.E.2d 701 (2001); Robles v. State, 277 Ga. 415, 589 S.E.2d 566 (2003); Ford Motor Co. v. Conley, 294 Ga. 530, 757 S.E.2d 20 (2014).

Defense counsel has right to examine jurors individually.

- Defendant has a right, after the usual voir dire questions have been put to the jury by the court, to individually question all jurors on the entire panel prior to interposing a challenge to any of the jurors. Gunnin v. State, 112 Ga. App. 720, 146 S.E.2d 131 (1965).

Right does not encompass isolated examination. The single purpose for voir dire is the ascertainment of the impartiality of jurors, their ability to treat the cause on the merits with objectivity and freedom from bias and prior inclination and the control of the pursuit of such determination is within the sound legal discretion of the trial court, and only in the event of manifest abuse will it be upset upon review. Whitlock v. State, 230 Ga. 700, 198 S.E.2d 865 (1973); Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976); Claxton Poultry Co. v. City of Claxton, 155 Ga. App. 308, 271 S.E.2d 227 (1980); Messer v. State, 247 Ga. 316, 276 S.E.2d 15, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S. Ct. 367, 70 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1981).

Defendant in a criminal case has an absolute right to an individual examination of each juror. Cowan v. State, 156 Ga. App. 650, 275 S.E.2d 665 (1980).

Right is not subject to judge's discretion.

- Language does not leave matter to discretion of the trial judge, but states that the defendant "shall" have the right to an individual examination of each juror prior to interposing a challenge. Blount v. State, 214 Ga. 433, 105 S.E.2d 304 (1958); Edwards v. State, 214 Ga. 436, 105 S.E.2d 307 (1958); Ferguson v. State, 218 Ga. 173, 126 S.E.2d 798 (1962).

It is not within the discretion of the court to deny the right of an individual examination of each juror prior to the interposing of a challenge, nor any other right of examination given by this section. Whaley v. Sim Grady Mach. Co., 218 Ga. 838, 131 S.E.2d 181 (1963).

This section does not leave to the discretion of the judge whether the defendant shall have the right to an individual examination of all the jurors before making a challenge to any of the jurors, but it is mandatory. Ladd v. State, 228 Ga. 113, 184 S.E.2d 158 (1971).

Either party in civil suit has right to examination of jurors individually prior to interposing a challenge. Hill v. Crowell, 152 Ga. App. 698, 264 S.E.2d 25 (1979).

Denial of right is reversible error. Denial by the trial judge of the right given is reversible error. Anthony v. State, 112 Ga. App. 444, 145 S.E.2d 657 (1965).

If the defendant asserts a right to examine all jurors before striking any of the jurors, it is reversible error for the trial court to deny the defendant that right. Thomas v. State, 247 Ga. 7, 273 S.E.2d 396 (1981).

Denial of right presumed harmful.

- If a party in a civil case has been denied the right to an examination of jurors individually, error is presumed to be harmful. Hill v. Crowell, 244 Ga. 294, 260 S.E.2d 18 (1979).

No prejudice need be shown.

- Denial of defendant's right to individual voir dire required reversal without specific showing of prejudice. Wallace v. State, 164 Ga. App. 642, 298 S.E.2d 627 (1982).

Showing required to excuse denial of right.

- If the defendant was not allowed to question jurors regarding their relationship to, or knowledge of, the prosecuting attorneys, the state was required to show that it was "highly probable" that the limitation of voir dire did not contribute to the verdict. Hunt v. State, 215 Ga. App. 677, 451 S.E.2d 797 (1994).

No right to further examine disqualified juror.

- If a juror's answers to questions concerning conscientious objection to the death penalty clearly disqualify the juror, the defendant is not entitled to further questioning as a matter of right, although the trial court may allow additional questioning. Roberts v. State, 252 Ga. 227, 314 S.E.2d 83, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S. Ct. 228, 83 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1984).

Isolated examination.

- Right to individual examination of jurors does not encompass isolated examination, whether or not individual questioning of the jurors is to take place outside of the presence of the other jurors is one of those matters lying within the sound discretion of the trial court. Stevens v. State, 247 Ga. 698, 278 S.E.2d 398 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 103 S. Ct. 3551, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1398 (1983).

Right to individual examination of jurors does not encompass isolated examination. There is no abuse of discretion if counsel has ample opportunity to thoroughly question each juror. Simmons v. State, 168 Ga. App. 1, 308 S.E.2d 27 (1983).

Granting or denying isolated examination is within discretion of court. Thomas v. State, 247 Ga. 7, 273 S.E.2d 396 (1981).

Discretion of court to conduct individual examination.

- There is no absolute right to have each juror examined outside the presence of the others, but such a request addresses itself to the discretion of the trial judge. Parham v. State, 135 Ga. App. 315, 217 S.E.2d 493 (1975).

While this section gives defense counsel the right to examine jurors individually after the usual voir dire questions have been put by the trial court to the jury as a panel, the right does not encompass isolated examination and such a request is entirely within the discretion of the trial judge. Carter v. State, 137 Ga. App. 824, 225 S.E.2d 73 (1976).

Whether or not individual questioning of jurors is to take place outside of the presence of the other jurors is a matter lying within the sound discretion of the trial court. Finney v. State, 242 Ga. 582, 250 S.E.2d 388 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 916, 99 S. Ct. 2017, 60 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1979).

There is no right to sequestration during voir dire. Claxton Poultry Co. v. City of Claxton, 155 Ga. App. 308, 271 S.E.2d 227 (1980).

Providing individual voir dire does not require mandatory sequestered voir dire. Stinson v. State, 244 Ga. 219, 259 S.E.2d 471 (1979).

Sequestered voir dire is not mandated by O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133, which provides for individual examination of jurors; the granting of sequestered voir dire is within the discretion of the court, and a showing of prejudice from denial is necessary to show an abuse of discretion. Sanborn v. State, 251 Ga. 169, 304 S.E.2d 377 (1983); Bailey v. State, 209 Ga. App. 390, 433 S.E.2d 610 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Walker v. State, 290 Ga. 696, 723 S.E.2d 894 (2012).

Right of defense counsel to examine jurors individually does not encompass isolated examination; an appellate court reviewed the jurors' general responses to defense counsel's proper questions regarding race as it related to the ability to be fair and impartial in the trial of a rape and sodomy case, and found that defendant did not show any prejudice resulting from the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to sequester potential jurors during individual voir dire. Fox v. State, 266 Ga. App. 307, 596 S.E.2d 773 (2004).

