Constitutionality of 1935 amendment to section.

- Ga. L. 1935, p. 396, § 1, amending former Code 1933, § 59-716 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-12-135), does not violate Ga. Const. 1945, Art. III, Sec. VII, Para. XVI (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IV), on grounds that no reference is made in the title to former Code 1933, § 59-804 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-12-163), providing that a juror may be objected to upon the ground "that he is so near of kin to the prosecutor, or the accused, or the deceased, as to disqualify him by law from serving on the jury" or because no reference is made to the decisions of the Supreme Court, which prior to 1935 had declared that a juror related within the ninth degree was disqualified. Davis v. State, 204 Ga. 467, 50 S.E.2d 604 (1948).

1935 amendment did not change definition of relationship by affinity or consanguinity.

- Ga. L. 1935, p. 396, § 1, amending this section, does not change definition of relationship by affinity or consanguinity but merely prescribes the method of computation and the degree of relationship that would disqualify a juror, and in no way changes the rule for determining the extent of relationship as between husband and wife. Garrett v. State, 203 Ga. 756, 48 S.E.2d 377 (1948).

Effect of 1935 amendment on other section dealing with disqualifications.

- Ga. L. 1935, p. 396, § 1, amending former Code 1933, § 59-716 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-12-135), neither repealed nor amended former Code 1933, § 59-804 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-12-163); it merely did what the Supreme Court, in the absence of any statutory law on the subject, had previously done, that was, establish the degree of relationship which would disqualify a juror, and former Code 1933, § 59-804 was still in full force and effect. Davis v. State, 204 Ga. 467, 50 S.E.2d 604 (1948).

Relationship to prosecutor.

- If it appears that a juror is related within the prohibited degree to the prosecutor, the law declares the disqualification; and if such relation is unknown to the accused until after the verdict, a new trial will be granted. Harris v. State, 188 Ga. 745, 4 S.E.2d 651 (1939).

Purpose of the law in disqualifying jurors who are related within the prohibited degree to prosecutors is to guarantee to the defendant an impartial jury. Tatum v. State, 206 Ga. 171, 56 S.E.2d 518 (1949).

Incompetent jury cannot render lawful verdict.

- Jury composed of people whose relationship to the parties renders the people incompetent as jurors cannot render a lawful verdict; it cannot be said that the defendants in error have had their case tried, certainly not legally, and, although the verdict may be in accordance with the facts, and such as a lawful jury should have rendered, yet it is no verdict, and the court did right to set the verdict aside. Tatum v. State, 206 Ga. 171, 56 S.E.2d 518 (1949).

New trial is demanded if there is no doubt as to the disqualification or incompetency of a juror and if such disqualification has not been waived by knowledge thereof for the reason that the verdict is illegal and void. Ferguson v. Bank of Dawson, 53 Ga. App. 309, 185 S.E. 602 (1936).

Supreme Court will not interfere with judgment of fact by trial judge.

- When an extraordinary motion for new trial is made on the ground that the verdict is illegal and void because one of the jurors rendering the verdict was disqualified because the juror was related to the prosecutor within the degree of relationship prohibited, the judge passing on the motion becomes and is the exclusive trier of the fact in controversy, and the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judge's decision on that issue when there is any evidence to support the judge's finding. Reece v. State, 208 Ga. 690, 69 S.E.2d 92 (1952).

Relationship of juror to one defendant on other defendants.

- While the fact that one of the jurors is related to the wife of one defendant will disqualify the juror, it will not be grounds for reversing the conviction of the defendant to whom the juror was related for the reason that the relationship is presumed to be favorable to that defendant; yet, it is apparent that such presumption of favor does not exist as to the other defendant, and a juror who is not qualified to serve, but does serve, is grounds for voiding the trial. Finger v. State, 112 Ga. App. 188, 144 S.E.2d 479 (1965).

Applicability if only one conspirator indicted.

- Rule of law that disqualifies a juror if the juror is related within the prohibited degree to a prosecutor or to one of the defendants in a joint indictment applies in principle in a case when a conspiracy is alleged to exist between two persons, although only one is indicted and on trial. Harris v. State, 188 Ga. 745, 4 S.E.2d 651 (1939).

Effect of pretrial order on disqualification.

