Constitutionality.

- Machinery provided for testing the juror's competency meets all constitutional requirements. Herndon v. State, 178 Ga. 832, 174 S.E. 597 (1934), appeal dismissed, 295 U.S. 441, 55 S. Ct. 794, 79 L. Ed. 1530 (1935).

Construction with other statutes.

- O.C.G.A. § 15-12-167 must be balanced with two other considerations: (1) the general authority under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 to discharge a juror at any time for illness, inability to perform duty, or other legal cause; and (2) the defendant's failure to show how the defendant was prejudiced by use of an alternate since under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-169 alternates are qualified in the same manner as the selected jurors. Payne v. State, 195 Ga. App. 523, 394 S.E.2d 781 (1990); Reynolds v. State, 271 Ga. 174, 517 S.E.2d 51 (1999).

Section is permissive.

- No inflexible rule is set forth in this section for selecting another juror; this section is permissive only. Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 324, 206 S.E.2d 481 (1974).

This section is permissive, rather than mandatory. Jones v. Anderson, 404 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd, 522 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1975).

This section permits impeachment of juror based on newly discovered evidence before submission of evidence on the main issue. Wesley v. State, 65 Ga. 731 (1880); Warnack v. State, 7 Ga. App. 73, 66 S.E. 393 (1909); Lindsay v. State, 138 Ga. 818, 76 S.E. 369 (1912).

State has the same rights hereunder as the accused. Eberhart v. State, 47 Ga. 598 (1873); Holton v. State, 137 Ga. 86, 72 S.E. 949 (1911).

When question should be raised.

- If the incompetency of jurors was known to counsel after the jury was sworn but before any further step in the trial is taken, the question as to competency should then be raised. Lampkin v. State, 87 Ga. 516, 13 S.E. 523 (1891); Simmons v. State, 88 Ga. 272, 14 S.E. 613 (1892).

Delay in raising issue constituted waiver.

- Defendant waived error by the trial judge in questioning and dismissing a potential juror out of defendant's presence since the defendant was advised after the judge returned to the courtroom that the juror had been excused, yet made no objection until further voir dire was completed and the jury was selected and sworn. Harmon v. State, 224 Ga. App. 890, 482 S.E.2d 730 (1997).

Challenge for cause may be made after jury sworn, if ground unknown until then. Hart v. State, 157 Ga. App. 716, 278 S.E.2d 419 (1981).

Question of competency and impartiality of jurors is to be determined after process of selecting jury has commenced. Atlanta Coach Co. v. Cobb, 178 Ga. 544, 174 S.E. 131 (1934); Gossett v. State, 203 Ga. 692, 48 S.E.2d 71 (1948), appeal dismissed, 214 Ga. 840, 108 S.E.2d 272 (1959).

Court may refuse to purge jury before selection.

- It is not error for the court to refuse a motion to purge the jury as to disqualification before beginning to select a jury for trial, the statutes on the subject as applied to felony cases being different from those in reference to civil and misdemeanor cases. Gossett v. State, 203 Ga. 692, 48 S.E.2d 71 (1948), appeal dismissed, 214 Ga. 840, 108 S.E.2d 272 (1959).

Challenge untimely.

- Although the defense counsel observed during voir dire that some of the jurors wore red ribbons in support of the anti-drug rally, it was not until after the jury was selected and sworn that the defense counsel raised the question of the jury's partiality resulting from the rally; therefore, the challenge of the jury's impartiality was untimely. Harris v. State, 212 Ga. App. 120, 441 S.E.2d 255 (1994).

Alleged hostility of a juror was manifest immediately after it was announced that the juror was chosen and the defendant should have raised the matter at that time, before the jury was sworn. Kelly v. State, 255 Ga. App. 813, 567 S.E.2d 36 (2002).

Because any evidence of a juror's bias against the defendant, when the juror was a second cousin to the mother of the defendant's children and had previously answered the phone when the defendant called, was known to defendant well before the juror was sworn; therefore, the defendant's claim of newly discovered evidence brought after the jury was seated was improper. Wilmore v. State, 268 Ga. App. 646, 602 S.E.2d 343 (2004).

Disqualification may be waived.