Although O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 granted the defendant the right to an individual response from each prospective juror, the statute did not mandate sequestered voir dire. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in putting in place a procedure that allowed some questioning in a confidential manner, but did not completely sequester voir dire. Kerdpoka v. State, 314 Ga. App. 400, 724 S.E.2d 419 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1112, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 603 (Ga. 2012).

Limits placed on voir dire did not violate defendant's rights.

- Trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 or defendant's due process and equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution by placing limitations on voir dire because defendant was given wide latitude during voir dire in asking questions related to race and the trial court specifically asked the jurors whether the jurors harbored any racial bias. Alexander v. State, 276 Ga. App. 288, 623 S.E.2d 160 (2005).

Time of examination a matter of discretion.

- Whether the examination of the individual juror by the defendant shall be made before or after the juror has been placed upon by the state is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. Starr v. State, 209 Ga. 258, 71 S.E.2d 654 (1952).

Since this section contains no requirement as to when such examination shall be made, such is within the discretion of the trial court. Whaley v. Sim Grady Mach. Co., 218 Ga. 838, 131 S.E.2d 181 (1963).

Waiver of right to individual examination.

- Right to individual examination of each juror may be waived by failure to exercise the right. Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 657, 200 S.E.2d 454 (1973).

By failing to object or claim right to examine every prospective juror before challenging any, a defendant waives the right to do so. Moore v. State, 153 Ga. App. 511, 265 S.E.2d 821 (1980).

Control of examination within discretion of trial court.

- Limitation to be placed upon counsel in their questioning of the jury on their voir dire lies largely within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the appellate courts should not interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless it is shown to have been manifestly abused. White v. State, 230 Ga. 327, 196 S.E.2d 849, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 886, 94 S. Ct. 222, 38 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1973).

Single purpose for voir dire is the ascertainment of the impartiality of jurors, their ability to treat the cause on the merits with objectivity and freedom from bias and prior inclination. The control of the pursuit of such determination is within the sound legal discretion of the trial court, and only in the event of manifest abuse will it be upset upon review. Frazier v. State, 138 Ga. App. 640, 227 S.E.2d 284 (1976); Legare v. State, 243 Ga. 744, 257 S.E.2d 247 (1979); Thompson v. State, 254 Ga. App. 704, 269 S.E.2d 474 (1980); Claxton Poultry Co. v. City of Claxton, 155 Ga. App. 308, 271 S.E.2d 227 (1980); Messer v. State, 247 Ga. 316, 276 S.E.2d 15, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S. Ct. 367, 70 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1981).

Conduct of voir dire is within the discretion of the trial judge, and the judge's rulings are proper absent some manifest abuse of the judge's discretion. Gatlin v. State, 236 Ga. 707, 225 S.E.2d 224 (1976).

Trial court did not err in refusing to allow defendant additional voir dire of all jurors after one juror stated that the juror was "slightly intimidated" by a tattoo on defendant's forehead as other jurors were asked about the tattoo after the one juror's comment and those jurors did not have any issue with the tattoo, other questions during voir dire of the entire panel were similar to that issue, and the trial court's decision was within the court's discretion. Andrews v. State, 275 Ga. App. 426, 620 S.E.2d 629 (2005).

Identity of propounder of voir dire questions.

- Trial court may exercise discretion concerning the identity of the propounder of voir dire questions and whether those questions are posed to the jury panel en masse, to each panel of twelve, or to each juror individually. Therefore, the trial court's decision to have counsel pose their general voir dire questions to the panel as a whole was not an abuse of discretion, especially since the general questioning was followed by the opportunity to inquire further of each individual juror. Hammond v. State, 273 Ga. 442, 542 S.E.2d 498 (2001).

Requiring immediate acceptance or rejection of juror error.

- When, in a civil case the trial court required counsel, after counsel had propounded various questions to each juror as each juror stood, to accept or reject the juror before the juror sat down, such action on the part of the trial court denied the plaintiff a substantial right given plaintiff by statute and rendered all further proceedings in the case nugatory. Keebler v. Willard, 90 Ga. App. 66, 81 S.E.2d 842 (1954).

Trial judge has no discretion to name arbitrary number of questions that will be permitted during voir dire. Lane v. State, 126 Ga. App. 375, 190 S.E.2d 576 (1972).

Trial court has discretion to determine whether a question is permissible under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133. Ridgeway v. State, 174 Ga. App. 663, 330 S.E.2d 916 (1985).

Participation by trial judge.

- Absent some abuse of discretion, participation by the trial judge in the voir dire examination of prospective jurors provides no basis for reversal. Curry v. State, 255 Ga. 215, 336 S.E.2d 762 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1090, 106 S. Ct. 1480, 89 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1986).

Court may delegate authority to ask statutory questions.

- Ga. L. 1951, p. 214, § 2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133) recognized the court's ultimate responsibility for seeing that the statutory questions of former Code 1933, §§ 59-806 and 59-807 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-12-164) were put to the jurors but the court may delegate this responsibility to the court's officers including the prosecuting attorney. Hicks v. State, 232 Ga. 393, 207 S.E.2d 30 (1974).

Jurors required to listen to questions and give truthful answers.

- Juror has a duty to truthfully answer any question posed to the juror on voir dire and a concomitant duty to be attentive to the questions and to speak up when the juror does not understand a question. Falsetta v. State, 158 Ga. App. 392, 280 S.E.2d 411 (1981).

Counsel entitled to truthful answers.

- Jury trials must be kept free from suspicion of irregularity or impropriety of conduct, and counsel are entitled to have truthful answers given to questions which counsel are permitted by the trial court to propound to the individual jurors. Pierce v. Altman, 147 Ga. App. 22, 248 S.E.2d 34 (1978).

Juror must answer questions.

- Juror was under obligation to reveal, in response to counsel's question, that the juror expected plaintiff's counsel to take action in the juror's behalf on a matter which the juror had previously discussed with counsel and it was error to refuse to grant the defendant's motion for mistrial based on the juror's failure to reveal such information upon questioning. First of Ga. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 165 Ga. App. 303, 299 S.E.2d 567 (1983).

Right to individual response, not to individual question.