- When the parties entered into a pretrial order under which only officers, agents, employees, and members of the churches that sought probate of a will in which they were named would be disqualified as jurors, the pretrial order controls the course of the trial, unless it is modified to prevent manifest injustice. Thus, jurors who would have been disqualified under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-135 may not be disqualified. Ricketson v. Fox, 247 Ga. 162, 274 S.E.2d 556 (1981).

Cited in Calhoun ex rel. Chapman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 189 Ga. 414, 5 S.E.2d 902 (1939); Goldstein v. Ipswich Hosiery Co., 104 Ga. App. 500, 122 S.E.2d 339 (1961); Southeastern Fid. Ins. Co. v. Fluellen, 128 Ga. App. 877, 198 S.E.2d 407 (1973); Purvis v. Tatum, 131 Ga. App. 116, 205 S.E.2d 75 (1974); Jones v. State, 139 Ga. App. 824, 229 S.E.2d 789 (1976); Drake v. State, 241 Ga. 583, 247 S.E.2d 57 (1978); Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 276 S.E.2d 224 (1981); Thompson v. Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp., 157 Ga. App. 561, 278 S.E.2d 143 (1981); Gribble v. State, 248 Ga. 567, 284 S.E.2d 277 (1981); Vining v. State, 162 Ga. App. 331, 290 S.E.2d 345 (1982); Walls v. State, 161 Ga. App. 235, 291 S.E.2d 15 (1982); Shields v. State, 162 Ga. App. 388, 291 S.E.2d 448 (1982); Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479, 299 S.E.2d 531 (1983); Whittington v. State, 252 Ga. 168, 313 S.E.2d 73 (1984); Smith v. Gearinger, 888 F.2d 1334 (11th Cir. 1989); Davis v. State, 194 Ga. App. 482, 391 S.E.2d 124 (1990); Reid v. State, 204 Ga. App. 358, 419 S.E.2d 321 (1992); Calhoun v. Purvis, 206 Ga. App. 565, 425 S.E.2d 901 (1992); Smith v. Crump, 223 Ga. App. 52, 476 S.E.2d 817 (1996).

Computation of degree of kinship.

- Civil law degree of kinship is ascertained by counting from the juror to the common ancestor to the interested party. Therefore, the correct method of computation is to count the "steps" or generations from one ancestor to the next counting each "step" or generation as one degree, and not to count each ancestor as a degree. If the sum is within the sixth degree, the juror is disqualified to serve in the matter. Eaton v. Grindle, 236 Ga. 324, 223 S.E.2d 670 (1976); Cheeks v. State, 234 Ga. App. 446, 507 S.E.2d 204 (1998).

Civil law degree of kinship means that the reckoning is taken from one of the persons up to the common ancestor, and then down again to the other person or party. Smith v. State, 62 Ga. App. 494, 8 S.E.2d 663 (1940); Williams v. State, 206 Ga. 107, 55 S.E.2d 589 (1949) (for comment on Williams v. State, see 12 Ga. B.J. 326 (1950)).

Kinship disqualifying.

- If the grandmother of the complainant is a sister of the grandfather of two jurors, those jurors are related within the sixth degree to an interested party and therefore disqualified. Smith v. State, 62 Ga. App. 494, 8 S.E.2d 663 (1940).

Witness kinship disqualifying.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-135, the trial court may exclude a prospective juror upon the court's own motion if the juror's father is a physician testifying for one of the parties at trial. Elder v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 160 Ga. App. 78, 286 S.E.2d 315 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Chadwick v. Miller, 169 Ga. App. 338, 312 S.E.2d 835 (1983).

Exclusion proper although degrees of consanguinity not established.

- Trial court properly excluded a juror who was a cousin of the defendant and a relative of one of the defendant's grandparents who testified at the trial; even if the juror's statements about the particular degrees of consanguinity were vague, it was within the trial court's discretion to exclude the juror whether or not the test of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-135(a) was met. Paige v. State, 281 Ga. 504, 639 S.E.2d 478 (2007).

No evidence of kinship found.

- Defendant's claim that three jurors who served on the jury in defendant's criminal trial should have been disqualified under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-135(a) by reason of their consanguinity to defendant lacked merit since the record contained no evidence that any of the jurors were related to defendant. Webb v. State, 275 Ga. 425, 566 S.E.2d 680 (2002).