- If an accused or the accused's counsel had knowledge of the disqualification of a petit juror, in that the juror had served on the grand jury, or by proper diligence could have ascertained the fact, and interposed no objection in the trial court, the accused is deemed to have waived the disqualification. Green v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 650, 193 S.E.2d 847 (1972).

If the defendant did not move to excuse jurors, the defendant waived any error by the trial court in failing to excuse two prospective jurors for cause. Hughes v. State, 217 Ga. App. 766, 458 S.E.2d 911 (1995).

Failure to object to familial relationship.

- If defense counsel was present during the entire voir dire, yet failed to object to the trial judge's failure to qualify prospective jurors as to a potential familial relation to the deceased victim, a ground for a challenge for cause under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-167, this was a waiver and constitutes induced error. McKenzie v. State, 248 Ga. 294, 282 S.E.2d 95 (1981), overruled on other grounds, O'Kelley v. State, 284 Ga. 758, 670 S.E.2d 388 (2008).

Trial vitiated by disqualification.

- It is disqualification of juror itself and not refusal to make inquiry of juror which will vitiate the trial. Atlanta Coach Co. v. Cobb, 178 Ga. 544, 174 S.E. 131 (1934).

Defendant not required to investigate potential jurors.

- Defendant in felony case is not required to make previous investigations out of court to determine whether jurors are disqualified. Atlanta Coach Co. v. Cobb, 178 Ga. 544, 174 S.E. 131 (1934).

Court has discretion to determine impartiality.

- Single purpose for voir dire is the ascertainment of the impartiality of jurors, the jurors' ability to treat the cause on the merits with objectivity, and freedom from bias and prior inclination; the control of the pursuit of such determination is within the sound legal discretion of the trial court, and only in the event of manifest abuse will the court's discretion be upset upon review. Legare v. State, 243 Ga. 744, 257 S.E.2d 247, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 491, 62 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1979).

Only statutory questions can be asked of jurors in first instance.

- If the juror answers the statutory questions satisfactorily, and is pronounced prima facie competent, and the parties put the juror before the court as trier, aliunde evidence of the untruthfulness of the juror's answers must be offered. Herndon v. State, 178 Ga. 832, 174 S.E. 597 (1934), appeal dismissed, 295 U.S. 441, 55 S. Ct. 794, 79 L. Ed. 1530 (1935).

Court may reexamine juror.

- Although a juror has been found competent and has been accepted, the trial court is authorized, before any evidence has been submitted on the main issue, to put the juror on trial again as to the juror's competency, if, subsequently to the juror's acceptance, there has been brought to the attention of the court any evidence attacking the juror's competency. Evans v. State, 37 Ga. App. 156, 139 S.E. 156 (1927).

Granting of a sequestered voir dire is within the discretion of the court and the trial judge did not err in denying a request that a reopened voir dire as to a particular juror be conducted outside the presence of the other jurors. Rhodes v. State, 264 Ga. 123, 441 S.E.2d 748 (1994).

Defect of a petit juror propter defectum is ground for challenge reasonably made but is not ground for new trial after the verdict even if the defendant was ignorant of such defect until after trial. Mitchell v. State, 69 Ga. App. 771, 26 S.E.2d 663 (1943).

Defect propter affectum may be ground for new trial.

- Defect propter affectum of a petit juror is a ground for challenge, and should be made before verdict if known to the defendant; yet, if unknown to the defendant and the defendant exercised due diligence, such a defect may be cause for grant of a new trial. Mitchell v. State, 69 Ga. App. 771, 26 S.E.2d 663 (1943).

Cited in Legare v. State, 243 Ga. 744, 257 S.E.2d 247 (1979); White v. State, 154 Ga. App. 527, 268 S.E.2d 790 (1980); Washington v. State, 253 Ga. 173, 318 S.E.2d 55 (1984); Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75, 365 S.E.2d 111 (1988); Edmonds v. State, 196 Ga. App. 190, 395 S.E.2d 566 (1990); McConnell v. State, 263 Ga. App. 686, 589 S.E.2d 271 (2003).

C.J.S.

- 50A C.J.S., Juries, §§ 413 et seq., 477.

ALR.

- Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of acquaintance or relationship with attorney in case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 A.L.R.3d 126.

Racial or ethnic prejudice of prospective jurors as proper subject of inquiry or ground of challenge on voir dire in state criminal case, 94 A.L.R.3d 15.