- Trial court may exercise discretion as to whether a party, or the court itself, shall propound the questions, and may require that questions be asked once only to the full array of the jurors, rather than to every juror - one at a time - provided, of course, that the question be framed and the response given in a manner that will provide the propounder with an individual response prior to the interposition of challenge. State v. Hutter, 251 Ga. 615, 307 S.E.2d 910 (1983).

Written questions disallowed.

- Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to use a written questionnaire to discern whether any potential jurors (or their family members or close friends) had been sexually molested as a child. Allen v. State, 239 Ga. App. 899, 522 S.E.2d 502 (1999).

Juror's failure to respond not prejudicial.

- Plaintiff failed to make the requisite showing of bias or prejudice resulting from the juror's failure to respond to voir dire questions about opposition to personal injury suits since the record demonstrated that although the juror was personally opposed to filing lawsuits, the juror had no bias against any person who brought suit. McCann v. Kelley, 209 Ga. App. 179, 433 S.E.2d 130 (1993).

Juror's failure to respond affirmatively to defense counsel's question as to whether any juror knew anyone who worked for the district attorney's office did not inject harmful error into the trial even though the juror knew an attorney in that office; the juror knew the attorney but did not know the attorney was a member of the district attorney's office. Royal v. State, 266 Ga. 165, 465 S.E.2d 662 (1996).

Prejudice from abuse of discretion must be shown.

- If error is committed by court by abuse of discretion it must further be shown that prejudice resulted, either in the defendant being in some way injured or in some advantage accruing to the state. Griffeth v. State, 154 Ga. App. 643, 269 S.E.2d 501 (1980).

Error must be objected to.

- To raise issue as to error in conducting of voir dire, objection must be made in trial court to preserve issue for appeal. State v. Graham, 246 Ga. 341, 271 S.E.2d 627 (1980).

Exceptions must be properly preserved.

- When exceptions to the refusal of a trial judge to permit an examination of prospective jurors were not preserved in the manner provided by law, no constitutional question could be presented for determination on appeal. Key v. State, 207 Ga. 552, 63 S.E.2d 356 (1951).

Erroneous procedure in striking jurors.

- Procedure utilized to strike the jury, striking jurors from each panel of 12, rather than comparing all the jurors at once, was in error and required the grant of a new trial. Peters v. State, 261 Ga. 373, 405 S.E.2d 255 (1991).

Exhaustion of peremptory strikes.

- If the defendant in a felony trial has to exhaust defendant's peremptory strikes to excuse a juror who should have been excused for cause, the error is harmful. Grant v. State, 160 Ga. App. 837, 287 S.E.2d 681 (1982).

Broad latitude.

- By the terms of this section, counsel in a given case are allowed, before making any challenge, to examine each member of the panel touching any matter or thing which would illustrate any interest of the juror in the cause, including any opinion as to which party ought to prevail, and the relationship or acquaintance of the juror with the parties. Upon challenge, it is the duty of the court to hear such competent evidence respecting the challenge as shall be submitted by either party. Jennings v. Autry, 94 Ga. App. 344, 94 S.E.2d 629 (1956).

This section permits counsel the broadest of latitude in questioning the jury as to any matter or circumstance indicating any inclination, leaning, or bias which the jurors might have respecting the subject matter of the suit, or counsel, or parties thereto. White v. State, 230 Ga. 327, 196 S.E.2d 849, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 886, 94 S. Ct. 222, 38 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1973).

Party is given the right to inquire into any fact or circumstance indicating any inclination, leaning, or bias which the juror might have respecting the subject matter of the suit. Falsetta v. State, 158 Ga. App. 392, 280 S.E.2d 411 (1981).

Defendant has right to ask questions included in section.

- If the questions appellant desired to propound to each prospective juror on voir dire examination are included specifically in this section, a defendant has an absolute right to propound such questions to the jurors. Hence, it is reversible error for the trial court to refuse permission to counsel to ask such questions. Cowan v. State, 156 Ga. App. 650, 275 S.E.2d 665 (1980).

Although control of voir dire examination is normally within the discretion of the trial court, the defendant in a criminal case has an absolute right to have the defendant's prospective jurors questioned as to those matters specified in O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133. Mitchell v. State, 176 Ga. App. 32, 335 S.E.2d 150 (1985).

Court may require counsel to limit interrogation to matters dealing directly with specific case to be tried. Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 657, 200 S.E.2d 454 (1973).

Although examination of prospective jurors by counsel is very broad under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133, the trial judge still retains the discretion to limit the examination to questions dealing directly with the specific case and to prohibit general questions. Jenkins v. State, 157 Ga. App. 310, 277 S.E.2d 304 (1981).

Specific questions covered by general question not barred.

- Question seeking to elicit, from an individual juror on the juror's voir dire, specific facts or circumstances which are clearly within the purview of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 should not be proscribed simply because more general questions dealing with the same subject matter have been previously addressed to the entire panel of prospective jurors. Craig v. State, 165 Ga. App. 156, 299 S.E.2d 745 (1983).

Questions should illustrate prejudice or interest.

- Right to examine each juror individually after the usual voir dire questions have been put by the court is a broad right. But, this right is not unlimited, and such examination in its broadest scope should not go beyond matters which would illustrate any interest of the juror in the cause. Curtis v. State, 224 Ga. 870, 165 S.E.2d 150 (1968).

Counsel should confine counsel's questions to those which may illustrate any prejudice of the juror against the accused or any interest of the juror in the cause. Freeman v. State, 132 Ga. App. 615, 208 S.E.2d 625 (1974).

Discretion of trial judge to limit examination.

- Court has wide discretion in permitting interrogation of the jurors. Leggett v. Brewton, 104 Ga. App. 580, 122 S.E.2d 469 (1961).

While this Code section permits an individual examination of each juror, there must be some limitation upon its extent, so the examination is conducted under the supervision and direction of the trial court, and what questions may or may not be asked are left largely to the sound discretion of the court, the exercise of which will not be interfered with by an appellate court unless clearly abused. Whaley v. Sim Grady Mach. Co., 218 Ga. 838, 131 S.E.2d 181 (1963).