Juror whose brother marries the sister of the prosecutor's wife does not thereby become related to the prosecutor so as to be disqualified. Lemming v. State, 61 Ga. App. 605, 7 S.E.2d 42 (1940).

When the juror's sister married the brother of the defendant's wife, and this juror fails to answer in the affirmative when asked if the juror was related by blood or marriage to either of the parties to the action, such complaint fails to merit a new trial. Everett v. Culberson, 215 Ga. 577, 111 S.E.2d 367 (1959).

If the prosecutor is the father-in-law of a person to whom a juror is related in the fifth degree under the civil law, such juror is not disqualified. Finger v. State, 112 Ga. App. 188, 144 S.E.2d 479 (1965).

Juror's relationship to victim.

- Trial court was authorized to find that a defendant waived the disqualification of a juror based on that juror's familial relation to the victim of the crimes for which the defendant was convicted as the defendant did not offer any evidence that the defendant did not know of, and could not have discovered, the juror's disqualifying relationship. Although the juror testified at the hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial that the juror only learned that the juror's uncle was the victim's grandfather after the juror's service was complete, the juror's ignorance of the relationship was not probative of whether the defendant knew, or through the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered, the relationship. Moran v. State, 293 Ga. App. 279, 666 S.E.2d 726 (2008).

Third cousins are eighth-degree relations and, thus, are not within the legally prohibited degree of relationship under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-135. Cheeks v. State, 234 Ga. App. 446, 507 S.E.2d 204 (1998).

Fourth cousin is not within the prohibited degree. Merrell v. State, 135 Ga. App. 699, 218 S.E.2d 458 (1975).

Relationship to attorney hired to assist in jury selection.

- Juror related to an attorney who is retained only to assist counsel for the defendant in the selection of a jury and who is not hired for a fee contingent on the outcome of the case is not disqualified. Johnson v. Jackson, 140 Ga. App. 252, 230 S.E.2d 756 (1976).

Contributor to fund to aid prosecution as voluntary prosecutor.

- One who contributes to fund for purpose of defraying expense of apprehending criminal or for prosecution of case is a voluntary prosecutor. Harris v. State, 188 Ga. 745, 4 S.E.2d 651 (1939).

If one contributes to a fund to be used in employing an attorney to aid the solicitor-general (now district attorney) in the prosecution of a particular person for an alleged offense with which the person is charged, the person so contributing is to be considered as a volunteer prosecutor. Tatum v. State, 206 Ga. 171, 56 S.E.2d 518 (1949).

Test to be applied in determining whether one becomes a volunteer prosecutor by contributing money for the employment of special counsel to assist the state is not whether the money contributed was actually used in the prosecution, but whether in fact, if a contribution was made for the specific purpose of employing counsel, such counsel was employed and assisted in the prosecution of the case. Tatum v. State, 206 Ga. 171, 56 S.E.2d 518 (1949).

Juror related to voluntary prosecutor disqualified.

- If, at the inception of the trial, the court ruled that all jurors, related within the prohibited degree to any person whose name appeared on a list of those who by making contributions for the purpose of employing special counsel to assist in the prosecution had become voluntary prosecutors of the defendant on trial, were disqualified from serving as jurors, one who was so related and served vitiated the trial. Tatum v. State, 206 Ga. 171, 56 S.E.2d 518 (1949).

Relationship of contributor to family of murder victim.

- In murder trial, the court did not err in refusing the motion of counsel for the defendant to purge the jury as to relationship of persons whose names appeared on certain lists or petitions as having made contributions to the family of the deceased. Tatum v. State, 206 Ga. 171, 56 S.E.2d 518 (1949).

Acquaintance with family member.

- Trial court did not improperly seat six jurors in a death penalty case as: (1) the first juror testified that, despite the juror's acquaintance with the victim's family, the juror could act impartially, listen to the evidence, and decide the case based upon the facts and arguments; (2) a second juror stated that the juror's acquaintance with a family member of the victim would have no bearing on the juror's consideration of the case; and (3) four jurors testified that they could fairly consider all possible punishments for the crime, not just the death penalty. Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (2006).

Contribution by plaintiff to fund for juror's office expenses.