Language of this Code section is broad, but the trial judge still retains the discretion to limit the examination to questions dealing directly with the specific case and to prohibit general questions. Hill v. State, 221 Ga. 65, 142 S.E.2d 909 (1965); Curtis v. State, 224 Ga. 870, 165 S.E.2d 150 (1968); Thacker v. State, 226 Ga. 170, 173 S.E.2d 186 (1970), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 936, 92 S. Ct. 2861, 33 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1972); McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633, 187 S.E.2d 271 (1972); King v. State, 230 Ga. 581, 198 S.E.2d 305 (1973); Merrill v. State, 130 Ga. App. 745, 204 S.E.2d 632 (1974); Freeman v. State, 132 Ga. App. 615, 208 S.E.2d 625 (1974); McGinnis v. State, 135 Ga. App. 843, 219 S.E.2d 485 (1975); Frazier v. State, 138 Ga. App. 640, 227 S.E.2d 284 (1976); Griffeth v. State, 154 Ga. App. 643, 269 S.E.2d 501 (1980); Chastain v. State, 255 Ga. 723, 342 S.E.2d 678 (1986); Starks v. Robinson, 189 Ga. App. 168, 375 S.E.2d 86 (1988); Ross v. State, 194 Ga. App. 285, 390 S.E.2d 429 (1990).

Questions which may be propounded to prospective jurors under the provisions of this section are largely within the discretion of the court, and only if that discretion is abused will the appellate court interfere. Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 150 S.E.2d 240, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 953, 87 S. Ct. 336, 17 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1966).

Trial court has the discretion to limit the examination of jurors to questions which are phrased or designed so as to elicit or reveal any actual bias or prejudice against the defendants or any interest in the cause and to prohibit general questions. Bennett v. State, 153 Ga. App. 21, 264 S.E.2d 516 (1980).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion after the court refused to allow the defense to ask, during voir dire, what prospective jurors would think of a failure of the defendant to testify. Anderson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 816, 289 S.E.2d 22 (1982).

Control of voir dire examination is within the sound legal discretion of the trial court, and the appellate courts should not interfere unless it is shown to have been manifestly abused. Lawton v. State, 191 Ga. App. 116, 381 S.E.2d 106 (1989).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion to restrict the scope of voir dire in the limited manner it did because although defense counsel was prohibited from questioning panel members about a specific method of corporal punishment with a belt, the trial court did not preclude questioning about the entire subject matter and defense counsel was permitted to inquire of specific members whether allegations of corporal punishment of a child would affect their ability to be fair and impartial. Alexander v. State, 294 Ga. 345, 751 S.E.2d 408 (2013).

Discretion in distinguishing proper and improper questions.

- Since the distinction between questions which ask jurors how the jurors would decide issues of a case if and when such issues are presented and questions which merely inquire whether jurors can start the case without bias or prior inclination is not always crystal clear, the control of the voir dire examination is vested in the sound legal discretion of the trial judge and will not be interfered with by this court unless the record clearly shows an abuse of that discretion. Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 283 S.E.2d 238 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 103 S. Ct. 3551, 75 L. Ed. 2d 1398 (1983); Wilcox v. State, 250 Ga. 745, 301 S.E.2d 251 (1983), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925, 108 S. Ct. 287, 98 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1987).

This section does not permit inquiry as to every matter and every thing. The court has wide discretion in permitting interrogation of the jurors. Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371, 219 S.E.2d 743 (1975).

Questions requiring impartiality.

- If a contested juror was an assistant district attorney's parent, the juror's initial doubt as to impartiality did not demand that the juror be removed in the absence of a defense motion. Shiver v. State, 276 Ga. 624, 581 S.E.2d 254, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1007, 124 S. Ct. 538, 157 L. Ed. 2d 414 (2003).

Questions requiring prejudgment of case.

- Considerable latitude may be allowed counsel in questioning jurors; however, the trial judge has authority to prohibit the jurors being asked such questions as would require the jurors in effect to prejudge the case. Bowens v. State, 116 Ga. App. 577, 158 S.E.2d 420 (1967).

No question should require a response from a juror which might amount to prejudgment of the case. Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 283 S.E.2d 238 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 103 S. Ct. 3551, 75 L. Ed. 2d 1398 (1983); Wilcox v. State, 250 Ga. 745, 301 S.E.2d 251 (1983), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925, 108 S. Ct. 287, 98 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1987).

Parties are entitled on voir dire to ascertain whether prospective jurors have formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. However, the parties are not entitled to ask jurors to prejudge the case. Lee v. State, 258 Ga. 762, 374 S.E.2d 199 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075, 109 S. Ct. 2089, 104 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1989).

Trial court abused the court's discretion by prohibiting defense counsel from asking prospective jurors whether the jurors had strong feelings about child molestation, and if those feelings would impair the jurors' judgment or make it difficult for the jurors to judge the case; but, this error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt regarding the numerous acts of sodomy that the defendant engaged in with the daughter, the scientific evidence which linked the defendant's DNA to the semen found in the victim's mouth, and the defendant's attempt to allude the authorities until the defendant was apprehended in Tennessee. Meeks v. State, 269 Ga. App. 836, 605 S.E.2d 428 (2004).

In a child abuse case in which the defense counsel asked the panel of potential jurors whether the nature of the case would have made it difficult for anyone to serve on the jury and the trial court sustained the state's objection on the ground that the defense counsel impermissibly asked potential jurors to prejudge the case in violation of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133, defendant was not prejudiced by any error, as the state asked a similar question under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-164(a)(2), and potential jurors were asked whether they had children or grandchildren, had foster children or operated a daycare center, or had received special training with respect to caring for children. Withrow v. State, 275 Ga. App. 110, 619 S.E.2d 714 (2005).

Even if a question posed by the defense counsel did not seek a prejudgment of the case, the question's exclusion was not reversible error, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133, as the substance of the excluded question was covered by other questions asked to potential jurors; further, it was highly probable that the limitation upon voir dire did not contribute to the verdict and that no harm occurred to the defendant. McKee v. State, 275 Ga. App. 646, 621 S.E.2d 611 (2005).

Long, confusing, argumentative, general, and hypothetical questions.

- Judge may prohibit questions that are long and confusing or unduly argumentative, or general and hypothetical. Gatlin v. State, 236 Ga. 707, 225 S.E.2d 224 (1976).

Confusing and overly broad question which appeared to ask an opinion as to a matter of law was properly refused. McCoy v. State, 231 Ga. App. 703, 500 S.E.2d 611 (1998).

Opinion of evidence.

- Neither the defendant nor the state has the right simply to outline the evidence and then ask a prospective juror the juror's opinion of that evidence, nor is it permissible to ask a juror to describe the kind of case that, in the juror's opinion, would warrant a death sentence. Blankenship v. State, 258 Ga. 43, 365 S.E.2d 265 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S. Ct. 183, 102 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1988).

There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to allow defendant to question the prospective jurors regarding the jurors' opinions as to the evidence that the trial court had ruled to be admissible at trial. Shields v. State, 202 Ga. App. 659, 415 S.E.2d 478 (1992).

Hypothetical questions assuming certain facts will be proven.

- Hypothetical voir dire questions are not per se improper, but a trial judge should be cautious in allowing counsel to propound questions which ask the juror to assume that certain facts will be proven. Such questions tend to improperly influence jurors. Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 283 S.E.2d 238 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 103 S. Ct. 3551, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1398 (1983).

Hypothetical questions involving evidence should be excluded.

- While the questions which may be propounded to prospective jurors are largely within the discretion of the court, and may include any matter or thing which would illustrate any interest of the juror in the cause, or any fact or circumstance indicating any inclination, leaning, or bias, which the juror may have respecting the subject matter of the suit, nevertheless hypothetical questions involving evidence should be excluded, and no question should be so framed as to require a response from the juror which might amount to a prejudgment of the case. Gunnin v. State, 112 Ga. App. 720, 146 S.E.2d 131 (1965); Bransome v. Barton, 154 Ga. App. 799, 270 S.E.2d 55 (1980).

Hypothetical questions involving evidence or requiring a response from a juror which might amount to a prejudgment of the case are improper and should be excluded from the examination of prospective jurors. Pinion v. State, 225 Ga. 36, 165 S.E.2d 708 (1969).

Under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133, the trial judge retains discretion to prohibit those questions of law which the jurors would have to consider and determine from the evidence. Jenkins v. State, 157 Ga. App. 310, 277 S.E.2d 304 (1981).

General or argumentative questions.

- In a prosecution for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, exclusion of the defense counsel's voir dire questions, "What do you say is the biggest problem facing America today?" and "Do you feel like that this country is waging a so-called war on drugs?," was not an abuse of discretion since both questions were general in scope but the second was argumentative. Dean v. State, 211 Ga. App. 28, 438 S.E.2d 380 (1993).

Question about country's "ongoing war against drugs."

- In a prosecution for trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in refusing to allow defense counsel to question a potential juror about the juror's opinion on the country's "ongoing war against drugs." Martinez v. State, 259 Ga. App. 402, 577 S.E.2d 82 (2003).

Juror's familiarity with defendant not disqualification

- Pretermitting whether a challenged juror would have been disqualified based on a relationship with the defendant, because the testimony from the juror at the new trial hearing did not reveal any bias for or against the defendant, or establish that the relationship affected the verdict, the defendant was not denied a fair and impartial trial. Moreover, even if the juror deliberately answered falsely, the defendant failed to show that a new trial was warranted because that juror had an evil motive or acted otherwise as one of the twelve jurors than with the required impartiality. Allen v. State, 290 Ga. App. 604, 659 S.E.2d 900 (2008).

Abstract legal questions.

- This section does not require the trial court to permit the use of abstract legal questions. Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371, 219 S.E.2d 743 (1975).

Technical questions as to presumption of innocence.

- Counsel for accused should not ask technical legal questions in regard to presumption of innocence, but should confine questions to those which may illustrate any prejudice of the juror against the accused, or any interest of the juror in the cause. McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633, 187 S.E.2d 271 (1972); Stack v. State, 234 Ga. 19, 214 S.E.2d 514 (1975); Mills v. State, 137 Ga. App. 305, 223 S.E.2d 498 (1976); Bennett v. State, 153 Ga. App. 21, 264 S.E.2d 516 (1980).

Technical legal question concerning presumption of innocence is a subject of instruction by the court and is not a proper area for voir dire examination. Mills v. State, 137 Ga. App. 305, 223 S.E.2d 498 (1976).

Questions about the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt may be prohibited. Thomas v. State, 217 Ga. App. 720, 458 S.E.2d 897 (1995).

Questions as to belief of innocence.

- Court does not err in refusing to allow counsel to ask "Do you believe defendant innocent?" Pinion v. State, 225 Ga. 36, 165 S.E.2d 708 (1969).

Questions on matters contained in general statutory questions.

- If there was an indication that the general questions had not been heard, it is not an abuse by the trial court to permit questions on matters contained in the general questions even though some veniremen had been questioned individually. Legare v. State, 243 Ga. 744, 257 S.E.2d 247, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 491, 62 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1979).

Question as to prejudice against defense counsel.

- Although a question posed by defense counsel to determine if any potential jurors were prejudiced against counsel, as a criminal defense lawyer, was within the purview of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, the trial court's refusal to allow that question to be addressed to potential jurors was harmless error. Sanders v. State, 204 Ga. App. 37, 419 S.E.2d 24 (1992).

Question regarding reaction to evidence of similar transactions.

- Trial court properly prohibited defense counsel's examination of the prospective jurors regarding their possible reaction to evidence of similar transactions. Stell v. State, 210 Ga. App. 662, 436 S.E.2d 806 (1993).

On defendant's appeal from convictions for forgery and racketeering, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by allowing the state to ask jurors during voir dire about whether the jurors had any knowledge about a similar transaction involving the defendant, and in allowing the state to comment on the parameters of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., during voir dire because contrary to defendant's contention that the state crafted questions that called for legal arguments and for the prospective jurors to prejudge the case, the record reveals that: (1) the state only mentioned RICO to determine whether prospective jurors had preconceived notions regarding the subject matter of the case; and (2) the question regarding the similar transaction was specifically framed to determine only whether the prospective jurors had any prior knowledge about that transaction. Davis v. State, 264 Ga. App. 128, 589 S.E.2d 700 (2003).

Questions permitted relating to racial bias.

- Refusal to allow interrogation of the jurors as to their racial bias or prejudice is a denial of due process, and essential demands of fairness require that it be done as a part of the guaranty of a trial by a fair and impartial jury. Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 657, 200 S.E.2d 454 (1973).

O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 gives the defendant the right to ask potential jurors questions relating to possible racial bias, and disallowance of such question is ground for reversal of conviction. Mitchell v. State, 176 Ga. App. 32, 335 S.E.2d 150 (1985).