- Fact that the plaintiff contributed to a fund used to keep up and pay the expenses of the juror's office renders the juror incompetent to sit in a case when the plaintiff was a party. Ferguson v. Bank of Dawson, 53 Ga. App. 309, 185 S.E. 602 (1936).

Employees of corporation are incompetent to serve as jurors if the corporation is a party. Ferguson v. Bank of Dawson, 53 Ga. App. 309, 185 S.E. 602 (1936).

Relation to an employee of the defendant corporation did not render a prospective juror incompetent to serve. Ford v. Saint Francis Hosp., 227 Ga. App. 823, 490 S.E.2d 415 (1997).

Working in same profession as defendant.

- Business relationship with a defendant which can best be characterized as two professionals working in the same profession, rather than as a master-servant relationship, is not the type of relationship contemplated by subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-135 as disqualifying a prospective juror. Poulnott v. Surgical Assocs., 179 Ga. App. 138, 345 S.E.2d 639 (1986).

Questioning as to relationship to trade association.

- In an action for personal injuries, if it appears on a private inquiry made by the court that the defendant is protected by a trade association against liability for injuries such as were sued for, it is not error for the court, in examining prospective jurors on their voir dire, to inquire whether any juror is an employee of the association, or related to stockholders thereof. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Shipp, 41 Ga. App. 705, 154 S.E. 385 (1930).

Counsel for creator of party to litigation.

- Trial court's refusal to excuse a juror for cause was error since the juror was counsel for the governing body of a governmental entity which created one of the parties for the purpose of meeting the entity's responsibility to provide health care to its citizens. Crumpton v. Kelly, 185 Ga. App. 245, 363 S.E.2d 799 (1987), cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 909, 363 S.E.2d 799 (1988).

Relationship to insurance company.

- When, on the trial of an action to recover damages for personal injuries it appears that the defendant carries liability insurance, and the plaintiff by timely motion requests the trial judge to qualify the jury by purging the panel of any and all persons who are employees of, stockholders in, or related to stockholders in the defendant's insurance carrier, it is error for the court to refuse the request. Rogers v. McKinley, 52 Ga. App. 161, 182 S.E. 805 (1935).

Stockholders of an insurance company which carries liability insurance indemnifying a party to an action from a judgment against the company in that case are interested in the result of the case and therefore are not qualified to serve as jurors. Shipman v. Johnson, 89 Ga. App. 620, 80 S.E.2d 717 (1954).

No presumption of harmful error arises in the refusal to qualify a jury as to their relationship with the insurers of the parties, regardless of whether the insurers are named parties, absent an affirmative showing that there is a strong probability that insurance companies that are not insurers of the parties to a suit have a direct, demonstrable financial stake in the outcome of the case. A financial interest in the outcome of a case cannot be established by simply alleging that non-insurers share a common "parent" corporation with an insurer. Wallace v. Swift Spinning Mills, Inc., 236 Ga. App. 613, 511 S.E.2d 904 (1999).

Insurance carrier with interest in outcome.

- It is proper to qualify the jury relative to the possible interest which the members may have in an insurance carrier having a financial interest in the outcome of the suit. Crosby v. Spencer, 207 Ga. App. 487, 428 S.E.2d 607 (1993).

Challenges for cause properly denied.

- Trial court did not err in not excluding three venirepersons for cause when one venireperson's sister-in-law had been formerly married to the victim's brother, when one venireperson's father was the elected county sheriff, and when another venireperson's mother was a victim-witness coordinator and his girlfriend an assistant district attorney; the defendant had not shown that any of them was biased or improperly related. Stokes v. State, 281 Ga. 825, 642 S.E.2d 82 (2007).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion when the court refused to strike a juror for cause because the juror could not be considered a party at interest but had, at most, an ongoing business relationship with the district attorney's office since the juror was only a consultant or contractor to the district attorney's office; the trial court was entitled to rely on the juror's responses to voir dire in determining qualifications. Berry v. State, 302 Ga. App. 31, 690 S.E.2d 428 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C0825, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 459 (Ga. 2010).

Issues of disqualification waived.

- Defendant waived the right to argue on appeal that a prospective juror was disqualified from service and should have been struck for cause because the defendant never sought to have the juror dismissed for cause. Lewis v. State, 291 Ga. 273, 731 S.E.2d 51 (2012).