O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 encompasses questions regarding possible racial prejudice and bias, even when such questioning would not be constitutionally required. Legare v. State, 256 Ga. 302, 348 S.E.2d 881 (1986), appeal dismissed, 269 Ga. 468, 499 S.E.2d 640 (1998).

Restricting defendant's race bias related questions to whether any juror held the opinion that a white police officer would be more likely to tell the truth than a black defendant was reversible error since the question defendant was permitted to ask did not address "any inclination, leaning, or bias" which a juror might have because of the fact and circumstance that the defendant was a black male and the victim an elderly white widow. Roberts v. State, 195 Ga. App. 808, 395 S.E.2d 54 (1990).

Even though the defendant should have been permitted to ask the following question on voir dire: "Are you racially biased towards blacks in any way?", since the defendant otherwise had a fair and adequate opportunity to explore the potential juror's racial bias, and an opportunity to obtain information on any potential juror's racial bias from questions posed by the codefendant's counsel during individual voir dire, any error of the trial court in putting a chill upon the defendant's right to ask the specific question in issue was harmless. Walker v. State, 215 Ga. App. 790, 452 S.E.2d 580 (1994).

In a prosecution for felony murder, aggravated assault, and other crimes, the defendant did not show the defense counsel's voir dire questions about attitudes regarding racial bias were unduly restricted as, after the trial court sustained the state's objections to questions about whether jurors had heard derogatory statements about a person of another race or had used a derogatory term regarding someone of another race, the trial court reconsidered and allowed inquiry as to whether a juror had heard or made racial remarks, and, if the answer was in the affirmative, the defense was allowed to ask if the juror's racial beliefs would make it impossible for the jurors to be impartial. Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 569, 619 S.E.2d 668 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1217, 126 S. Ct. 1435, 164 L. Ed. 2d 138 (2006).

Questions regarding racial stereotypes.

- Defendant's proposed question to prospective jurors asking if anyone had "formed an opinion that most of the guys that are arrested, because they are young black males, that they are guilty?" was forbidden because it called for an opinion on the ultimate issue in the case. Cherry v. State, 230 Ga. App. 443, 496 S.E.2d 764 (1998).

Questions regarding defendant's status.

- Trial court should not have prohibited defendants from raising the issue of their status as prison escapees during voir dire since the issue of defendants' escape from prison was relevant to the subject matter of the state's prosecution. Napier v. State, 276 Ga. 769, 583 S.E.2d 825 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Shelton v. Lee, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 452 (Ga. 2016).

Question as to membership with defendant in racist organizations.

- If the record shows that, at sentencing, appellant acknowledged that appellant was a Klansman, and the prosecution questioned jurors whether any of the jurors were members with defendant in any clubs or organizations such as the Southern Knights of the KKK or the Invisible Empire of the KKK, the court held that such questions did not improperly put defendant's character in issue and that the question asked by the prosecution falls within the right under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 to discover any interest prospective jurors might have in the case. Mize v. State, 190 Ga. App. 166, 378 S.E.2d 392 (1989).

Questions as to membership in social groups or organizations.

- It was reversible error for the trial court to forbid the defendant to examine prospective jurors as to whether any of the jurors "belong to any social groups or organizations or clubs, whether you're actively involved in them or you just pay your membership dues to them." Perry v. State, 216 Ga. App. 661, 455 S.E.2d 607 (1995).

Questions regarding political activities properly refused.

- Court's refusal to allow the defendant to question potential jurors regarding their political activities was not an abuse of discretion. Samples v. State, 217 Ga. App. 509, 460 S.E.2d 795 (1995).

Question as to employment of jurors' immediate family members by law enforcement agencies.

- Trial court errs in limiting voir dire of the jurors by refusing to allow the defendant to ask the panel whether members of the jurors' immediate families had ever worked for law enforcement agencies. Henderson v. State, 251 Ga. 398, 306 S.E.2d 645 (1983).

Regard for testimony of police officer.

- It is not error to refuse to allow defense counsel to ask whether a prospective juror would tend to believe or prefer the testimony of a police officer over other testimony. Blanco v. State, 185 Ga. App. 535, 364 S.E.2d 903 (1988).

Question whether rabbi's profession or religious orientation inclines, leans, or biases the rabbi.

- There is no prejudice to the defendant if, instead of merely confirming that a prospective juror is a rabbi, the district attorney queries whether the rabbi's profession or religious orientation would incline, lean, or bias the rabbi towards a certain party. This is not the same as a juror being asked if the juror as an individual will be more inclined to believe a police officer, for the latter question infringes more on the jury's right to determine individual credibility, and not on the juror's leaning, bias, or inclination because of the juror's own job or associations. Creamer v. State, 168 Ga. App. 790, 310 S.E.2d 560 (1983).

Witness status as officer, victim, or party.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in disallowing questions about the credibility of witnesses based on the witnesses' status as police officers, victims, or parties. Ganas v. State, 245 Ga. App. 645, 537 S.E.2d 758 (2000).

Question as to courts' handling of sex offenses in general.

- Trial court did not err in refusing to allow defense counsel to ask the entire panel of prospective jurors if any of the jurors had an opinion as to whether sex offenses were being handled adequately by the courts because counsel attempted to question the panel with reference to the issue of punishment or final resolution by the courts in general, an improper consideration for the jurors who potentially were merely to decide on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Hunter v. State, 170 Ga. App. 356, 317 S.E.2d 332 (1984).

Questions about domestic violence beliefs.

- In a prosecution for aggravated battery, allowing questions to prospective jurors about the jurors' personal beliefs regarding domestic violence issues was not an abuse of discretion. Childers v. State, 228 Ga. App. 214, 491 S.E.2d 456 (1997).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in disallowing questions about cases involving a man beating a woman. Ganas v. State, 245 Ga. App. 645, 537 S.E.2d 758 (2000).

Questions regarding whether child molestation victim should have resisted.

- Prosecutor's voir dire questions in a child molestation case, which included questions such as "Is there anyone on the panel that believes a child should have to physically resist an adult in order to hold the adult accountable? That they have to fight back? Kick, scream, bite, scratch? Would you feel the same way even if the child went willingly?" were properly posed by the state to determine whether the prospective jurors had preconceived notions regarding the subject matter of the case. The questions did not ask the jurors to prejudge the evidence or the factual issues in the case. Collins v. State, 310 Ga. App. 613, 714 S.E.2d 249 (2011).