Disqualification waived if attorney knowing of disqualification fails to complain.

- When parties are furnished with a list of jurors, it is their duty, if they know that any of the jurors are disqualified, to call attention to the disqualification, or the disqualification will be held to have been waived and if the parties have reasonable grounds to suspect that any of jurors are disqualified, it is the parties' duty to call attention to the fact so that due inquiry may be made of the panel. Bean v. Barron, 176 Ga. 285, 168 S.E. 259 (1933).

When the defendant failed to argue that the trial court erred in excusing a prospective juror based on the juror's relationship by affinity to a co-defendant wife because the relationship was not sufficiently close to mandate disqualification under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-135, defendant waived the disqualification on appeal; further, an adoption of objections entered by the attorney, which occurred long after the juror was excused, did not save the claim. Mintz v. State, 273 Ga. App. 211, 615 S.E.2d 152 (2005).

Same waiver test applied to the defendant is applied to state in respect to a juror disqualified by reason of relationship to the accused. Brindle v. State, 125 Ga. App. 298, 187 S.E.2d 310 (1972).

By refusing to appear at trial, party waives right to object to qualifications of juror. Mull v. Taylor, 68 Ga. App. 663, 23 S.E.2d 595 (1942).

Concealment of disqualification to serve as juror abridges right of plaintiff to pursue lawful procedure in selection of jury, regardless of whether actual injury resulted or not. Shipman v. Johnson, 89 Ga. App. 620, 80 S.E.2d 717 (1954).

Party seeking to examine jury regarding disqualifying ties must be permitted to pose questions before verdict.

- Party seeking to examine the jury regarding disqualifying ties to insurance companies must be permitted to pose the questions before the verdict, and an error in that regard cannot be cured or deemed harmless after verdict. Ford Motor Co. v. Conley, 294 Ga. 530, 757 S.E.2d 20 (2014).

Burden when attacking disqualified juror after verdict.

- If, after verdict, a juror is attacked as being disqualified by reason of a relationship to the prosecutor, it is essential for the accused and the accused's counsel to establish that neither knew of the relationship, nor could the relationship have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary diligence, prior to the rendition of the verdict; and because the affidavit of counsel for the accused asserted that counsel had no such knowledge "before the case began to be tried," it does not meet this requirement. Otherwise there would be no showing that the relationship was not known, and could not have been known, during the time the trial was in progress. Williams v. State, 206 Ga. 107, 55 S.E.2d 589 (1949), for comment on Williams v. State, see 12 Ga. B.J. 326 (1950); Kennedy v. State, 88 Ga. App. 749, 77 S.E.2d 778 (1953); Brindle v. State, 125 Ga. App. 298, 187 S.E.2d 310 (1972);.

If, after a verdict, a juror is attacked as being disqualified by reason of the juror's relationship to the plaintiff, it is essential for the movant and counsel to establish that neither knew of the relationship, nor could the relationship have been discerned by the exercise of ordinary diligence, for if either knew or had reason to suspect the relationship, and remained silent, the movant will be presumed to have waived the disqualification. Jennings v. Autry, 94 Ga. App. 344, 94 S.E.2d 629 (1956).

If a bank deposed a customer, who had filed a slip and fall action against the bank, four years before trial and when asked whether the customer had any relatives who might become jurors, the customer indicated that a spouse had some but the customer did not know their names, it was held that the bank was on notice that further investigation was required in order to avoid the issue of juror disqualification pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-135(a); accordingly, the denial of the bank's motion for a new trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-5-23, after the verdict was entered in favor of the customer, was properly denied because the bank could have avoided the issue of juror disqualification by use of ordinary diligence. Patterson Bank v. Gunter, 263 Ga. App. 424, 588 S.E.2d 270 (2003).

Defendants were not entitled to a new trial because of juror misconduct since the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that the juror was not untruthful about the juror's relationship with the victim since the juror was not even aware of the relationship with the victim, through her husband, at the time the juror answered the question; further, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in finding the defendants waived the matter of the juror disqualification because the defendants could have discovered the relationship between the juror and the victim by ordinary diligence since they shared the same last name. Dunbar v. State, 273 Ga. App. 29, 614 S.E.2d 472 (2005).