Questions regarding bias based upon child testifying.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's broad discretion by denying the defendant's voir dire question seeking to expose bias based upon a child testifying because, during the court's general voir dire questions, the state sought to identify jurors who had a problem with the nature of the case (statutory rape and child molestation) such that a juror questioned the juror's ability to be fair and impartial; and, after swearing the jury, the trial court posed questions to all of the jurors regarding prejudice or bias against the defendant and explained the need for jurors who could sit and fairly and impartially weigh the evidence, listen to the law, and reach a fair and impartial verdict. Davis v. State, 327 Ga. App. 729, 761 S.E.2d 139 (2014), cert. denied, U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 2317, 191 L. Ed. 2d 986 (2015).

Questions regarding religious beliefs as to homosexuality.

- Jurors' responses to defense counsel's proper questions as to their religious beliefs concerning homosexuality were sufficient to establish that such beliefs would not impact on the jurors' ability to fairly judge defendants' guilt or innocence. Baker v. State, 230 Ga. App. 813, 498 S.E.2d 290 (1998).

Questions about prior employment.

- Trial court did not err in refusing to strike a juror for cause based on the juror's failure to reveal specifics about former employment. Goss v. State, 237 Ga. App. 593, 516 S.E.2d 100 (1999).

Question as to previous military service does not relate to any fact or circumstance indicating an inclination, leaning, or bias which the juror might have respecting the subject matter of the action; and, therefore, it was not error for the trial judge to refuse to permit defendant's question on voir dire. Brown v. State, 170 Ga. App. 398, 317 S.E.2d 207 (1984).

Questions as to association with insurance company.

- If interest of the insurance company is admitted, examination as to the insurance affiliations of the jurors is permissible. Parsons v. Harrison, 133 Ga. App. 280, 211 S.E.2d 128 (1974).

Restriction on the individual examination of prospective jurors on voir dire as to whether any of the jurors were agents of the insurance company in question, when the trial court had previously asked whether any of the prospective jurors were officers, directors, agents, employees, or stockholders of the insurance company, was proper. Corley v. Harris, 171 Ga. App. 688, 320 S.E.2d 833 (1984).

Questions as to insurance matter which is not involved.

- If the questions objected to are not specifically permitted by this section, and the questions relate to a matter of insurance which is in no way involved either directly or indirectly, the trial court properly sustains objections of defendant thereto. Whaley v. Sim Grady Mach. Co., 218 Ga. 838, 131 S.E.2d 181 (1963).

Whether juror has been party to personal injury action is circumstance about which party has right to inquire and receive a truthful reply. Pierce v. Altman, 147 Ga. App. 22, 248 S.E.2d 34 (1978).

Question whether juror was ever crime victim permitted.

- There is no abuse of discretion in permitting the state to inquire whether a prospective juror has ever been the victim of a crime. Ridgeway v. State, 174 Ga. App. 663, 330 S.E.2d 916 (1985).

Denial of defendant's motion to strike for cause a juror who had been the victim of a violent crime was upheld even though the juror expressed some reservations about the juror's ability to be impartial and desire to be impaneled since the juror testified that the juror could render a decision based on the evidence. Smith v. State, 261 Ga. App. 871, 583 S.E.2d 914 (2003).

Questions relating to size of verdict.

- Under the broad sanction of this section, it must necessarily be held that prejudice as to the size of verdicts is as much comprehended under the subject matter of civil actions as the nature of the cause of action. Questions concerning such prejudice should be phrased in the most general terms, and in such a manner that the juror cannot feel that the juror is being pledged to a future action, but only that the juror is being queried on the juror's present convictions. Atlanta Joint Terms. v. Knight, 98 Ga. App. 482, 106 S.E.2d 417 (1958).

While it is permissible under the broad sanction of this section for counsel to examine prospective jurors with respect to prejudice as to the size of verdicts, such questions should be phrased in general terms and no question should be so framed as to require a response from the juror which might amount to a prejudgment of the case. Jones v. Parrott, 111 Ga. App. 750, 143 S.E.2d 393 (1965).

Questions as to previous jury service.

- Juror's participation in reaching a verdict in a prior case, totally unrelated to the case being tried, is not relevant to the subject matter of the action. McGinnis v. State, 135 Ga. App. 843, 219 S.E.2d 485 (1975).

Whether or not the potential juror had previously served on a grand or petit jury would not have been relevant to the subject matter of the action. Frazier v. State, 138 Ga. App. 640, 227 S.E.2d 284 (1976).

Questions as to juror's age.

- Trial court does not abuse the court's discretion in refusing to permit counsel for the accused to ask the prospective jurors their age. White v. State, 230 Ga. 327, 196 S.E.2d 849, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 886, 94 S. Ct. 222, 38 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1973).

Denial of the right to query as to marijuana being addictive drug is not error. Merrill v. State, 130 Ga. App. 745, 204 S.E.2d 632 (1974).

Questions relating to youth taking drugs.

- There was no abuse of discretion in allowing an inquiry concerning a prospective juror's experience with children or students who had taken drugs when the defendant was charged with selling illegal drugs. Ridgeway v. State, 174 Ga. App. 663, 330 S.E.2d 916 (1985).

Questions regarding absence of blood test in DUI case.

- In a prosecution for driving under the influence in which there was no blood alcohol test result to present because the defendant refused to take such a test, it was appropriate for the state to ask jurors whether the jurors believed that such a test must be produced in order for the defendant to be found guilty. Rayburn v. State, 234 Ga. App. 482, 506 S.E.2d 876 (1998).

Questions about the effect of alcohol or drugs on a person's faculties.

- State's voir dire questions regarding the effect of alcohol or drugs on a person's faculties, particularly if the alcohol or drugs could make a person impulsive or violent, were properly allowed as the questions addressed whether the prospective jurors had any inclination, leaning, or bias respecting the subject matter of the action or the counsel or parties thereto, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133. Quintana v. State, 276 Ga. 731, 583 S.E.2d 869 (2003).

Questioning to identify individuals with strong feelings about drugs.

- Any error in the trial court's limit on voir dire was harmless because the defendant was permitted to question the venire as a whole to identify prospective jurors who had strong feelings about individuals involved in the sale of drugs. Ellis v. State, 292 Ga. 276, 736 S.E.2d 412 (2013).

Voir dire question concerning robbery training courses of a bank employee is not within scope of this section. Cook v. State, 137 Ga. App. 406, 224 S.E.2d 70 (1976).

Questions as to right of self-defense.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in refusing to permit defense counsel to ask the prospective jurors if the jurors believed in the right of self-defense. Petty v. State, 179 Ga. App. 767, 347 S.E.2d 663 (1986).

In a prosecution for felony murder, aggravated assault, and other crimes, defendant did not show the defense counsel's voir dire questions about attitudes regarding self-defense in response to the actions of a police officer were unduly restricted, as, following the state's objection to the phrasing of a particular question, defense counsel proposed a question about a juror's consideration of a citizen's justification in responding with force against a police officer, the state had no objection to the question as rephrased, and the trial court allowed the question. Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 569, 619 S.E.2d 668 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1217, 126 S. Ct. 1435, 164 L. Ed. 2d 138 (2006).

Questions as to relative merits of various laws.

- While a party is entitled to ask whether or not a juror would be able to follow the court's instructions, the court need not allow questions which ask jurors to weigh the relative merits of various laws. Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 6, 287 S.E.2d 31 (1982).

Questions as to favorite color.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in not allowing the defendant to question jurors during voir dire about the jurors' favorite color. Bedingfield v. State, 219 Ga. App. 248, 464 S.E.2d 653 (1995).

Opinion as to appropriate punishment.

- Questions dealing with appropriate punishment should defendant be found guilty called for prejudgment of the case and were properly prohibited. Berryhill v. State, 249 Ga. 442, 291 S.E.2d 685, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 981, 103 S. Ct. 317, 74 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1982).

Questions regarding parole in death penalty cases.

- Because determining whether parole eligibility is part of the subject matter of the sentencing phase of death penalty trials, criminal defendants and the state are entitled to examine jurors concerning the jurors' inclinations, leanings, and biases regarding parole; however, the examination should be limited to the jurors' willingness to consider both a life sentence that allows for the possibility of parole and a life sentence that does not. Zellmer v. State, 272 Ga. 735, 534 S.E.2d 802 (2000).

Questions about books, movies, or television programs.

- Trial court may exclude questions about books jurors have read or movies and television programs jurors have seen. Thomas v. State, 217 Ga. App. 720, 458 S.E.2d 897 (1995).

Question as to whether prospective juror wondered why two individuals were indicted but only one was on trial was not aimed at uncovering the juror's interest in the case, or any fact indicating the juror's bias in the subject matter of the case, and was improper. Roland v. State, 266 Ga. 545, 468 S.E.2d 378 (1996).

Questions about sentencing options.

- Trial court abused the court's discretion in prohibiting the defendant from asking voir dire questions of prospective jurors as to whether the jurors would automatically impose the death penalty as opposed to fairly considering all three sentencing options (death, life without parole, and life with the possibility of parole) in a case involving the murder of young children as such questioning was permitted under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133. Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (2012).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury, §§ 108, 184, 248, 249.

C.J.S.

- 50A C.J.S., Juries, § 473, 483 et seq.

ALR.

- Failure to understand or unwillingness to accept presumption of innocence or rule as to reasonable doubt as rendering juror incompetent, 40 A.L.R. 612.

Admissibility, in civil case, of juror's affidavit or testimony to show bias, prejudice, or disqualification of a juror not disclosed on voir dire examination, 48 A.L.R.2d 971.

Prejudicial effect of reference on voir dire examination of jurors to settlement efforts or negotiations, 67 A.L.R.2d 560.

Right of counsel in criminal case personally to conduct the voir dire examination of prospective jurors, 73 A.L.R.2d 1187.

Propriety of inquiry on voir dire as to juror's attitude toward or acquaintance with literature dealing with amount of damage awards, 82 A.L.R.2d 1420, 63 A.L.R.5th 285.

Voir dire inquiry, in personal injury or death case, as to prospective jurors' acquaintance with literature dealing with amounts of verdicts, 89 A.L.R.2d 1177.

Disclosure in criminal case of juror's political, racial, religious, or national origin prejudice against accused or witnesses as ground for new trial or reversal, 91 A.L.R.2d 1120.

Propriety and effect of asking prospective jurors hypothetical questions, on voir dire, as to how they would decide issues of case, 99 A.L.R.2d 7.

Claustrophobia or other neurosis of juror as subject of inquiry on voir dire or of disqualification of juror, 20 A.L.R.3d 1420.

Propriety, on voir dire in criminal case, of inquiries as to juror's possible prejudice if informed of defendant's prior convictions, 43 A.L.R.3d 1081.

Jury: membership in racially biased or prejudiced organization as proper subject of voir dire inquiry or ground for challenge, 63 A.L.R.3d 1052.

Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of acquaintance or relationship with attorney in case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 A.L.R.3d 126.

Racial or ethnic prejudice of prospective jurors as proper subject of inquiry or ground of challenge on voir dire in state criminal case, 94 A.L.R.3d 15.

Religious belief, affiliation, or prejudice of prospective jurors as proper subject of inquiry or grounds for challenge on voir dire, 95 A.L.R.3d 172.

Effect of juror's false or erroneous answer on voir dire in personal injury or death action as to previous claims or actions for damages by himself or his family, 38 A.L.R.4th 267.

Propriety of asking prospective female jurors questions on voir dire not asked of prospective male jurors, or vice versa, 39 A.L.R.4th 450.

Necessity for presence of judge during voir dire examination of prospective jurors in state criminal case, 39 A.L.R.4th 465.

Cure of prejudice resulting from statement by prospective juror during voir dire, in presence of other prospective jurors, as to defendant's guilt, 50 A.L.R.4th 969.

Professional or business relations between proposed juror and attorney as ground for challenge for cause, 52 A.L.R.4th 964.

Fact that juror in criminal case, or juror's relative or friend, has previously been victim of criminal incident as ground of disqualification, 65 A.L.R.4th 743.

Effect of juror's false or erroneous answer on voir dire regarding previous claims or actions against himself or his family, 66 A.L.R.4th 509.

Exclusion of public and media from voir dire examination of prospective jurors in state criminal case, 16 A.L.R.5th 152.

Examination and challenge of federal case jurors on basis of attitudes toward homosexuality, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 864.