Failure of prosecutor to exercise diligence.

- If the representative of the state fails to exercise ordinary diligence and therefore does not discern a juror's relationship to the defendant, the representative impliedly waives any cause for complaint by the state, in respect to which, once the accused has been put in jeopardy by the state, the trial judge cannot interfere by declaring a mistrial without the consent of the accused. Brindle v. State, 125 Ga. App. 298, 187 S.E.2d 310 (1972).

Harm to party must be shown.

- If jurors who should have been disqualified are improperly allowed to serve, it must be shown that such ruling caused injury to the plaintiff in error or resulted in advantage to the state, and if it is not shown that the plaintiff in error exhausted plaintiff's strikes or that the state was benefited, it is not cause for a new trial. Smith v. State, 62 Ga. App. 494, 8 S.E.2d 663 (1940).

Disqualification of a juror will not result in the grant of a new trial unless it is shown that the movant was injured by such a disqualified juror's serving upon the jury or that the movant's opponent was benefited thereby. Jennings v. Autry, 94 Ga. App. 344, 94 S.E.2d 629 (1956).

Presumption of no harm if disqualification waived.

- Disqualification of a juror may be expressly or impliedly waived, and if the disqualification be expressly or impliedly waived, it will be conclusively presumed that the movant was not harmed nor the movant's opponent benefited by such disqualification. Jennings v. Autry, 94 Ga. App. 344, 94 S.E.2d 629 (1956); Brindle v. State, 125 Ga. App. 298, 187 S.E.2d 310 (1972).

Whether attorneys have knowledge of relationship is a question of fact.

- It is a question of fact to be determined by the trial judge as to whether the attorneys for the defendant have knowledge of the relationship between two jurors and the plaintiff's attorneys and also as to whether such knowledge, though previously and independently acquired, is still in the minds of the defendant's attorneys at the time of the trial so as to be imputed to the defendant at the time of selecting the jury or before the verdict is returned. Bean v. Barron, 176 Ga. 285, 168 S.E. 259 (1933).

Trial court acted within the court's discretion in excusing for cause a juror related to the defendant, even though the extent of that relationship was not known, since there was no showing that a competent and unbiased jury was not selected. Wells v. State, 261 Ga. 282, 404 S.E.2d 106 (1991).

Trial court did not abuse court's discretion in granting motion for new trial.

- Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiffs' extraordinary motion for new trial based on an auto company's misleading discovery responses with regard to liability insurance because they acted with due diligence to raise their claim that the jury should have been qualified as to the auto company's insurers and the failure to do so raised an unrebutted presumption that they were materially harmed. Ford Motor Co. v. Conley, 294 Ga. 530, 757 S.E.2d 20 (2014).

No error in court not excusing jurors for cause. Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 405 S.E.2d 660 (1991).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury, § 254 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 50A C.J.S., Juries, §§ 381, 382.

ALR.

- Service on jury in prosecution for selling intoxicating liquor as disqualification as juror in similar case, 3 A.L.R. 1206.

Disqualifying relationship by affinity in case of judge or juror as affected by dissolution of marriage, 117 A.L.R. 800.

Disqualification of judge who presided at trial or of juror as ground of habeas corpus, 124 A.L.R. 1079.

Juror's relationship to witness, in civil case, as ground of disqualification or for reversal or new trial, 85 A.L.R.2d 851.

Disclosure in criminal case of juror's political, racial, religious, or national origin prejudice against accused or witnesses as ground for new trial or reversal, 91 A.L.R.2d 1120.

Social or business relationship between proposed juror and nonparty witness as affecting former's qualification as juror, 11 A.L.R.3d 859.

Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of acquaintance or relationship with attorney in case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 A.L.R.3d 126.

Competency of juror as affected by his membership in co-operative association interested in the case, 69 A.L.R.3d 1296.

Similarity of occupation between proposed juror and alleged victim of crime as affecting juror's competency, 71 A.L.R.3d 974.

Professional or business relations between proposed juror and attorney as ground for challenge for cause, 52 A.L.R.4th 964.

Fact that juror in criminal case, or juror's relative or friend, has previously been victim of criminal incident as ground of disqualification, 65 A.L.R.4th 743.